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This book is dedicated to Dietrich Dörner (Bamberg, Germany)
and the late Alexander J. Wearing (Melbourne, Australia),
two research pioneers of human thought
in complex and dynamic situations.

Preface
On a sunny day in summer 2016, the two editors
(RJS and JF) were sitting in a café on the Haupt-
strasse near the Psychology Department of Heidel-
berg University. When the discussion moved to the
topic of textbooks, RJS asked JF if he would be in-
terested in coediting a textbook on the psychology
of human thought. There are not many recent com-
petitors, RJS noted. JF agreed that contemporary
textbooks in the field of human thought are truly
hard to find.
Soon the idea emerged to produce an “open-
access” textbook that could be used, free of charge,
by students all over the world. The newly founded
publishing house, “Heidelberg University Publish-
ing” (HeiUP), seemed to be a perfect platform for
this idea. We wrote a proposal for the Editorial
Board of HeiUP, which accepted our idea and soon
gave us the go-ahead. We then looked for potential
contributors for our chapters and obtained commit-
ments from some of the world’s leading experts in
the field.
Although not every college or university teaches
such a course, we believe that it is an extremely
important course for any psychology major—or, ar-
guably, anyone at all—to take. First, we know that
even a high IQ does not guarantee that a person will
think well in his or her everyday life. People commit
cognitive fallacies, such as the sunk-cost fallacy (oth-
erwise known as “throwing good money after bad”),
every day. It is important for students to understand
their lapses in thinking and to have ways of correct-
ing them. Second, standard cognitive-psychology or
cognitive-science courses only scratch the surface
of the field of human thought. Such courses need to
include a wide variety of other topics, such as per-
ception, learning, and memory, so that they cannot
possibly go into any true depth on complex thought
processes. Our textbook fills this gap. Third, we are
seeing today how even leaders all over the world—
individuals chosen to help guide whole countries
into the future—often show astonishing and some-
times seemingly inexplicable lapses in their critical
thinking. We all need to understand how such lapses
can occur, especially when people are under stress,
and how they can be corrected. We hope, therefore,
that you profit as much from this course as we both
did, taking similar courses, when we were younger.
The Content
This idea for an edited textbook, The Psychology of
Human Thought: An Introduction, is motivated by
our view that much of the “action” in psychological
science today involves the study of human thought
(as witnessed by the success of books such as Daniel
Kahneman’s Thinking, Fast and Slow, 2011, and of
Steven Pinker’s The Stuff of Thought, 2007, both
of which became best sellers). The excitement of
the field notwithstanding, we were able to find only
two textbooks on the topic of human thought (Mank-
telow, 2012; Minda, 2015). Yet, a course on “Think-
ing” (or any of its related course names) is one of
the most exciting in psychology. Such a course,
taught at the undergraduate level by the late Profes-
sor Alexander Wearing, was part of what motivated
RJS to enter the field of complex cognition. Be-
cause of the scarcity of recent textbooks covering
the broad range of this field, it seemed timely to
present a new one edited and authored by experts in
the field of human thought.
For Whom This Book is Written
This volume is intended as a primary or secondary
textbook for courses on what we call “The Psychol-
ogy of Human Thought”, which can take a number
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of different names, such as The Psychology of Hu-
man Thought, Thinking, Reasoning, Problem Solv-
ing, Decision Making, Complex Processes, Higher
Processes, Complex Cognition, Higher Cognition,
or similar titles.
The course is usually taught at the third (col-
lege junior) undergraduate level, or one level higher
than courses on Cognitive Psychology. Many stu-
dents with an interest in cognition take the cognitive-
psychology or cognitive-science course first, fol-
lowed by the more advanced course on human
thought.
How to Use This Book
The chapters describe the specific topics of the field
in terms of theories, research, and applications. The
pedagogical elements in the book include:
1. Chapter summaries. Each chapter has a
summary of the main points at the end.
2. Questions for comprehension and reflec-
tion. Five or so questions, at the end of each
chapter, assess both comprehension of and re-
flection on the material of the chapter. These
questions are thought-based rather than sim-
ple factual-recall questions.
3. Tables and figures. The use, where relevant,
of tables and figures to illustrate and clarify
material is based on the idea that multiple
representations of information help students
understand the material better.
4. Glossary. The book contains a glossary at
the end of each chapter that defines key terms.
These key terms are bolded in the text.
5. Hot topics. This box discusses current re-
search as seen by the chapter author(s), with
some references and also a photograph of the
author(s).
Conclusion
We hope that you enjoy this overview of the
psychology of human thought. If you have
any comments or suggestions, please send them
to the editors at robert.sternberg@cornell.edu or
joachim.funke@psychologie.uni-heidelberg.de
The editors thank the very supportive team from
Heidelberg University Publishing, especially Maria
Effinger, Daniela Jakob, Anja Konopka and Frank
Krabbes. Claire Holfelder and David Westley did a
wonderful job in checking language from non-native
authors. Also, we had the luck to have one of the
best (and fastest!) copyeditors we could think of:
Julia Karl. Thanks a lot for your invaluable help,
Julia! It was fun to work with you!
R.J.S. & J.F.
Ithaca, NY, USA & Heidelberg, Germany
Summer 2019
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Chapter 1
The Psychology of Human Thought:
Introduction
ROBERT J. STERNBERG & JOACHIM FUNKE
Cornell University & Heidelberg University
The psychology of human thought deals with how
people mentally represent and process complex in-
formation. For example, if you imagine an object
rotating in space, you might represent the rotating
object as an image of the object, or as a series of
propositions that specify the characteristics of the ob-
ject and its successive positions in space. A psycho-
logical scientist who studies human thought might
investigate how people solve complex problems, or
make decisions, or learn language, or use reasoning
to decide whether the claims of a politician are true.
Why do people find it easier to reason when the
content of what they are reasoning about is familiar
than unfamiliar, but why, at the same time, are they
more likely to make an error in reasoning when the
content is familiar? Why are people more afraid to
travel in airplanes than in cars, even though, statis-
tically, riding in a car is far more dangerous than
riding in an airplane? Why do people view a robin
or a bluebird as more “like a bird” than an ostrich
or a penguin, even though all are birds? These are
the kinds of questions that psychological scientists
address when they study the psychology of human
thought.
1.1 Goals of Research
Research in the psychology of human thought takes
many forms, but it generally follows a particular
form. We will illustrate this form with regard to the
purchase of a new bicycle.
Suppose you are trying to figure out how people
decide on a brand of bicycle (or anything else!) they
would like to buy. How do they think about this
problem? As a psychological scientist, you might
start thinking about the issue by informally consid-
ering some of the ways in which people might make
such a decision (see, e.g., Gigerenzer, 2015; Kahne-
man, 2013; Reyna, Chapman, Dougherty, & Con-
frey, 2011). Here are some strategies that a potential
bicycle-buyer might use:
1. Weigh all the features of each bicycle (e.g.,
price, appearance, sturdiness, reputation, ease
of use of gears, etc.) and decide which bicycle
does best, considering all of those features.
2. Decide what features of a bicycle are most im-
portant to you—ignoring the rest—and decide
on the basis of those features.
3. Decide what single feature of a bicycle is most
important to you, and decide on the basis of
that feature.
Of course, there are other possibilities, but sup-
pose, for the purposes of this chapter, you consider
just these three possibilities. You might then create
a theory—an organized body of general explana-
tory principles regarding a phenomenon. For exam-
ple, your theory might be that, in the end, people
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avoid complication and make their decisions only on
the basis of the most important factor in a decision
(see Gigerenzer, 2015). Then you might propose an
hypothesis—a tentative proposal of expected em-
pirical consequences of the theory, such as of the
outcome of research. So here, your hypothesis is
that if you offer people a series of bicycles, and
know their preferences regarding aspects of a bicy-
cle, their decision as to which one to buy will depend
only on the single feature that is most important to
them. Now you might design an experiment—a set
of procedures to test your hypothesis (or hypothe-
ses). In the experiment, you might ask people about
the features that matter to them, how important each
feature is, and then, which of several bicycles they
would choose, assuming they had a choice. You then
would do data analysis—statistically investigating
your data to determine whether they support your
hypothesis. You then could draw at least tentative
conclusions as to whether your theory was correct.
One thing to remember is that many scientists
believe, following Karl Popper (2002), that you only
can falsify ideas through experiments, not conclu-
sively prove them. That is, even if the results of an
experiment are consistent with your theory, it does
not mean that all possible experiments testing the
theory would be consistent with the theory. More
likely, some would be consistent but others would
not be. However, if the results are not consistent with
the theory, then perhaps you would want to move
on to a new theory; or alternatively, you would want
to see whether the theory is true only under limited
sets of circumstances.
1.2 Underlying Themes in the Study
of Human Thought
Theories and research in the study of human thought
tend to recycle through a set of underlying themes.
What are some of the main themes that arise again
and again in the study of higher cognition, such
as in the exploration of human thought? To under-
stand the psychology of human thought, you need
to understand how these themes recur, over and over
again (see Table 1.1). In the text and table, we refer
to the two aspects of the themes as potentially com-
plementary rather than contradictory. For example,
almost all behavior will result from an interaction of
genetic and environmental factors, rather than result-
ing solely from one or the other. For consistency, we
will show how seven themes arise in a single area of
research, human intelligence.
1.2.1 Nature and Nurture
One major issue in the study of human thought is the
respective influences on human cognition of nature,
on the one hand, and nurture, on the other. Scien-
tists who believe that innate characteristics of human
cognition, those due to nature, are more important
may focus their research on innate characteristics;
those who believe in the greater importance of the
environment, attributes due to nurture, may choose
to focus on acquired characteristics.
Perhaps nowhere has this issue played out more
than in the study of human intelligence (see, e.g.,
Sternberg & Grigorenko, 1997). Intelligence re-
searchers have argued for many years regarding the
respective roles of genes and environment in intel-
ligence, and two researchers with opposing points
of view even wrote a book about their opposing
stances (Eysenck & Kamin, 1981). At the time of
their book, hereditarian and environmental view-
points were viewed as in opposition to each other.
Today, scientists recognize that the picture is more
complex than it appeared to be at that time. Most
likely, genetic effects are not due to some “intelli-
gence gene”, but rather due to many genes, each
having very small effects (Tan & Grigorenko, in
press). The genes that have been identified so far
as possibly contributing to intelligence are of small
effect and their effects are sometimes difficult to
replicate. It appears that environment plays an im-
portant role, often in conjunction with genes (Flynn,
2016). Some effects may epigenetic, meaning that
aspects of the environment may turn certain genes
“on” and “off”, either resulting in their commencing
or ceasing, respectively, to affect development.
1.2.2 Rationalism and Empiricism
Rationalist investigators tend to believe that one
can learn a lot about human behavior through reflec-
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Table 1.1: Major Themes in the Study of Human Thought.




4 Domain Generality Domain Specificity
5 Validity of Causal Inferences Ecological Validity
6 Basic Research Applied Research
7 Biological Methods Behavioral Methods
tion and self-introspection. Empiricist investigators
believe in the necessity of data collection. The ratio-
nalist tradition dates back to the Greek philosopher
Plato, whose ideas are discussed further in Chap-
ter 2,“History of the Field of the Psychology of
Human Thought”.
In The Theaetetus, one of the Platonic dialogues,
Theaetetus imagines that there exists in the mind of
man a block of wax, which is of different sizes in
different men. The blocks of wax can also differ in
hardness, moistness, and purity. Socrates, a famous
Greek philosopher, suggests that when the wax is
pure and clear and sufficiently deep, the mind will
easily learn and retain and will not be subject to
confusion. It only will think things that are true, and
because the impressions in the wax are clear, they
will be quickly distributed into their proper places
on the block of wax. But when the wax is muddy
or impure or very soft or very hard, there will be
defects of the intellect (Great Books of the Western
World, 1987, 7, 540).
Plato’s view of intelligence in terms of a
metaphorical ball of wax is the product of a rational-
ist approach: Obviously, he did not do any kind of
formal experimentation to derive or test this point of
view. Aristotle, another early Greek philosopher, in
contrast, took a more empirical approach to under-
standing intelligence:
In the Posterior Analytics Book I, Aristotle con-
ceived of intelligence in terms of “quick wit”:
Quick wit is a faculty of hitting upon the middle
term instantaneously. It would be exemplified
by a man who saw that the moon has a bright
side always turned towards the sun, and quickly
grasped the cause of this, namely that she bor-
rows her light from him; or observes somebody
in conversation with a man of wealth and defined
that he was borrowing money, or that the friend-
ship of these people sprang from a common en-
mity. In all these instances he has seen the major
and minor terms and then grasped the causes,
the middle terms. (Hutchins: Great Books of the
Western World, 1952, Vol. 8, p. 122).
Although in Aristotle’s times, no one did formal
experiments, notice that Aristotle gives a genuine
real-world example, presumably derived from his
past experiences, whereas Plato’s discussion in The
Theaetetus was obviously hypothetically derived (or
contrived).
Today, psychological scientists studying intelli-
gence use an empirical approach. But rationalism
still plays an important part. Many theories, when
originally posed, are derived largely from the think-
ing processes of scientists. After the theories are
proposed, they then are tested empirically, usually
on human subjects, but sometimes by computer sim-
ulations or by other means. In the modern-day study
of human thought, both rationalism and empiricism
have a place.
1.2.3 Structures and Processes
Structures here refer to the contents, attributes, and
relations between parts of the human mind. Pro-
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cesses refer to the actual operations of the human
mind. Much of early research on human intelligence
was structural. Theorists of intelligence argued, and
to some extent, still argue about structural models of
intelligence. For example, Charles Spearman (1927)
believed that human intelligence can be character-
ized structurally by one general factor of the mind
permeating our performance on all cognitive tasks,
and then specific factors particular to each cognitive
task. Louis Thurstone (1938) believed that there are
seven primary mental abilities: verbal comprehen-
sion, verbal fluency, number, spatial visualization,
inductive reasoning, perceptual speed, and mem-
ory. Today, theorists of intelligence still disagree, to
some extent, about these structures. Two prominent
models are the CHC (Cattell-Horn-Carroll) model
(McGrew, 2005), which argues that there is a gen-
eral factor of intelligence at the top of a hierarchy
of abilities, and two strata below it, including fluid
abilities (ability to deal with novel stimuli) and crys-
tallized ability (world knowledge); and the Johnson-
Bouchard (2005) g-VPR model, arguing instead that
the three main abilities beneath general intelligence
are verbal, perceptual, and image rotation. So even
today, there are disagreements today about the struc-
ture of intellectual abilities and the resolution of
these disagreements is an active area of research.
Many of the issues today, however, revolve
around process issues. Are there basic processes
of intelligence, and if so, what are they?
In the latter part of the twentieth century, Earl
Hunt (e.g., Hunt, 1980) proposed what he called a
cognitive correlates approach to studying the rela-
tionship between intelligence and cognition—one
would study typical cognitive tasks, such as the time
an individual takes in naming a letter, and then look
at the correlation between that time and scores on
psychometric tests. In this way, Hunt thought, one
could understand the basic cognitive building blocks
of intelligence.
Sternberg later proposed an alternative cogni-
tive components approach (Sternberg, 1983, 1985),
whereby intelligence could be understood in terms
of components not of simple tasks, like identify-
ing whether two letters are the same as each other,
but rather more complex tasks similar to those that
appear on intelligence tests, such as analogies or
syllogistic reasoning.
Today, many of the discussions regarding pro-
cesses underlying intelligence concern working
memory (Conway & Kovacs, 2013; Ellingsen &
Engle, in press; Kane et al., 2004). Working mem-
ory appears to play an important part in processes
of intelligence, and is highly related to fluid intel-
ligence (discussed above). Originally, it appeared
that working memory is a, or perhaps the crucial
component of fluid intelligence (Kyllonen & Chrys-
tal, 1990). But in their recent work, Engle and his
colleagues have argued that working memory and
fluid intelligence may in fact work separately but
in conjunction—with working memory helping us
remember what we need to remember but fluid in-
telligence helping us forget what we need to forget
(Ellingsen & Engle, in press).
By the way, one of the first information-
processing accounts of intelligence was offered by
the same scholar who offered the theory of general
intelligence (Spearman, 1923). Charles Spearman
certainly was one of the most versatile as well as




The concept of domain-generality refers to the no-
tion that a cognitive skill or set of skills might apply
across a wide variety of domains. The concept of
domain-specificity refers to the notion that a cog-
nitive skills or set of skills might apply only in a
specific domain, or at most, a small set of domains.
Of course, there is no uniformly agreed upon def-
inition of what constitutes a “domain.” Is verbal
processing a single domain, or are reading, writing,
speaking, and listening separate domains?
Spearman (1927) suggested that the aspect of in-
telligence that we know best, general intelligence
or what he called “g”, is what matters most to peo-
ple’s ability to adapt to the environment. In ex-
treme contrast, Howard Gardner (2011) has sug-
gested that intelligence is highly domain-specific,
indeed, that there are eight distinct and independent
“intelligences”—linguistic, logical-mathematical,
6 • Psychology of Human Thought • Chapter 1
Validity of Causal Inferences and Ecological Validity Sternberg & Funke
spatial, bodily-kinesthetic, musical, naturalist, in-
terpersonal, and intrapersonal. He believes that any
general intelligence is merely an artifact of the inde-
pendent intelligences being used in conjunction in a
multitude of tasks.
An intermediate information-processing perspec-
tive is taken by Sternberg (2011), who has argued
that the basic information-processing components of
intelligence are the same in all tasks—for example,
recognizing the existence of a problem, defining the
problem, mentally representing the problem, formu-
lating a strategy to solve the problem—but that how
well these processes are performed depends on the
domain. That is, how well one can execute a given
process depends on the domain in which the process
is exercised.
1.2.5 Validity of Causal Inferences and
Ecological Validity
The advantage of laboratory-based research with
carefully controlled experimental conditions is that
they promote validity of causal inferences, that is,
the extent to which scientists can establish causal
bases for scientifically observed phenomena. Be-
cause scientists in the laboratory often can carefully
control independent as well as confounding vari-
ables (i.e., variables that are not relevant to an ex-
periment but that might affect the results, clouding
conclusions to be drawn), the scientists can ensure,
to the extent possible, that experimental effects are
due to the variables they are supposed to be due to.
But the potential disadvantage of laboratory experi-
ments is that the conditions of testing may be rather
remote from the conditions observed in everyday
life. One of the most famous scientists to point this
out was Ulric Neisser (1976), who argued that many
of the results obtained in the laboratory do not apply
well to real-world phenomena. Ecological valid-
ity refers to the generalizability of conclusions to
the everyday contexts in which behavior of interest
occurs.
Most formal research on intelligence is done in
laboratories. The results tell us, for example, that
most cognitive tasks tend to correlate positively with
each other, meaning that if a person does well on
one of them, he or she also will tend to do well on
others. But Sternberg et al. (2001) found that, un-
der circumstances, an important adaptive cognitive
task (procedural knowledge among rural Kenyan
children of natural herbal medicines used to com-
bat parasitic illnesses) correlated negatively with
some of the cognitive tasks used in laboratories and
classrooms to measure general intelligence. The
point of the research was not that, in general, gen-
eral intelligence correlates negatively with adaptive
procedural knowledge (i.e., knowledge of how ac-
complish tasks in real-world environments). Rather,
the point was that the correlation depends on the
circumstances—that we may be too quick to draw
general conclusions from experimental contexts that
are somewhat limited. Because the Sternberg et al.
(2001) study was a field experiment conducted under
challenging circumstances in rural Kenya, it would
be difficult if not impossible to draw causal con-
clusions from the research. But the research might
have a certain kind of ecological validity lacking in
the more “sterile” environment of the psychologist’s
laboratory or even a carefully controlled classroom
administration of a standardized test.
1.2.6 Basic Research and Applied
Research
Basic research attempts to understand fundamen-
tal scientific questions, often by testing hypotheses
derived from theories. It does not concern itself
with how the research is used. Applied research,
in contrast, seeks to apply scientific knowledge to
problems in the world, often with the goal of solving
those problems to make the world a better or at least
a different place.
Human intelligence is an area that historically
has had a lively mix of basic and applied research,
not always with the most admirable of outcomes.
The research that has yielded some of the theories
of intelligence described above, such as g theory
or the CHC theory, is basic. Applied research has
often been in the form of research on intelligence
testing, research following in the tradition of Alfred
Binet and Theodore Simon (Binet & Simon, 1916),
researchers who invented the first “modern” intel-
ligence test. The legacy of this research is mixed.
On the one hand, Binet was hopeful that his work
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on intelligence could be used to create a kind of
“mental orthopedics” that would help those who per-
formed at lower intellectual levels to improve their
performance. On the other hand, much of the ap-
plied research in the early years of the twentieth
century was at least in part pejorative, seeking to
demonstrate that people of some socially defined
races or ethnicities were inherently more intelligent
than others (see Fancher, 1987; Gould, 1981; for
reviews), usually according with some prior hypoth-
esis about the superiority of the “white race” over
other groups.
That said, there has also been applied research at-
tempting to show that intelligence is at least, in some
measure, modifiable in a positive way. For example,
Feuerstein (1980) presented a program called Instru-
mental Enrichment that his data suggested could
help improve the intelligence of those who were in-
tellectually challenged by the kinds of tasks found
on standardized intelligence tests. Sternberg, Kauf-
man, and Grigorenko (2008) presented a program,
based on research originally done in Venezuela, for
helping people improve their intelligence. Jaeggi
et al. (2008) showed that at least some aspects of
fluid intelligence might be susceptible to positive
modification.
These various efforts show that applied research
can serve either more or less positive purposes. Ap-
plied research is a useful way of putting science into
practice, but it can either create electric bulbs that
light up the world, or nuclear weapons that poten-
tially can destroy that same world.
1.2.7 Biological and Behavioral
Methods
There are many methods through which psychologi-
cal scientists can investigate the psychology of hu-
man thought. Two classes of methods are biologi-
cal, which involves studies of the brain and central
nervous system, using methods such as functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and positron
emission tomography (PET) to study the brain; and
behavioral, which typically presents people with
problems or questions for them to address. We
have discussed behavioral research throughout the
chapter. What does biologically-based research look
like?
Some of the earliest biological research empha-
sized the analysis of hemispheric specialization in
the brain. This work goes back to a finding of an
obscure country doctor in France, Marc Dax, who
in 1836 presented a little-noticed paper to a medical
society meeting in Montpelier. Dax had treated a
number of patients suffering from loss of speech
as a result of brain damage. The condition, known
today as aphasia, had been reported even in ancient
Greece. Dax noticed that in all of more than 40
patients with aphasia, there had been damage to
the left hemisphere of the brain but not the right
hemisphere. His results suggested that speech and
perhaps verbal intellectual functioning originated in
the left hemisphere of the brain.
Perhaps the most well-known figure in the study
of hemispheric specialization was Paul Broca. At
a meeting of the French Society of Anthropology,
Broca claimed that a patient of his who was suffering
a loss of speech was shown postmortem to have a le-
sion in the left frontal lobe of the brain. At the time,
no one paid much attention. But Broca soon became
associated with a hot controversy over whether func-
tions, particular speech, are indeed localized in the
brain. The area that Broca identified as involved in
speech is today referred to as Broca’s area. By 1864,
Broca was convinced that the left hemisphere is criti-
cal for speech. Carl Wernicke, a German neurologist
of the late nineteenth century, identified language-
deficient patients who could speak but whose speech
made no sense. He also traced language ability to
the left hemisphere, though to a different precise
location, which now is known as Wernicke’s area.
Nobel Prize-winning physiologist and psychol-
ogist Roger Sperry (1961) later came to suggest
that the two hemispheres behave in many respects
like separate brains, with the left hemisphere more
localized for analytical and verbal processing and
the right hemisphere more localized for holistic and
imaginal processing. Today it is known that this
view was an oversimplification and that the two
hemispheres of the brain largely work together (Gaz-
zaniga, Ivry, & Mangun, 2013).
More recently, using positron emission tomogra-
phy (PET), Richard Haier discovered that people
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who perform better on conventional tests of intelli-
gence often show less activation in relevant portions
of the brain than do those who do not perform as
well (Haier et al., 1992). Presumably, this pattern
of results reflects the fact that the better perform-
ers find the tasks to be easier and, thus, invoke less
effort than do the poorer performers. P-FIT (parieto-
frontal integration) theory, proposed by Rex Jung
and Richard Haier (2007), proposes that general
intelligence is associated with communication effi-
ciency between the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex,
the parietal lobe, the anterior cingulate cortex, and
specific temporal and parietal cortex regions.
Again, it is important to emphasize that biologi-
cal and behavioral methods are not opposed to each
other. In Haier’s research, as in most contemporary
biologically-based research, participants perform
some kind of cognitive task and their behavior is
recorded. What is different is that, while they per-
form the task, biological measurements are made,
for example, by an fMRI machine in which the par-
ticipants are embedded. So even biological research
and behavioral research can combine in powerful
ways to yield insights about human cognition.
1.3 Seven Themes Applied to Problem
Solving
We believe that the seven themes are universal issues
within a psychology of human thought. We have pre-
sented these themes in the context of intelligence
but to illustrate the usefulness of these distinctions
in another exemplary domain, we choose the field of
problem solving (see Chapter 9, “Problem Solving”,
for more details). We will go through the seven di-
chotomies and see if they are useful in that domain
too.
(1) Nature – nurture. This distinction plays not
so important a role as it does in the context of in-
telligence. One reason could be that there are no
controlled twin studies comparing problem solving.
The dependent variable of interest was always intel-
ligence, not problem solving. Therefore, a lack of
research data forestalls conclusions.
(2) Rationalism – empirism. As has been said
before, rationalists see an advantage in the use of
theories, empirists rely more on data. In problem
solving research, we need both: a strong theory that
makes predictions about behavior, and good experi-
ments that deliver reliable data.
(3) Structures – processes. Problem solving is
per definitionem more relevant to processes than to
structures but in fact, most studies using problem
solving measures (like those used for the world-
wide PISA problem solving assessment of 15-year
old students; see Csapó & Funke, 2017) rely on
performance evaluation in terms of solution qual-
ity. There are not many indicators for processes.
With the advent of computer-based assessments of
problem solving, log-file analyses have become new
data sources for process evaluation (Ramalingam &
Adams, 2018).
(4) Domain-generality – domain-specificity. This
is an important distinction in problem solving re-
search. Heuristics (rules of thumb) are differen-
tiated with respect to their generality: there are
general-purpose strategies like means-ends analy-
sis (i.e., considering the obstacles that prevent the
direct transformation from an initial problem state to
the goal state; formulating subgoals to overcome the
obstacles) and there exist domain-specific solution
strategies, like finding a bug in a software program
that can be used only under certain circumstances.
(5) Lab studies – ecological validity. There is a
group of researchers in the field (see Lipshitz, Klein,
Orasanu, & Salas, 2001; summarizing: Klein, 2008)
that uses the label of "naturalistic decision making"
(NDM). They claim that NDM relies on (1) the im-
portance of time pressure, uncertainty, ill-defined
goals, high personal stakes, and other complexities
that characterize decision making in real-world set-
tings; (2) the importance of studying people who
have some degree of expertise; (3) the importance of
how people size up situations compared to the way
they select between courses of action. They criticize
lab studies for their missing ecological validity. As
it turned out recently, the differences between the
two sides seem to be less than thought (Kahneman
& Klein, 2009).
(6) Basic research – applied research. Most of
the current research in problem solving is focused
on basic issues. But the field for applications is wide
open. Especially with complex problem solving (i.e.,
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complicated ill-defined problems), political and eco-
nomic problems come into the research focus. For
example, Dörner and Güss (2011) did an analysis of
Adolf Hitler’s decision making style and identified a
specific strategy of the dictator for solving political
problems.
(7) Biological methods – behavioral methods. Re-
cently, there have been some studies conducted with
fMRI methods (Anderson, Albert, & Fincham, 2005;
Anderson et al., 2008). But the use of biological
methods is still lacking in large portions of the re-
search arena of problem solving. One reason for
this lack of research is the complexity of higher
cognitive processes.
Summarizing, we can say that the application
of the seven themes to the field of problem solv-
ing research does work. The themes can be found
here, too. It is likely that these topics will be found
throughout the chapters of our book, some of them
more clearly, others of them less so.
1.4 Conclusion
Human thought is a fertile field for investigation.
Almost all the problems we solve and decisions we
make depend on human thought. We have argued
that seven themes pervade much of research on hu-
man thought. We have used human intelligence and
problem solving as examples of how these themes
are pervasive.
There is no one “best” method for studying hu-
man thought. Rather, one wants to use a variety
of converging operations (Garner, Hake, & Erik-
sen, 1956)—different methods that converge upon
the same substantive results—to understand human
thought. This book will show you the astonish-
ing number of different ways converging operations
have been used to help us all learn how we think and
use that thought to adapt to and shape the world in
which we live.
Summary
This chapter introduces the psychology of human thought. It opens by considering what the
field encompasses, and at a general level, how investigations of human thought proceed—through
theories generating hypotheses leading to experiments for which data can be analyzed. The chapter
then considers seven themes that pervade research in the psychology of human thought, giving
as an example, research on human intelligence, where all seven themes have permeated research
ever since the field began. The seven themes are nature and nurture, rationalism and empiricism,
structures and processes, domain generality and domain specificity, validity of causal inferences
and ecological validity, basic and applied research, and biological and behavioral methods. The
chapter concludes that the psychology of human thought is best investigated through a melding
of converging operations, that is, by multiple kinds of methods that one hopes will yield mutually
confirming results.
Review Questions
1. Why is there no single "best" method for studying human thought?
2. Can you explain some of the major underlying themes for studying human thought?
3. How are human intelligence and human problem solving related?
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Glossary
data analysis Statistically investigating your data
to determine whether they support your hy-
pothesis. 4
experiment A set of procedures to test your hy-
pothesis (or hypotheses). 4
hypothesis A tentative proposal of expected em-
pirical consequences of a theory, such as of
the outcome of research. 4
psychology of human thought Deals with how
people mentally represent and process com-
plex information. 3
theory An organized body of general explanatory
principles regarding a phenomenon. 3
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Chapter 2




Why should students bother to learn anything at all
about the history of the field? On the very day I
write this chapter, a younger colleague, an assistant
professor, told me she is interested in the future of
the field, not its past. Yet, there are three major
reasons to study the history of psychology in gen-
eral, and of the psychology of human thought, in
particular.
First, many contemporary ideas can be better un-
derstood if we understand their historical context.
For example, when trying to understand ideas about
whether propensities toward language are inborn or
acquired, it helps to understand the history of ratio-
nalism and empiricism and how they have influenced
this and other debates about human propensities. In-
deed, the debate between those who emphasize in-
born traits and those who emphasize environmental
influences truly cannot be well understood without
understanding the nature of rationalism and empiri-
cism. Moreover, current views on gene x environ-
ment interaction are a product of a long and, as it
happens, largely fruitless debate between those who
wanted to understand human behavior as almost en-
tirely genetically programmed (some early behavior
geneticists) and those who wanted to understand
it as driven almost entirely by experiences in the
environment (some early behaviorists).
Second, knowledge of history prevents us from
claiming original credit for ideas that are steeped in
the history of the field. Put another way, historical
knowledge prevents us from “reinventing the wheel.”
Imagine if society had no knowledge of past inven-
tions, and instead of dreaming up new inventions,
kept reinventing the same things, again and again.
Science is no different. For science to advance, sci-
entists have to be aware of what ideas have already
been proposed.
Third, we need to know which ideas from the past
worked well and which worked poorly. Knowledge
of the history of a field can prevent us remaking
mistakes that others already have made. When one
reads the history of the field, one sometimes feels
amazement at ideas people once held, such as of the
validity of phrenology (studying patterns of bumps
on the head) for understanding people’s personali-
ties. But if we do not learn from these past mistakes,
what is to stop us from making them again?
For example, why bother to read how Jerome
Bruner and his colleagues studied concepts and con-
cept learning in 1956 (Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin,
1956)? The idea of studying such simplified con-
cepts was that one could study some kind of “pure”
concept formation, unfettered and unimpeded by in-
dividual and group differences in prior knowledge.
If different shapes, sizes, color names, and so forth
were used, everyone would be at the same level of
advantage–and disadvantage.
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But later studies revealed that things did not work
that way. Rosch (1975) found that how people form
concepts about concrete items, such as kinds of an-
imal or plant life, bears little resemblance to how
people form concepts about abstract items. More-
over, concepts have a “basic level,” a level at which
we tend to think most easily about them. For exam-
ple, people find it easier to think in terms of con-
cepts at the level of “bird” than at the higher level of
“chordata,” even though the latter is a higher level.
Understanding the evolution of concept-formation
research will help future investigators realize that
there may be differences in the way more abstract
and more concrete concepts are conceived, so that
they do not again make the mistake of thinking that
all concepts are processed in the same way. Simi-
larly, there are differences in the way people solve
abstract, structured, IQ-test-like problems and more
concrete, practical, and unstructured problems such
as how to choose a mate (Frensch & Funke, 1995;
Sternberg et al., 2000). Thus, one might wish to
study problem solving in contexts that resemble the
universe of tasks to which one wishes to generalize
one’s conclusions.
2.1 The Dialectical Development of
Ideas
Many ideas in psychological science, in general, and
in the field of human thought, in particular, proceed
in a kind of dialectical progression. The idea of a
dialectic was formulated by the philosopher Georg
Hegel (1807/1931), who suggested that people think
in one way for a while, a thesis; then they move on
to a contrasting and sometimes contradictory way
of seeing things, an antithesis; finally, they move
on to an integrated view, a synthesis, whereby two
ideas that had seemed contradictory no longer seem
that way, but rather seem as though they can be inte-
grated and understood as both being true, perhaps at
different levels.
2.2 Early Western Antecedents of the
Psychology of Human Thought
Where did the study of human thought begin, and
when did it happen? The mythical origins of the psy-
chology of human thought can be traced to a Greek
myth of Psyche, whose name conveys the idea of a
“breath of life,” or put another way, the soul, believed
once and still by many to inhabit the body during
life and then to leave the body upon a person’s death.
The Greek term nous (which once was believed to be
a bodily organ responsible for the clear and coherent
perception of truth) is an uncommon English word
for the mind; nous particularly referred to thinking
that involved deep reasoning or even reasoning that
was divinely inspired. In the ancient Greek world,
the body and the mind were viewed as largely dis-
tinct. The mind might cause activity in the body,
but the mind nevertheless was independent of the
activity of the body. This dialectic–of the mind and
body as entirely separated or as unitary continues
even into the present day.
The origins of the study of the psychology of hu-
man thought can be traced to two distinct approaches
to the understanding of human behavior: philosophy
and physiology. Today, these two fields of inquiry
are viewed almost as dialectically opposed. That
is, philosophy is often viewed as involving specula-
tive methods and physiology as involving empirical,
largely scientific methods. But in ancient Greek
times, many physiologists as well as philosophers
believed that truth could be reached without the ben-
efit of empirical methods.
As time went on, philosophy and physiology di-
verged more and more, with physiologists seeking
out empirical methods that never interested philoso-
phers. As time went on, several dialectics kept
arising and re-arising in the study of the human
mind—whether the mind and body are one entity
or distinct entities; whether the mind is best under-
stood through rationalistic or empirical methods;
whether abilities are genetically or environmentally
determined. The synthesis stage of each dialectic
involved the recognition that the two positions are
not necessarily opposed to each other—the ideas
could be integrated. For example, abilities almost
certainly have both genetically and environmentally
influenced components, as well as a component in-
fluenced by the interaction between genes and envi-
ronment.
Hippocrates, the ancient Greek physician and
philosopher (ca. 460–377 B.C.E.) believed in mind-
body dualism, or the notion that whereas the body
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is composed of physical substance, the mind is not.
Hippocrates proposed that the mind resides in the
brain. Although today this idea sounds rather obvi-
ous, many of his predecessors had different ideas
about where the mind resided, ranging from the
heart to the gods.
Plato (ca. 428–348 B.C.E), who lived at roughly
the same time as Hippocrates, agreed that the mind
resided in the body, and in particular, in the brain.
In contrast, Aristotle (384–322 B.C.E.) believed that
the mind resided in the heart. These two philoso-
phers set up three important dialectics for the psy-
chology of human thought—the relationship be-
tween the mind and the body, the use of empirical
observations versus philosophical introspections as
a means for discovering the truth, and the original
source for our ideas.
Plato believed that reality inheres not in the con-
crete objects that we become aware of through our
senses, but rather in abstract forms that these objects
somehow represent. That is, the reality of you is not
in your physical substance but rather in the abstract
ideas you represent. The computer (or other device)
on which you are reading this text is not real; rather,
the abstract idea behind it is real. In contrast, Aris-
totle believed, as you probably do, that the reality of
yourself is in your concrete substance and that the
reality of your computer (or other device) is in that
concrete device, not in the idea of it. According to
Aristotle, the idea is derivative, rather than primary.
Plato’s ideas led to the philosophy of mind-body
dualism, whereas Aristotle’s ideas led to monism, or
the idea that the body and mind are of a single kind
of reality, existing in a single plane. In this view, the
mind is a byproduct of anatomical and physiological
activity. It has no separate existence apart from this
activity.
These different ideas about the nature of reality
led Plato and Aristotle to different methodologies
for investigating the nature of human thought. Plato
was a rationalist, believing that introspection and
related philosophical methods of analysis could and
should be used to arrive at truth. After all, what
purpose would there be to studying empirically the
imperfect copies of reality that concrete object repre-
sent? Rather, one would be better off using reflection
to understand reality in the realm of abstract ideas.
In contrast, Aristotle was fundamentally an em-
piricist, believing that the nature of human thought
could be best understood through observation and
experimentation. We learn about reality by observ-
ing concrete objects, including ourselves. Because
reality inheres in concrete objects, we learn best
about them by studying them empirically.
Further, Plato believed that ideas are largely in-
nate. That is, we are born with virtually all the ideas
we have. Experience merely brings them out. In
the dialogue Meno, Plato claimed to demonstrate
(through Socrates, who generally was the main pro-
tagonist in the dialogues) that all the ideas about
geometry that a slave boy had in his head were there
at the boy’s birth. Experience merely brought them
out. In contrast, Aristotle believed that ideas gener-
ally arise through experience.
All of these dialectics–whether the mind and body
are one entity or distinct entities; whether the mind
is best understood through rationalistic or empirical
methods; whether abilities are genetically or envi-
ronmentally determined—are still active in research
today that seeks to understand the human mind. Psy-
chological scientists disagree even today as to the
extent to which mind and body are distinct, on the
roles of rationalistic and empirical methods, and on
the origins of abilities.
2.3 Intermediate Periods in the
Western History of Understanding
Human Thought
During the early Christian era (200–450 C.E.) and
the Middle Ages (400–1300 C.E.), rationalism and
empiricism became subsidiary to the primacy of re-
ligious faith. Neither method was viewed as valid
unless it demonstrated what was already “known”
to be true on the basis of Christian doctrine. (Other
views evolved in Eastern countries, but because mod-
ern psychological science is largely based on the
Western tradition, that is what will be covered here.)
This kind of logic—which is perhaps as prevalent
today as in the past, just in different forms—shows
the fallacy of confirmation bias, whereby we seek
out information that is consistent with what we be-
lieve and ignore or reject information that is not
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consistent with our beliefs. More and more today,
through social media and other means, people only
read news feeds and websites that present views that
correspond to those the individual already has.
Modern views of science were born during the
period of the Renaissance, roughly from the 1300s
to the 1600s. The focus of psychological thinking
shifted from God to humanity. Strict control of
thinking in terms of religious doctrine came under
attack. Now empirical observation, often guided by
underlying theories, came into vogue as a preferred
method for understanding human thought and other
human phenomena.
2.4 The Early Modern Period (1600s to
1800s)
Interestingly, the Early Modern Period saw a replay
of some of the dialectics that distinguished Plato
and Aristotle. René Descartes, a philosopher, agreed
with Plato’s emphasis on rationalism as the best way
to seek truth, and Descartes, like Plato, was a dual-
ist. Descartes further believed that knowledge was
innate. In contrast, John Locke (1632–1704), also a
philosopher, sided largely with Aristotle, believing
in the primacy of empirical methods, monism, and
the idea that all knowledge is acquired from experi-
ence. Locke took this view to an extreme, arguing
that, at birth, the mind is a tabula rasa, or blank slate.
We acquire knowledge through sensory experience,
and thus the experiences we provide children are
the keys to what they are able to learn in their lives.
David Hume, another empiricist philosopher, sided
with Locke in the belief that knowledge is acquired.
He further pointed out that all our causal inferences
are indirect. We see one thing happen, and then
quickly and proximally, another, and infer causality.
We can never see causation directly occur—we can
only come to believe it is true.
Two important successors to Descartes and Locke
were the philosophers John Stuart Mill (1806–1873)
and Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). Mill saw the
mind entirely in mechanistic terms. He believed that
the laws of the physical universe could explain ev-
erything, including our lives as human beings. His
was an extreme form of monism, sometimes referred
to as reductionism, a view that reduces the role of
the mind to the status of the physical and chemical
processing occurring in the body. Those today who
see the mind as nothing more than physiological
operations of the brain and its accompanying central
nervous system might be viewed as reductionists.
Kant provided syntheses to many of the theses
and antitheses that had been proposed before him.
He sought to understand how the mind and the body
are related, rather than looking at one as subservient
to the other. Kant also allowed roles for both a priori
(rationally determined) and a posteriori (empirically
determined) knowledge. What is perhaps today most
important about Kant’s contribution is the recogni-
tion that philosophical debates do not have to be
“either-or,” but rather can be “both-and,” seeking
roles, for example, both for inborn knowledge and
for empirically derived knowledge.
2.5 The Modern Period of the
Psychology of Human Thought
The modern period of the psychology of human
thought can be seen as beginning with structural-
ism, which sought to understand the structure (con-
figuration of elements) of the mind by analyzing
the mind in terms of its constituent components or
contents (see Table 2.1 for a comparison between
this and other modern schools of thought). At the
time structuralism was introduced, scientists in other
fields also were trying to understand constituents,
such as the periodic table of elements and the bio-
chemical constituents of cells. Thus, structuralism
was a part of a large movement in science to break
things down into their basic elements.
An important pre-structuralist was the German
psychologist Wilhelm Wundt (1932–1902). Wundt
argued that the study of cognition should concentrate
on immediate and direct experience, not mediate and
indirect experience. For example, if a subject looked
at a tree, what would be important to Wundt, from a
psychological point of view, would not be the iden-
tification of the object as a tree or a maple tree, but
rather one’s seeing a large cylinder with a rough
brown surface jutting out into the air with green
protrusions (i.e., leaves) attached to smaller cylin-
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Table 2.1: Main Schools of Thought in the History of the Psychology of Thought.
School of Thought Main Emphasis
Structuralism Analysis of thought into constituent components
Functionalism and pragmatism Understanding “why” of behavior; practical uses of thought and behavior
Associationism Study of mental connections between stimuli and responses
Behaviorism Study of observable behavior and how rewards determine behavior
Gestaltism Study of thought and behavior as holistic, not just as a sum of parts
Cognitivism Understanding the mental processes and representations underlying thought
drical types of objects (i.e., branches) jutting out
from the main cylinder. Wundt suggested that the
best way to study immediate experience was through
introspection—that is, subjects reporting their direct
and immediate experiences. Wundt believed that
people could be trained to be experts at introspec-
tion, so that they would report exactly what they
sensed without the mediation of their knowledge of
concepts and categories (such as tree or maple).
Perhaps the first major structuralist was Edward
Titchener (1867-1927), whose views were similar to
Wundt’s. Although Titchener started out as a strict
structuralist, later in his career he branched out and
considered other ways of studying human thought.
Titchener’s change of mindset illustrates an impor-
tant lesson about scientific creativity: Scientists do
not have to get stuck in, or fixated upon, the ideas
that characterize their early work. They can “grow
on the job,” and themselves think dialectically, with
their ideas evolving along with their careers.
Structuralism is of interest today primarily in an
historical sense, because it was shown to have a
number of problems associated with it. First, as time
went on, the number of “elementary sensations” it
proposed grew too large to be manageable. There
seemed to be no limit, and so its role in reducing ex-
perience to a manageable number of elementary sen-
sations was lost. Second, to the extent it was useful,
it was for understanding simple rather than complex
aspects of human behavior, such as problem solving,
reasoning, or language. Third, its heavy reliance on
introspection came under attack. While introspec-
tion might be of some use, it scarcely seemed to be
the only method or even a primary method by which
knowledge about thinking could be gained. More-
over, people’s introspections, no matter how much
the people are trained, are subject to various kinds
of biases as a function of their past experiences. Fi-
nally, different people had different introspections,
so that it was difficult to gain agreement as to just
what the basic sensations were.
2.6 Functionalism
Functionalism looks at the functional relationships
between specific earlier stimuli and subsequent re-
sponses; in other words, it asked the question of why
people behave the way they do—how do events in
a person’s life lead the person to behave in certain
ways but not others? Thus, functionalists asked a
different set of questions from structuralists, concen-
trating less on what people experienced and more
on why they experienced it.
Again, there is an important lesson to be learned
from the evolution of psychological thinking from
structuralism to functionalism. That lesson is that
different schools of, or approaches to psychological
thought, differ at least as much in the questions they
ask as in the answers they obtain. When psycholog-
ical science moves on, it is often not so much that
the answers change as that the questions change.
The core beliefs of structuralists—seeking
elementary sensations through analyses of
introspection—were pretty well defined. The core
beliefs of functionalists never cohered quite as well.
Indeed, they used a variety of methods to answer
their questions about the “why” of human behavior.
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2.7 Pragmatism
Pragmatism, an outgrowth of functionalism, holds
that knowledge is validated by its usefulness. The
main question pragmatists are concerned with is that
of how knowledge can be used to make some kind
of a difference.
One of the most well-known pragmatists was
William James (1842–1910), who was not only a
psychologist but also a philosopher and a physician.
His landmark work was Principles of Psychology
(James, 1890/1983). It is rare for a scholar to enter
the pantheon of “most distinguished psychologists”
for just a single work, but James managed to do it
with that one major work.
James critiqued structuralism’s focus on minute
details of experience. He believed instead that psy-
chology needs to focus on bigger ideas. He is par-
ticularly well known for his theorizing about con-
sciousness, which he believed was the key to peo-
ple’s adaptation to their environments.
John Dewey (1859–1952) applied pragmatism to
a number of different areas of thought, most notably,
education. Dewey emphasized the role of motiva-
tion in education (e.g., Dewey, 1910). In order to
learn effectively, a student needs to see the use of
what he or she learns. If the learning is irrelevant to
a student’s life, the student will have little incentive
to process deeply the information that is taught. One
way educators can motivate students is by having
the students choose their own problems. In that way,
the students will choose problems that interest them,
whether or not they interest the teachers.
Dewey also believed in the value of applied re-
search. Much of the research being done, he thought,
had no obvious use and hence was not likely to make
a long-lasting contribution. Pragmatism would ar-
gue for applied or at least life-relevant research that
could be put to some use, even if not immediately.
Pragmatism remains a school of thought today:
One frequently hears politicians argue for educa-
tional programs that prepare students for careers and
that focus on knowledge that is readily applicable.
But the advantages of pragmatism are, in some ways,
also its disadvantages. First, it can lead to short-
sightedness. Much of the most important applied
research of today emanated from the basic research
of yesterday. Second, the school of thought raises
the question of “useful to whom”? Is it enough for
an education to be useful to just one person? How
about if it is useful to one person but useless to an-
other? Finally, pragmatism, in general, can have
a limited notion of usefulness. What is useful to
a person at one time, in the short run, may not be
useful to the person in the long run.
2.8 Associationism
Associationism concerns how ideas and events be-
come associated with one another in the mind. Thus,
it serves as a basis for a conception of learning—that
learning happens through the association of ideas in
the mind.
One of the most influential associationists was the
German psychologist Hermann Ebbinghaus (1850–
1909), who was the first empirical investigator to
apply associationist ideas experimentally. Whereas
Wundt was an introspectionist, Ebbinghaus was an
experimentalist. To the extent that he used introspec-
tion, it was about himself. Ebbinghaus also differed
from Wundt in that his main subject was himself.
Edwin Guthrie (1886–1959) expanded upon
Ebbinghaus’s ideas about associationism, proposing
that two observed events (a stimulus and a response)
became associated with each other through close
occurrence in time (temporal contiguity). In this
view, stimulus and response become associated be-
cause they repeatedly occur at about the same time,
with the response following the stimulus. Guthrie,
however, studied animals rather than himself.
Edward Lee Thorndike (1874–1949) developed
these ideas still further, suggesting that what is im-
portant is not mere temporal contiguity, but rather
“satisfaction,” or the existence of some reward. Ac-
cording to Thorndike’s law of effect, a stimulus tends
to produce a certain response (effect) over time if
an organism is rewarded (satisfaction) for that re-
sponse.
Associationism in its original form has not sur-
vived. The idea that complex behavior could be
explained just on the basis of simple associations
has never really worked well. None of the associa-
tionists ever gave a persuasive account of problem
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solving, reasoning, decision making, or any other
higher process.
2.9 Behaviorism
Behaviorism is the view that psychology should
deal only with observable behavior. It is in a sense
an extreme form of associationism. It originated as
a dialectical reaction against the focus on personally
subjective mental states as emphasized both by struc-
turalism and functionalism. Radical behaviorists
argue that arguments regarding (internal) thought
processes are merely speculations. In their view,
although such speculations may have a place in phi-
losophy, they do not have a place in the science
of psychology. The behaviorist view was part of a
movement called logical positivism, according to
which the basis of all knowledge is sensory percep-
tion.
The father of the radical behaviorist movement
was the American psychologist John Watson (1878–
1958). Watson believed that psychology should fo-
cus only on observable behavior. Watson worked
primarily with rats in his research, although he be-
came famous, or infamous, for an experiment in
which he conditioned a young child, “Little Albert,”
to fear a white rat, a fear that later generalized to
other animals, such as a white rabbit (Watson &
Rayner, 1920). A successor to Watson, Clark Hull
(1884–1952), believed that it would be possible to
synthesize the work of theorists like Watson and
Guthrie with the work of Pavlov on involuntary con-
ditioning. He constructed elaborate mathematical
models to achieve such a synthesis.
A famous successor to Hull was B. F. Skinner
(1904–1990), also a radical behaviorist. Skinner
believed that all behavior could be understood by
organisms emitting responses to environmental con-
tingencies. Skinner applied his ideas about behavior-
ism to many different kinds of behavior, at first learn-
ing, but then also language and problem solving. His
views may have had some success in accounting for
simple learning but did less well in accounting for
complex behavior.
Skinner also proposed that it would be possible
to construct a Utopian society based on his ideas
about instrumental conditioning (i.e., conditioning
in which responses are shaped by rewards and non-
rewards of behavior). Because Skinner believed
the environment controls behavior, the idea of the
Utopia was to create environments that would con-
trol behavior so that it would conform to the ideals
of the community.
2.10 Gestalt Psychology
Gestalt psychology sought to understand behavior
in terms of organized, structured wholes; that is, in-
stead of breaking down behavior and its underlying
cognition into constituent parts, Gestalt psychology
sought to understand behavior holistically. Three
of the main psychologists behind the movement, all
German, were Max Wertheimer (1880–1943), Kurt
Koffka (1886–1941), and Wolfgang Köhler (1887–
1967). The Gestaltists applied their framework to
many aspects of psychology, and especially to per-
ception and complex problem solving. For example,
they suggested that insight problems, in which one
is blocked from any kind of solution until one has
an “ah-ha” experience, could be understood in terms
of a holistic restructuring of a problem to reach a
solution. An example would be the nine-dot prob-
lem, in which one has to connect nine dots, arranged
in three rows of three, in four straight lines without
taking one’s pencil off the paper. The “insight” for
solving the problem is that one has to go outside the
implicit periphery of the nine dots in order to solve
the problem.
2.11 Cognitivism
The main current paradigm for understanding the
psychology of human thought is cognitivism, which
is the belief that much of human behavior is com-
prehensible in terms of how people represent and
process information. Cognitivists seek to understand
elementary information processes and how they are
represented in the mind.
Early cognitivists, such as Miller, Galanter, and
Pribram (1960), argued that both behaviorist and
Gestalt accounts of higher processes are inadequate.
Instead, they suggested that psychologists need to
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understand cognitive processes. The unit they pro-
posed was the TOTE (Test-Operate-Test-Exit). The
idea behind this unit is that when we need to solve
a problem, we first need to test the difference be-
tween where we are and where we need to be to
reach a solution. We then operate to reduce the dif-
ference between our current state and the solution
state. Then we test to see if we are done. If not, we
operate again. And we keep going until we reach a
solution to the problem, at which point we exit.
Two other pioneers in the study of human thought
were Newell and Simon (1972), whose book Hu-
man Problem Solving showed how a relatively small
set of elementary information processes could be
used to solve problems of a wide variety of kinds.
Neisser (1967), in his book Cognitive Psychology,
suggested a process called analysis-by-synthesis, in
which hypotheses are formulated and compared with
data in the environment until one of the hypotheses
produces a match to the data. In a later book, Cog-
nition and Reality Neisser (1976) emphasized the
importance of studying complex human behavior in
its natural contexts. Today, cognitivism thrives, but
other schools of thought are complementing it. For
example, more and more cognitive psychologists are
seeking to understand not only the cognitive bases of
complex behavior, but also its neuropsychological
underpinnings.
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Summary
The history of the study of human thought can be understood in terms of a dialectical progression
of ideas. Many of these ideas originated with the Greek philosophers, Plato and Aristotle, who,
respectively, believed in the importance of rationalist and empirical methods for understanding
human thought. Plato’s ideas formed the basis for mind-body dualism.
During the Middle Ages, ideas about human thought were seen as deriving from what individuals
thought they knew about their relation to God. In the Renaissance, the scientific method began to
gain ascendancy.
The rationalist and empiricist schools of thought gained exponents in philosophers René Descartes
and John Locke, respectively. Immanuel Kant synthesized many of their ideas, showing that the
methods of both rationalism and empiricism could be important in acquiring new knowledge.
In the early modern era, structuralism argued for the importance of decomposing sensations into
their most elementary constituents. Functionalism, in contrast, emphasized the “why” of behavior
rather than its constituents. An offshoot of functionalism, pragmatism, suggested we look for how
knowledge could be used. Associationism argued for the importance of connections between ideas;
behaviorism, especially in its radical form, suggested that only observable behavior should be
studied by psychologists. Behaviorists were particularly concerned with the role of environmental
rewards in behavior. Gestaltists suggested that behavior be studied as wholes, because the whole is
more than the sum of its part. Cognitivism, an important school even today, suggests the importance
of understanding the mental structures and processes underlying behavior.
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Review Questions
1. How do rationalism and empiricism differ?
2. What is a dialectic?
3. What is mind-body dualism?
4. What were some of the limitations of the associationistic way of understanding human thought?




The dialectic plays a role not only across investigators over time but also
within a single investigator over time (Sternberg, 2014, 2015). It is important
for researchers to look not only at how research has evolved over historical
time but also how the researcher’s research program has evolved over the
course of a career. If the researcher finds no evolution, then he or she perhaps
has not been as creative as he or she could have been.
In my own research, I originally proposed an information-processing “al-
ternative” to psychometric approaches to intelligence. At the time, the late
1970s, I saw an approach emphasizing information-processing components
as replacing structural psychometric factors. But I later synthesized what had
been a thesis and antithesis. Components and factors were compatible, with
factors obtained through analysis of variation between people and components
obtained through analysis of variation across stimuli. In other words, both
components and factors were valid, but as different partitions of variation in a psychological study.
Later this synthesis became a new thesis, as I argued that the approach I had used was too narrow and
failed to take into account creative and practical aspects of intelligence, which complemented the
analytical aspects dealt with in psychometric and cognitive approaches. I thought that I now had “the
answer.” But then I came to view the answer as incomplete, because I realized what mattered more
than one’s particular cognitive or other skills was how one utilized these skills. So I came to argue
that “successful intelligence” is the construction of a life path that makes sense in terms of one’s own
goals and initiatives, by capitalizing on one’s strengths and compensating for or correcting one’s
weaknesses. But later, I came to see even this view as incomplete, because it neglected wisdom, or
using one’s knowledge and skills to help achieve a common good. And in today’s world, I came to
believe, what most is missing is not IQ points—there are lots of smart people, including so many
people in universities—but rather the use of those “smarts” to help others and the world, not just
oneself and one’s loved ones.
In sum, the concept of a dialectic applies not only between but also within researchers. People
need to realize and appreciate how their own ideas evolve and how, through the course of a career,
one becomes not just older, but hopefully, in one’s research and life, wiser.
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Glossary
associationism Concerns how ideas and events be-
come associated with one another in the mind.
20
behaviorism The view that psychology should
deal only with observable behavior. It is in a
sense an extreme form of associationism. 21
cognitivism The belief that much of human behav-
ior is comprehensible in terms of how people
represent and process information. 21
dialectic The idea that people think in one way
for a while, a thesis; then they move on to a
contrasting and seemingly contradictory way
of seeing things, an antithesis; finally, they
move on to an integrated view, a synthesis,
whereby two ideas that had seemed contradic-
tory no longer seem that way, but rather seem
as though they can be integrated and under-
stood as both being true, perhaps at different
levels. 16
empiricist Believing that the nature of human
thought could be best understood through ob-
servation and experimentation. 17
fallacy of confirmation bias We seek out infor-
mation that is consistent with what we believe
and ignore or reject information that is not
consistent with our beliefs. 17
functionalism Looks at the functional relation-
ships between specific earlier stimuli and sub-
sequent responses; in other words, it asked
the question of why people behave the way
they do–how do events in a person’s life lead
the person to behave in certain ways but not
others?. 19
Gestalt psychology Sought to understand behav-
ior in terms of organized, structured wholes;
that is, instead of breaking down behavior and
its underlying cognition into constituent parts,
Gestalt psychology sought to understand be-
havior holistically. 21
mind-body dualism The notion that whereas the
body is composed of physical substance, the
mind is not. 16
pragmatism An outgrowth of functionalism, holds
that knowledge is validated by its usefulness.
20
rationalist Believing that introspection and related
philosophical methods of analysis could and
should be used to arrive at truth. 17
reductionism A view that reduces the role of the
mind to the status of the physical and chemi-
cal processing occurring in the body. 18
structuralism A school of thought in psychology
that seeks to understand psychological phe-
nomena in terms of their simplest mental el-
ements and the ways in which these mental
elements combine. 18
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As the other chapters of this book will reveal, the
psychology of thinking is a fascinating research field
which has discovered a lot of surprising insights into
this faculty of the human mind. Overcoming the
problems associated with investigating something
“invisible” such as thoughts is an interesting philo-
sophical problem and a research topic in itself. This
chapter will start with the methodological founda-
tion of cognitive psychology and the question as to
why scientists do not just rely on people’s reports
about their thoughts as data. Then, I will provide
an overview of the toolbox of methods that cogni-
tive psychologists have developed for discovering
insights into thinking. Most methods will be illus-
trated by one or two selected examples, but it should
be kept in mind that the range of possible appli-
cations is much broader. There is no recipe as to
how to do research on thinking, so psychologists
can still be creative in developing new methods and
in freshly combining old ones. This methodolog-
ical challenge is one further aspect which makes
research in cognitive science so intriguing.
Readers who want to recapitulate a few basics
on the methods of psychology may want to consult
Textbox 3.1 first.
Textbox 3.1: A brief primer of basic methods in empirical psychology
Psychological laws or hypotheses typically claim that one independent variable (IV) has some
influence on another variable called the dependent variable (DV). For example, it may be claimed
that the more “deeply” information is processed, the better it will be remembered later (Craik &
Lockhart, 1972). Here, the depth of processing is the IV, whereas memory performance is the DV.
Theoretical psychological variables are themselves unobservable, but they may be operationalized
by translating them into observable variables which are thought to represent the theoretical ones.
For example, a shallow processing of information could entail counting the letters of written words,
whereas deep processing is based on analyzing the meaning of the words. Likewise, memory
performance may be measured by tallying the words someone can recall in a later test. If the
hypothesis (or law) is true and the operationalization is adequate, both variables must show a
covariation. Empirical tests of psychological hypotheses therefore assess whether such a predicted
correlation exists. In a correlation study, researchers measure or observe both variables of interest
and assess their covariation. However, the correlation in such a study does not allow the conclusion
that the IV variation caused the DV change since they might both be influenced by a third variable.
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For example, the motivation of a participant might influence both the learning strategy and the
memory performance without a direct causal link between these variables. To test causal hypotheses,
scientists try to run experiments whenever possible. Here, they can actively manipulate the IV (for
example by instructing participants either to count letters or to find a meaningful associate to words).
If participants are randomly assigned to the different experimental conditions (so that there are no
systematic differences between them), an observed change in the DV has probably been caused by
the variation in the IV. Experiments are therefore stricter tests of causal hypotheses than correlation
studies.
3.2 A Natural Science of the Mind?
How can thoughts be studied scientifically? When
reflecting on the natural sciences, we imagine re-
searchers investigating things that can be observed
or even measured in objective and precise ways.
Thoughts, however, come as beliefs, imaginations,
intentions, logical inferences, fantasies, insights,
daydreaming, or plans, to name only a few of the
many concepts associated with thinking. These im-
material “things” do not have a weight or size or
electric charge that can be measured with physical
instruments1. Furthermore, these thoughts are unob-
servable for outsiders and hence, they seem to evade
an objective description.
Since they considered verbal reports based on so-
called introspection (self-observation) as unreliable
sources of data, philosophers and even the founder
of Experimental Psychology, Wilhelm Wundt (1832-
1920, see Figure 3.1), were convinced that higher
cognitive processes like memory and thinking could
not be studied with the methods of the natural sci-
ences. Beginning with John B. Watson’s (1913)
“behaviorist manifesto”, all internal psychological
processes including thoughts were abandoned from
scientific psychology for a few decades because ver-
bal data were considered as subjective and thus not
suited for scientific research (see Chapter 2, “History
of the Field of the Psychology of Human Thought”).
This state of affairs was unfortunate because in
his groundbreaking experimental investigations of
human memory, the German psychologist Hermann
Ebbinghaus (1850–1909) had already shown how
higher cognitive processes can be studied objectively
without using subjective verbal reports as data. In
principle, the methodological idea behind modern
cognitive psychology foreshadowed by Ebbinghaus
(1885) is simple: although cognitive processes like
thoughts or memory traces are by themselves unob-
servable, they may lead to observable consequences
in behavior which can be objectively noticed and de-
scribed by different independent observers. Hence,
hypotheses about these hidden or latent processes
can be tested by setting up experiments and obser-
vations that target these predicted consequences of
behavior as objective data. To use an example from
memory research as founded by Ebbinghaus (1885),
we may postulate that during the learning of new
materials, these leave a hypothetical “trace” in mem-
ory which may vary in strength. This trace itself is
unobservable, but one can show that it is “there”,
for example, when people are able to reproduce the
material in a later memory test or even show faster
responses to these stimuli in comparison to control
stimuli they had not learned before. The test results
(amount of recall or speed of reaction) are indica-
tors of the memory strength, and they can serve as
objective data for testing hypotheses about it. In the
study of thinking, for example, the number of solved
1 Most psychologists including myself believe for good reasons that all thoughts have a material basis since they strictly depend on
processes in the brain. However, a belief or an insight, for example, have a psychological surplus dimension (a meaning) that cannot
hitherto be reduced to electrical and chemical processes in the brain (some say it never will). The psychology of thinking benefits a
lot from knowledge about the brain (see section 4.2.6), but it deals with the semantics (meaning) of thoughts in human behavior
which is exactly this surplus dimension on top of the physical processes.
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test items may be an indicator of a certain facet of
intelligence (see Chapter 14, “Intelligence”), or the
response to a logical puzzle may indicate whether
someone followed the laws of logic or rather an
intuitive sense of credibility of the conclusion’s con-
tent (see Chapter 7, “Deductive Reasoning”, belief
bias).2
Hence, as in other natural sciences, psychologists
can test hypotheses about unobservable variables
by objectively observing or measuring their behav-
ioral consequences. As the American psychologist
Edward C. Tolman (1886-1959) argued, this kind
of research strategy (later called methodological
behaviorism) allows both (1) to use unobservable
theoretical concepts in a scientific manner and (2) to
do so without recourse to questionable introspective
data. Basically, this view is still the methodological
basis of modern cognitive psychology.
3.3 Why not just Ask People about
their Thoughts?
Reading this introduction, you may wonder why psy-
chologists do things in such a complicated way. Why
don’t we just ask the people about their thoughts to
investigate thinking? They know best, don’t they?
In fact, one of the first heated methodological
debates in the then young science of Experimental
Psychology was between Wilhelm Wundt (1907;
1908) and Karl Bühler (1908) about the value of in-
trospection as a means of investigating thinking. In-
trospection literally means “viewing inside” and was
used, for example, by psychologists of the Würzburg
School of Psychology to gain insights into thought
processes. Confronted with a thinking problem, the
test person was asked to observe her own thinking
processes and later report them to the researcher.
In rare agreement, both Wundt (1907; 1908) and
the founder of behaviorism, John B. Watson (1913),
criticized the “interrogation method” as unscientific
for the following reasons, still accepted by most psy-
chologists today (see Massen & Bredenkamp, 2005;
Russo, E. J. Johnson & Stephens, 1989):
1. Instrospection is prone to memory errors,
2. many thoughts cannot easily be verbalized
(since they are based on images, for exam-
ple),
3. some thoughts may even be unconscious (and
hence, not detectable by introspection),
4. the observation of thoughts may lead to re-
activity, meaning that the act of observing
changes the thinking process itself, and fi-
nally,
5. the verbalized observations are subjective,
meaning that they cannot be scrutinized by
independent observers (as is the case in other
natural sciences).
With respect to reactivity, Wundt (1908) even
doubted that it is logically possible to split one’s con-
sciousness into two independent parts, the thinker
and the observer. And with respect to subjectiv-
ity, Watson (1913) bemoaned that, “There is no
longer any guarantee that we all mean the same thing
when we use the terms now current in psychology”
(p. 163 f.).
In an attempt to vindicate verbal reports, a method
less prone to memory error and reactivity called the
thinking-aloud method was later championed by
Ericsson and Simon (1993). Here, test persons are
encouraged to verbalize everything that comes to
mind in the thinking process without the instruction
to explicitly “observe” their thoughts. These verbal
protocols are later analyzed qualitatively, and Erics-
son and Moxley (2019) provide extensive practical
information on how to set up studies and how to
analyze protocol data. However, this method does
not solve problems 2, 3, and 5 of the above list, and
even reactivity has been demonstrated in some stud-
ies (Russo et al., 1989; Schooler, Ohlsson & Brooks,
1993).
2 This “indirect” measurement of theoretical variables is not unique to psychology, but also commonly used in other natural sciences,
for example physics, where the mass of a particle may be inferred from its movement in a magnetic field, or the speed of distant
stars by a shift of their spectral lines.
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Figure 3.1: Three important methodological forethinkers of experimental cognitive psychology.
In light of the arguments above, are verbal data
therefore worthless for investigating thought pro-
cesses? This conclusion would be too harsh, espe-
cially with respect to thinking-aloud data. These and
also classical introspective reports may be worth-
while in helping researchers to generate hypotheses
about cognitive processes. In order to test these hy-
potheses empirically, however, one has to rely on
objective data.
3.4 Objective Methods for Investigating
Thought Processes
Psychologists have been quite creative in develop-
ing empirical methods for testing hypotheses about
thought processes. The following section describes
various methods. As we will see, although the meth-
ods can sometimes be subsumed under joint cate-
gories like, for example “response time analysis”
(Section 4.2.1), the applications vary considerably
depending on the specific task, theory, or hypothesis
under scrutiny.
We will start with the simple idea that we can
test hypotheses about thoughts by simply looking
at the outcomes of the process, such as the quality
or duration of a problem solution. The second and
longest section will illustrate several methods that
claim to more closely mirror the processes taking
place during thinking. Finally, we will add very
brief sections about computer simulations and neu-
roscientific methods in thinking research.
3.4.1 Outcome-based Methods
Observable behaviors like finding a problem solu-
tion, choosing an option or accepting a logical con-
clusion are the results of thought processes, but can
they reveal information about the unobservable pro-
cesses themselves? For example, large parts of re-
search on creative problem solving (see Chapter 9,
“Problem Solving”) are based on a simple dependent
variable, namely the percentage of participants who
solved a problem, typically a hard-to-solve riddle.
Whether this reveals insights into the processes in-
volved depends on how you set up your study to
test hypotheses. If you vary an independent vari-
able which is believed to change certain thinking
processes that either facilitate or impede successful
problem solving, differences in solving rates be-
tween conditions in your experiment speak directly
to your hypothesis at test. Next to simple solution
30 • Psychology of Human Thought • Chapter 3
Outcome-based Methods Bröder
Figure 3.2: (a) Example of a matchstick puzzle - you are allowed to move only one matchstick to achieve a valid equation with Roman
numerals, (b) The nine-dot problem: connect all dots with four straight lines without lifting the pen, (c) The ten-coins
problem: turn the triangle upside down by moving only 3 coins.
rates and choices, more sophisticated methods uti-
lizing behavioral outcomes allow conclusions about
underlying processes by designing diagnostic tasks
or even by the model-based disentangling of the pro-
cesses involved. We will illustrate the three methods
in turn with selected examples.
Simple Solution Rates. This issue has been con-
troversial since Maier’s (1931) anecdotal observa-
tion that unconscious “hints” can foster a problem
solution. In more recent studies using matchstick
puzzles (Knoblich & Wartenberg, 1998) or the noto-
rious “nine-dots” and “ten-coins” problems (Hattori,
Sloman & Orita, 2013; see Figure 3.2), researchers
presented hints to the solution so briefly that they
were not consciously registered by the participants.
Still, in Hattori et al.’s study, solution rates for the
nine-dots and ten-coins problems were tripled and
increased fivefold, respectively, as compared to a
control condition without these brief hints. On the
premise that the hints were truly unconscious,3 the
outcome data therefore reveal a lot about the nature
of problem solving processes. By simply registering
success rates as the main dependent variable, nu-
merous facilitating and impeding factors for creative
problem solving have been identified (e.g. Bassok &
Novick, 2012; Funke, 2003; see Chapter 9, “Prob-
lem Solving”). In a similar vein, large parts of rea-
soning research have used solution rates of logical
arguments to investigate the factors which make log-
ical problems easy or difficult (e.g. Johnson-Laird
& Byrne, 1991) or to compare the cognitive abilities
of different people.
Diagnostic task selection. Another example of
how pure outcome measures may reveal information
about latent processes uses the logic of diagnostic
tasks, meaning that you choose tasks in a way that
different processes or strategies predict different so-
lutions or choices for a set of problems. You can
then compare a subject’s pattern of actual choices
across these tasks with the predictions of the hypo-
thetical strategies you are interested in. The strategy
with predictions most “similar” to your actual data
is presumably the one the participant used. There
are different formal ways of assessing this similarity
3 Whether this is the case with “subliminal” priming is still a matter of debate. I assume it to be true for the illustrative purpose of the
example.
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between predictions and data, and conclusions are
subject to statistical error, but we will not deal with
these complications here. As a general conclusion,
it can be stated that pure outcome data may well
provide information on detailed process hypotheses,
given that these hypotheses make sufficiently differ-
ent predictions for a set of tasks. An example of this
research strategy is given in Textbox 3.2.4
Textbox 3.2: Which strategies do people use in memory-based infer-
ences?
Bröder and Schiffer (2003) were interested in which strategies people use when they have to make
decisions from memory. In their task, particpants had to compare different suspects in a hypothetical
murder case and choose the one most likely to be the perpetrator. At the beginning of the experiment,
participants had learned facts about the 10 suspects by heart (e.g., their blood type, their preferred
cigarette and perfume brands, their vehicle). Later, they had received information about the evidence
found at the crime scene. Based on the literature on decision strategies, the authors had identified 4
plausible strategies: the heuristic named Take-the-best (TTB; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996) will
look up the most important piece of evidence and base its decision on this evidence if it discriminates,
otherwise, it will use the next most important evidence and so on. A weighted additive rule (WADD),
in contrast, will look up all information and weigh it according to its importance. A tallying rule
(TALLY) will compare the suspects simply on the number of matching pieces of evidence. Finally,
participants might simply guess. The table shows three different task types, with the importance of
the evidence decreasing from top to bottom:
Item type 1 Item type 2 Item type 3
Critical evidence Suspect 1 Suspect 2 Suspect 3 Suspect 4 Suspect 5 Suspect 6
Blood type match - match match match -
Cigarette - match match - match match
Perfume - match match - - match
Vehicle - match - match - -
Across the three item types, TTB would predict the choices of Suspect 1, Suspect 3, and Suspect 5,
whereas a partcipant using WADD would choose Suspects 2, 3, and 5. Someone relying on a pure
tallying strategy would select Suspects 2 and 3, but be indifferent (guess with equal probability)
between Suspect 5 and 6. Finally, pure guessers would select all suspects in equal proportions. Based
on a few assumptions (see Bröder, 2010, for details), the probability of an empirical data pattern
can be assessed for each hypothetical strategy, and the strategy with the highest probability of the
observed data is diagnosed as the participant’s strategy. Bröder and Schiffer (2003, Experiment 1)
found a surprisingly high percentage (64%) of participants presumably using a simple TTB heuristic,
and a later analysis of response times by Bröder and Gaissmaier (2007) fitted well with this
interpretation (see Textbox 3.3).
4 The more the predictions of various strategies differ, the firmer your conclusion about underlying strategies. A method for
maximizing the diagnosticity of tasks is described in Jekel, Fiedler, and Glöckner (2011).
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Model-based measurement of processes. Finally,
detailed information about cognitive processes can
be achieved by measurement models that formal-
ize assumptions as to how latent processes inter-
act to produce the behavioral outcomes. The pro-
cesses are represented as parameters in a set of
equations, and the values of these parameters are
estimated from the observed data. This sounds
quite abstract, so we provide an example depicted
in Figure 3.3. This model formulated by Klauer,
Musch, and Naumer (2000) was developed to in-
vestigate belief bias in syllogistic reasoning (see
Chapter 7, “Deductive Reasoning”). Belief bias de-
scribes the phenomenon that people tend to accept
plausible conclusions more readily than implausi-
ble ones, irrespective of the logical validity of the
argument. For example, the syllogism “All vege-
tarians are peaceable. X is a vegetarian. Therefe-
ore, X is peaceable” is a logically valid argument
since the conclusion follows from the two premises.
However, if “X” is replaced by “Mahatma Gandhi”,
people are more ready to accept the argument as
valid than if X is replaced with “Adolf Hitler”.5
Klauer et al. (2000) formulated a processing tree
model depicted in Figure 3.3 which decomposes par-
ticipants judgments (“valid” vs “invalid”) of four
different types of syllogisms (valid and invalid ar-
guments with plausible vs. implausible conclusion
statements) into logical processes and biased guess-
ing. Logical processes are represented by the r pa-
rameters, and guessing based on plausibility by the
a parameters. Given certain assumptions and experi-
mental procedures, the parameters can be estimated
from the data, and they allow for diagnosing whether
experimentally manipulated variables like time pres-
sure, working memory load, the percentage of valid
syllogisms in the task etc. affect logical abilities
(reflected in r) or rather the readiness to accept con-
clusions irrespective of the logical validity (reflected
in a).
Such measurement models have been developed
for various tasks in cognitive psychology, including
memory, perception, decision making, and logical
thinking (see Batchelder & Riefer, 1999, and Erd-
felder et al., 2009; for comprehensive overviews).
If a measurement model has been validated in thor-
ough experimental tests, it allows the drawing of
very detailed conclusions about the underlying pro-
cesses of observed behavior.
Evaluation: As we have seen, focusing on the out-
comes of thought processes as objective data may
yield much more evidence about the underlying pro-
cesses than is evident at first glance. In the case
of simple success rates as a dependent variable, an
obvious advantage is that these are objectively mea-
surable and do not require complex assumptions
about their validity as measures. Diagnostic task
selection and model-based disentanglement of pro-
cesses need more assumptions (which should ideally
be validated in systematic studies), but this comes
with the payoff of sometimes quite detailed infor-
mation about the underlying processes. As we will
see in the next section, additional process measures
can often enrich the data by adding valuable infor-
mation.
3.4.2 Process-oriented Methods
As Schulte-Mecklenbeck et al. (2017, p. 446)
have argued, “process models deserve process data”.
Since cognitive theories try to describe the processes
that go on in our minds while thinking, it would be
worthwhile eliciting data which more directly re-
flect these processes instead of just focusing on their
results. Also, pure outcome data are often not di-
agnostic enough to differentiate between different
theoretical models which may make the same predic-
tions for many tasks (see, for example, item type 2
in Textbox 3.2, for which both TTB and WADD
predict the same choice).6 Although there is no con-
5 Both historical persons were vegetarians. Hence, there is obviously something wrong with the first premise, but the conclusion has
to follow from the premises if they were true.
6 Some authors enthusiastic about process data evoke the impression that process data would be necessary to test process models in a
sensible manner. As the preceding section 4.1 has shown, this is not the case, and I have argued elsewhere that outcome data are
sufficient if they are diagnostic and formally linked to the process models under scrutiny (Bröder, 2000). I admit, however, that
process data often increase the diagnosticity of the data and are therefore quite useful for research.
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Figure 3.3: Multinomial processing tree model by Klauer et al. (2000) to assess logical reasoning and biased guessing in syllogisms.
Each tree depicts processes for all the combinations of invalid vs. valid syllogisms with believable vs. unbelievable
conclusions. Parameters r reflect reasoning, parameters a reflect biased guessing. ©American Psychological Association.
Reprinted with permission.
sensus, yet, as to what a cognitive process actually is
(see Newen, 2017), a defining feature of any kind of
process is that it evolves over time. Hence, we will
start with this most general property of cognitive
processes, reflected in response time data.
3.4.2.1 Response Time Analysis
Response times are a major workhorse of cogni-
tive psychology. They are useful for estimating the
duration of component processes, or they can be
analyzed as data to estimate cognitive parameters in
decision models. Finally, they can be used to test
cognitive theories.
Measuring the duration of cognitive processes.
The first scientist to measure the duration of a simple
cognitive process was presumably Frans C. Donders
(1868) at the University of Utrecht in the Nether-
lands. We may smile today at his experimental
setup, but in fact, this was a scientifc revolution
because it pulled the actions of the mind into the
realm of measurable natural science. He invented
what later became known as the subtraction method:
for example, using the regular oscillations of a tun-
ing fork, he measured the simple reaction time of
his colleague repeating a syllable like “ki” when the
hearer knew in advance which syllable he would
hear. In a second set of trials, the test person did
not know in advance whether he had to repeat “ki”,
“ku”, “ke”, or “ko”. Repeating the stimulus without
knowledge took on average 46 ms (milliseconds)
longer. Donders concluded that the difference was
just the time needed to choose between the potential
responses which was the only additional cognitive
process needed in the second task. Shortly after
this revolutionary invention, reaction time measure-
ment for the analysis of simple processes became a
fashionable method in the newly established psycho-
logical laboratories which also triggered technical
developments for precise time measurement like
Hipp’s chronoscope (see Figure 3.4). Although the
subtraction method is preferably applied to percep-
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Figure 3.4: An early experimental setup (c. 1900) for the precise measurement of verbal reaction times. The memory apparatus on the
left displays a stimulus and starts the chronoscope (middle), the verbal reaction is recorded by the voicekey on the right
which closes a circuit and stops the chronoscope (taken from Schulze, 1909).
tual tasks, there have been fruitful applications to
processes of language understanding as well (Clark
& Chase, 1972; 1974), showing that processes of
sentence transformation and encoding a negation
need certain amounts of time. Hence, the logic of
the subtraction method in general is to contrast vari-
ants of speeded tasks that include or exclude specific
component processes (such as negating a statement)
and to generate a set of additive equations in order to
estimate the durations of the component processes
by simple difference calculations.
A severe limitation of the method is obviously to
find tasks which can be designed to differ in only
one process. To relax this requirement, S. Sternberg
(1969) proposed the widely used additive factors
method which can do without this specific task con-
struction and merely requires a decomposition of a
task into processing stages that can be selectively
influenced by experimental factors.
Estimating parameters in cognitive models with
reaction times. Sometimes, the researcher is not
interested in the duration of processes per se, but re-
action times are used as indicators for other aspects
of cognition, such as ability or motivation. Particu-
larly in research on decision making, various models
have been developed that assume a process of evi-
dence accumulation before a decision is made. For
example, if I want to decide which of two bicycles
to buy, I might sample evidence in favor or disfavor
of each alternative (such as price, color, number of
gears, weight etc.) until a certain subjective thresh-
old of confidence favoring one option over the other
is reached. Decision situations like these might be
explained by accumulation models, like the drift
diffusion model (DDF, Ratcliff, 1978) for simple
perceptual and recognition decisions or the decision
field theory DFT, (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993)
for more complex decisions (which would apply to
the bicycle example). Figure 3.5 depicts the DDF,
but the general idea is similar in other models as
well. Donkin and Brown (2018) discuss variants of
accumulation models, their similarities, and their
differences.
These models were initially developed to explain
the speed-accuracy tradeoff : in many tasks, peo-
ple can sacrifice accuracy for higher speed, or they
are slower and more accurate which depends both
on their ability and their motivation to be accurate.
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Figure 3.5: The drift diffusion model. When a stimulus with moving dots is presented, the person starts to sample perceptual evidence
for the options “right” vs. “left” until a subjective evidence threshold is met. The drift rate v, and the distance of thresholds
a, and the starting point z both determine the accuracy and the duration of the process.
Hence, only looking at error (or solution) rates or
response times tells only half of the story. Suppose
you have to decide in a perceptual task whether the
majority of dots in a display with many randomly
moving dots is moving to the right or to the left. Ac-
cording to the DDF, you start sampling perceptual
evidence which, from time to time, may speak for
one or the other direction, but on average, it will
favor one of the decision options and approach the
respective subjective threshold. The average speed
of this accumulation process approaching one side
is called the drift rate v, and it reflects the ease of
the task (if you compare tasks) or the ability of the
decision maker (if you compare people). The accu-
racy and the overall duration of the sampling process
both depend on the distance a between the two sub-
jective thresholds which is under the control of the
participant who establishes a compromise between
desired accuracy and speed. Furthermore, there may
be a bias z favoring one of the answers (e.g. a ten-
dency to respond “right” in the moving dots task),
reflected in the starting point of the sampling process
(an unbiased starting point is z = a/2, halfway be-
tween the boundaries). Although the mathematical
concepts are quite complicated, various computer
programs exist to estimate the parameters v, a, and
z from empirical response time distributions asso-
ciated with correct answers and errors. It has been
shown in validation studies for various tasks that the
parameters v, z, and a indeed primarily reflect task
ease (or ability), bias, and motivation to be accurate,
respectively (Arnold, Bröder, & Bayen, 2015; Voss,
Rothermund, & Voss, 2004). The model has been
successfully applied to various domains of cognitive
research (Ratcliff & Smith, 2015).
Testing and validating cognitive models which
make response time predictions. Finally, response
time data are critical whenever a cognitive model ex-
plicitly or implicitly predicts certain response time
patterns. The feature comparison model of cate-
gorization by Smith, Shoben, and Rips (1974) is
a prominent example (see Figure 3.6). The model
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Figure 3.6: A simplified representation of the feature comparison model of categorization by Smith et al. (1974). If the object is
sufficiently similar or dissimilar to the category, Stage 1 suffices for a decision. Medium similarity, however, invokes Stage
2 and hence, requires more time.
assumes that in order to categorize a stimulus, its
various features are compared with the typical or
characteristic features of the category. Hence, in
deciding whether a robin is a bird, you may quickly
find the answer because the characteristic features
of birds in general and a robin in particular show a
large overlap (can fly, has feathers and a beak, lays
eggs, builds nests).
However, when asked whether a penguin is a bird,
the feature overlap is smaller (since penguins do
not fly and do not necessarily build nests), and the
model predicts that you focus on the defining fea-
tures in a second step (e.g. has feathers and a beak,
lays eggs), excluding the merely typical (but not
necessary) features. This second comparison pro-
cess consumes additional time, and hence, positive
instances of a category should be categorized faster
the more characteristic features they share with the
category (because this makes the second step un-
necessary). Negative instances, however, should be
correctly classified faster the fewer characteristics
they share with the concept (e.g. “a whale is a bird”
is denied quicker than “a bat is a bird”). These quite
complex predictions have been observed, thus cor-
roborating the feature comparison model (Rips et
al., 1973).7 A second example of how response time
data have been used to validate cognitive models is
described in Textbox 3.3.
Evaluation: A precise cognitive theory or model
should ideally make predictions about the (relative)
duration of processes or tasks. Hence, as the above
examples have shown, response times can yield valu-
able information to test theories. Some early ap-
proaches to measure process durations like Donders’
(1868) and S. Sternberg’s (1966; 1969) methods
rely on strict seriality assumptions which are some-
times questioned and hard to justify since processes
may operate in parallel (e.g. Ellis & Humphreys,
1999). In addition, the subtraction method often
makes unrealistic demands for task construction. As
the paradigm case of the DDM has shown, response
times may also be a good indicator of ability, task
ease, bias, and motivation if analyzed in the context
of a model (see Donkin & Brown, 2018). Currently,
promising general approaches are being developed
that combine outcome-based measurement models
(see Section 4.1) with response time data (Heck and
Erdfelder, 2016), and more general approaches try to
7 Corroborating a theory does not “verify” it. There may be even better theories that can explain the same data and make new
predictions beyond the corroborated model.
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tackle the question as to whether processes operate
in parallel and whether they are self-terminating or
exhaustive. Finally, for many applications in logical
reasoning and problem solving, response times are
simply a good indicator of task difficulty in addition
to solution rates. Since they are easy to obtain in
computerized experiments, this additional source of
information should always be recorded.
Textbox 3.3: Validating outcome-based strategy classification with re-
sponse time data
In Textbox 3.2, we described how Bröder and Schiffer (2003) classified people as using the decision
strategies TTB, WADD, TALLY or GUESS based on the decision outcomes in a set of diagnostic
tasks. Bröder and Gaissmaier (2007) reasoned that if the classification really reflected the processes
assumed by the strategies, one should expect a specific response time pattern for each group classified
as using this strategy. Specifically, when people use TTB, they should need more time the more cues
they have to retrieve from memory. Remember that TTB searches cues in the order of decreasing
validity and stops search as soon as a discriminating cue is found. Hence, for TTB, we expect
increasing response times with the position of the most valid discriminating cue. Since WADD and
TALLY retrieve all four cues anyway, they should not show such an increase in response times, at
least a much smaller one. WADD should generally take more time than TALLY since it also weighs
the cue information with validity which TALLY does not require. Finally, GUESSing should be
quickest altogether not showing systematic variations with cue position. As Figure 3.7 shows, the
predictions were largely confirmed. Hence, the response time analysis lent additional credibility to
the classification procedure that was initially based on decision outcomes alone.
Figure 3.8: Results of the response time analysis by Bröder and Gaissmaier (2007). (See Text for details). ©Springer Nature.
Reprinted with permission.
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3.4.2.2 Monitoring Solution Steps and
Information Search
With the rise of information processing models of
thinking, problem solving research shifted to a type
of sequential tasks that allowed the researcher to
monitor directly the intermediate steps participants
took to solve the problem. A famous example is the
“Tower of Hanoi” problem in which three (or more)
discs of different sizes are stacked on one of three
pegs. The person’s task is to move the discs to the
third peg according to two rules: first, never put a
larger disc on top of a smaller one, and second, only
move one disc at a time (see Chapter 9, “Problem
Solving”, Figure 9.5). A second famous example is
the “hobbits-and-orcs” problem where a boat with
only two seats can be used to transfer 3 hobbits and
3 orcs across a river following the rule that there
must not be more orcs than hobbits on any side of
the river at any time. Participants’ solution steps
can be filmed, protocoled, or assessed by accompa-
nying think-aloud protocols. These kinds of tasks
helped to diagnose the general strategies people use
and where these heuristics may lead to impasses, for
example (Thomas, 1974).
Whereas this research strategy using sequential
tasks with “observable steps” has proven fruitful, it
is very restricted in scope. A somewhat more gener-
ally applicable approach is to monitor the informa-
tion search prior to a problem solution or decision.
In this paradigm, decision-relevant information is
hidden from the subject’s view and has to be ac-
tively uncovered or asked for. We will illustrate both
a structured version in an information board and an
unstructured open questioning paradigm.
Information search board. The first applications
of this method actually used information cards hid-
den in envelopes and laid out on a table or pinned
to a board (e.g. Payne, 1976). With the advent of
computerized experimenting, a so-called “Mouse-
Lab” version was first published by Payne et al.
(1988) which presents information boxes on a screen
that can be uncovered by just clicking it with the
computer mouse. This methodology is often used
Figure 3.7: Example of a hypothetical MouseLab layout similar to the one used in the study by Schulte-Mecklenbeck et al. (2013)
where participants could choose from two different meal options. All cells of the table were closed, and participants could
acquire information by clicking on the cells. They are opened here only for illustration.
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to investigate multi-attribute decisions, and it has
been developed in the meantime also for use in Web-
based studies (e.g., Willemsen & Johnson, 2019).
Figure 3.8 shows a typical display from Schulte-
Mecklenbeck et al. (2013) in which the decision op-
tions are arranged in columns, whereas the attributes
are arranged in rows. In this study, the participant
had to choose between meals offered in a virtual
canteen, each of which was described by the same
set of attributes (price, calories, different nutrients).
You may be familiar with these kinds of matrices
from consumer reports, for example, in which sev-
eral products are compared on various attributes. In
an information board study, all information is ini-
tially hidden, and the decision maker can uncover
information she desires (sometimes incurring some
search costs) and finally make a decision. The infor-
mation may remain visible after clicking, or it may
disappear again if the cursor leaves the respective
box. The latter procedure more heavily taxes work-
ing memory. As you can imagine, this procedure
yields a wealth of information about the search, such
as the search sequence, the amount of information
searched, and the time spent inspecting each piece
of information. Payne et al. (1988) have collected
various measures derivable from these data that are
believed to reflect aspects of the decision strategy
(see Textbox 3.4), in particular if decision making
tends to ignore information and focuses on compar-
ing options on important attributes (“noncompen-
satory” decision making) or whether the strategy
tends to use all information and compares overall
evaluations of the options (“compensatory” strate-
gies). Willemsen and Johnson (2019) report new
developments to visualize aspects of the search pro-
cess in this paradigm.
Unstructured open questioning formats. The in-
formation board technique described in the previous
section contains pre-structured information which
may create some experimental demands in suggest-
ing which kinds of information the experimenter
deems relevant. This allows the inferring of the rel-
ative importance people put on attributes but not
whether they find them important in the first place.
Huber, Wider, and Huber (1997) therefore developed
a technique with quasi-realistic decision scenarios.
After reading the scenarios (e.g. about the problem
of saving an endangered turtle species), participants
could ask for any further information they wished,
receiving answers from a large set of predefined in-
formation. This procedure has shown repeatedly that
participants tend to ignore probability information
(Huber et al., 1997) and that they ask for informa-
tion on how to eliminate risks (Huber, Bär & Huber,
2009).
Evaluation: Observing the steps involved in think-
ing by monitoring corresponding behavior is one
possibility to more “closely” follow thinking pro-
cesses. Monitoring stepwise problem solving is re-
stricted to a very specific type of tasks, however.
Another possibility is to register the information
search processes prior to a decision or action, for
example via MouseLab. As we have seen, this can
yield a wealth of data that may inform us about the
strategies people use. As a caveat, it should be noted
that information search is not necessarily indicative
of how the information is integrated (see Bröder,
2000), both may be quite different processes gov-
erned by different rules (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008).
For example, one may look up all relevant informa-
tion (seemingly indicating compensatory decision
making), but decide to ignore most of it (leading to
noncompensatory integration). Or one can decide in
a compensatory manner without exhaustive search
(if the remaining information could not reverse a
decision anyway). Researchers do not always dis-
tinguish between search and integration, which may
lead to misunderstandings in theory testing (Lohse
& E. J. Johnson, 1996). Hence, to apply the method-
ology, it must be clear which part of cognition is un-
der scrutiny. Finally, the active information search
paradigm by Huber et al. (1997) has the advantage
of not suggesting experimental demands to the study
participants but it is a rather explorative method for
generating instead of testing cognitive theories.
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Textbox 3.4: MouseLab Decision Strategy Indicators
Payne, Bettman, and E. J. Johnson (1988) and Payne (1976) derived various measures from the
search sequences and inspection times of information in MouseLab, for example the strategy
index SI (sometimes also called search index or PATTERN) which codes the relative amount
of option-wise search (i.e. moving within options to new attributes) versus attribute-wise search
(comparing different options on the same attribute). Option-wise search is thought to indicate
so-called compensatory strategies that use all information and compare overall evaluations of the
options (examples are WADD or TALLY in the previous textboxes), whereas attribute-wise search is
believed to reflect noncompensatory strategies that ignore information (such as TTB in the previous
textboxes). If no is the number of search transitions within an option to a different attribute and na
the number of transitions within an attribute to another option (transitions switching both option and





and it varies from -1 to +1, reflecting pure attribute- and option-wise search respectively. Böckenholt
and Hynan (1994) proposed a modified version of the index for asymmetric options x attributes
tables as in Figure 3.8. The following table contains further measures and their interpretation.
Measure Definition higher values indicate...
Strategy Index SI see text compensatory
ACQ number of acquisitions in trial compensatory
TPERACQ time per acquisition compensatory
PTMI percentage of time spent inspecting most important attribute noncompensatory
VAR-ATTR variance of times spent on different attributes noncompensatory
VAR-ALTER variance of times spent on different options noncompensatory
3.4.2.3 Tracking of Eye Movements
A method which has gained popularity in recent
years involves the registration of eye movements
while thinking, based on the assumption that a per-
son’s momentary attention and focus of process-
ing is reflected by his or her fixation on a stimulus.
While early eye tracking devices were expensive
and intrusive by requiring people to have their head
fixated (for example by biting a board) or to wear
heavy helmets with cameras and contact lenses, new
(and cheaper) devices allow for the remote moni-
toring of eye movements by use of infrared light
reflected from the cornea, either in front of a com-
puter screen or even in more natural environments
(see Ball, 2014, and Russo, 2019, for brief introduc-
tions). Eye-tracking has been used extensively in
research on reading and language comprehension,
but it is also becoming increasingly popular in deci-
sion research and research on thinking (see Orquin &
Loose, 2013). For example, by using an open infor-
mation board, tracking the gaze sequence may yield
similar information as with a MouseLab procedure.
The motor activity of the eyes is composed mainly
of saccades, which are quick movements during
which no information is registered, and fixations
which are brief resting periods during which the
viewer registers visual stimulus information (e.g.,
Holmqvist et al., 2011). Consequently, the sequence,
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number, average duration and cumulative duration
of fixations are of main interest to researchers.
For explorative (hypothesis-generating) research,
several methods for visualizing the gaze behavior
of participants exist. Heatmaps color-code the fre-
quency of fixations to certain parts of the stimulus,
and scanpaths contain additional information about
the sequence and the duration of the fixations (see
Figure 3.9 for examples of the same data presented
as a heatmap or a scanpath). These visualizations
are often used in applied research settings like us-
ability and consumer research in order to optimize
displays and ads.
In hypothesis-testing research, the stimulus dis-
play is typically arranged in a way that important
parts are clearly separated into areas of interest
(AOI) that contain different aspects of the problem.
For example, Figure 3.10 (left) shows a display with
five letters, four of which build an anagram (= scram-
bled word puzzle) with a four-letter solution, the
fifth letter being a superfluous distractor. The letters
are widely distributed across the screen for an error-
free detection of the stimulus a person is looking at
a specific moment.
Often, processing hypotheses can be formulated
in a way that different problem aspects are expected
to receive more attention than others which can be
tested by comparing the number or duration of fix-
ations at the respective AOIs. I will describe a re-
search example from problem solving research. To
test whether people acquire solution knowledge even
before they have a conscious insight into the cor-
rect solution, Ellis, Glaholt, and Reingold (2011)
used anagram problems like the one depicted in
Figure 3.10 and monitored eye movements during
problem solution. The anagrams consisted of five
letters, one of which was not part of the four-letter
solution word. Participants were instructed to press
a button as soon as they had found the solution word,
and in Experiment 1b additionally stated whether the
solution “popped up” in a sudden “aha” experience.
Ellis et al. (2011) tested the hypothesis that partici-
pants would accumulate knowledge prior to finding
the solution even if the solution appeared suddenly
in their consciousness. This should be reflected in
Figure 3.9: Heatmap and scanpath representation of the same eye tracking data of a person in a decision trial. In this task, the options
(columns) were card players, and participants had to predict their success based on advice of experts (rows). In this trial,
the participant focuses on the two leftmost options in a predominantly option-wise manner. (Data from Ettlin & Bröder,
2015, Experiment 4).
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decreasing attention to the distractor relative to the
solution letters. In fact, there was a significant ten-
dency to ignore the distractor letter on average 2.5 s
before particpants announced they had found the
solution, confirming the hypothesis of knowledge
accumulation before conscious insight.
Evaluation: The tracking of eye movements has
become cheaper, more user-friendly and less intru-
sive in recent years. Holmqvist et al. (2011) give an
extensive overview of theory and application. As we
have seen, eye-tracking data can reveal a lot about
the sequence of processing and the allocation of
attention while thinking, and it can be used both
in an explorative and a hypothesis-testing fashion.
The latter requires experimental setups with theoret-
ically defined AOIs for which gaze durations and
frequencies can be compared. Furthermore, impor-
tant extensions are under development such as the
memory indexing method developed by Renkewitz
and Jahn (2012). This ingenious idea is based on
the “looking-at-nothing” effect first investigated by
Richardson and Spivey (2000), demonstrating that
during memory retrieval, people tend to look at the
location (on a computer screen, for instance) where
they learned that information. Basically, this method
therefore allows the monitoring of sequences of hid-
den memory processes by analyzing gaze data! A
study by Scholz, Krems, and Jahn (2017) on (hy-
Figure 3.10: Top left: Anagram setup of Ellis et al. (2011), one letter does not belong to the four-letter solution word. Top right: Areas
of interest (AOIs) from which fixations to the letters are recorded (not visible to participants). Bottom: Mean proportion
of time looked at solution letters and distractor prior to solution in Experiment 1b. ©Elsevier. Reprinted with permission.
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pothetical) medical diagnoses not only replicated
the looking-at-nothing effect but also showed that
the gaze behavior reflects the diagnosis currently
most active in working memory, and it also allows
the prediction of participants’ final decisions. Also,
new software methods allow to change displays con-
tingent on gaze behavior “on the fly” (e.g. Franco-
Watkins & J. G. Johnson, 2011), thus opening new
possibilities for experiments.
There are a few downsides to the eye-tracking
method, however: first, the connection between vi-
sual attention and gaze direction is not always as
close as assumed since spatial attention can also be
directed to locations without moving the eyes. Sec-
ond, many other factors (like salience or reading rou-
tines) influence our gaze behavior, thus data are of-
ten quite noisy, and it is not always easy to separate
meaningful data from the unsystematic variation.
Third, depending on the quality of the equipment
used, often several participants have to be excluded
(e.g. those wearing glasses or contact lenses). Fi-
nally, at the moment of writing, explorative rather
than theory-testing applications seem to prevail in
the literature which may of course change in the
future.
3.4.2.4 Response Dynamics
A recent development pioneered by Spivey, Gros-
jean, and Knoblich (2005) uses the characteristics of
the motor behavior (specifically, participants’ hand
movements) during a decision response to draw con-
clusions about internal thinking processes and their
dynamics. Since most experiments use the com-
puter mouse as the input device, this methodology
has been christened mouse-tracking, although other
devices have been used to record participants’ hand
movements as well (e.g., the Nintendo Wii Remote,
a handle, or motion capture systems). One assump-
tion is that the decision dynamically evolves during
the mouse movement, and its trajectory may there-
fore reflect the extent to which a decision conflict is
present (Stillerman & Freeman, 2019). In a typical
setup, each trial presents two choice options in the
upper left and right corners of the computer screen.
The participant has to initiate a trial by clicking on a
start button that is typically placed in the neutral mid-
dle at the lower end of the screen (cf. Figure 3.11)
upon which the decision-critical information is pre-
sented (either immediately, after a delay, or follow-
ing an initial upwards movement; see Scherbaum
& Kieslich, 2018, for a discussion about the dif-
ferent starting procedures and their consequences
for mouse-tracking data). During the (sometimes
speeded) response, the participant will then choose
one option by clicking it while her mouse move-
ments are continuously recorded. If the decision
maker feels a conflict between both options, the
mouse path will probably not be totally straight, but
it will be “drawn” a bit to the competing alterna-
tive. Several measures can be derived to quantify
this deviation, the simplest is the “maximum abso-
lute deviation (MAD)” of the curved trajectory from
the straight line leading to the chosen option. Fig-
ure 3.11 shows a typical display investigating the
“Simon effect” along with visualized raw data as
well as average trajectories from data published by
Scherbaum et al (2010).
Although it is quite new, the method has been ap-
plied to a variety of domains, such as categorization
tasks (animals, gender, race), spoken word recog-
nition, risky decision making, word and sentence
comprehension, truth judgments, social cognition
and more (see Freeman et al., 2011; Freeman, 2018).
It provides a sensitive measure of conflict between
response options. Furthermore, the exact analysis of
the temporal dynamics in the trajectories (including
speed and acceleration metrics) can even provide
information about when the conflict arises, which
can signify whether a specific piece of information
is processed earlier or later in the decision process
(Dshemuchadse, Scherbaum, & Goschke, 2013; Sul-
livan, Hutcherson, Harris, & Rangel, 2015). For
example, Sullivan et al. (2015) had their participants
choose between food items they had rated before on
healthiness and taste. Independent of which food
was chosen in a trial, the mouse trajectory was in-
fluenced by the taste difference earlier than by the
healthiness information, indicating that the initial
preference tendency is driven by pleasure, whereas
health considerations come into play somewhat later
in the decision process.
Evaluation: The way in which participants move
the mouse to choose an option is an unobtrusive
44 • Psychology of Human Thought • Chapter 3
Process-oriented Methods Bröder
Figure 3.11: Top left: Exemplary mouse-tracking setup of Experiment 2 by Scherbaum et al. (2010) to investigate the Simon effect.
Participants had to click a start button at the bottom center of the screen (dashed lines), when moving the cursor upwards,
a number x appeared, and participants had to click left or right for x<5 and x>5 respectively. The presentation side of the
number varied, creating congruent (x<5 left or x>5 right) vs. incongruent (x<5 right or x>5 left) trials. Top right: The
summary mean absolute deviation of mouse trajectories demonstrates the Simon effect with greater average deviation for
incongruent trials. Bottom: Individual and average (thick lines) mouse trajectories for congruent and incongruent trials
(note that all trajectories were flipped to the left and only correct trials were analyzed).
method for revealing conflicting response tenden-
cies. As the food choice example shows, even quite
detailed information about the time course of pro-
cessing can be gathered. Furthermore, easy-to-use
implementation and analysis software has been de-
veloped, for example, the mousetrap plugin for cre-
ating mouse-tracking experiments in the free and
open-source graphical experiment builder OpenS-
esame (Kieslich & Henninger, 2017) and the mouse-
trap R package for analyzing and visualizing mouse-
tracking data (Wulff, Haslbeck, Kieslich, Henninger,
& Schulte-Mecklenbeck, 2019). As a relatively
novel method, mouse-tracking faces a number of
challenges. Many aspects of the design of mouse-
tracking studies (e.g. the starting procedure and
mouse sensitivity settings) require careful considera-
tion to reduce the amount of noise in the data and to
ensure that the decision process takes place during
(and not before) the movement (e.g. Scherbaum &
Kieslich, 2018). Also, averaged trajectories may be
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misleading and suggest a smooth curve when in fact,
they are averaged across different types of trajecto-
ries in different trials (Wulff et al., 2019). Finally,
it is currently unknown whether cognitive conflicts
always influence response dynamics and therefore
how to interpret the absence of trajectory effects.
3.4.3 Computer Simulations
Beginning with Newell, Shaw, and Simon’s (1958)
work on a computer program later called the “Gen-
eral Problem Solver” (although it was rather limited
in its abilities), cognitive scientists have attempted to
formulate their theories in precise formal terms and
to translate them into computer programs. The aim
is to simulate human performance in cognitive tasks,
including typical errors and fallacies or shortcom-
ings in memory etc. Computer versions of theories
are also termed computational models (Farrell &
Lewandowsky, 2018). The scope of such models
ranges from very specific theories about certain tasks
to broad overarching “cognitive architectures” (e.g.
ACT-R by Anderson et al., 2004) that entail many
empirically informed constraints for modeling and
predicting human behavior.
The advantages of formalizing theories and cog-
nitive processes in such a way are manifold: first,
the precision of the theory typically has to be in-
creased. Whereas verbal theories are often quite
vague, an implementation in the computer demands
precise concepts. Second, such a formalization may
reveal inconsistencies in the theory that would have
gone unnoticed without formalizing it. Third, in
addition to just predicting qualitative “effects” (e.g.
the existence of group differences), precise models
may even give quantitative predictions about effect
sizes. Hence, in addition to the experimental tools
researchers use to observe people’s behavior, match-
ing it with computer simulations can reveal a lot
about the validity of cognitive theories. We refer the
interested reader to Farrell and Lewandowsky (2018)
for an excellent introduction to cognitive modeling.
3.4.4 Neuroscientific Methods
Since all our cognitive functions including thinking
depend on brain functions, an ultimate understand-
ing of cognition will have to include knowledge
about these functions. The traditional approach of
neuropsychology gains many insights into the local-
ization of cognitive functions in the human cortex by
carefully assessing cognitive impairments caused by
specific brain injuries. These investigations have in-
spired the view that the brain’s architecture is largely
modular with certain modules being responsible for
specific abilities.
In recent decades, brain imaging methods—
mostly functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI)—have dramatically increased our knowl-
edge about the brain structures involved in diverse
cognitive tasks including thinking, although enthu-
siastic claims that fMRI can “watch the brain while
thinking” are quite overstated (see Satel & Lilien-
feld, 2013, for a critique). Basically, the standard
fMRI method can contrast the metabolic activity
pattern in the brain during a task with the activity
pattern in another (control) task, and the regions
with the greatest activity differences are probably
involved in the processes that differ between the
tasks. Hence, the experimental logic is quite sim-
ilar to Donders’ (1868) subtraction method for re-
sponse times, and the better the tasks are chosen, the
more meaningful the interpretation of the activation
differences. In the last few years, complex statisti-
cal methods called connectivity analysis have also
been developed which give very detailed informa-
tion about the path and time course of activation that
spreads through the brain during specific tasks (see
Bastos & Schoffelen, 2016, for a review).
A wealth of knowledge about brain structures
involved in various cognitive activities has been ac-
cumulated in the meantime, and a deeper treatment
of neuroscientific methods is beyond the scope of
this chapter. For the interested reader, I highly rec-
ommend Ward (2015) and Purves et al. (2013), for
introductions into cognitive neuroscience.
3.5 Conclusion
The behaviorists believed that investigating thoughts
and consciousness would require introspection and
verbal reports which are subjective and notoriously
unreliable. Hence, they believed the mind to evade
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serious scientific investigation. As this chapter has
shown, cognitive psychologists have proven this as-
pect of behaviorism to be blatantly wrong. Numer-
ous innovative techniques that rely on objective data
were developed that shed light on the proverbial
“black box” of the mind. As recent devlopments
like response dynamics and eye tracking show, this
development of clever methods is still going on, and
it will without doubt help to reveal more fascinating
insights into cognition in the future.
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Summary
How can theories about unobservable events like cognitive processes be tested and evaluated
empirically? Since the method of introspection (self-observation) was criticized very early on for
various reasons, cognitive scientists have developed a large toolbox of other methods that yield more
objective data for testing theories about cognition. The idea behind this is that cognitive processes
like retrieving a memory or solving a logical puzzle lead to observable consequences in behavior.
The easiest methods just measure the outcome of a process, e.g. whether an item is solved or not.
Depending on how precise the theory is, this can provide surprisingly detailed information about
cognition. For example, items may be chosen in a way that different processes predict different
solution patterns across these items which may allow the inferring of a strategy. Another set of
methods tries to tackle the underlying processes more closely, for example by dissecting response
times or by monitoring information uptake with information boards or eye movement analyses.
Also, movements during response generation can reveal conflicting response tendencies. Finally,
theories about thinking and cognition can profit very much from computer simulations and of course
neuroscientific research that investigates the neural underpinnings of the processes.
Review Questions
1. Why is it important to have objective measurements or observations in science, meaning
that in principle, different observers would come to similar conclusions about the observed
phenomena?
2. Explain in your own words how it is possible to draw conclusions about latent cognitive
processes or strategies by observing overt behavior.
3. If you employed an information board setup with an option-by-attributes matrix for a decision
problem, but displayed all information freely from the beginning, which information could
you extract from the scanpath of fixations if you monitor the gaze movements of a person?
4. Looking at Figure 3.11, what problems would you expect with the mouse-tracking procedure,
both theoretically and in practice?
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Hot Topic: Single or multiple mechanisms in decision making?
Arndt Bröder
My research in the last two decades has been greatly inspired
by research on “adaptive decision making” showing that people
flexibly adapt their decision behavior to changing environmental
demands, such as time pressure, memory retrieval demands, or
payoff structures. The predominant view has been that we can
choose from a large repertoire of qualitatively different strategies
and heuristics that we employ under appropriate circumstances (see
Textboxes 3.3. and 3.4). This idea of a strategy “toolbox” was
especially promoted by Gigerenzer et al. (1999) and stimulated
a lot of research. After developing valid methods for diagnosing
these strategies in a valid manner (see Textbox 3.3), my further research investigated under which
circumstances these strategies and simple heuristics are applied (see Bröder, 2012, for an overview).
However, there are also critics of the toolbox metaphor, claiming that we might rather use a single
mechanism for deciding, such as the evidence accumulation model described in Section 3.4.2
(Figure 3.5), and widening or narrowing the gap between decision thresholds may just mimick the
use of different strategies, although people just change a parameter in a universal strategy. Both
views are notoriously hard to differentiate empirically. In a series of elegant studies, my doctoral
student Anke Söllner showed that indeed the evidence accumulation view is more plausible than the
multiple heuristics view to describe information acquisition (Söllner & Bröder, 2016). Recent joint
work with colleagues favoring another “unified strategy” approach based on coherence-maximization
principles also showed that predicions from this theory appear to explain search behavior better
than the multiple strategies view (Jekel, Glöckner & Bröder, 2018). The debate which metaphor
is more appropriate will probably continue for a while (see Marewski, Bröder & Glöckner, 2018),
but I always try to respect Konrad Lorenz’ advice: “It is a good morning exercise for a research
scientist to discard a pet hypothesis every day before breakfast. It keeps him young.” a
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Glossary
area of interest (AOI) Region on a display that
is predefined as theoretically interesting when
fixated by a participant during eye tracking.
42
computational model A theory or theoretical as-
sumptions about cognitive processes cast in
precise mathematical terms to predict and/or
explain empirical phenomena. 46
correlation study Empirical study in which vari-
ables that are expected to covary are meaured
or observed in order to test whether they actu-
ally covary. This typically does not allow for
causal interpretations of their connection. 27
dependent variable (DV) The variable of inter-
est, the value of which we try to explain by
other (independent) variables. 27
experiment The independent variable (IV) is ac-
tively manipulated by an experimenter to ob-
serve its impact on the dependent variable
(DV). If participants are randomly assigned to
different levels of the IV, the effects of the IV
on the DV can be interpreted causally. 28
eye tracking A method for monitoring people’s vi-
sual information intake by recording their eye
movements during the inspection of a display.
41
fMRI Functional Magnetic resonance Imaging is a
non-invasive method to measure the regional
blood flow in the brain during task processing.
Contrasting the activity during different tasks
allows to infer the brain regions crucially in-
volved in the processes that differ between
tasks. 46
independent variable (IV) The IV is a variable
that is theoretically assumed to influedce an-
other variable of interest (the dependent vari-
able). 27
indicator An indicator variable ist an observable
variable (e.g. the number of test items solved)
that reflects a theoretically interesting unob-
servable variable (e.g. intelligence). 28
introspection The method of observing one’s own
cognitive processes during a task and to report
on them. This method has been criticized very
early as subjective and error-prone. 28
methodological behaviorism A methodological
position that keeps the behaviorist conviction
to base empirical data solely on objectively
observable behavior. However, in contrast
to radical behaviorism, the position does not
deny that unobservable processes (like cog-
nitive processes) exist, and hypotheses about
them can be tested by relying objective data.
29
neuropsychology Classical method of precisely
documenting cognitive impaiments caused by
circumscribed bran damage in order to local-
ize brain functions. 46
operationalization The process of translating a la-
tent variable (e.g. memory strength) into an
empirically observable variable (e.g. number
of recalled items). 27
reactivity A problem that may arise if the assess-
ment method of a process changes the process
itself. 29
thinking-aloud-method Verbalization of all
thoughts during a problem solution. This
method may give a researcher hints on the
nature of strategies used. 29
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Chapter 4
Concepts: Structure and Acquisition
KIMERY R. LEVERING & KENNETH J. KURTZ
Marist College & Binghamton University
A good way to begin thinking about the psychology
of concepts and categories is by making some con-
nections to other familiar and foundational elements
of human cognition. Perception provides organized
sensory impressions about the physical world. Mem-
ory contains a record of experience and a storehouse
of what we know about the world. Reasoning is the
process of going beyond available information to
generate inferences or conclusions. How do con-
cepts and categories fit in? One can convincingly
argue that they tie these elements of our cognitive
system together.
Perhaps the most fundamental and universal cog-
nitive task is matching our perceptions of the envi-
ronment around us with our knowledge in memory
about the kinds of things that exist and the kinds
of meaning that characterize scenes and situations.
This knowledge is our set of concepts—the tools
of thought or mental representations we apply to
identify and understand a stimulus. From a memory
perspective, it would take a lot of effort and capac-
ity to remember (and treat as distinct) each of the
seemingly infinite number of objects, people, places,
and ideas in our environment. Instead, our cognitive
system has the remarkable ability to organize our ex-
periences in long-term memory, grouping instances
together into one common concept despite the many
ways they might differ. Every apple you encounter
is a little different, but the commonalities shared
across the category cognitively outweigh their dif-
ferences enough to warrant grouping them together
into a concept of apple.
As a result of classifying something we have never
encountered before (e.g., recognizing an item on dis-
play in a grocery store as an apple), we do not need
to figure out everything about it from scratch. We
can assume that our category knowledge applies
to this instance and a number of important conse-
quences follow. We can access other knowledge that
is connected to the category (e.g. trees, serpents,
gravity, teachers, pies, etc.), we can communicate
to others about it (e.g., “Hey, pass me that apple!”),
we can reason about and predict characteristics that
may not otherwise have been obvious (e.g., it tastes
sweet and offers nutrients), and we can use the cat-
egorization toward further explanation (e.g., some-
one who orders an apple instead of fries is trying
to be healthy). As Murphy (2002) wrote, concepts
are “the glue that holds our mental world together”
because of their role in virtually every cognitive
experience we have.
Philosophers and other theorists have long rea-
soned about how people learn, represent, and use
concepts, but in the latter half of the 20th century,
psychologists began to collect empirical data from
carefully controlled laboratory experiments to test
theories grounded in the information-processing
framework. As in other areas of the field, research
has blossomed through the application of interdisci-
plinary approaches such as computational modeling.
In this chapter, we will review theories, models, and
behavioral data that have helped us to understand
how concepts are acquired and structured.
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4.1 How Concepts Arise from
Experience
It is understood that we do not come into the world
as infants knowing what concepts like fork or athlete
are. The rich knowledge we achieve about natural
concepts comes about at least in part from experi-
encing examples and organizing them into groups
(either on our own or based on what we are told).
But what is the organizing basis that causes individ-
uals or cultures to divide up the world as we do?
What gives concepts their naturalness, their coher-
ence, and their usefulness?
Most work in the field is consistent with the broad
assumption that concepts emerge because the mem-
bers of a category are like each other and different
from other kinds of things. On this view, categories
arise because there are regularities and a natural
order in the world that can be discovered. It does
not take any special work to invent categories—for
example, apples are intrinsically like one another
and unlike non-apples. The physical properties of
objects as experienced through our senses are the
grounding basis for categories. This idea of featural
similarity has been defined in a number of ways,
but it often refers to how many properties or features
are shared (e.g., Tversky, 1977). For example, you
would probably say that a dog is more similar to
a wolf than a peacock in part because a dog and a
wolf both typically have four legs, paws, fur, etc.
while a dog and a peacock share far fewer character-
istics. Another foundational approach to similarity
is based on the geometric distance between items
represented as points in a multidimensional psycho-
logical space (Shepard, 1957, 1987). To understand
this, consider a cube where each interior point repre-
sents a value along each of three spatial dimensions
(length, width, and depth). Shepard proposed that
examples are represented as points in a multidimen-
sional space corresponding to their values on the set
of psychological dimensions along which examples
vary (for example, apples may be defined in terms
of roundness, redness, crunchiness, size, etc.).
When we experience a set of examples that are
importantly alike (or when we are directly told that
they belong to the same category), this experience
invites a process of building up a general-level un-
derstanding that holds across these examples and
supports generalization to new cases. This basis for
category membership can be a set of features or di-
mension values that an item must be similar to—or
it can be a rule that specifies exactly what features
or dimension values are required for membership.
There have been various attempts to describe how
concepts arise from experience, and evaluating the
relative merits of these theories has made up a con-
siderable amount of the work in human category
learning.
4.1.1 Concepts as Abstractions from
the Data
Many theories of categorization assume that as you
encounter examples from a category, you engage
in a process of abstraction. This means that some
detail about an example or collection of examples is
lost and only the most important parts make up your
concept. To understand abstraction, imagine being
asked to draw a picture of your bedroom. Rather
than a precise replica of the room, your picture
would likely be simpler and contain fewer details.
The exact number of dresser drawers, the color of
your bedspread, and maybe even the presence of
certain items might not be included in your draw-
ing because you have either forgotten those details
or don’t consider them to be important. This is a
gist-like representation of a single instance. To form
concepts, the gist is formulated across many exam-
ples (other people’s bedrooms) or at increased levels
of abstraction (different types of rooms, interiors,
physical environments, etc.). There are a number of
ways that categories can be formed as abstractions,
depending on the specific basis for what information
to keep or discard.
4.1.1.1 Abstracting Defining
Features—Classical View
The first possibility considered was that concepts
are formed by abstracting a fundamentally impor-
tant characteristic or set of characteristics that all
examples of a category have in common. For ex-
ample, you may learn over time that to be a grand-
mother, someone must (1) be female and (2) have
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grandchildren. As long as someone meets those nec-
essary (they must have these qualities) and sufficient
(having just these qualities is enough) conditions for
membership, they are a grandmother. Because all
that is needed is satisfying some criteria, examples
are either members of the category or not, and no ex-
ample is any better or worse than any other. Acquir-
ing a concept then is a process of gradually learning
the essential properties that something needs to have
in order to be considered a member.
This account of essential or defining properties
has been around so long and was so popular in phi-
losophy that it is often called the classical view
(Smith & Medin, 1981). It wasn’t until the mid-
20th century that philosophers and psychologists
began to take issue with some of its assumptions.
First, it was argued that there are no perfect defini-
tions for categories. Wittgenstein (1953) famously
argued that the concept “game” cannot be defined
by any set of necessary and sufficient properties.
He defended against a number of possible attempts
to do so (e.g., must a game involve competition?
must a game involve winning/losing?) You may
expect these kinds of definitions to be easier for tax-
onomic categories like animal species or chemical
compounds, but it has been exceedingly difficult to
come up with hard and fast definitions even for these
types of categories. If a necessary characteristic of a
dog is that it has four legs, does an animal stop being
a dog if one of its legs is amputated? Objects not
fitting a definition can also sometimes be considered
members of a category. For example, Lupyan (2013)
found that people were willing to call someone a
“grandmother” even if they had no grandchildren.
Second, there are many examples that do not seem
to fit cleanly into one category or another. Medin
(1989) gives an example of rugs, which could be
considered members of the category furniture, but
do not seem to quite belong. Third, we see evidence
of graded structure, meaning that some examples
of a category are seen as better examples of that
category than others. If you were asked to rate a list
of fruit in terms of how typical they were of the cate-
gory fruit, you would probably rate a banana as more
typical than an avocado. This has been found con-
sistently, even for categories thought to be the most
well-defined. For example, Armstrong, Gleitman,
and Gleitman (1983) found that certain examples of
the category even numbers (e.g., 4) were considered
to be better examples than others (e.g., 34). Such
typicality effects are not easily explained by a theory
that assumes examples to be simply in a category or
not.
Figure 4.1: Difference between prototype and exemplar approach to the concept of dog arising from experiencing nine different dogs.
Exemplar theory assumes the concept to be the collection of memories of each instance while prototype theory assumes the
concept to be an abstracted example representing an average on relevant features.
Psychology of Human Thought • Chapter 4 • 57
Levering & Kurtz Concepts: Structure and Acquisition
4.1.1.2 Abstracting a Set of Common
Features—Prototype Approach
In response to criticism of the classical view, a the-
ory arose in philosophy (Wittgenstein, 1953) and
later in psychology (Posner & Keel, 1968; Hamp-
ton, 1993; Smith & Minda, 2001; Rosch & Mervis,
1975) that while we do abstract the most common or
central properties among category members, none
of these properties are necessary or sufficient. In
this set of views, eventually called the prototype
approach, an item can be missing some features
and still be considered a member of the category.
Proponents of this view often think of concepts as
boiling down to a single example, a prototype, that
has the most common characteristics (e.g., has four
legs) or the most common values along relevant di-
mensions (e.g., is 2.5 feet long). In Figure 4.1, the
prototype is the average of the nine dogs experi-
enced, even though that average is not exactly like
any one of the dogs previously seen. In this view,
we develop prototypes for every concept and then a
new instance is classified based on which category’s
prototype it is more similar to. This view is often
thought to better describe natural categories as mem-
bers often share most but not all features, a property
called family resemblance. This view is also con-
sidered more successful at explaining experimental
findings such as unclear category membership (rugs
just don’t have many of the common features of fur-
niture and are far from the category prototype) and
typicality effects (items rated as less typical tend to
possess fewer common features).
4.1.1.3 Abstracting a Boundary
Rather than developing a conceptual representation
that is the center or average of a set of category
members, other researchers have proposed that we
instead update information about the boundaries of a
category (Ashby, 1992; Ashby & Maddox, 1993). If
the goal of concepts is to differentiate between types
of things, perhaps the most important consideration
is the partition line—where one category ends and
another begins. For example, rather than seeing how
similar a new banana is to your prototypes for the
concepts ripe banana and unripe banana, we may
simply use information about the point at which a
banana goes from being classified as unripe to ripe
along one or more dimensions. Knowledge of these
partitions can identify examples of a concept with-
out having to know anything specific about other
examples or common/average features.
4.1.2 Concepts as just the
Data—Exemplar Approach
More recently, a set of theories has centered on the
idea that we do not form abstractions at all but
rather store specific information about examples
themselves (see Figure 4.1). In other words, your
concept of apple is made up of some version of a
memory of every apple you have encountered (or at
least the first or most prominent ones). New apples
are recognized because they are highly similar to
examples that have been thought of as apples before.
In fact, the most successful explanations rely on the
assumption that only the examples most similar to
the new apple have influence on classification.
This exemplar approach (Medin & Schaffer,
1978; Nosofsky, 1984, 1986; Kruschke, 1992) can
explain prototype effects related to typicality and
fuzzy boundaries because examples that are dissim-
ilar to prototypes are also frequently dissimilar to
other examples in the category. Rug and ostrich
would be considered poor examples of their respec-
tive categories because they are not highly similar to
any other piece of furniture or bird. Formal versions
of exemplar theory have been highly successful at
predicting human performance, particularly in cases
where there are not many examples to learn. These
draw upon two main design principles. The first
is that category representations are labeled exem-
plars that serve as reference points for similarity
comparisons. When a new example is experienced,
the model figures out how similar it is to the known
examples it has stored, and bases classification on
the category associated with the closest match. The
second has to do with how similarity is computed. In
the process of looking for particularly close matches,
some dimensions may be treated as more important
than others, a property known as dimensional selec-
tive attention. If we learn that size is useful when
distinguishing between types of dogs, this feature
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should be given more influence than something less
useful like number of legs. Selective attention is typ-
ically thought to happen during encoding (meaning
the number of legs a dog has does not even register)
but could also be applied at the point of making a
decision (the number of legs registers but does not
contribute to the decision of what type of dog it is).
There is plenty of experimental evidence suggesting
that we use selective attention when we are learning
categories, although this tendency does not seem to
be as central to categorization in infants and young
children.
4.1.3 Piecing Together Concepts
Much research in the last 50 years has been directed
at evaluating whether concepts should be thought
of as rules, prototypes, or a collection of exemplars,
and evidence has been found in support of each
account to differing degrees. Given that learning
appears to vary in important ways across people,
situations, and content, the category learning system
could involve multiple processes or systems that in-
voke different underlying mechanisms. In line with
this, several hybrid models have been developed,
each asserting that information from separate sys-
tems is either combined, competes, or that a second
system takes over when a primary system fails. One
class of hybrid models assumes that concepts are
acquired through a combination of learning rules
for membership and storing individual examples
(Erickson & Kruschke, 1998; Nosofsky, Palmeri,
& McKinley, 1994). An approach that emphasizes
separate neurobiological systems makes a strong dis-
tinction between an explicit verbal rule induction
system and an implicit, procedural system (Ashby
& Maddox, 2005). Similarity-based models have
been developed that allow for both abstraction and
exemplar-like effects by letting the model determine
on the fly whether to represent the category with
many clusters (a unique cluster for each item would
be the exemplar approach), with one cluster (pro-
totype view), or with an intermediate number of
clusters (having a set of sub-prototypes to capture
different aspects of the category; Love, Medin, &
Gureckis, 2004). Another highly flexible approach
is based on learning what configurations of feature
values are consistent with each category—this in-
volves no explicit use of rules or reference to specific
exemplars or prototypes (Kurtz, 2007, 2015; see Hot
Topic).
4.1.4 Explaining the Data
The approaches we have considered up to this point
take the data about categories (i.e., the members of a
category) as the direct basis for psychological repre-
sentations of categories. This is most clearly evident
in the exemplar view: the representation of a cate-
gory consists strictly of the stored examples known
to belong to the category. Abstractive accounts are
based on finding a summary representation that cap-
tures the character of the category members without
having to store them all. A rule is a representa-
tion that only requires storing the features that are
necessary and sufficient for determining category
membership. Instead of storing every example, the
learner stores the information that must be true of
each category member. A prototype is a statistical
rather than logical form of summarization—instead
of trying to summarize what is true of each exam-
ple, the idea is to keep track of the central tendency
among the examples. In this way, the nature of the
category is captured by the set of feature values that
are most representative of its members (i.e., storing
a single canonical example –that could be real or
made-up—instead of storing them all).
Are there alternatives to category representations
that use the examples or summaries of the examples
as building blocks? Why might such alternatives
be important? One important consideration is that
the present approach assumes that the available data
(the representations of each example) contains ev-
erything we expect our categories to contain. If that
is so, where do these item representations that are as
semantically rich as our concepts come from? For
example, if our concept of apple is merely a repre-
sentation of physical features, how can that explain
other information about apples like their role in ap-
preciating teachers, avoiding doctors, discovering
gravity, worms, cider, pesticides, bobbing, pies, etc.
This issue becomes more extreme when considering
categories that are even slightly more abstract (e.g.,
bag) where what makes examples similar is a con-
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struction rather than something directly derived from
physical form. A promising proposal that has re-
ceived only limited attention distinguishes between
a core and an identification procedure for concepts
(Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976; Smith & Medin,
1981). The identification component is perceptually
driven, while the core of the concept includes richly
constructed semantic elements that arise from world
knowledge and the interaction between humans and
their environment.
Also in line with criticisms of similarity- or data-
driven approaches is a theory-driven approach
which considers categorization to be a process of
explanation rather than similarity-based matching
(Murphy & Medin, 1985). In this view, category
representations are grounded in knowledge about
what makes something a member that is not ex-
pressed in the same terms as item representation.
In other words, a stimulus is not a chair because
it has features that closely resemble the features
of known chairs (or a summary of the features of
known chairs); instead, the stimulus is a chair be-
cause the data (our sensory experience) is best ex-
plained in terms of the explanatory principles un-
derlying chairs. What might such principles be?
Researchers have looked to function and origin for
such principles: Does it do what a chair should do?
Was it built to be a chair? Is it used as a chair?
The classic example from Murphy and Medin
(1985) asks how we categorize a fully clothed man
in a pool. The suggestion is that we explain the
available data in terms of the category of drunken-
ness by recognizing how explanatory principles like
reduced coordination/judgment accord with what
we see—it is not that we identify a close feature-by-
feature resemblance between the man in the water
and our prior experience of drunk people. The the-
ory view of categorization provides an important
critique of standard accounts: matching between
stimuli and category representations requires solv-
ing the problem of identifying the “respects” for
similarity—what are the features to compare upon
and with what weights or importances?
In practice, researchers have had little success in
translating this viewpoint into a mechanistic account
of the processes and representations underlying cat-
egorization ability. Even so, much progress in the
field can be seen as offshoots off the influence of the
theory view. For example, an important idea rising
in the field takes the perspective that categories are
best represented as models of the statistical regular-
ities that hold among category members; and the
models are applied to categorize examples through
a process of fitting the data rather than matching it
(see Hot Topic). This resonates with a view that cat-
egories may be best understood in terms of schema
theory as organized generic knowledge structures
that can be activated and instantiated by filling slots
with specific values (see Komatsu, 1992; Rumelhart,
1980). Another approach emphasizes the role of
causal relationships in category learning and repre-
sentation, for example the presence of wings on a
bird and the bird’s ability to fly (cf., Ahn & Kim,
2000; Rehder, 2003).
Murphy and colleagues have extended the impact
of the theory view in a number of ways including
a critique of the way category learning is typically
studied in the laboratory that reinforces limited psy-
chological accounts by excluding the critical role of
prior knowledge about features, concepts, and gen-
eral semantic memory (e.g., Murphy & Allopenna,
1994; Murphy, 2003; Wisniewski & Medin, 1994).
Researchers have also been influenced by the the-
ory view in expanding the problem of categoriza-
tion beyond the ability to classify traditional tax-
onomic categories. There is a diversity of kinds
of categories and a diversity of ways in which cate-
gories are learned and used (Markman & Ross, 2003;
Medin, Lynch, & Solomon, 2000; Kurtz, 2015).
4.2 Modes of Category Learning
While the study of human category learning is ulti-
mately about real-life concepts like athletes or forks,
it is often difficult to answer questions about how
natural categories like these are acquired because
they have already been learned in unique and per-
sonal ways that cannot be easily controlled for. In
order to get around this, cognitive psychologists cre-
ate and teach artificial categories that can be more
precisely controlled. These artificial categories are
made up of members that participants have never
seen before but that possess simpler versions of the
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kinds of features that exist in the real world. Exam-
ples are grouped into categories by researchers, of-
ten according to the same kinds of principles that we
think real categories are grouped by. Participants are
then taught which category each example belongs to,
imitating the process by which we learn about cat-
egories in the real world. What people learn about
the categories can be assessed by having them de-
cide what category some new item is in or by asking
them questions about trained examples (How typi-
cal is this example of its category?), features (What
category is a winged creature most likely to be in?),
or relationships between features (How likely are
winged creatures to have webbed feet?). Specific
aspects of the task (the stimuli, which examples are
in which category, how many categories, etc.) can
be manipulated to see in what way those changes af-
fect how easily categories are learned, what kind of
information is remembered, or how that knowledge
is applied.
4.2.1 Learning Concepts Through
Classification
Most commonly, concept learning is studied through
a supervised category learning (see Figure 4.2), in
which images are presented one at a time and learn-
ers decide which of usually two categories each
belongs to. They are told whether they are right or
wrong (this feedback is what makes the learning con-
sidered supervised) and over time they learn to cor-
rectly assign examples to the appropriate category,
often with high accuracy. More than just memoriz-
ing what category each example is in, learners can
pick up on relevant commonalities and differences
between the categories, just like how we learn about
what tends to be true of dogs and what distinguishes
dogs from coyotes.
It is not hard to come up with real life instances
that align with this kind of learning. For exam-
ple, imagine you see an animal running across your
lawn and think that it is a coyote before your friend
informs you that it is in fact your neighbor’s dog,
Fluffy. Although we can think of cases fitting this
kind of guess-and-correct classification, it is not
likely the only or even primary way we learn. Con-
cepts are most likely acquired through a combination
of many modes of learning, in service of particular
goals. What makes up your concept of dog likely
comes from times in which you knew something
was a dog before you saw it (e.g., your friend invites
you over to meet her new dog), made inferences
about a dog that ended up being true or not (e.g.,
you learn whether or not a dog will play catch), or
learned about dogs incidentally while focusing on
a specific task (e.g., picking out a pet from a pet
store). Sometimes you may not even get feedback
about whether your idea of category membership or
predicted features are correct (e.g., you never find
out whether the animal that ran across the lawn was
a coyote or a dog).
Figure 4.2: Example of one trial of a supervised classification task. The participant views an example and decides which of two
categories it is in before receiving feedback.
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4.2.2 Learning Concepts Through
Inference, Use, and Observation
Research has provided evidence that differences in
the way a concept is learned are important. Of-
tentimes, when a learning task is changed, differ-
ent kinds of information are acquired. For exam-
ple, when participants learn by predicting features
of labeled examples, they often learn more about
the most common features and the relationships be-
tween features (Markman & Ross, 2003; Yamauchi
& Markman, 1998). The fact that certain features
“go together”, or are more typical or central, are as-
pects of the internal structure of categories. Knowl-
edge of internal structure gives us a sense of what is
generally true of a category, sometimes above and
beyond what is necessary to figure out what some-
thing is. For example, the fact that silverware is typi-
cally made of metal may be useful to learn even if it
does not help you determine if something is a spoon
or a fork. In addition to inference learning, inter-
nal structure is also better learned through indirect
learning tasks where organization into categories
helps to accomplish some goal like predicting how
much food animals would eat but categories are not
explicitly learned (Minda & Ross, 2004). It is also
better learn in observational tasks where category
labels are provided before the example is shown,
and guessing is not necessary (Levering & Kurtz,
2015). In essence, task demands during learning in-
fluence what is attended to and what becomes more
central to the representation of a category. When a
task focuses the learner on classification, the learner
focuses on the information that is necessary for clas-
sification but when that focus is removed, more ro-
bust knowledge of internal structure can be acquired.
Because categories in the real world are used for
a multitude of different tasks, developing robust
categories through multiple modes of learning is
essential.
4.2.3 Organizing our Own Concepts
In many cases, we cannot rely on category mem-
bership being explicitly defined for us but rather we
must organize our observations into categories us-
ing our own heuristics. For example, your concept
of music genres (e.g., classical music or hip hop)
has probably not come from listening to carefully la-
beled songs and learning the features associated with
each genre. While some experiences may have been
labeled for you (e.g., you hear a song while listening
to a country radio station), you have largely con-
structed your own organization based on unlabeled
examples. Research into purely unsupervised classi-
fication is often difficult because there are so many
ways that a number of items can be organized. One
common finding emerging from this research is that
when asked to sort items into categories, people tend
to focus on forming rules along single dimensions
(e.g., Medin, Wattenmaker, & Hampson, 1987). For
example, you may decide that any song being sung
with a southern twang is country music and not need
consider any other dimension.
Rather than completely unsupervised, our learn-
ing is often semi-supervised, meaning that we ex-
perience a combination of labeled and unlabeled
examples. Studies on the role of unlabeled exam-
ples (relative to completely supervised learning) has
been mixed, sometimes showing that they are help-
ful, sometimes hurtful, and sometimes having no
effect. Recent research has suggested that labeled
cases are important when categories are highly simi-
lar and therefore category membership is ambiguous.
For example, it would be useful to have some labeled
cases when distinguishing subtle differences in types
of electronic music, but not when learning the broad
difference between classical and punk music (Vong,
Navarro, & Perfors, 2016).
Even when learning about a concept is supervised,
it is sometimes possible for us to decide which exam-
ples we want to learn about and when. For example,
on a trip to the zoo, a child may ask a parent to la-
bel certain unknown examples (“antelope?”) but not
others. This self-directed learning (also known as
active or selective learning) is thought to be more
effective than passive (receptive) learning, particu-
larly when category distinctions are based on simple
rules (Bruner, 1961, Markant & Gureckis, 2014).
Differences in how people learn in these modes can
be simulated in the lab by having one group of par-
ticipants construct or select specific examples to
learn about while another group is either given a
random presentation order or a presentation order
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that matches a participant in the first group (this
is called a yoked design). In these kind of studies,
the participant who made the selection often learns
the categories better despite being exposed to the
exact same examples as their yoked counterparts
(Schwartz, 1966). Possible reasons for this could be
that self-directed learning is more engaging, results
in deeper processing and better memory for exam-
ples, or allows for more focused attention oriented
toward testing specific hypotheses about category
membership (see Gureckis & Markant, 2012, for
more information).
4.3 Kinds of Categories and Their Uses
An important early contribution in the empirical
investigation of category structure was the finding
that categories are organized at different hierarchi-
cal levels that serve different purposes—and specif-
ically that an intermediate level, known as the ba-
sic level of categorization, appears to play a fore-
most role in guiding the way we access and use
categories (Rosch & Mervis, 1975). Very specific
categories (waterbuck antelope) capture tightly knit
knowledge reflecting a large overlap in the features
that each member has. This means that a great
deal can be inferred with high confidence about a
member of such a category. Very broad categories
(mammal) are based on only a few core common
properties that carry a great deal of weight in or-
ganizing knowledge, but do not provide much spe-
cific information about their members. The basic
level (antelope) provides a compromise of reason-
ably high resemblance between members of a sin-
gle category and low resemblance between mem-
bers in different categories. Therefore, the ba-
sic level of categorization may be our most fluid
and task-general way of making sense of everyday
experience. Interestingly, the level of categoriza-
tion that is privileged may not always be the ba-
sic level—instead it varies depending on factors in-
cluding age, domain expertise, cultural norms, and
the goals or tasks for which the category is being
used (see Medin & Atran, 2004; Tanaka & Taylor,
1991).
As discussed above, the theory view suggests that
concepts may not be sufficiently grounded by phys-
ical similarities (see Goldstone, 1994). This may
or may not apply to ordinary entity concepts like
dog and chair, but it has become clear that there are
important kinds of categories that are certainly not
subject to traditional similarity (high levels of match
between features) as an organizing principle.
Barsalou (1983, 1985) demonstrated the existence
and psychological role of ad-hoc categories that are
generated in the moment (i.e., things to take out
of a house in case of fire) as well as more stable
categories that are goal-derived (i.e., things to eat
on a diet). Critically, the members of these cat-
egories lack any traditional featural similarity to
one another but do cohere systematically around
functional ideals or goal-relevant properties (i.e.,
zero-calorie). More broadly, the term relational
has been proposed (Gentner & Kurtz, 2005; Mark-
man & Stillwell, 2001) to describe categories based
on how objects relate to one another within scenes
or situations. For example, an ‘obstacle’ is a cate-
gory that can take nearly any concrete or abstract
form, but that coheres around fulfillment of a re-
lationship wherein one entity blocks the progress
of another. Relational categories are grounded in
structure-mapping theory (Gentner, 1983), which
specifies how the alignment of structured representa-
tions (entities organized by filling roles in relations)
drives psychological similarity. On this view, much
of the meaning that people represent about the world
is more complex than simple objects and requires
specification of what elements relate to other ele-
ments in what. A great deal of empirical evidence
shows that comparison processes (analogy, similar-
ity, metaphor) play a major role in human cognition,
and operate based on a search for identical sets of
connected relationships between cases (see Gentner,
1983). Researchers are pursuing the study of re-
lational categories with an important emphasis on
real-world learning where challenges include mas-
tering foundational concepts in formal instructional
settings and promoting successful use of acquired
knowledge when the context or surface-level form
is not the same (Goldwater & Schalk, 2016; Kurtz
& Honke, 2017; Loewenstein, 2010).
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4.4 Future Directions in Concepts
While scientific progress toward an understanding of
how people learn, represent, and use categories has
been considerable, there remain significant frontiers
and challenges. One is that researchers have found a
number of explanatory principles that do a good job
of accounting for at least some part of the overall
problem, but it is not clear whether the categoriza-
tion system is deeply multi-faceted (i.e., variable
across domains, settings, learners, etc.) or whether
the range of performance characteristics reflects dif-
ferent manifestations of a single universal, highly
flexible mechanism. Another major challenge is
unifying our account of real-world, everyday catego-
rization with advances made using highly artificial
tasks in the laboratory. Lastly, there is an important
need for synthesis and integration of data and theory
from perspectives outside of the core approach that
have produced largely siloed progress. For example,
developmental psychologists have made important
progress in understanding the transitions from in-
fant to child to adult forms of categorization (Carey,
2009; Keil, 1989; Sloutsky, 2010), but there is lim-
ited cross-talk despite the obvious value to be gained.
Similarly, a subset of researchers has focused on
neurobiologically-oriented accounts of categories
and concepts with pockets of impact arising between
the approaches (e.g., Ashby & Maddox, 2005; Barsa-
lou et al., 2003; Tyler & Moss, 2001). In addition, a
set of mathematically-formulated accounts of con-
cept formation seem to exist as a largely independent
enterprise (Feldman, 2000; Pape, Kurtz, & Sayama,
2015; Vigo, 2013). We end by noting an emerg-
ing counter-example: the burgeoning field of ma-
chine learning/data science in which classification
tasks are one of the core problems addressed. In a
promising development, researchers are increasingly
finding value in drawing upon and contributing to
research on learning and representation of categories
in both humans and machines.
Summary
1. Concepts emerge from the discovery of fundamental similarities between category members.
They are the building blocks of thought as they connect perception to memory and allow for
reasoning about unknown properties.
2. Some theorists assert that concepts are abstractions of experienced category members, either
in the form of definitional rules for membership (classical view) or sets of commonalities or
averages that hold in most cases (prototype approach).
3. In contrast to abstraction, some theories assume that concepts are simply stored information
about individual examples that have been associated over time with category labels (exemplar
approach).
4. The theory-driven view focuses on the role of concepts in explanation and considers them to
be embedded in rich theoretical systems of knowledge that inform our determination of what
things are above and beyond how similar features are to previous examples.
5. Concept learning is most studied through a classification task in which examples are dis-
played and guesses followed by feedback result in learners developing knowledge of what
differentiates between members of more than one category.
6. Category learning tasks outside of the traditional classification task (observation, inference,
use) often result in more robust knowledge of the internal structure of a concept.
7. Learning concepts based largely on one’s own organization and in a self-directed way can
result in better learning.
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8. While we can think of categories at many levels, there is evidence of a basic level (e.g., dog)
that is favored over other levels (e.g., mammal or pit bull), perhaps because of its compromise
between generality and specificity.
9. In addition to taxonomic categories, categories can be created on the fly (ad hoc), created
based on relevant tasks (goal-derived), or based on relationships between features (relational
categories).
Review Questions
1. Consider your own everyday concepts of the world introspectively. Which psychological
account of categorization seems most plausible?
2. How would you imagine neuroimaging techniques could be used to address open questions or
debates in the study of categorization?
3. Can you think of a way to resolve the difficulty of studying concept formation in the laboratory
without giving up ecological validity (naturalistic properties of the stimuli, setting, and task)?
4. How do you think concepts change from when examples are first encountered to their mature
state? How do concepts change across the human lifespan?
5. How do you think that changes in how people function in a digital, connected world may alter
the way concepts are learned, represented, and used?
6. What constructs from the psychological study of concepts do you think could be leveraged to
develop artificial intelligence capable of learning and reasoning?
Hot Topic: Categorization as finding the best account of the data
Kimery Levering
Rather than using similarity to reference points, the theory view suggests that
items are categorized based on how well the item’s features are explained by
a category. This notion of “well-explained” can be realized without departing
the realm of data. For example, one could compute the likelihood of an item
having the features that it does if it were a member of a particular category.
This conditional probability is based on knowing how many category members
have each feature (e.g., having spots) versus not. Following Bayes’ Theorem,
instead of using the features to directly predict the category, one uses the
likelihood of dogs having spots (and the other observed features of the target)
to predict how well the category fits the example. If the example has features that occur frequently
among dogs and the category itself is sufficiently common then that is strong evidence of membership.
Anderson (1991) proposed a rational account in which the goal of categorizing is to make the most
accurate possible inferences given the data. In this way, categorization is explained as forming
clusters (neighborhoods) of the items in a domain and then predicting the category based on how
likely each item feature is relative to each cluster combined with the likelihood of the category
within each cluster. Criticisms of this approach include evidence that people make predictions based
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on one assigned category rather than by combining likelihoods arising from each possible category,
evidence that people do not treat category labels as just like any other feature to be predicted,
and the issue that the Bayesian foundations underlying this account implausibly assume feature
independence.
Kenneth Kurtz
Fortunately, there is another way to determine how “well-explained” an item’s
features are relative to a category. Kurtz (2007) proposed that categories
can be understood in terms of: (1) a transformation function instantiated
as a set of synapse-like connection weights between a layer of neuron-like
nodes that encode the input feature values and a “hidden” layer that recodes
the information in an internal learned feature space; and (2) reconstruction
functions that predict what item features are most likely with respect to each
category. The paired functions represent category knowledge in the form of
expectations about what configurations of feature values are consistent with
membership. Error-driven learning adjusts the function pairs to work harmo-
niously for items that belong in each category. When an item is consistent with
these expectations, it passes through the functions relatively unchanged, but
when input feature(s) are inconsistent, the functions yield reconstructive distortion—the expected
features do not match the observed ones. The amount of such distortion indexes the likelihood of
membership. When a cat is evaluated as a dog, the result is a shift toward category expectations
(i.e., bigger size, barking call, greater sociality) and this degree of distortion indicates poor category
fit. A connectionist model called DIVA (see Figure 4.3) based on these principles provides a better
account of human categorization on some critical tests than reference point models (e.g., Conaway
& Kurtz 2017).
Figure 4.3: The structure of the connectionist model DIVA (Kurtz, 2007). In this example, a stimulus (three input features) is
best reconstructed through the dog channel and so the model would classify it as a dog.
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Levering & Kurtz Glossary
Glossary
abstraction The process of filtering out irrelevant
details while preserving the most relevant,
common, or significant parts. 56
basic level of categorization Intermediate level
that provides the most cognitively useful com-
promise between being informative (members
share many common traits) but also generic
(glosses over minor differences). 63
category Collection of objects, people, events, or
ideas in the world that are considered similar
or treated similarly despite differences. 55
classical view Assumes a concept to be the neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for membership
in a category. 57
concept The mental representation of a category
which can take on different forms depending
on which theory is being considered. 55
exemplar approach Assumes a concept to be a
collection of remembered instances that make
up a category, with no abstraction. 58
graded structure When certain members of a cat-
egory are thought to be better examples than
others. 57
prototype approach Assumes a concept to be an
abstracted list or full example consisting of
common/average features that members are
likely (but not required) to have. 58
selective attention A focus of resources on char-
acteristics that are relevant for classification.
58
similarity The extent to which two or more con-
cepts or examples are alike, either through
having shared properties or close proximity
in multidimensional psychological space. 56
supervised category learning Learning about a
category when examples are labeled with
what category they are in either initially or
after a guess. 61
theory-driven approach Assumes a concept to be
based on feature similarity but in service of
and collaboration with knowledge-rich theo-
ries about the world. 60
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Knowledge Representation and Acquisition
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University of Memphis
This chapter discusses how knowledge is repre-
sented in our minds when we learn about new topics
in school and life. How do we encode and think
about subject matters in fields as diverse as psychol-
ogy, literature, art, history, biology, physics, mathe-
matics, and computer technology? The knowledge
representations and reasoning in these fields often
differ (Goldman et al., 2016). In psychology and
physics, we think like a scientist. We think about
hypotheses and how to test them by collecting data
in experiments. In mathematics, we puzzle over
formulas and proofs. In literature, we construct
imaginary worlds in our mind that may or may not
correspond to anything in the real world. In com-
puter technology, we think about procedures for
running programs that perform some practical task.
The representations and ground rules for thinking
are quite different in these different disciplines.
There are multiple ways to represent experiences
and topics of interest. Popular music is a great ex-
ample of this. Consider how people represent music
when they listen to songs such as Hey Jude by the
Beatles, Crazy in Love by Beyoncé, or Yankee Doo-
dle. Some have representations that focus on the
melody, others the lyrics, others the emotions, oth-
ers visual images, and others the rhythm and meter
that inspire dance or other forms of physical motion.
Most of us have mental representations with some
combination of these dimensions. There is no right
or wrong representation, but memory for the songs
is influenced by the nature of the representations
that people construct (Rubin, 1995). Psychologists
in the learning sciences investigate the nature of
the representations that we construct when we learn
new topics and use the knowledge when performing
tasks.
Mental representations of what we perceive are
not perfect copies of the world out there. The mental
representations we construct about the world are sim-
plifications that often have errors and distortions. As
an interesting exercise, draw from memory a floor-
plan of your home, with the various doors, windows,
and pieces of furniture. Then compare the sketch
with your actual home and note the differences. Or
if you prefer, sketch your town with the streets and
landmarks. Although you have experienced your
home and town for hundreds of thousands of days,
there are still distortions. Psychologists in the cog-
nitive sciences investigate theories about the prop-
erties of these mental representations and conduct
experiments to test the theories.
This chapter identifies some of the theories of
representation that cognitive and learning scientists
have developed. Their goal is to explain how chil-
dren and adults represent knowledge during learn-
ing. The focus of this chapter is on learning when
adults acquire subject matters in schools, the work-
force, and their personal lives. In contrast, Chapter 4
(“Concepts: Structure and Acquisition”) and Chap-
ter 17 (“Development of Human Thought”) take
on the development of representations in infants
and children. Our emphasis is also on deeper lev-
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els of comprehension and learning (Millis, Long,
Magliano, & Wiemer, 2019). A recent report by
the National Academy of Sciences, Engineering and
Medicine on How People Learn (volume 2, 2018)
contrasts six basic types of learning: habit forma-
tion and conditioning, observational learning, im-
plicit pattern learning, perceptual and motor learn-
ing, learning of facts, and learning by making infer-
ences from mental models. This chapter emphasizes
the learning of facts and making inferences from
mental models, although the other types of learning
are sometimes very relevant.
Instructional media and technology will play an
important role in this chapter because they dominate
the world we live in today. Media and technology
shape how we think and represent information. For
example, a few decades ago it would have taken days
to find an answer to a question as people walked to
libraries, to card catalogues, to stacks of books, and
searched pages and paragraphs for an answer. The
same question can now be answered in seconds on
the computer. We expect swift answers to questions
and get irritated by delays. A decade ago students
submitted essays for grading and waited for days
or weeks for a grade. Now essays can be graded
immediately with validity comparable to experts
(Foltz, 2016). We now live in a world of intelligent
tutoring systems that tailor learning to the individ-
ual student (Graesser, Hu, & Sottilare, 2018) and
computer environments where groups of people can
learn and solve problems together (Fiore & Wilt-
shire, 2016). We now live in a world where facts
need to be checked for misinformation and contra-
dictions (Rapp & Braasch, 2014) and technology
has the only major capacity to do so. We live in
a world of media, games, and adutainment. These
seductions appeal to our motivational and emotional
seductions and run the risk of competing with the
learning of important subject matter. All of these
advances in media and technology influence how we
represent and acquire knowledge.
5.1 Knowledge Components
This first approach to representing subject matter
knowledge consists of a list of knowledge com-
ponents. A knowledge component is much like
a sentence that expresses a particular idea that is
important to know about a topic. Example knowl-
edge components in psychology can be captured
in such expressions as “absence makes the heart
grow fonder” (as the opposite to “out of sight, out
of mind”), “team members in groups may not re-
spond because they expect other members to re-
spond”, or “correlation does not imply causation.”
An example in physics is “force equals mass times
acceleration” whereas an example in mathematics
is “the circumference of a circle is pi times the di-
ameter.” Some knowledge components are if-then
rules with contingencies: “If a person has XX chro-
mosomes, they are female; if a person has XY
chromosomes, they are male.” The subject matter
on a topic may consist of a long list of dozens
to hundreds of knowledge components. As stu-
dents learn a subject matter, students and teachers
do not know how well the performance on these
knowledge components is progressing. However,
computers can track this progress for individual
students in intelligent tutoring systems (Graesser,
2016; Koedinger, Corbett, & Perfetti, 2012) and
for individuals and groups in team learning (von
Davier, Zhu, & Kyllonen, 2017). When the com-
puter determines that enough of the knowledge com-
ponents have been learned by the student, the sys-
tem then decides that the student has mastered the
topic.
How does the student, instructor, or computer
know whether a knowledge component (KC) has
been mastered? The answer is debatable. Consider
once again the knowledge component “team mem-
bers in groups may not respond because they expect
other members to respond.” How would one know
whether this KC has been mastered by a learner?
There are many possible operational definitions. Can
the learner recite the KC in words that have the same
meaning as the KC? Does the learner send impor-
tant requests to individuals rather than groups in
social communication systems (knowing that there
may be diffusion of responsibility in groups)? Mas-
tery of some KC’s may be reflected in a number
of cognitive measures, such as response times to
requests, eye movements, and neuroscience indica-
tors (see Chapter 3, “Methods for Studying Human
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Thought”). Individual learners may differ in how
they behaviorally show mastery of a particular KC.
They may exhibit mastery in words, drawing figures,
gestures, problem solving, or other actions.
Mastery of knowledge components improves over
time if there is knowledge acquisition. Computers
can track this. Suppose a computer tracks whether
or not a student on a KC has a successful response
(1) or an unsuccessful response (0) over 8 episodes
of being assessed. The following sequence would re-
flect successful learning on assessment episode num-
ber 4: 00011111. The sequence 01010101 shows
no learning because the number of 1’s is the same
for the first four episodes and the second four. Prob-
abilistic learning is reflected in 00101011 because
there is only one 1 among the first four episodes but
three 1’s in the last four episodes. Mastery of a topic
is achieved when many of the KCs are mastered in
performance assessments.
5.2 The Representation of Knowledge
Components
The mastery of a knowledge component depends
how it is represented and how picky one is as to
whether it is mastered. A precise standard for a ver-
bal representation would be an exact match between
the expected knowledge component and the stu-
dent’s language. However, it is important to match
on meaning rather than precise language (Kintsch,
1998). There are many ways to articulate “team
members in groups may not respond because they
expect other members to respond” in particular con-
texts, such as “there is diffusion of responsibility in
the group”, “tell John personally because he expects
others on the team to handle the task”, or “the like-
lihood of a team member completing an assigned
task is lower than when an individual is assigned
the task.” How can one determine whether these
answers match the KC when they are worded so
differently? Computers have made major advances
in evaluating the accuracy of semantic matches in
a field called computational linguistics (Jurafsky &
Martin, 2008), but they are far from perfect. Expert
human judges have moderate agreement on whether
two sentences have the same or different meanings,
but they also do not always agree.
Multiple levels of language and discourse need
to be considered when deciding whether two verbal
expressions have the same meaning (Pickering &
Garrod, 2004; McNamara, Graesser, McCarthy, &
Cai, 2014). We need to consider whether the words
have the same or similar meaning. For example, the
phrase “team members in groups” is very similar in
meaning to “people in groups” in the example KC
but not to “sports in groups.” Syntax and word order
matter when interpreting meaning. The meaning
of the phrase “team members in groups” is quite
different in meaning than “to members group in
teams” and the nonsensical expression “groups team
in members.” The discourse context also needs to
be considered when deciding whether two sentences
have the same meaning. The expression “absence
makes the heart grow fonder” makes sense in a psy-
chology class when debating whether a romance will
survive after two lovers part for a few months. It
does not make sense when a student tries to explain
to an instructor why an exam was missed.
Mastery of a knowledge component is manifested
in its meaning rather than the precise surface struc-
ture (i.e., wording and syntax). People tend to re-
member in long-term memory the meaning of ideas
rather than the surface structure (Craik & Lockhart,
1972). Surface structure is normally short-lived, a
minute or less, whereas the semantic meaning lasts
a long time. Therefore, verbal memory assessments
of how well a student has mastered a subject matter
need to consider the meaning of the KCs rather than
the exact wording. An essay test that taps meaning
is superior to a test on reciting texts verbatim.
Mastery of a knowledge component is often man-
ifested nonverbally. Actions, facial expressions,
eye movements, pointing gestures, and other behav-
iors can signal mastery. Consider a KC that “some
chemical sprays from groundkeepers cause people
to sneeze.” When someone starts sneezing, this KC
is likely to have been mastered if the person gets up
and looks out the window, glares in contempt at the
groundkeeper, points to the groundkeeper, closes the
window, and/or puts on an allergy mask. There is no
need to articulate the KC in words.
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Figure 5.1: Four different types of knowledge structures: Taxonomic, spatial, causal, and goal-action procedures.
5.3 Knowledge Structures
Our description of the knowledge component repre-
sentation does not take into consideration the struc-
tural relations between ideas. This section em-
phasizes these relational connections. Four types
of structures are being discussed here to illustrate
the importance of relations. These are shown in
Figure 5.1: Taxonomic, spatial, goal-action proce-
dures, and causal structures. There are many other
types of knowledge structures, such as organiza-
tional charts of positions in a corporation and the
lineage in family trees. All of these knowledge
structures emphasize how knowledge is intercon-
nected and that ideas close to each other in the struc-
ture are more conceptually related than ideas far
away. When an idea is activated during learning, it
tends to activate its nearby neighbors in the structure
more than neighbors far away (Collins & Loftus,
1975).
There is a terminology that researchers use to talk
about these knowledge structures. Nodes are basic
ideas that can be expressed in a word, phrase or
sentence. As explained above, however, it is the
meaning rather than the surface structure that cap-
tures the essence of a node. Nodes are sometimes
assigned to epistemic categories, such as concept,
state, event, process, goal, or action. An arc is a
connection between two nodes. An arc is directed
(forward, backward, or bidirectional) and often as-
signed to categories (such as is-a, has-as-parts, prop-
erty, contains, cause, reason). A graph consists of a
set of nodes connected by arcs. Below we describe
some different kinds of graphs that are depicted in
Figure 5.1.
5.3.1 Taxonomic Structures
Taxonomic structures represent the concepts that
were discussed in Chapter 4, “Concepts: Structure
and Acquisition”. The concepts are organized in a
hierarchical structure that is connected by is-a arcs.
A robin is-a bird, a turkey is-a bird, a bird is-a an-
imal, an animal is-a living thing. These is-a arcs
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that are directly represented in the graph, but others
can be inferred by the principle of transitivity: a
robin is an animal, a turkey is an animal, a robin
is a living thing, a turkey is a living thing, and a
bird is a living thing. Each of these concept nodes
have distinctive properties, such as a robin has a red
breast, a turkey is eaten by humans, a bird can fly, an
animal breathes, and living things can move. These
properties can be inherited by transitive inference,
such as the following expressions: a robin can fly, a
robin breathes, a robin can move, a bird can move,
and so forth. There is some evidence that these in-
ferred expressions take a bit more time to judge as
true or false than the direct expressions (Collins &
Loftus, 1975).
5.3.2 Spatial Structures
Spatial structures have a hierarchy of regions that
are connected by is-in arcs (or the inverse contains
relation). As shown in Figure 5.1, Los Angeles is-in
California, San Diego is-in California, Reno is-in
Nevada, California is-in the western US, Nevada
is-in the western US, and the western US is-in the
USA. From these, we can derive via transitivity the
following inferences: Los Angeles is in the western
US, San-Diego is in the western US, Reno is in the
western US, Los Angeles is in the USA, and so on.
The locations within each region can also be con-
nected by relational arcs that specify north, south,
east, and west. We see in Figure 5.1 that Los Ange-
les is north-of San-Diego and California is west-of
Nevada. We can infer by transitivity that San Diego
is west of Reno. Most of these transitive inferences
are correct when we look at actual maps. However,
these inferences are not always correct (Stevens &
Coupe, 1978). For example, San Diego is actually
east of Reno rather than west of Reno according to
an actual map. Similarly, Seattle is actually north
of Toronto and El Paso is actually west of Denver.
Knowledge structures and these transitive inferences
are often accurate, but sometimes generate some in-
teresting errors. The knowledge structures also can
to some extent predict biases in distance. For ex-
ample, distances between cities within a region can
also, to some extent, seem closer than distances be-
tween cities from different regions. The distance
from Memphis to Jackson, Tennessee seems closer
than to Jackson, Mississippi, yet the actual distance
is the opposite.
5.3.3 Goal-action Procedures
Goal-action procedural structures are organized
into a hierarchy of nodes connected by “in order
to” arcs. The nodes refer to goals or desired states
that are organized hierarchically and that guide a
sequence of actions that achieve the goals if the pro-
cedure is successfully performed. Imagine you have
a goal of eating at a restaurant. The structure in
Figure 5.1 shows how this could be accomplished.
In order to eat at the restaurant, you need to get to
the restaurant and order your food. In order to get
to a restaurant, you need to drive your car and look
for the restaurant. This specific knowledge structure
in Figure 5.1 does not require careful deliberation to
plan and execute. The procedure becomes a routine
through experience and repetition. It would be ex-
hausting to plan through problem solving for each
step of every goal-action procedure you carry out
throughout the day. However, such problem solv-
ing (see Chapter 9) is needed when a person visits
another country.
The structure in Figure 5.1 is taken from the per-
spective of one person who needs food. However,
there are other people who have their own agenda,
such as the cook and the person at the counter. A
script is a structure that considers all of the people
who participate in the organized activity of a restau-
rant (Bower, Black, & Turner, 1979). The cook, the
person at the counter who collects money, and the
customer all have their own goal structures and per-
spectives. The script also has taxonomic structures
(cook→ employee→ person) and spatial structure
(table→ restaurant→ building).
These goal-action procedures and script struc-
tures explain a number of psychological phenomena.
Each goal-action node is broken down into subor-
dinate nodes that become much more detailed in
the activity. People tend to forget the lower-level
details of the actions and procedures (Bower et al.,
1979), which are often automatized from repetition
and experience (see Chapter 13, “Expertise”). Peo-
ple tend to notice obstacles to goals being accom-
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plished and may become frustrated, as everyone
who has waited for many minutes trying to order
food at a counter knows. When people visually ob-
serve scripts being enacted, they tend to notice event
boundaries (i.e., junctures, separations) after a goal
is achieved/interrupted, when there is a new spatial
setting, and when a new person enters a scene (Za-
cks, Speer, & Reynolds, 2009). When people read
stories, sentences take more time to read when they
introduce new goals, spatial settings, and characters
(Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). These structures also
explain answers to questions. When asked, “Why
do you go to a restaurant?”, a good answer would go
up the structure (in order to eat food) but not down
the structure (in order to drive). When asked “how
do you go to a restaurant?”, a good answer would
be down the structure (you drive) but not up the
structure (you eat). Organized structures like these
explain a large body of data involving neuroscience,
cognition, behavior, emotion, and social interaction.
5.3.4 Causal Networks
Causal networks can be used to answer the ques-
tion, “What causes something to occur?” For exam-
ple, one could use causal networks to show the chain
of events that cause a volcanic eruption, cancer, the
winner of an election and other phenomenon in phys-
ical, biological, and technological systems (van den
Broek, 2010). In a causal network, nodes represent
events (or states, or processes) whereas arcs point
from one node to another if an event causes or en-
ables another event. For example, in Figure 5.1, we
have a causal network showing how heart disease
can be a result of a causally driven chain of events.
Some of these events are inspired by sociological
factors (getting a divorce) and psychobiological fac-
tors (smoking), whereas other events are entirely
products of biological systems (hardening of the
arteries). The events in the causal system that are
linked through enables arcs convey a weak sense of
causality, while the causes arcs indicate a stronger
sense of causality. Causal networks are complex.
They are not strictly hierarchical or follow a linear
order but can have many paths of connections and
loops.
The structures in Figure 5.1 are very systematic,
organized, and conceptually precise. The mental
structures are not that neat and tidy. One approach
to help people learn is to have them construct such
graphs during or after they comprehend text, digital
environments on the internet, conduct an experi-
ment, or perform some other activity. The activity
of constructing these conceptual graphs can help
them learn a subject matter even though they are not
likely to generate neat and tidy structures. Available
research has also revealed that nodes that are more
central in the structure (i.e., many arcs radiate from
them) are more important and better remembered
(Bower et al., 1979; van den Broek, 2010).
5.4 Associative Representations of
Knowledge
According to classical associationism, ideas vary in
how strongly associated they are with each other.
That is no doubt true, but the deep secret lies on
what can predict the strength of association. A word
like “evil” has likely strong associations to words
like “bad” (a functional synonym), “good” (an oppo-
site), “Halloween” (an event), “Knieval” (part of the
phrase evil Knievel, the dare devil), and “devil” inter-
esting etymology), but not to words like “smooth”,
“birthday”, and “Michael Jordan.”
What makes associations strong versus weak?
Strength of repetition is clearly one factor. The
strength of association between ideas increases with
the frequency of the ideas occurring together at the
same time and location. Another prediction is the
similarity of the ideas. The strength of association
between two ideas is stronger to the extent they are
similar in meaning. Positive outcomes is yet another
prediction: two ideas have stronger association to
the extent that they lead to positive outcomes (a
reward, a solution) rather than negative outcomes
(punishment, failure). In summary, repetition, sim-
ilarity, and reinforcement are major predictions of
the strength of association between two ideas.
These principles of associationism have been
known for at least two centuries. They are deeply en-
trenched in modern cognitive models of perception,
categorization, memory, judgment, and other auto-
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Figure 5.2: A neural network with an input layer, two hidden layers, and an output node.
mated processes of cognition. Neural networks
are a noteworthy class of models that implement
associationism (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1987).
Figure 5.2 presents an example of a neural network.
A neural network is a structure of nodes (analogous
to neurons) in multiple layers that are interconnected
by directed, weighted arcs that potentially activate
the nodes (positive weights) or inhibit the nodes
(negative weights). A node is fired (all-or-none) if
the arcs that feed into it receive enough activation,
with the sum of the activation being stronger than
the inhibition.
In order to illustrate the mechanisms of a neu-
ral network, consider a neural network that detects
whether or not a person’s face shows confusion. The
input layer of nodes would correspond to states,
events, or processes on parts of the face at particular
positions. For example, the right eyelid opens wide,
the mouth opens wide, or the left corner of the lip
contracts. Ekman and his colleagues developed a
facial action coding system that defines these fea-
tures for those who investigate facial expressions
(Ekman & Rosenberg, 2005). The output node is
activated if the set of activated input node features
show a pattern of confusion, but otherwise it is not
activated. There may also be one or more hidden lay-
ers of nodes that refer to intermediate states, events,
or processes. Exactly what these hidden nodes refer
to is not necessarily clear-cut and easy to interpret.
They could refer to higher order categories, such
as the overall amount of movement, positive versus
negative emotions, upper face parts versus lower
face parts, or angle of perspective. The hidden lay-
ers and nodes within these layers are statistically
derived characteristics that depend on a long history
of experiences that the individual person has had.
It is important to emphasize that these neural net-
works learn from experience. The nodes and arcs
are strengthened or otherwise altered with each ex-
perience. The networks capture the associationist
principles of repetition, similarity, reinforcement,
and contiguity of events in time and space.
Today neural networks are frequently used in ma-
chine learning and artificial intelligence to enable
computers to perceive people, objects, events, and
scenes, to guide robots in completing routine tasks,
and to solve some types of problems. In this “deep
learning” revolution, massive amounts of experi-
ences are fed into the computer during training of
the neural network, far more than a single person
would ever receive. As a consequence, the com-
puter outperforms humans in precisely defined tasks.
This has the potential to threaten the workforce for
some jobs that humans traditionally perform (El-
liot, 2017). These neural networks can handle only
specific tasks, however. A neural network for detect-
ing confusion would not be of much use to detect
surprise or boredom – they cannot generalize and
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transfer to other tasks. Nevertheless, it is widely
acknowledged that generalization and transfer are
also very difficult for humans to accomplish (Hattie
& Donoghue, 2016). Perhaps the human mind is lit-
tle more than a large collection of these specialized
neural networks. This is a debate in the cognitive
and learning sciences.
Another example of associative knowledge rep-
resentations is latent semantic analysis, LSA (Lan-
dauer, McNamara, Dennis, & Kintsch, 2007). LSA
is a statistical representation of word knowledge and
world knowledge that considers what words appear
together in documents, such as articles in books,
speeches, conversations, and other forms of verbal
communication. According to LSA, the meaning of
a word depends on the other words that accompany
it in real-world documents. The word riot often
occurs in the company of other particular words in
documents, such as crowd, dangerous, protest, po-
lice, and run. These words do not always occur with
the word riot of course, but they do with some co-
occurrence probability. These probabilities of words
with other words define a word’s meaning, which is
very different than word meanings in a dictionary
or thesaurus. LSA has been found to predict data
in many cognitive tasks such as priming (a word
automatically activates another word), judgments
of sentence similarity, inferences, and summariza-
tion of text (Landauer et al., 2007). LSA has also
been used in computer systems that automatically
grade student essays (Foltz, 2016) and tutor them in
natural language (Graesser, 2016).
5.5 The Body in Cognition
Proponents of embodied cognition believe that
mental representations are shaped and constrained
by the experience of being in a human body. Our
bodies influence what we perceive, our actions, and
our emotions. These embodied dimensions are often
incorporated in representations when we compre-
hend text (Zwaan, 2016) and influence how we learn
(Glenberg, Goldberg, & Zhu, 2011). Embodied rep-
resentations are constructed, for example, when you
read a novel and get lost in the story world. There
is a rich mental model of the spatial setting, the ac-
tions performed by characters, and their emotions.
Your experience is similar to watching a movie or
acting the parts yourself. Mental representations
are often colored with perceptual images, motoric
actions, and visceral emotions rather than being ab-
stract conceptualizations. The meaning of abstract
concepts (such as love) is often fortified by these
dimensions of perception, action, and emotion, such
as visual image of a wedding cake, a dance, or a first
kiss (Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, 2005). There is
substantial evidence that memory is improved for
verbal material when learners construct visual im-
ages in their mind (Clark & Paivio, 1991) or they
perform actions associated with the content.
The importance of embodied cognition in com-
prehension is obvious when you go someplace new
and ask for directions to a specific location, such
as the city hall. When you ask a stranger, “Where
is the city hall?” the helpful stranger nearly always
points in the right direction and launches several sen-
tences with landmarks, paths, and left-right-straight
comments, typically accompanied by hand gestures.
You get confused by the second sentence but politely
nod. Then you follow the suggested direction and
soon ask the next person. The problem is that there
is very little shared knowledge between you and the
stranger so you have no foundation for constructing
a precise embodied path to the destination. Embod-
ied representations are necessary for precise compre-
hension of important messages about the physical,
social, and digital worlds.
The importance of embodied representations on
reading comprehension has been confirmed in the
Moved by Reading program (Glenberg, Goldberg,
& Zhu, 2011). Readers who struggle with reading
comprehension experience difficulty constructing
an embodied representation of the text. Suppose
that students read a text about events that occur at a
tea party. This would be difficult to imagine if they
had no knowledge or experience with tea parties. In
Moved by Reading, the student is presented with an
image of a tea set on a computer screen and then
asked to act out a story on the content by pouring
tea, sipping tea, and performing other actions con-
veyed in the story. Students are also later asked to
imagine acting out the story so they will internalize
the strategy of constructing a mental model of the
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text. When compared to students who were asked to
simply reread the text, the students who were asked
to imagine manipulating the objects showed large
gains in comprehension and memory. One of the in-
teresting research questions is whether it is better to
physically perform the actions compared to digitally
moving images on a computer screen or to imagine
performing actions in the mind.
5.6 Conversations
People have learned by observing and participating
in conversations throughout most of the history of
personkind, especially prior to the invention of the
printing press and computer technologies. The se-
crets of family life and a person’s livelihood were
learned by holding conversations with members of a
family, a tutor, a mentor, a master, or a group of peo-
ple participating in the practical activities. Knowl-
edge representations are to some extent shaped by
these conversations that are observed, enacted, re-
membered, or otherwise internalized in the mind
(Vygotsky, 1978). Texts that are written in the style
of stories and oral conversation are read faster, com-
prehended better, and remembered better than tech-
nical text that is distant from conversation.
There is also solid evidence that one-on-one hu-
man tutoring helps to learn subject matter in courses
more than simply listening to lectures or reading
texts (Cohen, Kulik, & Kulik, 1982; VanLehn, 2011).
The individual tutor can find out the problems the
learner is facing, provide hints or direct assertions
on helping them, and answer their questions. Re-
searchers have developed intelligent tutoring sys-
tems that simulate human tutors (VanLehn, 2011),
including some systems like AutoTutor that hold
conversations with the student in natural language
(Graesser, 2016). These systems help students learn
subject matters like computer literacy, physics, and
Figure 5.3: This is a screenshot showing pedagogical agents used in an intelligent tutoring system (D’Mello, Lehman, Pekrun, &
Graesser, 2014). In this example, the tutor agent, Dr. Williams is on the left of the screen, and the peer agent, Chris, is on
the right of the screen. Reprinted from Learning and Instruction, 29, D’Mello, S., Lehman B., Pekrun, R., & Graesser, A.C.
Confusion can be beneficial for learning. 153-170. ©(2014), with permission from Elsevier.
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scientific reasoning about as good as human tutors,
both of which are better than conventional training
methods like reading texts and listening to lectures.
A promising approach to establish deeper knowl-
edge representations is to plant contradictions and
information that clashes with prior knowledge to
the point of the learner experiencing cognitive dise-
quilibrium. Cognitive disequilibrium occurs when
people face obstacles to goals, interruptions, con-
tradictions, incongruities, anomalies, impasses, un-
certainty, and salient contrasts. Cognitive conflicts
can provoke information-seeking behavior, which
engages the learner in inquiry, reasoning and deep
learning. Learning environments with computer
agents have been designed to stage contradictions
and debates, thereby inducing cognitive disequilib-
rium (D’Mello, Lehman, Pekrun, & Graesser, 2014).
These studies had tutor and peer agents engage with
the student in conversational trialogues while cri-
tiquing research studies in psychology, biology, and
chemistry. An example screenshot is shown in Fig-
ure 5.3. Most of the research studies had one or
more flaws with respect to scientific methodology.
For example, one case study described a new pill
that purportedly helps people lose weight, but the
sample size was small and there was no control
group. During the course of the three-way conver-
sation, the agents periodically expressed false infor-
mation and contradictions. Disagreements between
the agents and with what the student believed tended
to create cognitive disequilibrium, confusion, and
disagreement. During the course of the trialogue
conversation, the agents periodically asked students
for their views (e.g., “Do you agree that the control
group in this study was flawed?”). The students’
responses were coded on correctness and also the
vacillation in making decisions when asked a ques-
tion multiple times throughout a conversation. There
were also measures of confusion. The correctness
and confusion scores confirmed that the cognitive
disequilibrium that resulted from contradictions im-
proved learning, particularly among the students
who had enough knowledge and thinking to be con-
fused. That is, the experience of confusion, a signal
of thinking, played an important role in the deep
learning.
Table 5.1: Key affordances of learning technologies (National Academy of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2018). ©National
Academies Press. Reprinted with permision. https://www.nap.edu/catalog/24783/how-people-learn-ii-learners-contexts-a
nd-cultures
1. Interactivity. The technology systematically responds to the actions of the learner.
2. Adaptivity. The technology presents information that is contingent on the behavior,
knowledge, or characteristics of the learner.
3. Feedback. The technology gives the learner information about the quality of their
performance and how it could improve.
4. Choice. The technology gives learners options on what to learn and how to regu-
late their own learning.
5. Nonlinear access. The technology allows the learner to select or receive learning activities
in an order that deviates from a set order.
6. Linked representations. The technology provides quick connections between representations for
a topic that emphasizes different conceptual viewpoints, media, and
pedagogical strategies.
7. Open-ended learner input. The technology allows learners to express themselves through natural
language, drawing pictures, and other forms of open-ended communica-
tion.
8. Communication with other people. The learner communicates with one or more people or agents.
80 • Psychology of Human Thought • Chapter 5
Importance of Media and Technology in Knowledge Representation and Learning Graesser, Lippert, & Shubeck
5.7 Importance of Media and
Technology in Knowledge
Representation and Learning
Theories of distributed cognition assume that the
mind is shaped and constrained by the physical
world, technologies, and other people in their en-
vironment (Dror & Harnad, 2008; Hutchins, 1995).
An expert problem solver in a distributed world
needs to assess whether a technology, a social
community, the external physical world, or his/her
own analytical mind is best suited for achieving
particular steps in solving challenging problems.
Judgments are involved in the decisions you make
when you decide whether to trust your own an-
alytical judgment, the output of a computer pro-
gram, or a decision of a group. There are ques-
tions such as “Should I write down on a piece
of paper the groceries I need to buy or try to
memorize them?”; “Should I compute this square
root by hand or use a calculator?”; “Should I ask
my friends where to on vacation or decide that
for them?” These are decisions in a distributed
world.
Media and technology play a central role in
shaping cognitive representations in a distributed
world. It is important to take stock of how they
do so. Old-school media consisted of listening to
lectures, watching video presentations, and reading
books. For these media, the learners passively ob-
Table 5.2: Mayer’s (2009) Principles to Guide Multimedia Learning. Adapted from NAESM (2018). With permission from National
Academy of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2018. ©National Academies Press. https://www.nap.edu/catalog/24783
/how-people-learn-ii-learners-contexts-and-cultures
1. Coherence Principle People learn better when extraneous words, pictures and sounds are excluded
rather than included.
2. Signaling Principle People learn better when cues that highlight the organization of the essential
material are added.
3. Redundancy Principle People learn better from graphics and narration than from graphics, narration
and on-screen text.
4. Spatial Contiguity Principle People learn better when corresponding words and pictures are presented near
rather than far from each other on the page or screen.
5. Temporal Contiguity Principle People learn better when corresponding words and pictures are presented simul-
taneously rather than successively.
6. Segmenting Principle People learn better from a multimedia lesson is presented in user-paced segments
rather than as a continuous unit.
7. Pre-training Principle People learn better from a multimedia lesson when they know the names and
characteristics of the main concepts.
8. Modality Principle People learn better from graphics and narrations than from animation and on-
screen text.
9. Multimedia Principle People learn better from words and pictures than from words alone.
10. Personalization Principle People learn better from multimedia lessons when words are in conversational
style rather than formal style.
11. Voice Principle People learn better when the narration in multimedia lessons is spoken in a
friendly human voice rather than a machine voice.
12. Image Principle People do not necessarily learn better from a multimedia lesson when the
speaker’s image is added to the screen.
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serve or linearly consume the materials at their own
pace. However, the learning environments in today’s
world require learners to be more active by strate-
gically searching through hypermedia, constructing
knowledge representations from multiple sources,
performing tasks that create things, and interacting
with technologies or other people (Chi, 2009; Wiley
et al., 2009). From the standpoint of technology, it
is worthwhile taking stock of the characteristics of
learning environments that facilitate active, construc-
tive, interactive learning environments. Table 5.1
shows some of these characteristics that were iden-
tified by the National Academy of Sciences, Engi-
neering, and Medicine in the second volume of How
People Learn (NASEM, 2018). It is important to
consider these characteristics when selecting tech-
nologies to support the acquisition of knowledge rep-
resentations in different subject matters, populations,
and individual learners. All of these characteristics
have been implemented in learning technologies and
have shown some successes in improving knowledge
representations and learning.
Unfortunately, there is an abundance of commer-
cial technologies that are not well designed, are not
based on scientific principles of learning, and have
no evidence they improve learning. There are many
bells and whistles of multimedia in so many prod-
ucts (a lot of razzle dazzle), but under the hood
there is no substance in helping people learn and
build useful knowledge representations. We live in
a world replete with games and social media that
contribute to shallow rather than deep knowledge
representations.
It is important to consider the characteristics
of the learning technologies that support deeper
knowledge representations and learning (Millis et
al., 2019; NASEM, 2018). Mayer (2009) has also
identified 12 principles of multimedia learning that
improve knowledge representation and acquisition
(see Table 5.2). These principles are all based on
psychological theories and confirmed by data col-
lected in experiments.
The hope is that stakeholders and policy mak-
ers in education encourage learning environments
which support knowledge representations needed
in the 21st century. Citizens in the 21st century are
faced with complex technologies, social systems and
subject matters (National Research Council, 2012;
Levy & Murnane, 2006). Mastery of facts and rou-
tine procedures are necessary, but not sufficient for
participation in a world that demands deeper com-
prehension of technical material and more complex
problem solving, reasoning, information handling
and communication. Understanding the nature of
knowledge representations will be extremely impor-
tant in meeting this challenge.
Summary
1. People construct mental representations when they experience the social, physical, and digital
world. Our perceptions are not exact copies of the world, but are simplified with errors
and missing information. Learning and performance on tasks are influenced by how our
knowledge is represented.
2. This chapter has reviewed the different types of representations that have been proposed by
researchers in the cognitive and learning sciences who investigate adult learning of different
subject matters. The types of representations include (1) ensembles of knowledge components,
(2) knowledge structures, (3) associationistic neural networks, (4) embodied perceptions,
actions, and emotions, (5) conversation, and (6) distributed cognition with diverse multimedia
and technologies.
3. Knowledge of a specific subject matter is represented by a set of knowledge components
which express ideas relevant to the topic. Knowledge structures consist of nodes, which
represent concepts, states, events, goals or processes, and arcs that connect the nodes with
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different types of relations (e.g., is-a, has-a, contains, causes). Four example knowledge
structures were discussed: taxonomic, spatial, causal, and goal-action procedures.
4. Neural networks model associationistic representations with neuron nodes connected by
associative weights. The strengths of the associations are determined by repetition, similarity,
how often nodes co-occur in time, and positive versus negative outcomes.
5. Knowledge representations and acquisition are influenced by our human experience and how
we interact with our environment. Embodied representations capture perception, action, and
emotion. Conversational representations include the social discourse we observe and enact
with families, tutors, mentors, and groups.
6. Digital technologies will continue to shape and constrain the mental representations and
influence how people learn. These technologies are making information about topics more
distributed across people, times, locations, and media sources.
Review Questions
1. Sketch a map of your town or city, including major landmarks and streets, based on your
memory. Try to be as detailed as possible. After you finish, compare your sketch with an
actual map. What did you get right, what did you miss, and what errors did you make in your
mental representation?
2. Create a more complete knowledge structure of eating at a fast food restaurant that includes
all types of structures in Figure 5.1: taxonomic, spatial, goal-action procedure, and causal.
3. According to the text, there are computerized tutoring systems that help people learn as well
as human tutors. What sort of subject matters have representations that are very difficult for
computer tutors to simulate, and why?
4. One very abstract concept is “peace.” To what extent can this concept be represented by
embodied perception, action, and emotion? What features of peace would be impossible to
capture with embodied cognition?
5. Consider a class you are currently taking. Which of the characteristics in Table 5.1 are part of
the class activities? For any characteristics that are missing, how could they be incorporated
by changing the class activities?
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Hot Topic
Art Graesser
Our research, along with colleagues in the interdisciplinary Institute for In-
telligent Systems, investigates language, discourse and learning. Our primary
focus is on the mastery of deep knowledge rather than shallow knowledge
in adults. Examples of shallow knowledge are facts, definitions, and routine
procedures, whereas deep knowledge involves causal reasoning, justification
of claims with evidence, resolution of contradictions, precise quantification of
ideas, and problem solving (Graesser, 2015). The workforce in the 21st century
has an increased expectation to acquire deep knowledge to the extent that
routine tasks are handled by robots and other digital technologies. Unfortu-
nately, the process of deep learning is challenging because the material is
difficult, useful strategies are sometimes novel, and some of the accompanying
emotions are negative (such as confusion and frustration, D’Mello, Lehman,
Pekrun, & Graesser, 2014). Moreover, our current educational systems are
typically designed for acquiring shallow knowledge rather than deep knowledge.
Keith T. Shubeck
One approach to acquiring deep knowledge is to develop com-
puterized intelligent tutoring systems that help adults acquire deep
knowledge. These systems have pedagogical strategies that are
tailored to the knowledge, skills and abilities of individual stu-
dents. We have developed a system called AutoTutor (Graesser,
2016), where a student learns by having conversations with ani-
mated conversational agents (computer-generated avatars). AutoTu-
tor presents difficult questions or problems, often with associated
figures and diagrams; the student and AutoTutor have a multiturn
conversation to co-construct an answer/solution. AutoTutor has
been developed and tested on a number of difficult subject matters, such as computer literacy,
physics, electronics, scientific reasoning, and comprehension strategies. These conversational ITS
have shown significant learning gains on deep knowledge compared with pretests and control
conditions such as reading text. Some versions of AutoTutor implement “trialogues” that involve
a conversation between the student and two computer agents, a tutor and a peer (Graesser, Li, &
Forsyth, 2014). The two agents can model good social interaction, productive reasoning, and at
times argue with each other to show different perspectives and resolutions of conflicts (D’Mello et
al., 2014).
Anne M. Lippert
We have investigated other approaches to improve deep learning through
language and discourse (Graesser, 2015). These include investigating inference
generation and mental models during the comprehension of stories, technical
text, illustrated texts, hypertext, and hypermedia. We have developed computer
systems (available on the internet for free) that scale texts on difficulty (Coh-
Metrix, http:/ /cohmetrix.com) and questions on comprehension problems
(QUAID, http:/ /quid.cohmetrix.com). We have investigated collaborative
problem solving where groups of people in computer-mediated communication
tackle problems that individuals cannot solve alone. A curriculum for 21st-
century skills is destined to include discourse technologies that facilitate deeper
knowledge acquisition.
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Graesser, Lippert, & Shubeck Glossary
Glossary
arcs In a knowledge structure, arcs are what con-
nect two different nodes and represent how
the nodes are related: is-a, has-a-part, prop-
erty of, contains, cause, reason. 74
causal networks A knowledge structure consist-
ing of event nodes that are connected by “en-
ables” arcs. 76
embodied cognition The idea that knowledge
and mental representations are influenced by
experiences of the human body (e.g., emotion,
perception, actions). 78
goal-action procedure A hierarchical knowledge
structure where nodes represent goals or de-
sired states which are connected by “in order
to” arcs. 75
graph The set of nodes that are connected by arcs.
74
knowledge component Describes a mental struc-
ture used by learners to understand a topic.
Any given topic may consist of many differ-
ent knowledge components. 72
knowledge structure Relational structure be-
tween concepts in a particular topic. De-
scribes how ideas are conceptually related in
terms of their proximity with each other. 74
neural network Structure of nodes organized in
multiple layers that are interconnected by arcs
that either activate or inhibit nodes given arc
direction and arc weight. 77
nodes In a knowledge structure, nodes are con-
cepts, states, events, processes, goals or ac-
tions of basic ideas that can be expressed by
words, phrases, or sentences. 74
script A structure that encompasses the goal-action
procedures of all participants in an organized
activity. 75
spatial structure A hierarchy of regions that are
connected by “is-in” or “contains” arcs. 75
taxonomic structure A hierarchical knowledge
structure in which concepts are connected by
“is-a” arcs. 74
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6.1 Introduction: What is
Metacognition?
6.1.1 Setting “Metacognition” Apart
from “Cognition”
Metacognition is the “top manager” of cognitive
functioning. Memory, for instance, consists of the
basic cognitive functions for storing and retrieving
information. Metacognitive processes are respon-
sible for regulating these functions: setting goals
for learning, examining the quality of memory stor-
age and retrieval, allocating time to memory pro-
cesses, choosing among strategies for reasoning,
making decisions, and acknowledging achieving
goals. Metacognition is not separate from cognition,
but integral to all higher-order cognitive inferences,
including explicit learning, skill development, re-
call of personal events, communication, decision
making, problem solving, navigation, design, etc.
It refers to the superordinate and in a way to the
most responsible level of all cognitive functions. It
constitutes the quality control of one’s own mental
functions.
The prefix “meta” in Greek loanwords denotes
“something that consciously references or comments
upon its own subject” (https://www.dictionary.co
m/). Thus, metacognition is cognition about one’s
own cognition. It serves to monitor the correctness
of our cognitive operations and to correct for in-
correct operations in order to control for the costs
and benefits of our judgments and decisions (Nelson
& Narens, 1990). To illustrate, an invoice must be
checked (monitoring) and corrected for potential
calculation errors (control). Before a written exam
can be submitted, all responses must be validated
(monitoring) and revised if necessary (control). Pur-
chasing decisions must be confirmed (monitoring)
or revised in case of dissatisfying expected results
(control).
6.1.2 Metacognitive Monitoring and
Control
The output of the metacognitive monitoring func-
tion provides the input to the metacognitive control
function (Nelson & Narens, 1990). Monitoring judg-
ments, the critical assessment of the mental opera-
tions used to transform the stimulus information, are
preconditions for appropriate corrections and for any
decisions or actions. Thus, the veracity of verbal
communications has to be assessed critically before
one can decide whether to trust, distrust or discard
the communication. One monitors the navigation
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of one’s car or boat in order to draw a controlled
decision at the next branching. Or, monitoring the
money one has spent on prior occasions affords a
precondition for the controlled use of the remaining
budget.
Metacognition is ubiquitous because virtually all
cognitive operations are monitored and controlled,
before, during, and after their execution. The ex-
ecution of an action plan—such as telling a story
about what we did last weekend—is not confined
to retrieval and speech activities; it also involves
monitoring operations such as keeping track of the
position reached in the story, checking grammar
and pronunciation, assessing the available time left,
receiving signals from communication partners, or
noting the ease (or difficulty) with which story de-
tails come to mind (e.g., “I don’t recall the name
now, it will probably come to mind soon”). As
a function of these monitoring results, one can
then control speed and story detail, correct for mis-
takes, secure comprehension, and maybe change
one’s nonverbal behavior in order to appear hon-
est.
Figure 6.1 provides a schematic overview of
generic monitoring and control functions involved
in different stages of cognitive processing, from ac-
quisition to retention, retrieval, and inferences lead-
ing to judgments and decisions. It is an extended
version of a diagram that was originally presented
in a seminal article by Nelson and Narens (1990),
which focused on memory processes. As apparent
from the direction of arrows, monitoring functions
are informed by the contents of the primary cogni-
tive processes, whereas control functions constitute
metacognitive influences exerted on the cognitive
processes, informed by monitoring results.
Metacognition covers both meta-memory and
meta-reasoning (see Ackerman & Thompson,
2015, 2017). That is, monitoring and control func-
tions are not only concerned with memory proper but
also with memory-dependent reasoning processes
leading to judgments and decision making. Thus, a
cognitive-ecological perspective on judgment and
decision calls for an extended metacognitive ap-
proach, which must not only regulate internal cogni-
tive functions but also check on the validity and us-
ability of environmental information samples. In this
regard, Figure 6.1 indicates that for judgments and
decisions to be unbiased and accurate, the weight
given to sampled information must depend on a crit-
ical assessment of its validity and trustworthiness.
Figure 6.1: Schematic overview of major monitoring and control functions, based on Nelson and Narens (1990).
90 • Psychology of Human Thought • Chapter 6
Review of Insights Gained from Metacognition Research Fiedler, Ackerman & Scarampi
6.2 Review of Insights Gained from
Metacognition Research
In a review of four decades of pertinent research (see
Kornell & Bjork, 2007; Son & Sethi, 2010), some
milestones can be identified. The general research
theme is the interplay of monitoring and control
(Nelson & Narens, 1990), which need not be strictly
unidirectional (see Koriat, Ma’ayan, & Nussinson,
2006). Yet, only when monitoring is reliable can
people have a solid basis for effective control of
strategies and allocation of effort and resources.
6.2.1 Metacognitive Regulation of
Effort
Imagine Lisa, a student, who is studying a chapter
in a text book for an exam. While reading the chap-
ter, Lisa is considering her proficiency and decides
whether to restudy a previous paragraph, look for
additional information over the Internet, continue to
the next paragraph, or stop studying, either because
she does not progress adequately today, or because
she knows the entire chapter to a satisfactory degree.
All these regulatory functions rely on monitoring her
knowledge of each paragraph in the chapter. This
assessment allows Lisa to identify the weak points
and those which she mastered already.
The available empirical evidence on effort reg-
ulation was to a large extent collected by simple
methodologies involving memorized lists of words
or word pairs. Nevertheless, the scientific insights
gained from these paradigms are robust and gener-
alizable to many other cognitive tasks (e.g., solving
problems, answering knowledge questions, learning
from texts, decision making). In a typical paired-
associate memory study, people are asked to memo-
rize pairs of related or unrelated words (e.g., KING
– CROWN; FLAG – POT) presented one after the
other. They are allowed to allocate time to each
item freely. Immediately after memorizing each
word pair, people assess their chance for success
by providing a Judgment of Learning (JOL). For
adults, the tasks typically involve memorizing 60
word pairs presented in a random order. After mem-
orizing all of them, there is a recall phase, in which
the left words are presented one by one in a new
order, and participants are asked to recall the right
word that was attached to it in the study phase. Anal-
yses of study time, JOL, and recall success provide
evidence about the way people allocate study time
across items and in various conditions (e.g., high
motivation for success; repeated learning; emotion-
ally loaded vs. neural words; words presented in
large or small fonts).
The causal role of JOL for effort regulation was
established by Metcalfe and Finn (2008). They
asked participants to learn half of the word pairs
once and half repeated three times in the study list.
Participants then provided their JOLs and recalled
the items. Not surprisingly, JOL and recall were
higher for the items learned three times than for
those learned only once. In a second block, the
items studied once in the first block were now pre-
sented three times, and vice versa. All items were
thus learned four times altogether and recall of both
sets was equivalent. However, JOLs were higher
for items learned three times than for those learned
only once in the first block, presumably because of
the advantage in the initial recall test after the first
block. This effect of a previous test on JOL is called
memory for past test. Most relevant for effort reg-
ulation is that when providing JOL for the second
block, which differed between the item sets, par-
ticipants were also asked whether they would like
to restudy each item. Although recall performance
was equivalent for both item sets, participants chose
to restudy items for which JOL was lower—those
studied only once in the first block. This finding
demonstrates that effort regulation decisions, like
decisions to restudy items, depend on JOL rather
than on actual memory strength. Similarly, people
relied on JOL when betting on success, even when
these judgments were misleading (Hembacher &
Ghetti, 2017).
Using more complex learning and memory tasks,
Thiede, Anderson, and Therriault (2003) found that
judgments of comprehension guide decisions to
restudy texts. When these JOLs were more reliable,
participants were better attuned to their knowledge
level and chose to restudy the less well-known texts.
This strategy led to higher achievement, demonstrat-
ing that effort regulation becomes more effective
with more reliable JOLs. For visual perception, sub-
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jective confidence guided decisions to get a hint
that was helpful for choosing among two options
(Desender, Boldt, & Yeung, 2018). Notably, the
tight association between monitoring and control
was reduced among clinical populations and en-
hanced among young and healthy people (e.g., Dan-
ion, Gokalsing, Robert, Massin-Krauss, & Bacon,
2001; Koren et al., 2004). Thus, a well-functioning
monitoring-control link should not be taken for
granted.
The next question to ask is when people stop in-
vesting effort. That is, what are the stopping rules
that guide effort regulation? A regular finding is
that people invest more time in studying the more
difficult items (Zacks, 1969). This finding led to
the development of Discrepancy Reduction Models,
which assume that people set a target level accord-
ing to their motivation in the given scenario. The
target acts as a stopping rule: they study each item
until monitoring indicates that their knowledge of
this item is satisfactory (Nelson & Narens, 1990;
see Figure 6.2). For more difficult items (B in Fig-
ure 6.2) this takes longer than for easier items (A).
There are conditions, such as time pressure, under
which the stopping criterion gets lower, reflecting a
compromise in the target level of knowledge (Thiede
& Dunlosky, 1999). High motivation for success,
in contrast, leads people to raise their stopping cri-
terion, yielding longer time investment aiming to
increase the chances of success (Koriat et al., 2006).
As known from real-life scenarios, when the items
to be studied are extremely difficult, people may give
up early, even when they acknowledge that they do
not know them as they would have desired. This
strategy is effective since it reduces labor-in-vain:
time investment in items that have a low chance of
being mastered, even after extensive effort to master
them. Moreover, this strategy allows more time to
be invested in other items, at intermediate difficulty
levels, which have a higher chance of being mas-
tered (Son & Sethi, 2010). Indeed, it was shown
that people compromise on their target level as more
time is invested. They also set a time limit, beyond
which they are not willing to invest further time in
studying an item (Ackerman, 2014). This time limit
is adjusted to be higher when learners have high
motivation and to be lower when they learn under
time pressure (Undorf & Ackerman, 2017).
One more consideration is order effects. Dun-
losky and Ariel (2011) demonstrated that, when pre-
Figure 6.2: Illustration of the discrepancy reduction model, based on Ackerman and Goldsmith (2011, Figure 1). It shows the straight
criterion and the regulatory role of Judgment of Learning (JOL) in guiding the decision whether to continue or cease
learning. A – early termination with overconfidence, B – termination with perfect calibration, C – point of decision to
continue learning because the stopping criterion was not reached yet.
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sented with several items, people tend to choose to
restudy items encountered earlier in their habitual
reading order (e.g., from left to right) rather than
those appearing later. When study time is too short
to master all materials, investing too much in early
list parts is counterproductive, relative to waiving
the most difficult items: the time invested in the dif-
ficult items, when they appear early in the list, could
be used more effectively for studying easier items
appearing later in the list. Beyond this order effect,
Dunlosky and Ariel (2011) also found indications
for waiving the most difficult items. Thus, these
strategies are complementary rather than mutually
exclusive.
Generalizing these principles to text learning,
Ackerman and Goldsmith (2011) compared learning
printed texts to learning the same texts presented on
computer screens. In both cases, participants were
allowed to write comments and highlight text sec-
tions. In the computerized condition, participants
believed to learn more quickly than on paper, and
thus stopped learning earlier (see Figure 6.2, point
A). In fact, though, rate of learning was equivalent
in both media. As a result, performance in tests
taken immediately after studying was respectively
lower in the computerized than in the printed-text
condition. This apparently reflects the role of over-
confidence in effort regulation—people stop when
they think they know the materials adequately. If
they are overconfident, stopping will be premature.
Later studies showed that learning in computerized
environments suffers most from limited learning
time (for a meta-analysis, seeDelgado, Vargas, Ack-
erman, & Salmerón, 2018). Similar overconfidence
effects were found with problem-solving tasks of
the types students encounter in math, logic, geome-
try, and psychometric tests (Ackerman, 2014; Sidi,
Shpigelman, Zalmanov, & Ackerman, 2017).
6.2.2 The Heuristic Bases for
Metacognitive Judgments
The metacognitive judgments regarding memory,
reading comprehension, and solutions to problems
introduced in the preceding section are known to be
based on heuristic cues (see Dunlosky & Tauber,
2014, for a review; Koriat, 1997). Thus, people can-
not directly “read” their knowledge and the quality
of their own cognitive processing, but instead, must
base their judgments on cues experienced when they
perform the task and immediately after stopping
performing it.
One prominent cue is fluency—the subjective ease
with which a cognitive task is performed. Fluency
is accounted to underlie many metacognitive judg-
ments; it is indeed a rather valid cue for success.
For instance, memorizing the word pair TUBER –
AZORES is hard as the words are rarely encountered
and their pairing is rather unusual. When memo-
rizing this word pair among sixty other pairs, the
chances of remembering the right word when en-
countering the left one remains low despite investing
a lot of effort, which means that this item’s fluency
is low. In contrast, when a pair consists of familiar
words which are often encountered in the same con-
text (e.g., SOCK – FOOT), cued recall is typically
quick and has a high chance of success, and thus
characterized by high fluency. Koriat, Ma’ayan, and
Nussinson (2006) suggested that people use in such
contexts a memorizing effort heuristic: longer learn-
ing times, experienced as lower fluency, indicate a
lower probability of memorizing the item later.
The predictive accuracy of metacognitive judg-
ments depends on the diagnosticity of the utilized
cues. A great deal of research focused on condi-
tions under which heuristic cues, like fluency, can
be misleading. For instance, people may feel that
they found the correct solution for a problem right
away and based on fluency be confident they solved
it successfully, while in fact they are wrong, and
investing more effort could increase their chance of
success. Thus, identifying factors that induce pre-
dictable biases in people’s confidence is important
because such biases impair effort regulation.
The potentially misleading impact of heuristics
suggests that metacognitive judgments are dissocia-
ble from the actual success of cognitive processes;
factors that affect performance do not necessarily
affect judgments regarding the same cognitive pro-
cesses, and vice versa. In particular, dissociation of
JOL from actual performance can stem from surface
properties of the to-be-learned items affecting per-
ceptual fluency rather than the more relevant cue of
processing fluency. Rhodes and Castel (2008) found
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higher JOLs for words printed in large font than for
those printed in smaller fonts, although recall was
less affected by font size (see Undorf, Zimdahl, &
Bernstein, 2017, for a similar perceptual influence
on JOL). Conversely, other variables have more pro-
nounced effects on performance than on JOLs. For
instance, rehearsal improves recall, and long delays
between learning and test cause substantial forget-
ting, yet JOLs are hardly sensitive to either (Koriat,
1997; Koriat, Bjork, Sheffer, & Bar, 2004). Thus, ac-
curacy of JOLs and other metacognitive judgments
depends on the validity of the utilized cues.
An effective and easy-to-adapt solution to several
biases of JOLs is to delay the JOL elicitations to
a time closer to the test, rather than immediately
after learning. The delayed JOL effect is robust (see
Rhodes & Tauber, 2011, for a meta-analysis). De-
layed JOL accuracy reflects access to more diagnos-
tic heuristic cues from long-term memory reflecting
better the state of knowledge when taking the test
than when provided immediately after learning each
item.
In the context of problem solving, Ackerman and
Zalmanov (2012) compared performance and confi-
dence in the solutions of multiple-choice and open-
ended test format. As expected, they found higher
success rates in a multiple-choice test format than
in the open-ended test because of guessing or iden-
tifying the correct option when readily available.
However, subjective confidence ratings were equiv-
alent in both test formats; they did not reflect this
performance difference. Confidence in the same
solutions was however sensitive to response time:
lower for slow responses than for quick responses.
This finding reflects utilization of fluency. Simi-
larly, Fernandez-Cruz, Arango-Muñoz, and Volz
(2016) found sensitivity to processing fluency for
both feeling of error and final confidence in a nu-
merical calculation task. Thompson and colleagues
(2013) examined fluency effects on final confidence
and on Feeling of Rightness (FOR)—an initial confi-
dence judgment collected immediately after produc-
ing the first solution that comes to mind, and before
rethinking the solution. They used misleading math
problems and considered both processing fluency,
based on ease of processing, and perceptual fluency,
manipulated by font readability (e.g., hard vs. easy
to read fonts). Both FOR and final confidence re-
flected processing fluency, as both judgments were
associated with response times. However, none of
the examined judgments reflected perceptual fluency,
unlike the aforementioned font-size effects on JOL.
This example of a difference between metacognitive
judgments of memory processes and of reasoning
processes suggests that research should delve into
commonalities and differences across tasks (Acker-
man & Beller, 2017; Ackerman & Thompson, 2015,
for a review).
Convincing evidence for the role of fluency in
judgments, as reflected by response time, was pro-
vided by Topolinski and Reber (2010). Using three
different types of problems, they first presented each
problem and then, delayed either for a short or
longer time, presented a potential answer, which
was the target stimulus. Participants had to judge
whether the presented answer was the correct solu-
tion for the presented problem. For both correct and
incorrect candidates, faster appearing solutions were
more frequently judged to be correct than those pre-
sented after a delay. Because solution display time
was the only difference, the findings indicate that
mere delay led to lower endorsement of answers as
correct.
Two other heuristic cues were shown to affect
feelings-of-knowing regarding answers to knowl-
edge questions. The first cue is the familiarity of the
question terms or the knowledge domain (e.g., Reder
& Ritter, 1992; Shanks & Serra, 2014). The second
cue is accessibility, which reflects the number of
associations that come to mind during a retrieval
attempt, regardless of whether this information pro-
motes retrieval of correct answers (Koriat, 1993).
For example, Koriat and Levy-Sadot (2001) com-
posed general knowledge questions that differed in
familiarity of the terms (e.g., the ballets “Swan lake”
vs. “The Legend of Joseph”) and in accessibility,
operationalized as the number of names people can
provide for a category (e.g., people tend to know
more composers than choreographers). These cues
contributed independently to feeling-of-knowing-
judgments, which were higher for more familiar
objects, especially when items were highly accessi-
ble. Accessibility also affected judgments regarding
problem solutions (Ackerman & Beller, 2017). Al-
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though not necessarily reflected in response time, it
is possible that familiarity and accessibility affect
fluency by affecting the ease of processing experi-
ence.
Focusing on a rarely considered cue, Topolinski,
Bakhtiari, and Erle (2016) examined the effects of
ease of pronouncing on judgments of solvability—
quick assessment as to whether the problem is
solvable—has a solution—or whether it includes
contradiction that does not allow one to solve it at
all. Topolinski and colleagues presented participants
with solvable anagrams (scrambled words) and un-
solvable letter sets, that could not be rearranged to
form a valid word, and manipulated their pronounce-
ability. For instance, for the word EPISODE, they
had two anagram options: EDISEPO and IPSDEOE.
Easy- and hard-to-pronounce versions also existed
for the unsolvable letter sets. As expected, easy-
to-pronounce anagrams were more often rated as
solvable than hard-to-pronounce anagrams, regard-
less of whether anagrams were in fact solvable or
not. This finding is particularly interesting because
in reality anagrams that are easier to pronounce are
often harder to solve, since people find it harder to
rearrange their letters. Thus, pronounceability may
function as a misleading heuristic cue for metacog-
nitive judgments.
Most heuristic cues considered in memory and
reasoning research somehow refer to semantic
knowledge activated in verbal tasks. This is the
case with relatedness of word pairs, familiarity of
question terms, accessibility of relevant knowledge,
and pronounceability, as reviewed above. Studying
heuristic cues that affect perceptual decisions pro-
vides opportunities to consider non-semantic heuris-
tic cues. In a study by Boldt, De Gardelle, and
Yeung (2017) participants judged the average color
of an array of eight colored shapes and rated confi-
dence in their choice. The higher the variability of
colors across the eight shapes, the lower the partici-
pants’ confidence in the average color choice, even
when equating the actual difficulty. Thus, people
utilize misleading heuristic cues in perceptual tasks
as they do in verbal tasks.
When considering the bases for metacognitive
judgments, in particular those associated with flu-
ency, a question in place is whether people base their
judgments on the experience of ease while perform-
ing the task (experience-based cues), or on knowl-
edge about cognitive processes, which is general
rather than specific to the current experience with
the item at hand (theory-based cues; Koriat, 1997).
For instance, the unjustified effect of font size on
JOL mentioned above could stem from experience
of easy learning when the fonts are large relative to
an experience of difficulty when the fonts are small
(Undorf & Zimdahl, 2018). The same effect on JOL
could also stem from people’s implicit theories of
learning, saying that large presentation helps memo-
rizing while small presentation adds a challenge to
the task. Attempts were made to separate the two in-
formation sources. Kelley and Jacoby (1996) aimed
to focus on experience-based cues while controlling
for potential theories people might have. They pre-
sented participants anagrams (scrambled words). In
the first phase of the experiment, participants studied
the solution words to half the anagrams. This prior
exposure led to faster solutions of those anagrams
in a second phase, as the correct solution came to
mind more easily. After experiencing such process-
ing ease, participants expected these anagrams to be
easier for other people to solve relative to anagrams
these participants solved without prior exposure to
their answers. This finding demonstrates the intri-
cate role of experience-based cues in metacognitive
judgments.
The contribution of experience-based fluency and
theory-based beliefs is a source of debate about
heuristic cues. Mueller, Tauber, and Dunlosky
(2013) found dominance of theory-based beliefs that
related word pairs (SOCK - FOOT) were easier to
remember than unrelated word pairs (PARROT –
GAZ) over effects of experience-based processing
fluency on JOLs. Based on Undorf and Erdfelder’s
(2015) counter-evidence that experience-based flu-
ency is nevertheless an important basis for JOLs,
both teams later concluded that theory-based beliefs
contribute to JOLs in addition to experience-based
fluency (Mueller & Dunlosky, 2017; Undorf & Zim-
dahl, 2018).
In sum, metacognitive judgments are prone to pre-
dictable biases due to utilizing heuristic cues that
are generally valid, though misleading under distinct
conditions. Understanding factors that people take
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into account when making metacognitive judgments
is essential for any attempt to educate and improve
effort and behavior regulation.
6.2.3 Knowing What You Know:
Judgment Accuracy
Judgments and decisions are generally accompa-
nied by a subjective feeling of confidence, aimed
at assessing the probability of being correct. This
metacognitive judgment serves as a guide for current
and future behavior, helping people avoid repeating
the same mistakes and evaluate whether the avail-
able information suffices to make a reliable decision.
Most research on confidence has focused on the
relation between confidence judgments and objec-
tive performance on a criterion task, with the aim of
investigating how well individuals can monitor their
own knowledge. Two main aspects of judgment ac-
curacy can be distinguished, resolution (or metacog-
nitive sensitivity) and calibration (or metacogni-
tive bias). Resolution refers to distinguishing be-
tween correct and incorrect answers (Fleming &
Lau, 2014), whereas calibration refers to the extent
to which confidence judgments tend to be overconfi-
dent (i.e., more optimistic than actual performance)
versus underconfident (i.e., less optimistic).
Resolution. Resolution plays an important role
in metacognitive control processes and people’s be-
havior (Nelson & Narens, 1990). Imagine a student
facing a multiple-choice test in which errors are pe-
nalized whereas omissions are not. The test will
be solved differently depending on the assessment
the student makes of their candidate answers. If an
answer is judged as correct, it may be worthwhile
responding and risking the penalty. In contrast, if
an answer is assessed as wrong, the student might
decide to withhold the response. The decision to
produce or withhold an answer is determined by res-
olution. Perfect resolution will lead to offering all
the candidate responses which are indeed correct,
and withhold all incorrect responses. Conversely,
poor resolution—at the same level of knowledge—
may lead to withholding some of the correct answers
and to offering a portion of the incorrect ones, re-
sulting in penalties and lost opportunities for points
(Higham & Higham, 2018).
Several indexes of resolution can be computed to
assess the accuracy of a judgment once it has been
elicited. All measures require the acquisition of an
independent performance criterion that quantifies
the relationship between accuracy and confidence.
In previous research, resolution has been measured
using confidence-accuracy correlations within par-
ticipants (Nelson, 1984). As an alternative, other
researchers have suggested signal detection theory
(SDT; Green & Swets, 1966; see Figure 6.4 be-
low), which assesses discrimination between objec-
tive states of the world (e.g., distinguishing signal
from noise, or the presence or absence of a stimu-
lus). Applied to metacognitive judgments, resolu-
tion can be seen as the sensitivity to a signal. More
precisely, the primary cognitive task (e.g., memory,
decision making, etc.) is often called Type 1 task,
whereas the task of the discriminating of confidence
ratings between one’s own correct and incorrect re-
sponses in the Type 1 task is called Type 2 task. Ad-
vancers of SDT have argued that gamma correlations
can be problematic, as they can be affected by the
overall tendency to use higher or lower confidence
ratings (i.e., metacognitive bias; Fleming & Lau,
2014). Nevertheless, gamma correlations continue
to be used in metacognition research. Above-chance
confidence-accuracy correlations were found in a
variety of tasks, ranging from perceptual decision
making to challenging problem solving, indicating
that people are skilled at identifying whether their
responses are correct or wrong (see Ackerman & Zal-
manov, 2012; Koriat, 2018 and references therein).
Calibration. Another key monitoring accuracy
measure in metacognition and self-regulation is cali-
bration. A simple measure of calibration is the differ-
ence between mean confidence in success with each
item and actual success rate. Several studies have
indicated that people tend to be overconfident across
a variety of conditions (Dunning, Heath, & Suls,
2004). In particular, Kruger and Dunning (1999)
documented a metacognitive bias through which
relatively unskilled individuals not only make erro-
neous responses but also overestimate their abilities.
That is, a deficit in knowledge prevents poor per-
formers from realizing how poorly they are perform-
ing. However, if trained to become more competent,
their self-assessment also becomes more accurate.
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Calibration and resolution are independent mea-
sures. An individual may have high overall confi-
dence, but poor resolution and vice versa (Fleming &
Lau, 2014). Nevertheless, recent research has shown
that the two are not independent when the proba-
bilistic structure of the environment is considered
(Koriat, 2018). Across a series of experiments using
two-alternative forced choice items from different
domains (e.g., perceptual decision making, general
knowledge, memory, and predictions about others’
judgments, beliefs, and attitudes), Koriat (2018)
found that resolution is strictly dependent on the
accuracy of Type 1 task performance and that posi-
tive correlations between confidence and accuracy
observed across many studies are confined to items
for which accuracy is better than chance. Further-
more, calibration depended on task difficulty: items
with accuracy smaller than 50% led to a strong over-
confidence bias, whereas items for which accuracy
was better than chance were associated with almost
perfect calibration. These results support the propo-
sition that for difficult items that are likely to elicit
erroneous responses, individuals are largely unaware
of making a mistake. Consistent with this account,
the overconfidence bias decreases markedly when
the selective reliance on difficult items is avoided
through representative sampling (Gigerenzer, Hof-
frage, & Kleinbölting, 1991).
Another key element of metacognitive judgments
is the time of elicitation. Judgments can be prospec-
tive (i.e., occurring before performing a task), or
retrospective (i.e., occurring after task completion).
For example, a student may reflect on their current
knowledge to predict their success on an upcoming
test (prospective judgment) and, judge afterwards
how well they did, trying to estimate their grade (ret-
rospective judgment). Few behavioral studies have
pitted prospective against retrospective judgments
for the same task. Siedlecka, Paulewicz and Wierz-
choń (2016) compared prospective and retrospective
confidence judgments. Participants rated whether
presented words were the solution to anagram tasks.
Participants also rated their certainty, either before
or after seeing the suggested solution. The authors
found that post-decision confidence ratings were
more accurate than ratings made prospectively. Res-
olution and calibration were also found to be higher
in retrospective than in prospective judgments by
Fleming, Massoni, Gajdos, and Vergnaud (2016),
using a perceptual decision task. Retrospective con-
fidence ratings were provided on every trial, whereas
prospective judgments were only provided prior to
every fifth trial. The authors found dissociable in-
fluences on prospective and retrospective judgments.
Whereas retrospective judgments were strongly in-
fluenced by current-trial fluency, and accuracy and
confidence in the immediately preceding decision,
prospective judgments were influenced by previous
confidence over a longer time frame. Furthermore,
individual overconfidence was stable across prospec-
tive and retrospective judgments, suggesting that
overconfidence represents a stable personality trait
(Ais, Zylberberg, Barttfeld, & Sigman, 2016; Jack-
son & Kleitman, 2014).
As many reasoning and problem-solving tasks go
on over an extended period of time, the assessment
of performance and success probability must be up-
dated repeatedly (Ackerman, 2014). Intermediate
confidence is an internal estimate of the adequacy of
possible responses considered before arriving at a fi-
nal solution (see Ackerman & Thompson, 2017). To
study this process, Ackerman (2014) asked partici-
pants to rate their intermediate confidence every few
seconds until they provided a solution, after which
they rated their final confidence. The first interme-
diate judgment turned out to be a good predictor
of the amount of time participants spent solving
the problems. Confidence tended to increase over
time. However, whereas at the beginning, partici-
pants tended to provide answers when confidence
was high, over time they became more willing to
provide answers at a lower level of confidence. Fi-
nal low-confidence responses could be as low as
20%, even when there was an option to give up, by
answering “I don’t know”.
The study of confidence judgments has been ex-
tended in the last few decades to collective decision
making. In numerous perceptual as well as cognitive
decisions, interacting individuals can make more ac-
curate decisions by discussing one’s own perceptual
experiences with others and integrating different
opinions, achieving a reliable collective benefit even
in the absence of objective feedback (Bahrami et al.,
2010). That is, the accuracy achieved by sharing
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and combining subjective information via social in-
teraction can exceed the accuracy of each individual
opinion, even that of the best individual in the group.
This phenomenon is known as the “two-heads-better-
than-one” effect (Koriat, 2012) or “wisdom of the
crowd” (Surowiecki, 2004). Koriat (2012) presented
participants with two-alternative forced inference
tasks and showed that members of a dyad can take
advantage of the wisdom of the group by using a
simple heuristic: choosing the response expressed
with the highest level of confidence. These find-
ings have relevant implications for collective and
democratic decisions and actions.
6.2.4 Neuroscience of Metacognition
In recent years, the study of metacognition was en-
riched by growing evidence from neuroscience con-
cerning the underlying neurocognitive architecture.
Specific neural substrates (especially in frontolateral,
frontomedial, and parietal regions; see Figure 6.3)
are involved in metacognition (e.g., Fleming, Hui-
jgen, & Dolan, 2012; Fleming, Ryu, Golfinos, &
Blackmon, 2014; Fleming, Weil, Nagy, Dolan, &
Rees, 2010). However, the neural bases of human
metacognition remain controversial. Metacognition
operates on a variety of first-order processes, rang-
ing from memory to perception, problem solving,
etc. The diversity of the tasks to be monitored and
controlled complicates the study of its neural signa-
ture, as it can be difficult to differentiate between
the neural activations attributable to the metacogni-
tive monitoring and control processes and the neural
signature of the first-order cognitive/emotional pro-
cesses (Metcalfe & Schwartz, 2016).
Existing attempts to isolate the metacognitive
monitoring and control processes from first-order
processes, testify to the uniqueness of metacognitive
processes. Initial evidence was obtained from neu-
ropsychological cases. For instance, Shimamura and
Squire (1986) suggested that frontal lobe (behind
forehead) impairments in patients with Korsakoff’s
syndrome—a chronic memory disorder character-
ized by severe anterograde amnesia—can impact
metacognitive judgments independently of cogni-
tive performance per se. A common finding suggests
that neural signals involved in error monitoring orig-
inate in the posterior medial frontal cortex (pMFC;
Dehaene, Posner, & Tucker, 1994).
Since the introduction of these seminal studies,
further research into such domains as memory, per-
ception, and decision making, has identified neural
correlates of metacognitive judgments and further
dissociated cognitive from metacognitive processes.
Fleming et al. (2010) had participants performing a
perceptual decision-making task and providing rat-
ings of confidence after each decision. The authors
found considerable variation between participants in
metacognitive accuracy. Using MRI, this variation
in confidence accuracy was found to be correlated
with grey matter volume in the right rostrolateral
areas of the prefrontal cortex (PFC). Furthermore,
greater accuracy in metacognitive judgments was as-
sociated with increased white-matter microstructure
connected with this area of the PFC. These results
point to neural bases of metacognition that differ
from those supporting primary perception. Similarly,
in a study by Do Lam and colleagues (2012), partici-
pants who had first learned the pairwise associations
between faces and names were then presented again
with each face and asked to provide judgments of
learning (JOLs) regarding the chance of recalling the
associated name. A neurological dissociation was
found between the processes of memory retrieval,
which were located in the hippocampal region (i.e.,
medial temporal lobes), and those underlying JOLs,
which were located in the medial PFC, orbitofrontal
cortex (OFC) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC).
Anatomical, functional, and neuropsychological
studies have confirmed the consistent involvement
of a frontoparietal network in metacognition (Vac-
caro & Fleming, 2018). Activations were located
in the posterior medial PFC, ventromedial PFC and
bilateral anterior PFC/ dorsolateral PFC. Other re-
searchers observed activations in the bilateral insula
and dorsal precuneus (Vaccaro & Fleming, 2018).
These results suggest that the parietal cortex, par-
ticularly precuneus, and insula represent key nodes
supporting metacognition, together with the PFC.
Existing research supports the existence of neural
dissociations between prospective and retrospective
metacognitive judgments (Chua, Schacter, & Sper-
ling, 2009; Fleming & Dolan, 2012). For example,
in a study on patients with lateral frontal lesions,
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Pannu, Kaszniak, and Rapcsak (2005) found im-
paired retrospective confidence judgments, but pre-
served judgments of future task performance. Con-
versely, Schnyer and colleagues (2004) found an as-
sociation between damage to the right ventromedial
PFC and a decrease in accuracy for metacognitive
judgments about future recall (feeling of knowing),
but not for accuracy of retrospective confidence judg-
ments. Further evidence comes from functional MRI
studies, which have shown that prospective metacog-
nition activates medial aspects of the PFC, while ret-
rospective metacognitive accuracy is correlated with
lateral PFC activity (Fleming & Dolan, 2012). When
separating metamemory judgments by temporal fo-
cus in their meta-analysis, Vaccaro and Fleming
(2018) found that retrospective judgments were as-
sociated with activity in the bilateral parahippocam-
pal cortex and left inferior frontal gyrus, whereas
prospective judgments activated the posterior me-
dial PFC, left dorsolateral PFC, and right insula.
Figure 6.3: Gross neuroanatomy. a) Relative position and direction of brain structures. b) The four brain lobes from a lateral view. c)
and d) Approximate locations of the broadest subdivisions of the PFC and other areas linked to metacognition. Illustrations
adapted from Patrick J. Lynch, medical illustrator, C. Carl Jaffe, MD, cardiologist, under the Creative Commons Attribution
2.5 License, 2006 (CC-BY-2.5). Retrieved from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Brain_human_lateral_view.svg
and https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Brain_human_sagittal_section.svg. Abbreviations: dmPFC, dorsomedial
prefrontal cortex; vmPFC, ventromedial prefrontal cortex; ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; dlPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex; rlPFC, rostrolateral prefrontal; vlPFC, ventrolateral prefrontal cortex; OFC, orbitofrontal cortex.
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Nevertheless, neuroimaging evidence directly com-
paring between different judgement types is scarce.
In one of the few studies directly comparing neural
activation related to prospective feeling of know-
ing and retrospective confidence judgment, Chua
and colleagues (2009) found an association between
prospective judgements and activation in medial
parietal and medial temporal lobe, whereas retro-
spective judgements were associated with inferior
prefrontal activity. However, common activations
associated with both prospective and retrospective
judgments were also observed in regions of medial
and lateral PFC, and mid-posterior areas of cingulate
cortex. These results suggest that neural activations
related to different judgment type may differ in de-
gree rather than in kind (Vaccaro & Fleming, 2018).
Another relevant question tackled in neuroscience
is whether metacognition relies on a common,
domain-general resource or on domain-specific
components that are particular to the respective
first-order tasks. Recent neuroimaging studies
yielded pertinent evidence for both domain-general
and domain-specific neural markers (see Rouault,
McWilliams, Allen, & Fleming, 2018, for a review).
A frontoparietal network contributes to metacogni-
tive judgments across a range of different domains.
Still, neuroimaging evidence for direct comparisons
is scarce. In a recent meta-analysis, Vaccaro and
Fleming (2018) observed common regions in sepa-
rate investigations of memory and decision-making
tasks, which included: insula, lateral PFC, and pos-
terior medial PFC. As suggested by Morales et al.
(2018), this result may indicate that judgments in
both memory and decision making are driven by
common inputs. The meta-analysis also pointed to
further regions that are activated by specific tasks.
More precisely, meta-memory engaged left dorsolat-
eral PFC and clusters in bilateral parahippocampal
cortex, whereas right anterior dorsolateral PFC was
involved in decision making (Vaccaro & Fleming,
2018).
In summary, the neural underpinnings of even
the most straightforward metacognitive judgments
are complicated. Although metacognition can be
dissociated from task performance, most studies
have revealed activations in multiple brain areas,
and differences have emerged between prospective
and retrospective judgments. Convergent evidence
indicates that the function of the rostral and dorsal
areas of the lateral PFC is important for the accuracy
of retrospective judgments of performance. In con-
trast, prospective judgments of performance seem
to depend on medial PFC. Recent studies have re-
sulted in a rather nuanced picture, suggesting the
co-existence in the brain of both domain-specific
and domain-general signals.
6.3 Metacognitive Perspectives on
Applied Rationality
The research reviewed so far has proven to be fruit-
ful and thought-provoking, suggesting metacogni-
tive explanations of adaptive behavior. We have seen
that metacognitive deficits can lead to irrationality
and inefficiency. In particular, we have reviewed
memorable evidence on the illusion of knowledge,
which consists of the gross overestimation of one’s
chance of success, typically brought about by de-
ceptive feelings of fluency or flow (Fiedler, 2013).
Overconfidence, in particular, can be a major source
of bias and a dangerous obstacle in decision making
under risk and under uncertainty (Glaser & Weber,
2007; Kruger & Dunning, 1999).
The metacognitive perspective is of particular
importance for applied research on rational think-
ing, adaptive regulation, medical diagnosis and
treatment, democratic decision making, lie detec-
tion, debunking of fake news, argumentation, trust,
(im)moral action, and procedural justice in court-
rooms, selection committees, or executive deci-
sions. Checking and optimizing the quality of
higher-order cognitive operations—the very domain
of metacognition—is crucial for rational and respon-
sible behavior. We illustrate this point in the remain-
der of this section.
6.3.1 Legal Judgments and Decisions
A classical domain of metacognitive research in le-
gal psychology is eyewitness identification perfor-
mance. Because everybody expects eyewitnesses
to identify the perpetrator in a lineup and because
the persons in the presented lineup are much more
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vivid than the original persons in a past episode,
the enhanced readiness to make a positive recogni-
tion decision produces many correct identifications
(when the identified suspect is indeed the perpetra-
tor) but also many incorrect identifications (when
the identified suspect is not the perpetrator).
As illustrated in Figure 6.4, a liberal identifica-
tion criterion (rather left position of C) produces,
say, 90% correct identifications but roughly 40%
incorrect identifications. A high false-alarm rate can
be conceived as a case of overconfidence; C is appar-
ently too weak a criterion to discriminate guilty and
innocent persons, yielding an intolerably high rate of
wrong convictions. Consistent with this account, a
majority of exoneration cases after the introduction
of DNA proofs turned out to be innocent victims of
incorrect eyewitness identification.
The distinction between prospective and retro-
spective confidence judgments is also relevant to
eyewitness testimony (Nguyen, Abed, & Pezdek,
2018). Witnesses are often asked to rate shortly af-
ter witnessing a crime their ability to recognize the
perpetrator in the future (prospective confidence).
Subsequently, when asked to identify someone from
a lineup, eyewitnesses are asked how confident they
are that they identified the correct person as the per-
petrator (retrospective confidence). Nguyen, Abed,
and Pezdek (2018) found that postdictive confidence
was a better indicator of identification accuracy than
predictive confidence, both for faces of the same
race as the witness and for cross-race faces. Con-
sistent with the lab findings reviewed above, this
suggests that eyewitness confidence should be col-
lected at the time of identification rather than earlier
on the crime scene.
6.3.2 Metacognitive Myopia as a Major
Impediment of Rationality
Fewer optimistic insights were obtained in other ar-
eas of metacognition research. Rational judgments
and decisions about economic, political, legal, and
health-related issues rely heavily on the critical as-
sessment of both the logical correctness of mental
operations and the validity of the underlying evi-
dence. A conspicuous deficit in this sorely needed
function of critical assessment has been termed
metacognitive myopia (Fiedler, 2000, 2008, 2012).
As the term “myopia” (short-sightedness) suggests,
experimentally demonstrated violations of rational
norms typically do not reflect insufficient attention
or insensitivity to the stimulus data. On the con-
trary, people are quite sensitive to the data given;
they are in a way too sensitive, taking the data for
granted and failing to discriminate between valid
and invalid information. For example, when judging
the success of different stocks on the stock-market,
participants were quite sensitive to the frequency
with which various stocks were reported in TV pro-
grams among the daily winners. However, they
failed to take into account that the daily winning
outcomes of some stocks had been reported in more
than one TV program (Unkelbach, Fiedler, & Frey-
tag, 2007). Although they fully understand that two
TV programs on the same day provide the same
stock-market news, participants do not exhibit much
success in taking the redundancy into account. Even
when they are explicitly reminded of the redundancy
and instructed not to be misled by such repetitions,
they cannot avoid their misleading influence. This
failure to overcome a known pitfall is a metacogni-
tive flaw.
Analogous findings were observed across many
experimental tasks. Fully irrelevant numerical an-
chors influence quantitative judgments (Wilson,
Houston, Etling, & Brekke, 1996). Samples that dra-
matically over-represent the base-rate of rare events
(e.g., samples in which the prevalence of HIV is 50%
rather than 0.1% as in reality) are used to estimate
associated risks (Fiedler, Hütter, Schott, & Kutzner,
2018). Correctly denied questions referring to ob-
jects or behaviors not included in a film nevertheless
increased the probability that the non-existing ob-
jects were later recalled erroneously (Fiedler, Arm-
bruster, Nickel, Walther, & Asbeck, 1996). In a
perseverance paradigm, explicit debriefing about an
experimental lie did not erase the implications and
psychological consequences of the lie (Ross, Lepper,
& Hubbard, 1975). Common to all these findings
is that participants, who fully understand that in-
valid stimulus information should be discarded, are
nevertheless influenced by that invalid information.
The conspicuous naivety with which information
is used and retained uncritically, regardless of its
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Figure 6.4: Signal detection analysis of eyewitness-identification performance: the solid (dashed) curve represents the distribution of
memory strength when the suspect in a lineup is (is not) the real perpetrator. Discriminability is the average horizontal
difference d’ between curves. An identification decision is made when memory strength exceeds the criterion C. The areas
right of C under the solid (dashed) curve are the probabilities of correct (incorrect) identification.
invalidity, is reminiscent of Hannah Arendt’s (1963)
admonition that compliance and uncritical confor-
mity are the origin of severe harm and violations of
legal norms of humanity. But although the super-
ego residing in the metacognition’s pre-frontal brain
area is ethically obliged to engage in critical test and
reconfirmation, its role in higher-order cognition is
often impoverished. Meta-analyses of modern re-
search on debunking (Chan, Jones, Hall Jamieson,
& Albarracín, 2017), for instance, testify to the in-
ability of scientific or political debriefing to erase
fake news or obvious myths. Thus, even when the
public are fully debriefed that Iraq did not possess
any atomic bombs when the US invaded, that the
evidence on global warming is uncontestable, or that
polygraph lie detection is not supported by reliable
studies, people change their erroneous beliefs only
slightly and continue to hold the discredited wrong
beliefs to a considerable extent.
When it comes to integrating different individual
opinions in group decision making or advice taking,
a typical uncritical strategy is equal weighting of
opinions, in spite of better knowledge or even ex-
plicit feedback about clearly unequal competence
of different advice givers (Fiedler et al., 2018; Mah-
moodi et al., 2015). Recent research by Powell,
Yu, DeWolf, and Holyoak (2017) showed that the
attractiveness of products offered by Amazon may
depend on quantity (number of available reviews)
more than on quality (mean rating provided by pre-
vious customers). Confusion of quantity and quality
was also observed by Fiedler, Kareev, Avrahami,
Beier, Kutzner, and Hütter (2016), who found that
increases (decreases) between samples of two sym-
bols in the proportion of one critical symbol were
readily detected only when absolute sample size
increased (decreased) well.
In causal reasoning, metacognitive myopia is ev-
ident in a tendency to exclusively focus on effect
strength and to disregard the strength of the causal in-
put that was necessary to induce the observed effect
strength. For example, the impact of a drug on ath-
letic performance is judged to be higher if the same
dose of the drug causes a performance increase of 10
scale points rather than 1 point. However, whether
254 mg or only 34 mg of the drug were necessary
to induce the same observed performance change is
given little weight (Hansen, Rim, & Fiedler, 2013).
Why do irrational consequences of metacognitive
myopia extend from objectively difficult to such triv-
ially easy task settings? Why do people continue
to be influenced by invalid information which is
obviously wrong (like an irrelevant numerical an-
chor) and which they explicitly classify as invalid?
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A tentative answer might lie in a kind of metacogni-
tive learned-helplessness effect (Maier & Seligman,
1976). Homo sapiens may have learned that many
real-life tasks do not provide us with sufficient infor-
mation for a normatively sound monitoring and con-
trol process. Thus, a Bayesian algorithm required to
correct for biases in an information sample is often
unknown or does not exist at all. This experience
may then be over-generalized to easy situations in
which monitoring and control would be simple and
straightforward. In any case, metacognitive myopia
seems to constitute a major impediment in the way
of rational behavior.
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Summary
1. The term “metacognition” refers to the subset of cognitive operations that are involved in
the critical assessment and quality control of one’s own cognitive functions. It is useful to
distinguish between monitoring and control as the two major metacognitive functions. Rather
than being separate from cognition, metacognition is integral to every cognitive performance,
from brief perceptual tasks to complex reasoning challenges.
2. Guiding people to effective regulation of effort is the "holy grail", or ultimate goal, of
metacognitive research.
3. Crucial to understanding sources for monitoring biases is measurement of resolution, the
ability to distinguish between correct and incorrect answers, and calibration, the extent to
which judgments tend to be overconfident or underconfident.
4. Retrospective, post-decision confidence ratings were found to be more accurate than prospec-
tive ratings provided beforehand.
5. Metacognitive judgments (e.g., of confidence) utilize distinct heuristic cues, such as fluency,
familiarity, accessibility, and pronounceability.
6. Although the neuropsychological underpinnings of metacognition are complicated, convergent
evidence indicates that rostral and dorsal parts of the lateral PFC are important for the accuracy
of retrospective performance judgments, whereas prospective judgments of performance seem
to depend on the medial PFC.
7. Metacognitive myopia—the uncritical and naïve tendency to rely on invalid samples of
information—constitutes a serious impediment of rational behavior.
Review Questions
1. Is metacognition confined to monitoring and control of conscious and deliberate cognition, or
is it also required to regulate automatic processes in low-level cognition?
2. Does metacognition apply to animal learning and decisions?
3. How do we know that we know? Explain the bases of metacognitive judgments.
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4. Explain how to measure judgment accuracy and why it is important.
5. How does neuroscience contribute to the understanding of metacognition?
6. What insights and what practical lessons about how to improve learning and test-taking
effectively do students gain from an understanding of metacognitive processes?
7. Why is it essential for a teacher, a doctor, and a judge to understand metacognitive processes?
Hot Topic
Klaus Fiedler
More on eyewitness memory
Signal-detection analysis has been extremely helpful in clarifying the metacog-
nitive origin of the serious errors in eyewitness identifications. Even though
witness’ memory cannot be influenced in retrospect—that is, the discrim-
inability d’ of correct and incorrect memories is typically invariant—it has
been shown that the rate of false identifications can be markedly reduced
by simply inducing a more conservative response strategy, that is, a higher
criterion C. A glance at Figure 6.4 will easily confirm that a rightward shift
of C (up to the intersection point of both curves) will reduce the number of
incorrect identifications (area right of C under the dashed curve) more than the
number of correct identifications (are under the solid curve), thus increasing
the overall rate of correct decisions. Such clever metacognition research has
led to a commonly noted improvement of legal practices (Wells et al., 2000).
Now after two or three decades of improved lineup procedures, a recent state-of-the art review by
Wixted and Wells (2017) has arrived at the optimistic conclusion that “. . . our understanding of how
to properly conduct a lineup has evolved considerably”. Under pristine testing conditions (e.g., fair
lineups uncontaminated with administrator influence; immediate confidence statement), eyewitness
“. . . (a) confidence and accuracy are strongly related and (b) high-confidence suspect identifications
are remarkably accurate.” [p. 10].
Rakefet Ackerman
Computerized learning environments
Computerized environments are replacing paper-based environments for
training, learning, and assessment. However, a puzzling finding is screen
inferiority—a disadvantage in learning from computer screens even when the
task draws on capabilities considered well-suited for modern technologies like
computers or e-books (see Gu, Wu, & Xu, 2015, for a review).
A recently arising metacognitive explanation proposes that computerized
environments provide a contextual cue that induces shallower processing than
paper environments (e.g., Daniel & Woody, 2013; Morineau, Blanche, Tobin,
& Guéguen, 2005). Metacognitive research on reading comprehension has
found that JOL reliability is poor (see Dunlosky & Lipko, 2007, for a review).
Notably, studies provide growing evidence that associates computerized learn-
ing with inferior metacognitive processes, particularly with consistent overconfidence and less
effective effort regulation (for a review, see Sidi et al., 2017).
104 • Psychology of Human Thought • Chapter 6
Metacognitive Myopia as a Major Impediment of Rationality Fiedler, Ackerman & Scarampi
Chiara Scarampi
Self-regulated learning needs guidance. Metacognitive scaffolding can sup-
port preparatory phases of orientation and planning, monitoring of progress
while learning, and retroactive activities such as reflection (Roll, Holmes,
Day, & Bonn, 2012). Given that learning and JOL reliability can be im-
proved through self-questioning, appropriate test expectancy, analyzing the
task, and delayed summaries (Wiley, Thiede, & Griffin, 2016), it is interest-
ing that screen inferiority could be ameliorated by guiding participants to
increase mental effort expenditure. This was achieved by asking participants
to proofread, edit, and write keywords summarizing texts’ contents (Eden
& Eshet-Alkalai, 2013; Lauterman & Ackerman, 2014). Apparently, then,
in-depth text processing is the default on paper, whereas on screen an external
trigger is required to enhance metacognitive processes leading to enhanced
performance (Sidi et al., 2017).
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Glossary
calibration Calibration is the gap between subjec-
tive confidence and actual chances of success.
It can be in the direction of overconfidence
or underconfidence. When confidence corre-
sponds performance, people are accounted to
be well-calibrated. 96
confidence Subjective feeling that one’ decision
or response is correct, typically elicited as a
probability judgment. 92
effort regulation This central metacognitive con-
trol function is focused on mental effort invest-
ment in terms of time and focused attention
and working memory resources. 91
heuristic cues Since individuals do not have di-
rect access to their knowledge and the quality
of their own cognitive processing, metacog-
nitive judgments are inferred from heuristic
cues experienced during task performance and
immediately afterword. 93
Judgment of Learning Prediction of the likeli-
hood of recall for recently studied items. JOL
has an essential role in study time allocation
and effort regulation. 91
meta-memory Monitoring and control of memo-
rizing and retrieval processes. 90
meta-reasoning Monitoring and control pro-
cesses regarding problem solving, reasoning,
and decision-making processes. 90
metacognitive control Cognitive actions trig-
gered by various complementary metacogni-
tive monitoring judgments, which can take
many different forms depending on the task
at hand and the available resources. The cog-
nitive actions may include effort regulation
decisions and strategic changes aimed at facil-
itating cognitive performance. 89
metacognitive myopia Phenomenon by which
people are pretty accurate in utilizing infor-
mation given in a sample, whereas they are
naive and almost blind regarding the validity
of the sample. 101
monitoring Critical assessment of one’s ongoing
cognitive activities in light of the goals of
the task. Results of the monitoring func-
tion trigger the complementary control func-
tion, which entails corrections and strategic
changes to ensure that goals are achieved
more effectively or efficiently. 89
neuroimaging Use of various tools to produce
images of the nervous system. Structural
imaging (e.g., MRI) provides images of the
brain’s anatomical structure, whereas func-
tional imaging (e.g., fMRI) provides images
of the brain as individuals complete mental
tasks. The brain areas involved in responding
to current tasks “light up”, mapping the parts
of the brain involved in a given task. 100
overconfidence A calibration bias in the direction
of inflated confidence relative to actual perfor-
mance, ability, or chance of success. 93
prospective and retrospective judgments In
metacognitive research, subjects are explicitly
asked to make judgments about their perfor-
mance on a criterion task. These judgments
can be prospective, and ask subjects to judge
their future performance, or they may be ret-
rospective, and ask subjects to judge their
prior performance. 97
resolution Extent in which confidence judgments
regarding several tasks of the same kind (e.g.,
answers in an exam) indeed distinguish be-
tween correct and incorrect responses. 96
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A deduction is a conclusion that follows from things
we believe or assume. Frequently, we combine some
fact or observation with a rule or rules that we al-
ready believe. For example, you meet Sue, who tells
you that Mary is her mother. You immediately infer
that Sue is Mary’s daughter, although that is not the
fact that was presented to you. This means that you
must carry around rules such as
If x is the mother of y and y is female, then y is
the daughter of x
Of course, I am not saying that you are conscious
of this rule or of applying it to make this deduc-
tion but it must be there in some form in your brain,
together with some mechanism for applying it to
facts and observations. In this case, the inference
occurs rapidly and effortlessly but this is not always
the case with deductive reasoning. Take the case of
claiming allowances when completing an income
tax return. In this case there may be many rules
and their wording may be complex and opaque to
those who are not expert in tax law. If your financial
affairs are complex, even establishing the relevant
facts may be headache. This is why people often
pay expert tax advisers to do the reasoning for them.
Deduction has a clear and obvious benefit for
human beings. Our memories are limited and our
brains can only store so many beliefs about the
world. However, if we also hold a number of general
rules, then these can be applied to draw out impli-
cations as and when they are required. Deduction
is also involved in hypothetical thinking, when we
ask ‘What if?’ questions. An example is science
in which theories must be tested against empirical
evidence. Scientific theories take the form of rules,
often formalised with mathematics. When experi-
mental studies are run, we set up some conditions
and then predict the outcome. The prediction is a
deduction, which is used to test the theory. For exam-
ple, climate change scientists have been predicting
for the past twenty years or more that warming tem-
peratures would disrupt the jet stream and lead to
more extreme weather events. These predictions
were calculated from their mathematical models,
which is a form of deductive reasoning. Both ab-
normal jet stream flows and extreme weather events
have been observed in recent years with increasing
frequency, lending credibility to these models.
For deduction to be useful, it needs to be accurate.
This has been recognised in the discipline of philos-
ophy for centuries. Philosophers devised systems of
logic, whose purpose is to ensure accurate deduction.
A logically valid argument is one whose conclusion
necessarily follows from its premises. Put simply,
this means that in a logical argument the conclusion
must be true if the premises are true. If the mother-
daughter rule given earlier is true (which it is by
convention) and your observation that Sue is female
is also correct, then she must be Mary’s daughter.
Logic provides rules for reasoning. Here are a
couple of examples
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Modus Ponens Given if x then y, and the assump-
tion of x, y is a valid conclusion
Disjunction elimination Given x or y and not-x,
y is a valid conclusion
Modus Ponens is very useful, because it means
we can state hypothetical beliefs, which only apply
when some condition is met. Some of the condi-
tional sentences we use in everyday life are neces-
sarily true, for example, ‘if a number is even and
greater than two, it cannot be prime’, but most are
not. For example, we may advise someone ‘if you
catch the 8.00 am train then you will get to work on
time’. If this is generally true, then it is good advice,
but of course the train might break down. The real
world rarely allows inferences to be certain, but we
nevertheless use conditional statements a great deal
because of the natural power of Modus Ponens. A
disjunctive statement is an either-or. For example,
someone might say ‘I will either catch the 8.00 am
train or take the bus at 8.10’. If you later learn that
they did not catch the train you can deduce that they
took the bus instead. Once again, in the real world,
the inference will not be certain. The individual
may have called in sick and not gone to work at all.
But our deduction is valid, given the assumptions on
which is based.
There is a tradition in philosophy that logic is
the basis for rational thought (Henle, 1962; Wason
& Johnson-Laird, 1972). This view held a power-
ful influence on psychology during the second half
of the twentieth century and was responsible for a
major method of studying human reasoning, which
I will call the deduction paradigm (Evans, 2002).
Huge numbers of experiments were run with this
paradigm and I will try to summarise their main find-
ings in this chapter. While many important things
were learnt about the nature of human thinking and
reasoning, a lot of psychologists eventually lost faith
in the importance of logic for rational thinking. In
recent years, this has a led many to revise their meth-
ods and adopt what is called the new paradigm
psychology of reasoning. I will explain the new
paradigm and some of the findings it has led to at
the end of this chapter. For now, I will focus on the
deduction paradigm and the theories and findings
that are associated with it.
The deduction paradigm tests whether people un-
trained in logic can make valid inferences. The idea
behind this is that if logic is the basis for rationality
in everyday thinking then everyone should comply
with it, not just those who have taken logic classes.
So the first condition in this method is to exclude
participants with formal training. The next is to
present them with some premises, or assumptions,
from which a logical deduction can be made. Of-
ten a conclusion is also given and people are asked
whether it follows or not. Two other instructions are
usually given: (1) assume that the premises given
are true and (2) only make or endorse a conclusion
which necessarily follows from them. Given these
instructions, only the form of the argument should
matter, not the content. For example, people should
always agree that Modus Ponens and disjunction
elimination are valid arguments, no matter what we
substitute for x and y in the rules given above. By
this means, the paradigm assesses whether or not
people are logical in their deductive reasoning.
7.1 The Deduction Paradigm: The
Main Methods and Findings
A small number of experiments on deductive rea-
soning were published early in the twentieth century
(Wilkins, 1928; Woodworth & Sells, 1935), which
immediately demonstrated what was to come from
the intensive study that occurred from the 1960s
onwards. That is to say, people were observed to
make frequent logical errors, to show systematic
biases, and to be influenced by their beliefs about
the content of the premises and conclusions. All
of these findings have been replicated many times
since using three major methods, or sub-paradigms.
These are syllogistic reasoning, conditional infer-
ence, and the Wason selection task. In this section
I will discuss each in turn, explaining the methods
and typical findings.
7.1.1 Syllogistic Reasoning
A syllogism involves two premises and three terms,
which I will call A, B and C. This is the most an-
cient system of logic, devised by Aristotle. You may
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have come across the famous syllogism ‘All men
are mortal, Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is
mortal.’ Classical syllogisms have statements in four
moods, shown in Table 7.1 (a). These statements
can be used for either the first premise, the second
premise, or the conclusion in any combination. Let
us consider them in turn.
Figure 7.1 shows diagrammatically several differ-
ent models for the relation between two categories,
A and B. When we examine the different statements
in Table 7.1 (a) we see that most of them are ambigu-
ous and can be represented by at least two different
models. For example, All A are B would be true for
a model of identity – All men have Y chromosomes
– or where B includes A – All boys are male. No A
are B is unambiguous; it can only refer to a model
of exclusion. Some A are B is highly ambiguous
– it is true in all models except exclusion. Finally,
Some A are not B is true for exclusion but also for
a model in which A includes B – Some males are
not boys. This gives us a clue to the complexity of
syllogistic reasoning, as we have to take account of
all possible ways that the categories could be related.
Moreover, when we combine two premises, we have
to consider the ways in which all three categories A,
B, and C could be related. For the argument to be
valid, its conclusion has to be true in all models of
this three-way relationship that the premises allow.
A fallacy is an argument whose conclusion need
not be true, given the premises. A basic finding
with syllogistic reasoning is that participants en-
dorse many fallacies. This has been reported by
many authors and confirmed in the one study (to
my knowledge) that presented every possible com-
bination of premises and conclusions for evaluation
(Evans, Handley, Harper, & Johnson-Laird, 1999).
But these mistakes are not random – there are sys-
tematic biases in syllogistic reasoning. Consider the
following syllogism:
All A are B
All B are C
Therefore, All C are A
This is a fallacy: the conclusion does not nec-
essarily follow. Yet in the study of Evans et al.
(1999), 77% of participants (university students)
said that the conclusion necessarily followed from
Table 7.1: The structure of classical syllogisms.
(a) Mood of premises
A All A are B
E No A are B
I Some A are B
O Some A are not B
(b) Figure of syllogism
1 2 3 4
A – B A – B B – A B – A
B – C C – B B – C C – B
—— —— —— ——
A – C A – C A – C A – C
Note: The letters A, E, I and O are classically used as abbreviations for the four moods of the premises.
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the premises. This is really odd when you con-
sider the set relationships involved (see Figure 7.2).
Surely, the most likely situation that describes the
premises is the model to the left, showing that A is
a subset of B and B a subset of C. For example
All Alsatians are dogs; all dogs are mammals
But in that the case, the conclusions endorsed
would be ‘All mammals are Alsatians,’ which is ob-
viously false. The conclusion All C are A would
only be true in the second model, where A, B, and
C are all identical, a most unusual state of affairs.
This is a finding which you only get with abstract
materials, where letters are used to represent cate-
gories. But why does it occur? It is consistent with
a very old claim called the atmosphere effect: par-
ticipants are inclined to accept conclusions whose
mood matches that of the premises. In the same
study, only 47% of participants said the following
syllogism was valid
All A are B
All B are C
Therefore, Some C are A
This is stranger still because Some C are A has
to be true whenever All C are A. Not only that, but
the conclusion is actually valid in this case. You can
verify that by examining the models of the premises
shown in Figure 7.2. Of course, the mood of the
conclusion does not match that of the premises here,
so it does conform with the atmosphere effect. In
fact, atmosphere is consistent with many but not
all responses observed in syllogistic reasoning tasks
(Evans, Newstead, & Byrne, 1993). Another known
biasing factor is the figure of the syllogism, which is
the order in which terms are arranged (Table 7.1b).
This also affects people’s perception of validity.
There are a number of high-profile theories of syl-
logistic reasoning based on different principles and
giving broadly accurate explanations of the data (for
reviews, see Evans et al., 1993; Manktelow, 1999).
When realistic content is introduced, however, other
factors come into play, especially belief bias. Con-
sider the following syllogism:
No addictive things are inexpensive
Some cigarettes are inexpensive
Therefore, some addictive things are not
cigarettes 71%
A major study which established the influence
of beliefs was that of Evans, Barston, and Pollard
(1983). Over three experiments, they found that
Figure 7.1: Models of relations between two categories, A and B.
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Figure 7.2: Models of relations between three categories, A and B and C consistent with the premises All A are B, All B are C.
71% of participants agreed that this syllogism was
valid, that is, that the conclusion must be true if
the premises are true. Now consider this syllogism
presented in the same study:
No millionaires are hard workers
Some rich people are hard workers
Therefore, some millionaires are not rich people
10%
In this case, only 10% thought the syllogism was
valid. But if you look carefully you can see that
both syllogisms have the same logical form. The
syllogism is actually invalid. The key difference
between these two is that the first realistic version
has a conclusion which is believable (we know that
there are other addictive drugs) but the second has
a conclusion which is unbelievable – millionaires
are rich by definition. When valid arguments were
used, people also more often thought they were valid
if they believed the conclusion (89%) than if they
did not (56%), so there is a belief bias for valid ar-
guments as well, although not as a strong. These
findings have been replicated many times since (for
a review see Klauer, Musch, & Naumer, 2000).
7.1.2 Conditional Inference
Conditional statements, also known just as condi-
tionals, have the form, if p then q. We use many
such statements in real life for all kinds of purposes.
Here are some examples:
Causal: If you heat water sufficiently, it will boil.
Prediction: If you vote Republican, you will get
your taxes cut.
Tip: If you study hard, you will pass the exami-
nation.
Warning: If you miss the 8.00 am train, you will
be late for work.
Promise: If you wash my car, I will give you ten
dollars.
Threat: If you stay out late again, you will be
grounded.
Counterfactual: If you had putted well, you
would have won the match.
Philosophers have long studied conditional state-
ments, considering them of particular importance
for human reasoning, writing many books on the
subject (an excellent review of philosophical work
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Table 7.2: The four main conditional inferences.
Label Rule Example
Modus Ponens (MP) If p then q; p: therefore q. If the letter is B then the number is 3;
the letter is B: therefore the number
is 3.
Denial of the Antecedent (DA) If p then q; not-p; therefore not-q. If the letter is G then the number is
7; the letter is not G: therefore, the
number is not 7.
Affirmation of the Consequent (AC) If p then q; q: therefore p. If the letter is T then the number is 5;
the number is 5: therefore the letter
is T.
Modus Tollens (MT) If p then q; not-q; therefore not-p. If the letter is M then the number is
1; the number is not 1: therefore, the
letter is not M.
is given by Edgington, 1995). A great deal of work
in the psychology of reasoning has also focussed
on conditional statements (for a recent review see
Nickerson, 2015). I wrote an entire book on ‘if’
myself, collaborating with a philosopher to cover
the perspectives of both traditions—philosophy and
psychology (Evans & Over, 2004). The reason they
are so important is that they are central to a unique
human facility which I call hypothetical thinking
(Evans, 2007). That is the ability to imagine how
things might be in the future or how they might have
been different in the past.
Standard logic provides an account of how we
should reason with conditionals. Some of this stan-
dard account is disputed by both philosophers and
psychologists, but all are agreed about the four in-
ferences shown in Table 7.2. We have already en-
countered Modus Ponens (MP) as an example of a
valid deductive argument. Imagine a situation where
cards have a letter written on one side and a number
on the other. Then we can express a conditional
hypothesis such as
If the letter is B, then the number is 3
For conditional inference, we need to assume that
the conditional is true. This is the major premise
of the deductive argument. The minor premise is
an assertion that either the first or second part of
the conditional is true or false, leading to the four
arguments illustrated in Table 7.2. For example, if
we suppose that the first part is true – the letter is B –
then it follows by MP (Modus Ponens) that the num-
ber is 3. The other valid argument that can be made
is Modus Tollens (MT). Suppose that the number on
the card is not a 3. Then it follows logically that the
letter is not a B. Why? Because the conditional is
true, so if there had been a B on the card, then there
would also have to have been a 3. This argument
is equally valid, if less immediately obvious. What
all psychological studies of such abstract inferences
show is that the MP inference is made nearly 100%
of the time, while the MT inference is only endorsed
about 60% of the time in the same experiments (see
Figure 7.3).
The other two arguments shown in Table 7.2 are
fallacies. That is, the conclusions given do not nec-
essarily follow. If we assume that the number is
3, it does not necessarily follow that the letter is
a B (Affirmation of the Consequent, AC), because
the conditional does not say that only B cards can
have 3s. Similarly, if we know that the letter is not
B, we cannot say that the number is not a 3 (De-
nial of the Antecedent, DA). And yet we see that
university students endorse both of these fallacies
about 40% of the time (see Figure 7.2). A likely
reason for this is that people are making inferences
that are pragmatically rather than logically implied.
For example, the Denial of the Antecedent fallacy
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Figure 7.3: Percentage frequencies of endorsement of the four conditional inferences with abstract materi-
als (weighted average of 11 studies reported by Evans et al. 1983, Table 2.4, total N = 457).
Key: MP – Modus Ponens, DA – Denial of the antecedent, AC – Affirmation of the consequent, MT – Modus
Tollens.
is endorsed much more often for conditional state-
ments that express causal relationships or are used
to make threats or promises (Newstead, Ellis, Evans,
& Dennis, 1997). Consider the promise: if you wash
my car, I will give you ten dollars. Most people will
say that if you suppose the car is not washed then
the ten dollars will not be paid (DA). Although not
logically implied this makes every sense in terms
of the pragmatics of everyday conversation. The
speaker wants the car washed and is providing an
incentive: it would make no sense to pay someone
who did not wash the car. A tip is weaker than a
promise pragmatically because the speaker suggests
an action will produce a desired outcome but has no
actual control over it. An example might be ‘if you
wash Dad’s car, he will give you ten dollars.’ The
frequency of endorsing even Modus Ponens drops
significantly when a tip is substituted for a promise
as do all the other conditional inferences.
There are many experiments published on how be-
liefs influence conditional inferences, far too many
to discuss here (for reviews, see Evans et al., 1993;
Evans & Over, 2004; Nickerson, 2015). All of
them show that belief affects conditional reasoning
in very significant ways when logically equivalent
inferences are presented with different problem con-
tent.
7.1.3 The Wason Selection Task
Peter Wason was a British psychologist who is re-
garded as the father of the modern psychology of
reasoning. Most of his influential work was pub-
lished between about 1960 and 1980, including a
book which helped to identify the psychology of rea-
soning as a research field (Wason & Johnson-Laird,
1972). Of lasting importance has been the inven-
tion of several novel tasks for studying reasoning,
the most influential of which has been the four-card
selection task. Strictly speaking, the selection task
does not meet all the definitions of the deduction
paradigm as I have given them, as it involves hypoth-
esis testing as well as reasoning. However, the task is
focussed on the logic of conditional statements and
has been extensively studied by the same research
community that has studied conditional inferences
and other more conventional reasoning tasks. It has
also been used to address broadly the same set of
theoretical issues
A typical standard abstract form of the problem is
presented in Figure 7.4. The generally accepted cor-
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Figure 7.4: The standard abstract Wason selection task.
rect answer is to choose the A and 7 cards, although
few participants make these selections. Most people
choose either the A card alone, or the A and the 3.
Wason pointed out that the conditional statement
can only be falsified if there is a card which has an
A on one side and does not have a 3 on the other.
Clearly, the A card must be turned over because it
must have a 3 on the back, and if it does not, dis-
proves the claim. Similarly, the 7 card – which is not
a 3 – could have an A on the back, which would also
disprove the statement. Turning the 3 is unnecessary,
as it cannot disprove the rule. It need not have an A
on other side.
Why do people choose A and often 3 and ignore
the 7? Wason originally suggested that they had a
verification or confirmation bias. They were trying
to prove the rule true rather than false, and hence
looking to find a confirming combination of A and 3.
In support of this account, if you ask people to give
written justifications for their choices, they typically
say that they were looking for 3 when turning the A
and vice versa because this would make the rule true
(Wason & Evans, 1975). However, in an early re-
search paper of my own, I showed that this account
cannot be right. The trick is to include a negative in
the second part of the conditional as in the example
shown in Figure 7.5. When the rule says, as in the
example, that if there is G on one side of the card,
then there cannot be a 4 on the other side of the card,
most people choose the G and 4 cards. But these
choices do not verify the rule, they correctly falsify
it. The combination that falsifies this statement is,
of course, G and 4. Once again, participants say
that they are turning the G to find a 4 and vice versa
(Wason & Evans, 1975) but now in order to make it
false. It is as though the negative has helped them
to understand the logic or the problem.
The effect here is called matching bias. People
tend to choose the cards which match those named in
the conditional, whether or not negations are present.
But these negations affect the logic of the task, so
it is a puzzling finding. Matching bias is another
example of a cognitive bias, like the atmosphere ef-
fect, which operates with abstract materials. With
the other methods, I showed that the introduction of
realistic materials makes a big difference to respond-
ing. The same is true of the selection task. It was
thought initially that simply using realistic materials
made the problem a lot easier with higher rates of
correct selections (Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972).
This was known as the thematic facilitation effect.
However, it was later shown that the versions that
make the task really easy include a subtle change to
the logic. An example, known as the ‘drinking age
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Figure 7.5: The abstract Wason selection task with an added negation.
rule,’ is shown in Figure 7.6. People are first of all
given a short context. In this case, they are asked to
imagine that they are police officers enforcing rules.
Then the rule is given which requires beer drinkers
to be over 18 years of age. Now most people will
check the beer drinkers and those under 18 of years
of age. This is correct as only underage drinkers
can violate the rule. Experiments which give the
drinking age rule find much higher rates of correct
answers than with the standard abstract version.
As later authors pointed out, problems like the
drinking age rule change the task from one of indica-
tive logic (concerned with truth and falsity) to one
of deontic logic, concerned with obeying rules and
regulations. A number of different theoretical ac-
counts have been offered to explain why the deontic
version is so much easier. One idea is that we ac-
quire and apply pragmatic reasoning schemas: rules
which apply in certain contexts and can be instanti-
ated with the content of a particular problem (Cheng
& Holyoak, 1985). So people might solve the drink-
ing age rule because they have a permission schema
such as ‘if an action A is to be taken, then condition
C must be filled’, which could be instantiated as A =
drinking beer and C = 18 years or age or older. The
schema tells them violations of this rule occur when
the action is taken without the precondition being
filled. Other proposals included the use of innate
evolved rules for social exchange (Cosmides, 1989),
interpreting the problems as a decision-making task
in order to maximise perceived benefits (Manktelow
& Over, 1991) and the role of pragmatic relevance
for different forms of conditional statement (Sperber,
Cara, & Girotto, 1995).
7.2 Theoretical Issues in the
Psychology of Deduction
Having described the main methods and typical find-
ings in the study of deduction, I now turn to some
broader theoretical issue and arguments that have
arisen.
7.2.1 How We Reason: Rules or
Models?
Despite the frequency of errors and biases, people
do show some level of deductive competency on
reasoning tasks, especially those of higher cogni-
tive ability (Stanovich, 2011). For example, people
endorse far more inferences that are valid than in-
valid on both syllogistic and conditional inference
tasks. Some psychologist have focussed on the com-
petence rather than the errors and asked questions
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Figure 7.6: The Deontic selection task: Drinking age rule.
about the mechanisms by which people draw deduc-
tions. One approach is often described as mental
logic but should more accurately be described as
mental rule theory (Braine & O’Brien, 1998; Rips,
1994). Traditional logics are usually presented as
rules, but other techniques for generating valid de-
ductive inferences are available. The term ‘mental
logic’ was devised to distinguish the logic inside
people’s heads from that in the philosopher’s text-
books. The idea is that ordinary people reason by
built-in logical rules. However, the psychological
authors were mindful from the start of certain psy-
chological findings. For example, in proposing a
mental logic account of conditional inference, psy-
chologists were well aware that people find Modus
Ponens a lot easier than Modus Tollens. In standard
logic, these would both be primitive rules of equal
standing, but that cannot be the case in a mental
logic.
Mental logicians have tried to address this prob-
lem by proposing only Modus Ponens is a simple
rule allowing direct inference. Modus Tollens can
be drawn but by an indirect reasoning procedure
called reductio reasoning. In this kind of reasoning,
one makes a supposition p and tries to show that this
leads to contradiction, q and not-q. Since a contra-
diction cannot exist in logic, the supposition must
be false, hence not-p follows. Consider our earlier
examples of a conditional which applies to cards
with a letter on one side and a number on the other
If the letter is B, then the number is 3
If people are told there is a B, then they can imme-
diately apply their built-in rule for Modus Ponens
and conclude that there is a 3. When told there is
not a 3, however, they do not have a rule for Modus
Tollens that can be applied in the same way. Instead,
they have to reason as follows:
‘If I imagine there is a B on the card, then there
must be a 3. But I have been told there is not a 3
which is a contradiction. So I must have been wrong
to suppose that there was a B on the card. Hence, I
can conclude that there is not a B.’
This indirect reasoning is harder to execute and
more prone to errors, explaining the lower accep-
tance rate of Modus Tollens. Hence a fully speci-
fied mental logic account consists of a set of direct
rules of inference together with indirect reasoning
procedures and can be implemented as a working
computer program (Rips, 1994).
For many years now, rule-based mental logics
have had a major rival, which is mental model
theory, championed by Phil Johnson-Laird (1983,
2006; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) and followed
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and supported by many other psychologists. This
theory also proposes that people are deductively
competent in principle, but fallible in practice, but
does not rely on the application of mental rules. The
core of the theory is the idea that people reason
about possibilities, which are states of the world that
might be true or false. These possibilities are rep-
resented by mental models. When the premises of
an argument are presented, people are supposed to
construct mental models to represent all possibilities
and then reason as follows:
1. If the conclusion is true in all models of the
premises, it is necessary
2. If the conclusion is true in some models of the
premises, it is possible
3. If the conclusion is true in no models of the
premises, it is impossible
Consider the inference of disjunction elimination,
discussed earlier. Given the major premise Either
the letter is B or the number is 3, people construct




Each line here represents a separate mental model.
So this reads as: one possibility is that there is a B,
the second that there is a 3 and the third that there is
both a B and a 3.
Now given the minor premise, the number is not
3, the last two models are eliminated leaving only
the possibility of B. Hence, people will conclude
B as a correct deduction but without having any
rule of disjunction elimination for the inference.
The model theory of conditionals (Johnson-Laird
& Byrne, 2002) is more complex and controversial
(Evans, Over, & Handley, 2005). Consider the state-
ment
If there is a B, then there is a 3
The full set of possibilities for this statement, ac-




Given these possibilities, the minor premise B
eliminates all but the first model, so the conclusion 3
follows (Modus Ponens). The minor premise not-3,
eliminates all the last model, so that not-B follows
(Modus Tollens). However, like the mental-logic
theorists, Johnson-Laird and Byrne were well aware
of the relative difficulty of Modus Tollens. So they
actually proposed that people initially represent the
conditional statement as follows:
[B] 3
. . .
The first model means that in all cases of B (mean-
ing of []), there is a 3. The ellipsis ‘. . . ’ means there
are other possibilities. So if B is presented, people
can immediately do Modus Ponens and conclude
3. However, if not-3 is presented, then they have to
‘flesh out’ the models to the fully explicit set given
above in order to make Modus Tollens. Fleshing
out is error prone, so people sometimes fail to make
this valid inference. The theory has been applied
to many other types of reasoning, including with
syllogisms.
I think it fair to say that both mental rule and men-
tal model theory are firmly rooted in the traditional
deduction paradigm, as they both put an account of
logical competence foremost and deal with effects
of beliefs and pragmatics as add-ons. Whether belief
rather than logic should be the focus of psychologi-
cal accounts of reasoning is precisely the issue for
researchers in the new paradigm, to which I return
later. We next consider dual-process theory which
is not directly concerned with how logical reasoning
occurs, but rather with the idea that such reasoning
competes with other kinds of cognitive processes of
a more intuitive nature.
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7.2.2 Dual-process Theories of
Reasoning
In 1982, I published my first book which was a
review of the psychology of deductive reasoning.
Even at that time, with many of the key studies in
the field yet to be conducted, it was clear that logical
errors were frequent, and there was much evidence
of systematic biases and belief-based reasoning. I
was struck by what seemed to be two factors in-
fluencing many different reasoning tasks. People’s
choices were indeed influenced by the logic of the
problems, just as had been originally expected, but
also by non-logical factors that were completely ir-
relevant to the task such as atmosphere or matching
bias. But two-factor theory is descriptive and pro-
vides no real explanation of the cognitive processes
that underlie our observations.
An important theoretical leap is from dual sources
to dual processes. What if the two factors reflect
quite different mental processes? I mentioned earlier
that Wason and Evans (1975) observed that when
matching bias cued a correct choice on the selection
task, people appeared to understand the logic of the
problem and the importance of falsification. But
in the standard version, they talked as though they
could prove the rule true. In this early paper, we sug-
gested a distinction between unconscious Type 1 pro-
cesses responsible for the matching selections and
conscious Type 2 reasoning, which simply served to
rationalise or justify the unconsciously cued cards.
The radical suggestion was that actual choices were
determined by one kind of process but the verbal jus-
tifications by something entirely different. The next
important step, in work also described earlier, was
the belief-bias study of Evans et al. (1983). What
we observed there was that syllogistic reasoning was
influenced heavily by both the logic of the syllogism
and the believability of conclusion. We showed that
the two factors were in conflict and that individuals
would sometimes go with logic and other times with
belief.
The linkage with the Wason and Evans work was
not made immediately but in retrospect the view
developed was that Type 2, explicit (slow, reflec-
tive) reasoning processes were responsible for the
preference for valid over invalid conclusions. How-
ever, these competed with Type 1 (fast, intuitive)
processes, which favoured believable over unbeliev-
able conclusions. So on tasks other than the se-
lection task, at least, Type 2 reasoning could solve
problems and not just rationalise intuitions. (Later
research showed that Type 2 processes have a role
in the selection task choices as well.) As different
dual-process accounts were developed over the next
quarter of a century, there was a particular emphasis
on the idea that Type 2 reasoning was responsible
for logically correct answers and Type 1 processing
for non-logical effects, such as matching and belief
bias (see Evans, 2007; Stanovich, 1999; see also
Chapter 10, “Decision Making”, for application of
dual-process theory to decision making).
A large individual-differences programme con-
ducted by Keith Stanovich and Richard West, who
showed that on a wide variety of reasoning and
decision-making tasks, cognitive ability or IQ (see
Chapter 14, “Intelligence”) was strongly correlated
with the ability to give the correct answer. The the-
oretical idea here is that people with higher IQs
also have higher working memory capacity and are
therefore more able to manipulate mental represen-
tations of premises and conclusions in order to rea-
son logically. In fact, the engagement of working
memory is now considered a defining feature of
Type 2 processing (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Other
methodologies were developed that supported this
view. For example, if people are given a very short
time to respond, they are less likely to give the log-
ical answer and were more likely to show a bias,
such as matching or belief. Similar results occur
if a working-memory load has to be carried while
reasoning (for reviews see Evans, 2007; Evans &
Stanovich, 2013). However, Stanovich and West
also showed that general intelligence was not the
only individual difference factor in human reason-
ing. In particular, people vary in rational thinking
disposition which measures the inclination to ac-
cept an intuitive answer or to check it out by high
effort reasoning.
Some dual-process theorists have suggested that
there are ruled-based (Type 2) and associative
(Type 1) processes that operate in parallel (Sloman,
1996) but more popular among deductive-reasoning
researchers is the idea that fast intuitive (Type 1) an-
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swers come to mind immediately and are subject to
checking and possible revision by slower, reflective
(Type 2) processes that follow (Evans & Stanovich,
2013; Kahneman, 2011). This leads to the important
question of why it is that some intuitive answers
are more carefully checked than others. A hot topic
in the field right now is whether people’s initial
answers are accompanied by feelings of rightness,
which help them decide whether to accept the intu-
itive answer or whether to check it out with careful
reasoning (Hot Topic, see also Chapter 6, “Metacog-
nition”).
7.3 The New Paradigm Psychology of
Reasoning
The deduction paradigm was developed about 50
years ago to assess the then-prevalent view that logic
was the basis of rational reasoning. As evidence of
logical errors, cognitive biases, and belief-based rea-
soning accumulated, this presented a clear problem
both for psychologists and for philosophers who
became aware of the findings of research on de-
duction as well as other kinds of human reasoning
with similar findings. The problem was that, by the
original assumptions, people were turning out to
be irrational. Peter Wason, for example, was quite
clearly of the view that people were illogical and
therefore irrational (see Evans, 2002). In a famous
paper, the philosopher Jonathan Cohen argued that
people were in fact inherently rational and that psy-
chological experiments could never prove otherwise
(Cohen, 1981). He suggested that the experiments
were unrepresentative or being misinterpreted. He
also pointed out that standard logic, for example, is
not the only kind that logicians have offered. There
could be alternative normative accounts of how to be
rational. A normative theory is one of how people
ought to reason. Subsequently, a number of psy-
chologists engaged with the issue of what counts
as rational reasoning (e.g. Evans & Over, 1996;
Stanovich, 1999).
A major issue is whether traditional logic provides
the correct standard for human reasoning. One ma-
jor research programme, that of Mike Oaksford and
Nick Chater, has disputed this from the start (Oaks-
ford & Chater, 2001, 2007). Their first important
contribution was an alternative normative account of
the Wason selection task, arguing that the typical an-
swer can be seen as rational from a decision-making
perspective (Oaksford & Chater, 1994). Like Cohen,
they took the view that human behaviour must be
rationally adapted to the environment and if a stan-
dard normative account does not explain it, then we
should look for another. They have presented vari-
ous theories of reasoning tasks based on probability
theory and decision theory. Naturally this approach
is controversial and has been branded Panglossian
by some authors (Stanovich, 1999). Pangloss was
a fictional philosopher in a novel by Voltaire who
as prone to say ‘all is for the best in the best of all
possible worlds’!
The essence of the new paradigm is that people
naturally reason from their beliefs about the world
and that this should not be treated as an error or cog-
nitive bias. Strong deductive reasoning instructions
are artificial: they require people to ignore what they
believe for the sake of the experiment. Other meth-
ods have been explored. For example, people can be
asked what inference follows from some informa-
tion and allowed to express degrees of belief in their
conclusions. A key feature of the new paradigm is
the proposal of the suppositional conditional, also
known as the probability conditional (Evans & Over,
2004; Oaksford & Chater, 2001). The conditional
statement of standard logic is equivalent to a disjunc-
tion. For example,
If the letter is B, then the number is 3
is true except when we have a B and not a 3. Hence
it is equivalent in meaning to
Either the letter is not a B or the number is a 3
This is what logicians term the material condi-
tional. However, many philosophers have rejected
the material conditional as an account of the ordi-
nary conditional of everyday language (Edgington,
1995). This is because it leads to unacceptable infer-
ences. The material conditional, if p then q, is true
whenever p is false or q is true. So the following
statements must be true
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If President Trump is French, then Paris is the
capital of the USA
If 2+2 = 5, then 3 is a prime number
It is clear that no normal person would endorse these
statements.
If the ordinary conditional is not material, then
what is it? The philosopher Ramsey famously ar-
gued that belief in the ordinary conditional if p then
q, is in effect the probability that q will be true if p
is (Ramsey, 1931/1990). He also suggested that we
do this by adding p to our current stock of beliefs
and arguing about q on that basis. This is known
as the Ramsey test and we suggested that condi-
tional statements are suppositional – they depend on
the supposition of p (Evans & Over, 2004). Let us
consider some examples
If teachers’ pay is raised, then recruitment will
increase
Many people will agree with this statement or
assign a high probability to it. They do this by sup-
posing first that teacher’s pay is in fact raised and
then using other beliefs to calculate the likelihood
that they will prove easier to recruit. They may be
aware that recruitment has been difficult in recent
years and that one factor is almost certainly that
salary levels have fallen behind those of workers
in other professions. So, they believe that financial
incentive will help address the issue. In doing this,
they ignore any beliefs they have about what will
happen if pay is not increased, which they regard as
irrelevant. The Ramsey test is also related to find-
ings with Modus Ponens mentioned earlier. When
people believe a conditional statement to be true,
they also believe that q is probable when p is as-
sumed and so will readily infer q from p. Consider,
however, this statement
If the global economy grows then there will be
less poverty and starvation in the world
The Ramsey test will not produce a high level
of confidence in this conditional for many people.
They may believe, for example, that the growth in
the global economy increases wealth for rich indi-
viduals and rich countries but is not likely to be
distributed to the third world. where most of the
poverty and starvation is concentrated. If their belief
in the conditional is low, they will also be reluctant
to draw inferences from it, even the apparently ob-
vious Modus Ponens. There is now much evidence
that, with real-life conditionals like these, people do
indeed assign very similar belief levels to if p then q
as they do to the probability of q given p (e.g. Over,
Hadjichristidis, Evans, Handley, & Sloman, 2007).
People act as though the conditional only applies on
the supposition that p is true, in people’s minds, and
is otherwise irrelevant. This is not consistent at all
with the material conditional of standard logic.
The essence of the new paradigm is to view belief-
based reasoning as natural and rational, rather than
to consider it necessarily a source of bias. The new
paradigm is, however, not yet as clearly defined as
the old. A lot of authors are pursing alternative nor-
mative theories of reasoning to standard logic or
seeking explanations in terms of Bayesian decision
theory – a system which takes account of subjective
beliefs. Others have argued that the new paradigm
should concern itself less with normative theory and
more with describing what people actually do when
they reason. One thing that all agree upon is that the
traditional standard logic is neither a good account
of how we actually reason, nor of how we ought to
reason.
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Summary
1. Deduction was studied originally to assess the classical view that logic is the basis for rational
human thinking.
2. The traditional deduction paradigm assesses whether people untrained in logic can neverthe-
less correctly evaluate the validity of deductive inferences. They are instructed to assume
some premises are true and to decide if the conclusion necessarily follows.
3. Many psychological experiments were conducted in the second half of the twentieth century
within this paradigm, most using one of three methods: syllogistic reasoning, conditional
inference or the Wason selection task.
4. Typical findings from these different methods converged. People make many logical errors,
shown systematic biases and are strongly influenced by their beliefs about the problem content.
5. People also show a degree of deductive competence. Theories of how this is achieved include
the idea that people have built in rules for reasoning – a mental logic – or alternatively that
people use mental models to represent logical possibilities.
6. Dual-process theories arose from the observation that the logical deductions people make on
these tasks often seem to conflict and compete with cognitive biases. These theories propose
the operation of rapid, intuitive Type 1 processes as well as slow, reflective Type 2 processes,
the latter engaging working memory.
7. Individual differences studies show that successful reasoning on laboratory tasks is often
related to general intelligence or working memory capacity. People also vary in rational
thinking dispositions which makes them more or less likely to engage in high effort reasoning.
There is also evidence that people experience a feeling of rightness about the intuitive answers
that come easily to mind and that they are less likely check answers by reasoning if this
feeling is strong.
8. The new paradigm psychology of reasoning has arisen in the past twenty years or so as many
psychologists did not accept that illogicality implied irrationality. According to this view,
the frequent intrusion of beliefs into laboratory reasoning tasks where they are defined as
irrelevant tells us something important about human reasoning. The paradigm assumes that
belief-based reasoning is both normal and adaptive in everyday life.
Review Questions
1. Are people rational in their reasoning, given their apparent illogicality in laboratory tests of
deductive reasoning?
2. Is it more plausible that people make deductions by accessing logical rules and performing
mental proofs, or by simply reasoning about what is or is not possible given the premises of
an argument?
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3. Are cognitive biases observed in the laboratory a real concern for real world reasoning and
decision making? For example, is it likely that belief bias prevents us from fairly assessing
evidence for rival hypotheses?
4. Are dual-process accounts inherently plausible? That is, can you think of many examples in
everyday life where intuitions might come into conflict with reflective reasoning?
5. Is it safe and appropriate to rely on a strong feeling that you are drawing the correct inference
or making a good decision?
Hot Topic: Feelings of rightness in reasoning and implications for dual-
process theory
Jonathan Evans
The standard dual-process approach assumes that an intuitive answer to
reasoning (and decision making) problems comes to mind quickly and rapidly
due to Type 1 processing. It is then subject to checking by Type 2 processes,
which may rationalise the intuitive answer or substitute more complex reason-
ing to provide a different answer. An important question is why we sometimes
rely on the initial intuition with minimal reasoning and other times engage
Type 2 processes. Some known factors are the processing style of the individ-
ual and time available for thinking. However, an additional factor has been
proposed by Valerie Thompson and her colleagues – metacognitive feelings.
The initial intuition comes with a feeling of rightness (FOR), which could
determine whether we accept it or expend effort on reasoning (Thompson,
Prowse Turner, & Pennycook, 2011). Thompson has claimed in several papers that FOR is the key
factor in determining whether extensive Type 2 processing occurs.
Thompson invented a methodology called the two-response task (Thompson et al., 2011). Par-
ticipants are given a reasoning or decision task and asked to generate an initial answer as quickly
as possible without reflecting on it. They then rate the degree to which they are confident that the
answer is correct – the FOR. Following this, they are then asked to think again about the problem,
taking as long as they like. After this, they again give a response to the problem which may or
may not be the same as first answer. Using a range of different tasks, the following pattern was
established: when FOR is high, the initial answer tends to be given quickly, rethinking time tends
to be short and second response usually matches the first. In other words, when we are intuitively
convinced of our original answer, we expend little effort in trying to check or correct it. Conversely,
when FOR is low, we are more likely to take time rethinking the problem and to change our original
answer.
There are some unresolved difficulties with this account. First, none of the studies on this report
a relation between FOR and actual accuracy. We are no more likely to be confident of a correct
answer than a biased one and we are just as likely to change a right answer to a wrong one after
reflection as the other way around. So if FOR has evolved to help us make good decisions, using
our cognitive resources effectively, why is it not helping us identify errors? In fact, the opposite
seems to be true. Matching bias and belief bias, for example, have been shown to be supported by
false feelings of rightness. Matching cards and believable conclusions feel right, even when they are
wrong. Another difficulty is that there is no direct evidence for a casual connection between FOR
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and Type 2 reasoning as Thompson and colleagues claim. Everything is in fact correlational. All
we really know is that answers with high FOR are also made more quickly, thought about less and
changed less often.
There are also some recent empirical findings which raise difficulties for the dual-process story
here. On relatively simple tasks, when a correct choice is put in conflict with a bias, there is evidence
that this conflict is detected very rapidly by the brain, indicating that some kind of ‘logical intuition’
(De Neys, 2014) is available to conflict with the bias. Recently, using the two-response task with
syllogistic reasoning, Bago and De Neys (2017) showed that most people who are correct at time 2
were also correct at time 1. There was little evidence for people correcting intuitive responses by
a period of reflection, as might be expected with Type 2 intervention. However, it is possible that
studies of this kind provide a misleading impression, as the tasks are relatively simple. Hence, it
could be that ‘logical intuitions’ arise from Type 1 rather than Type 2 processing as these solutions
do not require the engagement of working memory on the tasks used (Evans, 2018). As is the
nature of hot topics, there is as yet no clear resolutions to the questions I have raised, and research
continues.
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Glossary
belief bias A disposition to accept an argument as
valid because you believe the conclusion. 116
deduction paradigm A method and tradition that
involves asking people untrained in logic to
evaluate the validity of arguments. 114
dual-process theory The claim that there are two
distinct types of cognitive processing: Type 1
(rapid, intuitive) and Type 2 (slow and reflec-
tive). 123
feeling of rightness (FOR) The feeling of confi-
dence that someone has in a quick intuitive an-
swer when reasoning or making judgements.
125
mental logic The theory that there is a logic in the
mind for reasoning comprised of inference
rules and mechanisms for applying them. 122
mental model theory The theory that we reason
about logical possibilities, represented by
mental models, without need for rules of in-
ference. 122
new paradigm (psychology of reasoning) A
method and theory which allows for beliefs to
exert a rational influence on human deductive
reasoning. 114
rational thinking disposition An individual dif-
ference measure related to personality or cog-
nitive style. It measures the extent to which
people rely on intuitions or check them out by
reasoning. 124
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Inductive reasoning involves inferring likely conclu-
sions from observations or other forms of evidence.
For example, if your car starts making loud clunking
noises, you might conclude that it probably has a
serious and expensive problem. Without reasoning
in this manner, the world would be a more primi-
tive and confusing place. It would be impossible
to develop scientific theories, forecast the weather,
persuasively argue legal cases, learn from mistakes,
make predictions about how a best friend will be-
have around strangers, use previous experiences to
help transition to a new job, or think critically before
making important decisions. Furthermore, people
would probably be less creative (Goswami, 2011;
Vartanian, Martindale, & Kwiatkowski, 2003). It
even takes inductive reasoning to predict how life
would be different without it. In short, this form of
reasoning expands and deepens world knowledge,
helps social interactions, and allows us to adapt to
new environments (Heit, 2000; Rhodes, Brickman,
& Gelman, 2008).
As implied above, induction is viewed as the most
common form of reasoning that people use in their
daily lives (Hayes & Heit, 2017). It can occur so
automatically that we are often unaware of quickly
using examples, observations, and other existing
knowledge to draw conclusions or make predictions
about the future. It might seem odd that we fre-
quently rely on inductive reasoning, given that the
conclusions from it are never guaranteed to be cor-
rect. The data on which they are based is always po-
tentially incomplete or perhaps even flawed, which
means the conclusions at their very best can only
have a high probability of being right. There is al-
ways the chance that they will need to be modified
or even rescinded in the future after new evidence is
acquired.
Although induction never provides definitive an-
swers, we habitually use it for two primary reasons
related to being human. One, we categorize, infer
causality, and reason by analogy in an attempt to
explain and manage almost everything that happens
around us (Feeney & Heit, 2007). For example, peo-
ple who live near different kinds of dogs might use
size, breed, and amount of barking to infer which
ones will be friendly and which ones to avoid. Sec-
ond, we reduce our uneasiness about an uncertain
future by using past experiences to predict upcom-
ing events or outcomes (Murphy & Ross, 2007). For
example, if you take a new course from a professor
who taught two of your other courses, you might
reasonably assume that the same study skills that
worked well for you in the other two courses will
work well in this one.
Why is it important to learn about inductive rea-
soning? Knowledge about this topic provides us
with insight into how humans use limited data to
make rational inferences and how, across our lifes-
pans, we generalize from the known to the unknown
(Hayes & Heit, 2017). On a personal basis, it helps
us learn how to construct strong persuasive argu-
ments that could convince others to adopt our point
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of view (Jones, 2013). Additionally, induction is
a major component of other fundamental cognitive
activities, such as decision-making, categorization,
and similarity judgments (Heit, 2007). In other
words, we cannot comprehend the full-range of how
humans think and behave if we do not understand
when and how inductive reasoning is performed.
Given that inductive reasoning is a central part of
being human, it has been examined through a wide
variety of approaches. If you are a philosopher like
David Hume (1739), you might conclude that induc-
tions are a questionable habit of the mind because
using past experiences to predict an unknown future
is not logically justifiable. In other words, it is not
rational to assume that life twenty years from now
will closely resemble the world today. Furthermore,
according to Goodman’s new riddle of induction, if
there is more than one possible future, it is not clear
how best to distinguish which one to select (Good-
man, 1983). Goodman’s answer to his own riddle is
that we make projections that are entrenched or well
established simply because they are familiar and
may have worked in the past. However, there are
several psychological approaches to inductive rea-
soning that are data-driven and examine induction
through a wide range of problems, methodologies,
models, and developmental perspectives. This rich
collection of research has increased our knowledge
about the cognitive processes used to reach prob-
abilistic conclusions and how these processes and
their regularities relate to other forms of thinking
and problem solving (Heit, 2007).
This chapter is divided into five sections. The
first compares induction with deduction, the other
commonly used type of reasoning. It then examines
the attributes that help create strong inductive argu-
ments, followed by descriptions of some different
forms of induction. The fourth section reviews how
inductive reasoning develops in children. Finally,
the chapter’s main points are summarized.
8.1 Comparing Inductive Reasoning
with Deductive Reasoning
In the past, inductive reasoning has primarily been
understood by contrasting it with deduction (Heit,
2007; see Chapter 7 for an in-depth review of de-
ductive reasoning). Inductive reasoning is some-
times described as “bottom-up” logic because spe-
cific observations are often used to draw general
conclusions or principles that explain the evidence
(Johnson-Laird, 2000). For example, after observing
that students who show up on time for my classes
tend to perform better than ones who arrive late,
I might induce that effective time management is
a crucial component of academic success. In con-
trast, deductive reasoning is sometimes defined as
the opposite because it often uses “top-down” logic
to reason from general principles to derive specific
conclusions (Johnson-Laird, 2000). For example,
given the premises that every first-year student at
my small college must live on campus and Brenda is
a first-year student, I deduce that she lives on cam-
pus, which means I know how to track her down.
Table 8.1: Key differences between inductive and deductive reasoning.
Basis of Comparison Inductive Reasoning Deductive Reasoning
Typical Direction Specific to general General to specific
Type of Premise Observations and patterns General principles or facts
Common Type of Process Often fast and automatic Often slow and conscious
Conclusions Go beyond the premises Follow from the premises
Evaluation Weak to strong arguments Invalid/valid conclusions
Best Outcome Highly likely to be true Logically true and sound
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However, it is important to note that recently the
distinction between bottom-up and top-down pro-
cessing is viewed by some researchers as too simplis-
tic because it does not apply to all cases of induction
and deduction (Feeny & Heit, 2007). For example,
inductive reasoning sometimes results in specific
conclusions. Consider the following problem: “It
rained in Seattle yesterday. It rained in Seattle to-
day. Will it rain in Seattle tomorrow?” This scenario
requires the solver to determine a probabilistic con-
clusion that is specific rather than general. Further-
more, there are problems that some people solve in-
ductively and others solve deductively, which means
that problem type cannot be used to determine which
form of reasoning is being used. Consider, for ex-
ample, the task of buying a new car. One individual
might observe which models are commonly or rarely
found in car repair shops before inducing which type
of car seems to need the least amount of mechanical
work. Another individual might use the premises
that “All cars made in Japan are good cars and Toy-
otas are made in Japan” to deduce that a Toyota is
a good car that would be worth buying. Evidence
that some problems can be solved either inductively
or deductively has resulted in the process view of
reasoning (Heit, 2007). Instead of the traditional
procedure of using type of problem to determine the
form of reasoning being applied, the focus is on the
mental processes that each individual employs.
What are the current key differences between in-
ductive and deductive reasoning? Unlike induction,
deduction can be independent of external knowl-
edge of the world or it may even contradict such
knowledge (Goswami, 2011). The conclusion is
completely derivable from the premises and addi-
tional information is not required. Consider, for
example, the following problem: “All dogs fly. Fido
is a dog. Does Fido fly?” The correct answer that
Fido flies is unsound and counterfactual but logi-
cally valid because the premises, despite being false,
require the conclusion to be logically true. If the
problem had been “No dogs fly. Fido is a dog. Does
Fido fly?” the correct answer that Fido does not
fly is sound because it is logically valid and the
premises, in reality, are true. In contrast, inductive
arguments are dependent on world knowledge rather
than on formal rules of logic and they are viewed on
a continuum of weak to strong, rather than on the
dichotomy of logically valid or invalid (Foresman,
Fosl, & Watson, 2017). Extremely weak arguments
have such little support that conclusions drawn from
them are quite unlikely to be true. Ones that are
quite strong are based on relevant, substantial, and
compelling evidence. However, even if the premises
or arguments are accurate and convincing, we can-
not know that new information will be not be found
that will overturn our earlier conclusions. In other
words, inductive conclusions can be thought of as
educated guesses based on our current knowledge.
Deductively valid conclusions are not guesses; they
are guaranteed to be logically true. Furthermore,
inductive reasoning tends to happen more quickly,
intuitively, and automatically than deductive reason-
ing, which often requires more conscious, analytical
processing (Heit & Rotello, 2010). Some research
has also found more activation in the brain’s left
prefrontal cortex during inductive reasoning than
during deductive reasoning (Hayes, Heit, & Swend-
sen, 2010). Table 8.1 summarizes key differences
between these two forms of reasoning.
There are several similarities between induction
and deduction that deserve recognition. For exam-
ple, both involve evidence, logic, working memory,
and are central to critical thinking (Foresman et al.,
2017; Süß, Oberauer, Wittmann, Wilhelm, Schulze,
2002). Both are used in the scientific method. As
John Steinbeck (1954) describes,
Everyone knows about Newton’s apple. Charles
Darwin and his Origin of Species flashed com-
plete in one second, and he spent the rest of
his life backing it up; and the theory of relativ-
ity occurred to Einstein in the time it takes to
clap your hands. This is the greatest mystery of
the human mind–the inductive leap. Everything
falls into place, irrelevancies relate, dissonance
becomes harmony, and nonsense wears a crown
of meaning. (p. 20)
Although Steinbeck undoubtedly over-estimated
the frequency of true inductive leaps, inductive rea-
soning is used to form hypotheses and theories that
advance scientific knowledge. However, this is not
nearly enough; scientists then need to use deductive
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reasoning to test their hypotheses and theories on
specific situations in order to verify their accuracy.
In addition, both forms of reasoning are continuous
across our lifespans and are susceptible to similar
heuristics and biases (Goswami, 2011).
8.2 Inductive Reasoning at Its Best
As noted earlier, we can never be 100% certain that
our inductive conclusions are right. However, by
keeping the following attributes in mind, we can
reduce errors and biases, which increases the like-
lihood that our inductive arguments are strong and
the conclusions are warranted, justifiable, and have
a high probability of being true.
8.2.1 A Sizeable Sample
A large number of observations typically increases
the strength of inductive arguments, which makes
the conclusions more likely to be accurate (Nisbett,
Krantz, Jepson, & Kundra, 1983). Consider the
following two examples:
Observations: Every morning for the past 8
months, George drank a large glass of milk
and thirty minutes later his stomach consistently
started hurting.
Conclusion: George has lactose intolerance.
Observation: Natalie ate a peanut and then had
trouble breathing.
Conclusion: Natalie has a peanut allergy.
The first example has a stronger argument than
the second because it is based on approximately
250 observations or pieces of evidence rather than
only one. Although there are exceptions (Osher-
son, Smith, Wilkie, Lopez, & Shafir, 1990), a large
sample size helps maximize information, reduces
distortions in the evidence, and makes the conclu-
sions more likely to be correct (McDonald, Samuels,
& Rispoli, 1996; Nisbett et al., 1983).
The importance of a large sample is highly rel-
evant to both scientific research and inductive rea-
soning in our daily lives. Given that there are in-
dividual differences in human behavior, psycholog-
ical research, in particular, needs to have a large
number of participants and numerous experimen-
tal trials or survey questions in order for the data
to be robust and trustworthy. Non-scientists have
also been found to pay attention to number of obser-
vations, especially when making inductions about
highly variable attributes. For example, Nisbett and
his colleagues (1983) asked college students to esti-
mate the percentage of obese male members of the
Barratos tribe if they observed one obese tribesman,
three obese tribesmen, or twenty of them. Results
showed that participants were least likely to make
strong inferences based on only one tribe member;
conclusions were strongest for the highest number
of observations. This finding is known as premise
monotonicity, which means that a higher number
of inclusive premises results in a stronger inductive
argument than a smaller number (Osherson et al.,
1990). However, as will be explained in the section
on representativeness, individuals do not always take
sample size into account as much as they should.
8.2.2 Diverse Evidence
Although the milk example presented earlier in-
volves numerous observations, the conclusion that
George has lactose intolerance would have a higher
probability of being true if it were based on a wide
range of evidence, such as George getting stomach
aches after consuming other lactose-based foods,
George’s health history, and observations conducted
at different times of the day and night. In other
words, inductive arguments are stronger if they
present a range of converging evidence taken from
different sources (Heit, 2000). For this reason, sci-
entific experiments are often conducted in various
ways using different types of participants in order
to test a single hypothesis. For example, inductive
reasoning has been studied using objects, cartoon
pictures, complex verbal arguments, computational
models, and participants of different ages from vari-
ous backgrounds (Heit, 2007).
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Given that it would be time consuming and of-
ten impossible to collect every possible observation,
people often use shortcuts or heuristics to reach in-
ductive conclusions (see Chapter 10,“Decision Mak-
ing”, for more information about heuristics.). In
many cases these heuristics can result in quick and
highly probable conclusions. Unfortunately, some-
times they can cause errors. One of these heuristics
or “rules of thumb” is the availability heuristic,
which can undermine our diversity of evidence. We
tend to use information that easily comes to mind,
without also considering a significant number of
cases that take longer to retrieve from memory. For
example, when Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahne-
man (1973) asked people to predict whether there
are more words in the English language beginning
with the letter R or more words with R as the third
letter, 69% of their participants erroneously pre-
dicted that more words begin with R. In other words,
it is easier to generate words like “rutabaga”, “rat”,
and “ridiculous” than it is to think of instances like
“bard”, “certify”, and “dare.” According to Tversky
and Kahneman, “to assess availability it is not nec-
essary to perform the actual operations of retrieval
or construction. It suffices to assess the ease with
which these operations can be performed” (p. 208).
However, other researchers believe information must
be retrieved from memory because it is used to guide
and evaluate inductive inferences (Shafto, Coley, &
Vitkin, 2007).
Moreover, the availability heuristic applies when
people easily retrieve information from memory that
indicates there is a relationship between events, cat-
egories, or attributes. They then base their inductive
conclusions on this perceived correlation, which can
often be quite useful. For example, if you remember
that your professor has granted requests for paper
extensions when he or she is in a good mood, you
might take this information into account when you
want permission to turn your paper in late. However,
the availability heuristic can sometimes result in an
illusory correlation, which means that people be-
lieve a relationship exists when, in reality, it does not
(Hamilton & Lickel, 2000). For example, prejudicial
conclusions are sometimes drawn when individuals
have information readily available in memory that
leads them to believe there is a correlation between
negative personality traits and a particular group of
people. In short, making predictions based only on
easily retrievable evidence can result in wrongly as-
suming correlations exist, which lowers the strength
of our arguments and reduces the likelihood that our
inductive conclusions are correct.
Having a range of evidence, if it is chosen cor-
rectly, can also help prevent confirmation bias. We
have a tendency selectively to seek data that supports
our hypotheses, while overlooking information that
would invalidate them. Suppose someone gave you
the numbers 2, 4, and 6 that conform to a rule and
asked you to discover the rule by generating sets of
three numbers you think would fit. What do you
think the rule is and which three numbers would you
select to test your hypothesis? When Peter Wason
(1960) gave this task to adults, his nonobvious rule
was “three numbers in increasing order of magni-
tude” but most participants assumed the rule was
“increasing intervals of two”. Box 8.1 shows his
instructions and examples of different ways of re-
sponding. Thirty-one percent of the participants
practiced what Wason refers to as enumerative in-
duction; they did not try to disconfirm their hypothe-
sis by testing odd numbers or descending ones. As a
result, they never discovered the correct rule. In sci-
ence and in everyday life, it is essential to practice
eliminative induction by seeking both confirming
and disconfirming evidence before drawing conclu-
sions.
The availability of different types of knowledge
to inform our inductive reasoning is dynamic; it can
change based on context and effects of prior expe-
rience (Shafto et al., 2007). More specifically, the
information in the premises of an inductive prob-
lem can have an immediate consequence for which
knowledge we retrieve from memory in order to
make our generalizations. If we are told that dogs
have a recently discovered illness, we might infer
that cats will get it too because we remember they of-
ten live in the same households. However, if we dis-
cover that dogs have a recently discovered gene, we
would be more likely to conclude that wolves also
carry it because we remember that the two species
are genetically closely related. In contrast, prior
experience has long-term consequences for knowl-
edge availability. For example, novices in a domain
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are more likely to retrieve taxonomic or categorical
information than are domain experts, who tend to
rely more on causal, thematic, and ecological rela-
tionships. Interestingly, if put under time pressure,
experts often fall back on using taxonomic similarity
to draw their conclusions (Shafto, Coley, & Baldwin,
2007).
Textbox 8.1: Examples of Enumerative and Eliminative Induction on
the 2-4-6 task
Instructions
You will be given three numbers which conform to a simple rule that I have in mind. This rule is
concerned with a relation between any three numbers and not with their absolute magnitude. . . .
Your aim is to discover this rule by writing down sets of three numbers, together with reasons for
your choice of them. After you have written down each set, I shall tell you whether your numbers
conform to the rule or not. . . . There is no time limit but you should try to discover this rule by
citing the minimum sets of numbers. Remember that your aim is not simply to find numbers which
conform to the rule, but to discover the rule itself. When you feel highly confident that you have
discovered it, and not before, you are to write it down and tell me what it is (Wason, 1960, p. 131).
Trial Participant’s Type of Current Strategy Overall Induction
# Sets Feedback Hypothesis Type
1 4-6-8 “Yes” Even &
Increasing by 2s
To confirm Enumerative (only
confirming)
2 6-8-10 “Yes” Even &
Increasing by 2s
To confirm
3 20-22-24 “Yes” Even &
Increasing by 2s
To confirm
4 8-10-12 “Yes” Increasing by 2s To confirm
Participant never gets the correct rule.
1 22-24-26 “Yes” Increasing by 2s To confirm Eliminative (both con-
firming & disconfirm-
ing)
2 6-4-2 “No” Increasing by 2s To disconfirm
3 1-17-23 “Yes” Ascending #s To confirm
4. 3-2-1 “No” Ascending #s To disconfirm
Participant announces the correct rule.
8.2.3 Representative Observations
To achieve strong inductive arguments, it is not
enough to have several observations that include
diverse evidence. The observations must also fully
represent the entire population or category of inter-
est. For example, suppose you wanted to predict
whether the citizens of California believe the legal
drinking age should be lowered from age 21 to 18.
Polling undergraduates at several universities in Cal-
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ifornia would probably tell you more about college
students than it would about the beliefs of people in
the entire state. To draw potentially accurate con-
clusions about drinking attitudes in California, it
would be important to obtain opinions from a repre-
sentative cross-section of the people who live there.
Similarly, results from scientific studies can only be
safely generalized to the population represented in
the sample of participants. Experiments conducted
on mice, college students, males, or individuals from
a specific culture are often replicated using mem-
bers of other populations so that the conclusions can
encompass other species or all humans.
In solving inductive reasoning problems, indi-
viduals often use the representativeness heuristic.
When trying to estimate the probability of an event,
this short cut involves finding a comparable case
or prototype and assuming that the two events have
similar probabilities. Consider a problem developed
by Tversky and Kahneman (1974): “Steve is very
shy and withdrawn, invariably helpful, but with lit-
tle interest in people, or in the world of reality” (p.
1124). Is Steve more likely to be a farmer, librar-
ian, salesman, airline pilot, or physician? Using
the representativeness heuristic, people are likely
to respond that Steve has the highest probability of
being a librarian because he best fits how they view
a typical librarian. However, this conclusion can
be inaccurate if important base rate information is
not taken into account. At the time the study was
conducted, there were more male farmers than male
librarians in the United States.
In addition, people do not always take small sam-
ple sizes into account to assess representativeness.
One demonstration of this is another study con-
ducted by Tversky and Kahneman (1974). Ninety-
five participants were asked the following question:
A certain town is served by two hospitals. In
the larger hospital about 45 babies are born each
day, and in the smaller hospital about 15 babies
are born each day. As you know, about 50 per-
cent of all babies are boys. However, the exact
percentage varies from day to day. Sometimes it
may be higher than 50 percent, sometimes lower.
For a period of 1 year, each hospital recorded
the days on which more than 60 percent of the
babies born were boys. Which hospital do you
think recorded more such days? (p. 1125)
The answer options were (1) the larger hospi-
tal, (2) the smaller hospital, or (3) about the same
(within 5 percent of each other) for the two hospitals.
Over half of the participants predicted the record-
ings would be about the same, presumably because
they assumed that both hospitals would be equally
representative of male and female birth rates in the
general population. However, the correct answer is
the smaller hospital because about 15 babies born
each day will show more fluctuation in the number
of males and females born than will the bigger sam-
ple size at the larger hospital, which is more likely to
reflect the statistic found in the general population.
8.3 Different Forms of Inductive
Reasoning
Given that induction is central to our daily lives as
we engage in a variety of activities, it is not surpris-
ing that there are different ways we use it. Four of
these will be covered in this section.
8.3.1 Category-based Induction
Category-based induction has probably been studied
more than any other form of inductive reasoning
(Heit, 2007). In this type of reasoning, if people are
told that one or more members of a category have a
certain property, they then determine whether other
members of the category are likely to have the same
property. For example, if you observe that chim-
panzees groom each other, you would probably infer
that gorillas have the same behavior. Would you also
conclude that groundhogs groom each other?
8.3.1.1 Premise Typicality
In a classic study conducted by Lance Rips (1975),
participants were told that a particular species on
an isolated island had a new contagious disease and
then asked to estimate the likelihood that other kinds
of animals on the island would contract the disease.
Results indicated that species’ typicality had a large
influence on individuals’ inductive judgments, even
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when similarity was held constant. In other words,
if one species (e.g., a robin) is highly representative
of an inferred superordinate category (e.g., birds),
individuals were more likely to generalize to other
members (e.g., sparrows) than if the same infor-
mation was given about an atypical member (e.g.,
canary). It is more convincing to project the robins’
disease onto sparrows than it is to generalize the
disease from canaries to sparrows.
There is also premise-conclusion asymmetry,
which means a single-premise argument is viewed
as stronger if the more typical member of an inferred
superordinate category is used in the premise rather
than in the conclusion. For example, it is more con-
vincing to project a property of lions onto bats than
the other way around because lions are viewed as a
better prototype of mammals than are bats (Smith,
Shafer, & Osherson, 1993).
8.3.1.2 Category Similarity
Two categories are highly similar if they have sev-
eral features in common and few distinctive ones
they do not share. Perceived similarity between
the premise category and the conclusion category
strengthens inductive arguments and increases the
likelihood that a novel property of one category will
be generalized to another category (Hayes & Heit,
2017). For example, individuals are more likely to
generalize a property from lions to wolves than from
hippopotamuses to giraffes.
The similarity-coverage model (Osherson et al.,
1990) posits that individuals automatically compute
similarity and make inductive generalizations when
(a) there is a great deal of overlap between the fea-
tures of the premise and conclusion categories and
(b) there is substantial similarity between premise
features and the inferred superordinate category
(e.g., mammals) that is inclusive of the premises
and conclusion. This model is predictive of the
premise-conclusion similarity effect found in many
studies of category-based induction (Hayes & Heit,
2017). It can also account for the premise typical-
ity results mentioned earlier. Typical premises have
higher mean similarity to the inferred superordinate
category than do atypical ones, which means that
typicality provides better coverage.
8.3.1.3 Premise Diversity
After typicality and premise-conclusion similarity,
probably the next most important attribute to con-
sider is diversity of the actual premises. Other things
being equal, arguments are stronger and conclusions
are more probable if dissimilar subordinate cate-
gories are used as evidence (Smith et al., 1993). For
example, if given the information that mice and lions
share the same property, it is more likely that we will
predict that elephants and other mammals also have
the property than if we are told that cougars and lions
share the property. Similarly, as mentioned earlier,
premise monotonicity increases the amount of evi-
dence and typically strengthens inductive arguments
(Osherson et al., 1990). For example, information
that mice, lions, bears, dog, and horses share a prop-
erty is stronger evidence than knowing only about
mice and lions.
The similarity-coverage model (Osherson et al.,
1990) mentioned above accounts for this diversity
effect; less similar subordinate categories tend to
provide more coverage of the inferred superordi-
nate category (e.g., mammals) than do subordinate
categories that are quite similar. In the same way,
premise monotonicity provides more coverage of the
inferred superordinate category and makes a prop-
erty more likely to be generalized.
Premise typicality, category similarity, premise
diversity, and premise monotonicity involve taxo-
nomic relationships between premises and conclu-
sions. As noted earlier, novices in a domain are more
likely than experts to be influenced by these taxo-
nomic relations (Hayes & Heit, 2017). Experts tend
to rely instead on thematic, causal, and ecological re-
lations for their generalizations of properties related
to their domain of expertise. For example, when
tree experts were asked to infer which of two novel
diseases would be most likely to affect all trees, they
focused on causal-ecological factors related to how
tree diseases work and “local coverage”, which in-
volves extending the property to other members of
the same folk family. In other words, they were not
very influenced by typicality and diversity of the
premises (Proffitt, Coley, & Medin, 2000).
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8.3.2 Causal Induction
Predicting what causes certain events and outcomes
is an important part of being human. This form of
reasoning is commonly used in both science and
in our daily lives to advance knowledge and give
us a sense of control. For example, predicting that
not going to class or turning in the work will result
in a failing grade can motivate students to attend
and finish assignments. However, poorly executed
causal reasoning can result in superstitions, such as
believing that breaking a mirror causes seven years
of bad luck.
Causal relations are so important to us that they
typically outweigh other information. Even for non-
experts, for example, the presence of a causal rela-
tion can over-ride taxonomic ones, such as premise
typicality, category similarity, premise diversity, and
premise monotonicity. In a demonstration of causal-
ity’s strong influence (Rehder, 2006), participants
were given a novel category (e.g., Kehoe ants) and
told characteristic features of its members (e.g., their
blood has high amounts of iron sulfate). Participants
were then told about a novel property possessed by
one of the category members (e.g., it has a venom
that gives it a stinging bite) and asked to estimate
the proportion of all category members that also pos-
sessed this new property. In some conditions, partic-
ipants were told that the new property was caused by
a characteristic feature they had previously learned
(e.g., the stinging bite is caused by the high amounts
of iron sulfate in its blood). When causal explana-
tions were present, the standard effect of typicality
was almost completely eliminated. Additional exper-
iments demonstrated that causal explanations also
drastically reduced the effects of premise typicality,
diversity, and similarity.
John Stuart Mill (1843) was one of the first to
propose a theory of causality and it includes five
methods (or canons) of causal analysis that focus on
the observation of patterns. Four of the five involve
inductive reasoning and each of these is paraphrased
and briefly described below. The first three help
people practice Wason’s (1960) notion of elimina-
tive induction; ruling out some possible causes helps
narrow the hypotheses for what actually is the cause.
1. Method of agreement: If all observed cases of
a phenomenon have only one factor in com-
mon, then that factor is the likely cause of the
phenomenon. For example, if you and the rest
of your family got food poisoning after din-
ing at a buffet, you and the health department
would be highly motivated to determine the
cause. Table 8.2 illustrates a systematic way
to determine whether there was one item you
all ate in common, while ruling out the others.
2. Method of disagreement: If a phenomenon oc-
curs in one observed case and not in another
and there is only one circumstance that differs
between the two cases, then this circumstance
is the likely cause of the phenomenon. If all
of your family members got food poisoning
except for you, determining the food they ate
that you wisely avoided will allow you to in-
fer the most probable cause of their illness.
As shown in Table 8.3, the items you had in
common are eliminated in order to detect the
unshared one.
Table 8.2: Method of agreement indicating fish as the source of illness.
Member Salad Bread Fish Pie Ill?
Mom Yes No Yes No Yes
Dad Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Brother No Yes Yes Yes Yes
You Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 8.3: Method of disagreement indicating pie as the source of iIllness.
Member Salad Bread Fish Pie Ill?
Mom Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Dad Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Brother No Yes Yes Yes Yes
You No Yes Yes No No
3. Joint method of agreement and disagreement.
As the name implies, this canon essentially
combines the first two methods. Suppose you
and your brother did not get food poisoning
but, sadly, your parents did. As illustrated
in Table 8.4, it would be important to know
if there was anything your parents ate that
you and your brother avoided. If there is,
then this item would be a likely cause of their
foodborne illness. The experimental method
used in psychology fits this method well be-
cause one group of participants receives the
experimental condition and the other does not;
everything else is held constant for the two
groups. If one group shows different behav-
ior than the other, then it is appropriate to
conclude that the experimental manipulation
caused the difference. This is why results
from scientific experiments can be used to
draw cause and effect conclusions but surveys
and naturalistic observation cannot.
4. Method of concomitant variation. If there is a
high correlation in the variations occurring for
two different phenomena, one phenomenon is
likely to be the cause of the other or a third
unknown variable might be causing the vari-
ation in both. Suppose you did not eat berry
pie at the buffet, your mom had half a piece,
your brother had a whole one, and your dad
ate five pieces. You feel fine later that night,
your mom feels a bit queasy, your brother is
moderately sick, and your poor dad needs to
be rushed to the hospital. A highly probable
conclusion to infer from this evidence is that
suffering from the effect (i.e., food poisoning)
is proportional to the cause (i.e., the amount
of pie consumed).
Mill’s methods provide useful tools for finding
potential reasons for effects but they are limited to
what we choose to focus on. Potential causes will
not be observed and found unless we already have
relevant hypotheses about what the causes are likely
to be. For example, in discovering the source of
food poisoning, factors other than a buffet dinner
might be involved.
Miriam Schustack and Robert Sternberg (1981)
examined what sources of information people actu-
ally use when making causal inferences about un-
Table 8.4: Joint Method of agreement and disagreement indicating salad as the source of illness.
Member Salad Bread Fish Pie Ill?
Mom Yes No Yes No Yes
Dad Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Brother No Yes Yes Yes No
You No No Yes Yes No
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certain and complicated situations. For example,
participants were given information about various
cosmetic companies, including the facts that (a) a
company did or did not have a major product under
suspicion as a carcinogen and (b) the company’s
stock had or had not drastically dropped. Partici-
pants were then asked to infer the probability that
some other cosmetic company would have its stock
values drop drastically if it had a major product
under suspicion as a carcinogen. Overall results in-
dicated that people confirm a causal relationship in
one of two ways. One, which is related to Mill’s
method of agreement, is based on evidence of the
joint presence of the hypothesized cause (e.g., sus-
picion of a carcinogen) and effect (e.g., declining
stock values). The other, which is related to Mill’s
method of disagreement, is based on evidence of the
joint absence of the hypothesized cause and effect.
Overall results also indicated that people disconfirm
causality in one of two ways. The first focuses on the
presence of the hypothesized cause but the absence
of the outcome and the other is based on the absence
of the cause, yet the outcome still occurs. These
overall findings are supported by Rehder’s (2006)
result that an effect is viewed as more prevalent if
the cause is also prevalent.
8.3.3 Analogical Reasoning
Even though many people hate answering analogy
problems on standardized tests, this form of induc-
tion allows us to use familiar knowledge to under-
stand something we do not know. For example,
learning the structure of an atom might be easier
if it is compared to already acquired knowledge
about the solar system. The sun and its orbiting
planets can help us comprehend the atom’s nucleus
and the electrons that move about it. Analogical
reasoning can also cause us to consider familiar ma-
terial in new ways. When Kevin Dunbar and his
colleagues (Dunbar, 1995; Dunbar & Blanchette,
2001) videotaped immunologists and molecular bi-
ologists during their lab meetings, they discovered
that the scientists frequently used analogies 3 to 15
times in any given meeting as an important source
of knowledge and conceptual change. For example,
when discussing the flagellar pocket, a postdoctoral
fellow said, “Things get in, but things. . . It’s like
the Hotel California - you can check in but you can
never check out” (Dunbar, 1995, p. 383).
As implied above, analogical reasoning typically
works by comparing two domains of knowledge in
order to infer a quality they have in common. The
first domain is often the more familiar of the two and
it serves as the base or source. It provides a model
for understanding and drawing inferences about the
target, which is often the more novel or abstract
domain (Gentner & Smith, 2012).
Robert Sternberg (1977) used simple picture, ver-
bal, and geometric analogies to determine the com-
ponents of analogical reasoning (Figure 8.1 shows
examples similar to the ones he used). Consider the
following verbal problem, which involves choosing
the best option for the end of the analogy.
A lawyer is to a trial as a surgeon is to:
(a) a stethoscope, (b) medical school, (c) an oper-
ation, (d) patients.
The successful analogy solver encodes the first
two terms of the base (i.e., lawyer and trial), which
includes forming an appropriate mental representa-
tion of them in memory. Next one or more relations
between these two items are inferred (e.g., lawyers
present their cases during a trial). The term ‘surgeon’
is then encoded and an overall relation is mapped
between a lawyer and a doctor (e.g., they are both
practicing professionals). This is followed by ap-
plying the relation in the base to the target. Finally,
a response is prepared and given (i.e., operation is
the correct answer because surgeons perform their
procedures during an operation and lawyers perform
theirs during a trial.)
Using mathematical modeling, Sternberg (1977)
analyzed the amounts of time participants spent on
the components of analogical reasoning mentioned
above: encoding, inference, mapping, application of
the relation, and preparation-response. Interestingly,
he found that participants spent quite a bit more
time on encoding and preparation-response than in-
ference, mapping, and application. Furthermore, for
all three types of analogies (picture, verbal, and ge-
ometric), the preparation-response component was
the one most highly correlated with standardized
tests of reasoning.
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Figure 8.1: Examples of different types of analogies.
In later work, Sternberg identified higher-order
components (metacomponents) that are used suc-
cessfully to plan, evaluate, and monitor strategies
and solutions for analogies and other problems. For
example, some individuals do not form a connection
between the first and second halves of an analogy
because they do not select the lower-level compo-
nent of mapping (Sternberg & Rivkin, 1979). Other
individuals might not select the best strategy for
combining lower-level components and they end
up using an inefficient search strategy for inferring
relations between the first two terms in an anal-
ogy (Sternberg & Keatron, 1982). Not surprisingly,
Sternberg’s work on analogical reasoning plays an
influential role in his triarchic theory of intelligence
(1988) and his theory of successful intelligence
(1997).
As Sternberg’s work indicates, the elements in an
analogy need to be linked by a relation they have
in common. In other words, relational (or struc-
tural) similarity is a basic constraint of this form of
reasoning (Goswami, 2011). Surface similarity is
not required; objects in each domain do not need to
resemble each other physically or have the same be-
haviors. For example, computers and humans do not
look or act alike but they are relationally similar in
terms of information processing. However, surface
similarities can facilitate the mapping of relations
and improve performance (Gentner, 1989; Holyoak
& Koh, 1987).
Interestingly, analogical reasoning is not always
done consciously and deliberately. For example,
Blanchette and Dunbar (2002) had participants read
descriptions of a target topic (e.g., legalization of
marijuana) and then read shorter information about
a potential analogical base (e.g., prohibition). After-
wards, when participants were given a recognition
test, they erroneously believed that their analogical
inferences were concrete facts actually presented in
the target description. In other words, they uncon-
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sciously inserted their inferences into their mental
representations of the target domain.
8.3.4 Insight
Sudden insight into the solution of a seemingly im-
penetrable problem is another form of inductive rea-
soning (Goswani, 2011) or what Steinbeck (1954)
referred to as the inductive leap. The Gestalt psy-
chologists paved the way for later research on this
creative and productive way of thinking, which oc-
curs when an individual goes beyond old associa-
tions and suddenly views information in a new way
(see Chapter 9, “Problem Solving”, for more infor-
mation about Gestalt theory and insight). A novel
solution and a subjective feeling of “aha”, or sud-
denly knowing something new without consciously
processing how one arrived at it, often accompany
this new perception of the situation (Topolinski &
Reber, 2010). In contrast, an analytic process in-
volves consciously and systematically evaluating
the problem, using strategic thinking and deduction.
In support of this view of insight, Janet Metcalfe
(1986a, 1986b; Metcalfe & Weibe, 1987) and David-
son (1995) found that incremental increases in feel-
ings of confidence (or warmth) that one is nearing
a solution negatively predict correct solution of in-
sight problems but positively predict correct solution
of deductive reasoning problems. In other words, in-
dividuals who felt they were gradually getting closer
to solving insight problems tended to arrive at in-
correct solutions; others who thought they were far
from solving the insight problems and then suddenly
realized the answers tended to be accurate. Metcalfe
concludes that insight is a subjectively catastrophic
process, not an incremental one.
An important source of insight involves cogni-
tive restructuring of a problem’s components, which
can occur multiple times as an individual moves
from general to specific mental representations of
a problem (Mayer, 1995). Unlike routine or well-
defined problems, ill-defined or non-routine ones are
more likely to require individuals to search through
a space of alternative approaches (Newell, & Simon,
1972) because the givens, goals, and obstacles are
not clear. However, it should be emphasized that
insight is process rather than problem oriented. One
individual may solve a problem by having an in-
ductive leap; another person may solve the same
problem incrementally and consciously, especially
if it is familiar (Davidson, 1995; Webb, Little, &
Cropper, 2016).
The Gestalt psychologists believed that people’s
inability to restructure a problem’s components and
produce an insightful solution is often due to their
fixation on past experience and associations. For
example, in what is now seen as a classic insight
problem, Karl Duncker (1945) gave individuals
three small cardboard boxes, candles, matches, and
thumbtacks. The participants’ task was to mount a
candle vertically on a screen so that it could be used
as a reading light. The solution is to light a candle,
melt wax onto the top of a box, stick the candle into
the wax, and tack the box to the screen. Participants
who were given boxes filled with tacks, matches,
and candles had much more difficulty solving the
problem than did those who received the same sup-
plies outside of the boxes. According to Duncker,
seeing a box serve the typical function of a container
made it difficult for many individuals also to view
the box as a structural support. This phenomenon
became known as functional fixedness.
Similar types of mental blocks can interfere with
insightful problem solving. In particular, even when
we realize that we are approaching a problem incor-
rectly, we often cannot break our fixation on this
approach in order to change our strategies or search
for new evidence. Fortunately, taking a break when
we reach an impasse often allows us to stop this fix-
ation and see material in a new way when we return
to it (Davidson, 2003).
8.4 How Does Inductive Reasoning
Develop?
Young children have limited knowledge about the
world and they have a lot to learn in a relatively
short amount of time in order to adapt well to their
environments. Inductive reasoning allows them to
acquire new information and fill in gaps in their
knowledge. Not surprisingly, research shows this
form of reasoning appears early in development. For
example, infants between 9-16 months of age make
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inductive inferences based on perceptual similari-
ties of objects, expecting new ones to wail when
squeezed if they physically resemble a previously
squeezed one that wailed (Baldwin, Markman, &
Melartin, 1993). Although inductive reasoning is
relatively continuous across the human lifespan, it
becomes more complex as children’s cognitive skills,
experience, and knowledge base expand and they
become better able to evaluate and apply evidence
to draw likely conclusions (Goswami, 2011; Hayes,
2007).
8.4.1 How Children Use Inductive
Evidence
8.4.1.1 Sample size
Do children, like adults, take sample size into ac-
count when making inductive generalizations? Ev-
idence indicates that they do if the tasks are made
simple enough. Grant Gutheil and Susan Gelman
(1997) asked 8-10 year old children to make induc-
tions based on small and large samples of observable
features. For example, children were shown a pic-
ture of one butterfly and told that it has blue eyes.
They were also shown a picture of five butterflies
and told that all of these butterflies have gray eyes.
The experimenter then looked at a picture but did
not show it to the children and asked whether they
thought the butterfly in the picture has blue eyes
or gray eyes. The children were significantly more
likely to generalize traits, such as eye color, from
the large sample than from the small one.
Similarly, it has been found that children younger
than age 6 take number of observations into account
for their inductive generalizations if the task involves
only one sample of evidence (Jacobs & Narloch,
2001; Lawson & Fisher, 2011). If they need to
compare a larger sample with a smaller one, the cog-
nitive demands are too great for them to do this well
(Gutheil & Gelman, 1997; Lopez, Gelman, Gutheil,
& Smith, 1992).
8.4.1.2 Diversity
As discussed earlier, adults are more likely to make
inductive generalizations from different types of
converging evidence than from only one type. The
results for children under age 10 have been more
mixed, with some studies finding no evidence of
diversity effects (Carey, 1985; Gutheil & Gelman,
1997; Lopez et al., 1992) and others finding that
young children often over-generalize from diverse
data (Carey, 1985; Lawson & Fisher, 2011). How-
ever, if the tasks have low cognitive demands and
no hidden properties, young children seem capable
of taking diversity into account. For example, when
shown pictures of three very different types of dolls
played with by Jane and three quite similar dolls
played with by Danielle and then shown a picture
of another kind of doll, 73% of participants ages 5
and 6 inferred that Jane rather than Danielle would
want to play with the new type of doll (Heit & Hahn,
2001). However, it was also found that children
were less likely to use diverse evidence when mak-
ing inferences about remote categories or hidden
properties of objects.
Interestingly, Margorie Rhodes and Peter Lieben-
son (2015) found that children ages 5-8 appropri-
ately used diverse evidence more than non-diverse
information when making inductions about novel
categories but not when making them about familiar
natural kinds (e.g., birds). In other words, category
knowledge interfered with their diversity-based rea-
soning. In contrast, children ages 9 and 10 general-
ized more broadly from diverse samples than non-
diverse ones when reasoning about both novel cate-
gories and natural kinds. These results indicate both
developmental continuity and change in diversity-
based inductions. At least by age 5, children have
the cognitive mechanisms for incorporating differ-
ent types of information into their generalizations,
as shown by their use of diverse evidence when rea-
soning about novel categories. However, there is
developmental change for the situations in which
children access these mechanisms.
8.4.1.3 Typicality
Several studies have found that young children are
similar to adults in making inductive inferences
based on premise typicality or how well an item
represents a familiar category. For example, Gelman
and Coley (1990) showed 2-year-old children a pic-
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ture of a typical bird (e.g., robin), told them it was
a bird, and asked them about one of its properties
(e.g., “Does it live in a nest?”). The children were
then shown atypical (e.g., dodo) and typical (e.g.,
bluebird) category members without the category
name (e.g., bird) being repeated and asked if each
one lives in a nest. The results were that children
projected the property (e.g., living in a nest) to typ-
ical category members (e.g., bluebird) 76% of the
time and to atypical members (e.g., dodo) only 42%
of the time. Similar behavior was found for 3- and
4-year old children (Gelman and Markman, 1986).
In addition, as with adults, premise-conclusion simi-
larity also increased inductive inferences.
8.5 Development of Forms of Induction
As implied by the previous section, young children
can usually perform category-based inductive rea-
soning, causal reasoning, and analogical reasoning
if the tasks are simple and the children have the req-
uisite knowledge about the properties, categories,
and causal or functional relations that are used in the
tasks (Goswami, 2011; Hayes, 2007). As Goswami
notes about the development of analogical reason-
ing, “in the absence of the requisite knowledge, it is
difficult to reason by induction” (p. 405).
Research indicates that by the time children are
around age 5, they most likely use the same broad re-
lations and cues that adults use for their inductive in-
ferences (Hayes, 2007). The developmental changes
that do occur are mostly quantitative and gradual,
with some types of information, such as causal re-
lations, being applied more frequently and across
more domains. As they develop, children’s knowl-
edge base increases, their inhibition and memory
retrieval processes become more efficient, and their
relational working memory capacity improves (Per-
ret, 2015). These cognitive changes allow children
to perform more complex category-based inferences,
causal inductions, and analogical reasoning.
In addition, some research indicates that children
age 6 or older are more likely to have insights than
those who are younger. For example, Tim German
and Margaret Anne Defeyter (2000) gave children
aged 5-7 an analogous task to Duncker’s candle
problem described earlier in this chapter. Their re-
sults showed that 6- and 7-year-olds in the experi-
mental condition were significantly slower to think
of the solution, which involved emptying and turn-
ing over a wooden box and using it as a support, than
the same-age control group that received an empty
box. Interestingly, the 5-year-olds in the experimen-
tal condition were significantly faster to think of
the solution than their older cohorts. Furthermore,
they were equally as fast as their same-age peers
in the control condition. German and Defeyter con-
clude that around age 6, children develop a more
narrow criterion for an object’s function than they
had earlier in life. Seeing the box used as a container
placed that function in their initial representation
of the problem. As with the adult participants in
Duncker’s experiment (1945), these children had
to overcome functional fixedness and restructure
their initial representation of the problem before
they could insightfully solve it. In contrast, the 5-
year-olds’ fluid conception of the box’s function
required no restructuring or insight.
To conclude, both children and adults habitually
use different forms of inductive reasoning to help
make sense of their worlds and to predict future
events. Throughout the human lifespan, this form
of reasoning is influenced by similar attributes and
constraints. These characteristics include number of
observations, knowledge base, inhibitory processes,
working memory capacity, memory retrieval pro-
cesses, and the cognitive ability to detect relational
similarity (Goswami, 2011; Perret, 2015). As in-
dividuals gain experience and expertise in multiple
domains, their inductive reasoning becomes increas-
ingly sophisticated for a wider-range of problems.
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Summary
1. In inductive reasoning, conclusions are inferred from evidence but are never guaranteed to be
correct. Their degree of certainty is based on a continuum of weak to strong evidence. Strong
inductive arguments are based on a substantial number of observations, diversity of evidence,
and representativeness of the observations.
2. Inductive reasoning is often compared to deductive reasoning. Both of these forms of
reasoning are central to critical thinking and involve evidence, logic, and working memory.
However, induction and deduction differ in the types of evidence on which they are based
and how they are evaluated. In addition, inductive conclusions go beyond the evidence or
premises and are educated guesses; deductively valid conclusions follow directly from the
premises and are guaranteed to be logically true.
3. Inductive reasoning is widely used in everyday life. Humans often automatically make
predictions about what will happen next based on what occurred in the past. In addition,
this form of reasoning plays an important role in other cognitive activities, such as decision-
making, categorization, and similarity judgments.
4. The availability heuristic is a cognitive short-cut used when people easily retrieve information
from memory and perceive it as relevant evidence for the likelihood of a phenomenon.
Although this heuristic is sometimes useful, it can undermine the diversity of evidence needed
for strong inductive arguments. It can also result in illusionary correlations.
5. Confirmation bias also limits the diversity of evidence. This bias occurs when people use
enumerative induction and only seek observations that support their hypotheses. Eliminative
induction is more informative because it is based on seeking evidence that both confirms and
disconfirms a tentative hypothesis.
6. The representative heuristic allows us to infer the probability of an event by assuming it is
similar to a prototype event. However, this heuristic can result in weak inductive arguments if
base rate and sample size are not considered.
7. There are several forms of inductive reasoning, including category-based inductions, causal
inductions, analogical reasoning, and insight. At some level, they are all based on finding
similarities in a situation.
8. Category-based induction involves generalizing a property of one category member to a
member of another category. Premise typicality, premise-conclusion similarity, premise
diversity, and premise monotonicity are taxonomic relations used by novices when reasoning
inductively about a relevant domain. In contrast, experts in a domain apply causal, ecological,
or thematic relations.
9. Causal induction involves predicting what causes outcomes. If a hypothesized cause and
effect are both present at the same time and absent at the same time, a causal induction is
confirmed. If one is present when the other is not, the induction is disconfirmed. When
causal relations are indicated in category-based problems, they over-ride the use of taxonomic
relations in making inductive generalizations.
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10. Analogical reasoning involves comparing two domains in order to infer a quality they have
in common. Relational similarity is necessary for this form of reasoning, although surface
similarity can foster the mapping of relations between the domains.
11. Insight involves perceiving information in a new way, which often requires cognitive restruc-
turing of our mental representations. It is often accompanied by a subjective feeling of “Aha”
or not consciously knowing how one arrived at the new perception. Functional fixedness or
fixation on unproductive procedures can hinder this form of inductive reasoning.
12. Inductive reasoning begins early in life and there is evidence of both continuity and change
in its development. Cognitive changes and a larger knowledge base allow older children to
perform more complex category-based inferences, causal inductions, and analogical reasoning,
while becoming more susceptible to functional fixedness.
Review Questions
1. If you want to make a strong inductive argument, what attributes should you keep in mind?
2. When and why do people make mistakes when they perform inductive reasoning?
3. If you are an expert in one domain and not in another, how will this alter your category-based
inductions related to each domain?
4. When would you be likely to use category-based induction, causal induction, analogical
reasoning, and insight in your daily life?
5. As you developed from infancy to adulthood, how did your inductive reasoning change and
how did it stay the same?
Hot Topic
Janet E. Davidson
My research on insight began in 1982 when Robert Sternberg and
I developed a three-process theory of insight. According to this
theory, the cognitive processes of selective encoding, selective
combination, and selective comparison are used to restructure one’s
mental representation of the givens, the relations among the givens,
and the goals found in a problem in order to find a novel solution.
Selective encoding occurs when an individual suddenly finds one
or more important elements in a problem situation that previously
had been nonobvious. Selective encoding elicits insight by abruptly
restructuring one’s mental representation so that information that
was originally viewed as being irrelevant is now seen as relevant for problem solution and vice versa.
Selective combination occurs when an individual discovers a previously nonobvious framework
for the relevant elements of a problem situation. In many problems, even when the relevant features
are known, it is often difficult to know that these features should be combined and then to find a
procedure to combine them appropriately. Selective comparison occurs when one suddenly discovers
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a nonobvious connection between new information and prior knowledge. Analogies, for example,
can often be useful for solving new problems.
To be referred to as insightful, the relevant selections must not occur to people immediately
upon presentation of a problem. After individuals reach an impasse, they must spontaneously
search for and select previously overlooked relevant elements, methods for combining the elements,
or connections between prior knowledge and the problem situation. Also, successful search for
this relevant information must result in a seemingly abrupt change in the problem solver’s mental
representation of the problem.
In studies conducted with adults and gifted and non-gifted children as the participants, it was found
that the three insight processes play an important role in the solution of non-routine problems and
in individual differences in intelligent behavior. More specifically, individuals who solved the non-
routine problems correctly were more likely than those who solved them incorrectly to (a) have above
average intelligence as measured by standardized tests, (b) apply spontaneously the three insight
processes, (c) switch mental representations as a result of these processes, (d) experience a sudden
and dramatic increase in feelings of confidence that they were nearing a solution, and (e) take longer
than others to solve the problems. The last finding supports the view that successful insights can
require additional time to restructure a mental representation for a problem and verify the solution.
Correct performance on the nonroutine problems was also more highly correlated with scores on
a standardized test of inductive reasoning than on scores for deductive reasoning. In addition, it
was found that school-age children can be trained on the three processes to perform insightful
problem solving; the training effects are transferable and durable. Future work will examine whether
preschoolers at a science museum apply the three processes when they solve non-routine problems.
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Glossary
availability heuristic A cognitive shortcut that re-
sults in basing estimates of the probability
of an event only on how quickly and easily
relevant evidence is retrieved from memory.
137
confirmation bias Selectively seeking evidence
that confirms a hypothesis and overlooking
evidence that invalidates it. 137
eliminative induction Seeking evidence that both
confirms and disconfirms a hypothesis. 137
functional fixedness A cognitive bias that occurs
when an individual’s notions about the func-
tion of an object inhibit the individual’s use
of the object for a different function. 145
illusory correlation Believing a relationship ex-
ists between variables when, in reality, the
variables are not related. 137
premise monotonicity The strength of an induc-
tive argument increases as the number of in-
clusive premises increases. 136
representativeness heuristic When trying to es-
timate the probability of an event, this short-
cut involves finding a prototype of the event
and assuming that the two events have similar
probabilities. 139





Problem solving is essential for humans to survive
in a world that is full of surprises and challenges.
Let us start with an example. Imagine the legendary
situation on April 11, 1970, when the commander
of the “Apollo 13” moon mission, James Lovell,
told the people on the ground, »Houston, we’ve
had a problem!« One of the oxygen tanks had ex-
ploded and brought the mission close to a catastro-
phe. Through a lot of creative measures (we would
call them problem-solving activities), finally a safe
re-entry to earth atmosphere was possible. A similar
situation happened decades later, at the launch of the
space shuttle “Discovery” on July 26, 2005. Film
footage from more than 100 surveillance cameras
showed that several tiles had fallen off the insula-
tion of the outer tank of the rocket shortly after
the launch. These tiles protect the space shuttle
from overheating when re-entering the atmosphere.
Fortunately, the damage could be fixed by repair
carried out for the first time in space and thus the
life-threatening situation could be averted (in our
terms: the problem could be solved). Our other
example does not have such a happy ending and
shows just how existential problem solving can be:
on February 1, 2003, similar damage to the rocket
insulation had caused the “Columbia” to explode
and the 7 crew members were killed while millions
of people watched the deadly launch live on TV.
Of course, problems like these are far from com-
monplace. But life-threatening situations in space
shuttles show what it means to have a problem in a
spectacular way: to be pursuing a goal (in this case,
to complete the mission and return to earth alive
again) and suddenly not know if and how this goal
can be achieved because there is an obstacle or a
barrier.
Problem solving is one of the highest forms of
mental activity we know. The problem solutions
resulting from this activity have contributed signifi-
cantly to the success (and thus survival) of the hu-
man species, not only on the individual level, but
also on a cultural level (e.g., in the form of speak-
ing, writing, and numbering). To this day we know
of no other creature besides humans on this planet
who shape their lives in a comparable way through
planned action and problem solving. However, this
is no cause for unrestrained optimism in unlimited
progress. These human capabilities also harbor the
greatest destructive potential that has ever been ob-
served in a species.
This chapter presents important concepts and re-
sults from the field of problem-solving research. The
two parts of the term problem solving suggest start-
ing with the problem part (differentiations that have
to be made regarding the types of problems - not
all problems exhibit the same characteristics) and
then moving on to the solving part (which consists
of different phases and has a temporal characteris-
tics). Different theories will be described, together
with an overview of methods as to how to analyze
problem solving activities. Finally, the main aspects
of this chapter will be summarized.
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9.1 The Problem Part: What
Constitutes a Problem?
Problems are normally embedded in certain domains.
A domain can be as exotic as “space shuttle” or as
normal as “playing cards” or “driving a car”. In
each domain, a given situation can be described as
a state that can be changed by means of operators
(tools). For example, the current state of my chess-
board can be changed by using one of the possible
regular moves (the operators) that brings me closer
to my goal of a win (goal state). Sometimes there
are barriers on the way from a starting point to the
goal state. So, if a person wants to reach a certain
goal state in a given domain and does not know how
to reach it or how to overcome a barrier, this person
has a problem.
The important parts of a problem can be identi-
fied as follows: the actor wants to reach a goal in a
specific domain, there are different states, changes
between states are possible with the help of opera-
tors, barriers on the way from a given to a goal state
have to be overcome. For example, in case of the
space shuttle mentioned earlier, the problem consists
in tiles having fallen off, the goal is to come back
safely to Earth, and operators were the activities that
moved the given to the goal state.
There are different types of problems, depending
on the clarity of the goal description and depend-
ing on the tools that can be used for changing the
states of affair: In terms of the clarity of the goal
description, a well-defined problem with clear goal
descriptions (e.g., winning chess) is differentiated
from an ill-defined problem that has no clear goal
(e.g., the political situation in the Middle East: what
would be the best political goal here?).
9.2 The Solving Part: What are the
Steps to the Solution?
Traditionally, different phases of the course of action
are differentiated into action-theoretical approaches
(cf. Cranach & Tschan, 1997; Dörner & Wearing,
1995; von Wright, 1974; Werbik, 1978). Dewey
(1910) already explained in his book How we think
that people take a certain sequence of steps when
solving problems. It begins – according to Dewey
– with a feeling of doubt (= the problem), continues
with the identification of the problem, the search for
relevant facts, and the formulation of first draft so-
lutions. Then it comes to the examination of the
solutions and, if necessary, to the reformulation
of the problem, and finally ends in the selection
and realization of the solution assumed to be cor-
rect.
According to Pretz, Naples, and Sternberg (2003,
p. 3f.) problem solving runs through the following
stages (they call it the “Problem-Solving Cycle”):
“1. Recognize or identify the problem.
2. Define and represent the problem mentally.
3. Develop a solution strategy.
4. Organize his or her knowledge about the prob-
lem.
5. Allocate mental and physical resources for
solving the problem.
6. Monitor his or her progress toward the goal.
7. Evaluate the solution for accuracy.”
This is an idealized sequence of steps, and good
problem solvers adapt this sequence to the situa-
tional requirements. For example, in some cases the
representation step may require some effort whereas
the step of allocating resources might be short. Pretz
et al. call this sequence a “cycle” because the solv-
ing of one problem often generates new problems
and, thus, requires the cycle to run again with the
new problem.
The assumption of different phases of problem
solving, described early by Bales and Strodtbeck
(1951) and later by Witte (1972) as the “phase the-
orem” of problem solving, has both a descriptive
and a prescriptive side: it is descriptive, as it is
intended to describe the processes actually taking
place in problem solving; it is prescriptive, inso-
far as this sequence also intends to serve as a rule
for “good” problem solving. As Lipshitz and Bar-
Ilan (1996) point out, this theorem in its manifold
manifestations is indeed an important component of
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the problem-solving literature, but the descriptive
as well as prescriptive validity is not very well sup-
ported by empirical evidence, perhaps because these
distinctions are logical rather than empirical. Thus,
the various phases of the course of action, which will
be discussed in more detail below, only have an or-
dering and thus meaningful function. A distinction
is made here between the following five phases: a)
goal formulation, b) hypothesis formation, c) plan-
ning and decision-making, d) monitoring, and e)
evaluation:
a) Goal elaboration. At the beginning of an action
there is a goal (motivational: a desired satisfaction
of a need; cognitively: a target state to be reached)
whose specificity can vary. The more unspecific the
goal is (e.g., in the case of an ill-defined problem),
the more effort must be put into working out the
goal, to overcome dialectical barriers.
b) Hypothesis formation. Before acting, it is nec-
essary to model the environment in which one acts.
To this end, assumptions must be formulated about
the relationships between the variables involved in
order to exert an appropriate influence on this en-
vironment. Depending on the characteristics of the
environment (e.g., computer simulations; see be-
low), hypotheses can be formed and tested during
the individual steps of an action.
c) Planning and decision making. Based on the
hypotheses, intervention sequences need to be for-
mulated that seem suitable for transferring the ini-
tial state into the goal state. This preparation of
future decisions is called planning – an important
component of actions, since it contains the prepa-
rations for a good (in the sense of target-oriented)
course of action. In Funke and Glodowski (1990),
this phase is referred to as the creation of a plan,
which is intended to underline the constructive as-
pect. However, efficient planning is based as much
as possible on experience (retrieval from long-term
memory) and reusing “old” plans, thus minimizing
the effort (in computer science this aspect is called
“re-usability”, see Krueger, 1992).
d) Monitoring. The phase of drawing up the plan
is followed by a phase of plan monitoring, intended
to ensure that the implementation of the plan does
not in fact give rise to much disruption due to “fric-
tions” (Clausewitz, 1832). Frictions occur as unfore-
seen (usually also unforeseeable) disruptions during
the execution of the plan and require corrective in-
terventions up to and including the termination of
the plan.
e) Evaluation. The final phase consists of exam-
ining whether the result of the action corresponds to
the objective(s) formulated at the beginning. Further
action and problem solving might be necessary.
Fischer, Greiff, and Funke (2012) see the process
of complex problem solving as a mixture of two
phases, namely knowledge acquisition and knowl-
edge application. These authors emphasize the im-
portance of (1) information generation (due to the
initial intransparency of the situation), (2) informa-
tion reduction (due to the overcharging complexity
of the problem’s structure), (3) model building (due
to the interconnectedness of the variables), (4) dy-
namic decision making (due to the eigendynamics
of the system), and (5) evaluation (due to many, in-
terfering and/or ill-defined goals).
In contrast to conceptions of more or less ordered
processes, there is the assumption of "muddling
through". Coming from the field of policy-making
in public administration, Lindblom (1959, 1979)
argues that decision-making in complex situations
cannot follow a simple means-ends relationship.
Instead, he proposes a kind of "incrementalism"
(=muddling through), i.e. small changes towards
certain goals following a series of trials, errors, and
revised trials.
9.3 Problem Solving: What are the
Theories?
In the short modern history of problem-solving re-
search, there have been three major theoretical ap-
proaches to problem solving: Gestalt theory (in-
cluding insight problem solving), action theory, and
information-processing theory. The basic ideas, im-
portant terms, and the respective definition of a prob-
lem are given for all three approaches. A review of
problem solving theories can be found in the recent
paper by Fischer, Greiff, and Funke (2012).
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9.3.1 Gestalt Theory
Problem-solving theories based on Gestalt princi-
ples were developed in analogy to concepts from
the psychology of perception in Germany at the be-
ginning of the 20th century (for a short history of
Gestalt concepts, see Wertheimer, 2010). The basic
idea at that time was that the field of perception does
not consist of isolated elements but rather is orga-
nized in groups or shapes. In line with the principle
of supersummativity, according to which the whole
is more than the sum of its parts, it is also postulated
in the case of thinking tasks that organized forms
emerge from different parts which determine the
solution. For example, look at the well-known nine-
dot problem, in which nine dots distributed evenly
in a square have to be connected by drawing four
lines without the problem solver setting down the
pen. The form of the dots creates a shape, which in
this case is an obstacle to the solution: the square
form suggests erroneously that the lines should be
drawn within the four corners of the square – in fact,
however, one must go beyond this boundary in order
to find a solution (see Figure 9.1).
Important terms from Gestalt psychologists for
today’s psychology of thought are: insight and aha-
experience, restructuring, functional fixedness, and
Einstellung. Insight and aha-experience describe
psychological qualities based on experience that oc-
cur in the solution phase of a problem and denote
the understanding of an initially incomprehensible,
problematic fact (e.g., understanding of a magician’s
trick). Restructuring means changes in the atten-
tional structure (e.g., interpreting the background
as foreground). Functional fixedness occurs when
objects of daily use are first to be used in their nat-
ural function, but later on in a new, unusual one
(e.g., a matchbox with matches to light a cigarette
but that could be used later as a candleholder). The
Einstellung effect occurs when a certain solution
pattern becomes routine for similar problems and
is executed even if there are simpler solution paths
(also called set-effect; e.g., using a complicated so-
lution sequence in filling water jars even when more
simple sequences exist, Luchins & Luchins, 1950).
Definition of a problem: According to Gestalt the-
ories, a problem is characterized by a bad gestalt that
could be transformed into a good gestalt by restruc-
turing as a result of insight, according to Gestalt-
theoretical assumptions. The problem-solving pro-
cess thus presupposes the recognition of the bad and
the good gestalt as well as the existence of insight.
9.3.2 Action Theories
Action theories differentiate between several stages
of action: action planning, action execution, and ac-
tion evaluation. They do not isolate specific psychic
sub-functions but rather determine their contribution
to the more comprehensive form of an action and its
context. In addition, action theories address inten-
tions that give meaning to certain behaviors (for the
distinction between behavior and action, see Grau-
mann, 1980). For example, if you see somebody on
a cold winter day in a summer dress, this strange
behavior can become understandable if the person
explains her intention to train her immune system.
Strange behavior, thus, becomes intentional action.
Action theories have an integrative function and
can help to compensate for the fragmentation of psy-
chology into separate parts by providing a general
frame of reference. It is interesting from a histor-
ical point of view that at the time John B. Watson
formulated his radical “manifesto of behaviorism”
in the USA and recommended to psychology the re-
striction of theory and research to intersubjectively
undisputed “pure” behavior (Watson, 1913), the Hei-
delberg sociologist Max Weber built a “sociology
of understanding” on the basic concept of action
(Weber, 1913).
Definition of a problem: According to action the-
ories, a problem is characterized as part of a goal-
driven, intended action that reaches a dead end and
requires active regulation processes to overcome the
barrier or to find another course of action that leads
to the goal state.
9.3.3 Information-Processing Theories
Theories of information processing are inspired by
the idea of conceiving human cognition as symbol
manipulation. Starting from the cognitive turn in the
1950s (for a more detailed description of this revolu-
tion see Gardner, 1985) and against the background
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Figure 9.1: The Nine-Dot problem: Nine points distributed evenly in a square (left side) are to be connected by four lines without
setting down the pen.
of the information theory presented by Shannon and
Weaver (1949), all kinds of mental activity – per-
ception, learning, thinking etc. – were summarized
under the term information processing. Information
became the raw material that the organism absorbs,
stores, and processes.
The underlying idea of interpreting information
processing of the organism as symbol manipulation
makes it possible to reproduce such processes on a
computer (“cognitive modeling”); the division into
data (symbols representing certain states) and pro-
gram (symbols representing certain transformations
of symbols) is unimportant considering the fact that
symbols are involved in both. Important for the sym-
bolic system of human language is its tool function
for thinking. The “inner conversation of the soul
with itself” (=thinking), as the Greek philosopher
Plato formulated it over 2000 years ago, is nothing
other than information processing (see also Chap-
ter 11, “Nature of Language”).
9.3.3.1 Problem Space and Task Environment
When a motivated person deals with an intellectual
requirement, an analysis of behavior provides infor-
mation about both the task and the thought processes.
Both aspects are inextricably linked, but should nev-
ertheless be kept apart conceptually. For a better
understanding, Newell and Simon (1972) therefore
introduced the term task environment to describe
the symbolic content that is necessary to solve a
problem. This externally given information corre-
sponds to the internally constructed problem space,
which describes the subjective representation of a
task, i.e. the imaginary space in which problem
solving takes place during thinking. Their influen-
tial theory of problem solving is described in more
detail in Textbox 9.1.
Textbox 9.1: Theory of Problem Solving by Newell and Simon
In their book “Human Problem Solving”, Newell and Simon (1972) presented a theory of prob-
lem solving that has been widely and sustainably received and still represents the basis of many
approaches in this field today. Two cooperating sub-processes form the core of their theory: the
process of understanding and the process of searching.
The process of understanding. The understanding process has the function to generate the internal
representation of the problem. The problem situation must be perceived in order to deduce from the
information given initially (a) what the initial state is, (b) which operators can be used to change the
state, and (c) how to recognize that an achieved state represents the goal. These three components
make up the problem space, which is constituted by the process of understanding (see below for
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more). Of course, the problem space can change during the solution process when new information
becomes known, whether due to external circumstances or due to search processes.
The search process. The search process has the function of generating the solution to the problem.
This process is driven by the result of the understanding process. It searches for differences between
a given state and a target state and for operators that could bring about a state change. Different
search procedures for low-knowledge tasks have been called “weak methods”. They are weak
because their generality is at the expense of their power. Specific methods (“Use the hammer to
drive in the nail!”) are stronger, but cannot be used often (it does not help to fasten a screw). More
general methods (“Find a tool to get ahead!”) are more common, but weaker (which tool to use
remains open).
One might think that the two processes of understanding and searching described by Newell and
Simon would be executed in a fixed order (first understanding, then searching). In fact, however,
problem solvers often switch back and forth between the two processes and mix them (see Chi,
Glaser, & Rees, 1982; Hayes & Simon, 1976).
With their ideas, Newell and Simon (1972)
pointed to an important issue for problem-solving
research. They distinguish between psychological
processes on the part of the problem-solving per-
son on one hand and perfect rationality on the other
hand – a distinction that results from the limited ra-
tionality (Simon, 1947) of human behavior. By the
way: Herbert Simon was awarded the Nobel Prize
for Economics in 1978 for these considerations and
the associated criticism of the theory of the all-time
rational homo oeconomicus.
The idea of a problem space has inspired Simon
and Lea’s (1974) “dual space model”, which divides
the problem space into a rule space and an instance
space. In the rule space, all possible rules of a task
are represented, in the instance space all possible
states. Using the example of chess, the rules repre-
sent the legal moves of each figure (the operators).
The instances are all possible arrangements that the
figures can take.
Using the example of cryptarithmetic problems
(see below, Section 9.5.1.2, “Cryptarithmetic Prob-
lems”), where letters stand for numbers, the instance
space consists of the individual column elements of
the letter addition, whereas the rule space contains
the rules as to how letters can be replaced by num-
bers. Problem solving in this case means finding out
those letter-number substitutions where the resulting
arithmetic operations are correct. If, for example,
the task is to assign numbers to letters so that the
following addition becomes a correct one
and the problem solver also knows that D=5, a
replacement process can be carried out that now
rewrites the instance space as
By applying mathematical rules, the last position
of the result has to be T=0 and thus the rule space
is extended. What can be done to find the complete
solution?
With the method of (a) “generate-and-test”, one
can simply try out arbitrary assignments of numbers
to letters. More intelligent would be method of (b)
knowledge-guided “heuristic search”, which does
not produce arbitrary new states in the instance space
but only those which fulfill certain preconditions;
e.g., R must be an odd number because of the neces-
sary carry of the second to last column and the fact
that the addition of two same numbers (L+L) always
produces an even-numbered result. An alternative
description of this process would be the method of
(c) “rule induction”, which is used to check whether
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Figure 9.2: (a) Programmable truck BigTrak. (b) Keypad for programming. The keypad shown differs from the one used in the
experiment by having a X2 key instead of a RPT key (both figures from WikiMedia Commons, licensed under the terms of
the CC-BY-SA-2.0).
a certain assumption such as R=7 is not only correct
in a concrete case but is also consistent with all other
available data.
Simon and Lea (1974) emphasize that their ap-
proach is useful not only for cryptarithmetic prob-
lems but also for the description of concept ac-
quisition, sequence learning, or the recognition of
grammars. The “General Problem Solver” (GPS)
is accompanied by a “General Rule Inducer” (GRI)
which supports exactly these processes concerning
the generation and testing of possible solutions.
Klahr and Dunbar (1988) further extended the
dual space model. They have developed their SDDS
model (“Scientific Discovery as Dual Search”) to
explain scientific discoveries. In this model, they
differentiate between the experiment space (which
is similar to the instance space), and the hypothesis
space (similar to the rule space). In the hypothe-
sis space, hypotheses are generated, modified and
rejected, e.g. via connections between input and out-
put variables. In the experimental space, on the other
hand, experiments of the type in which the hypothe-
ses generated can be tested or how the operators are
to be applied are planned. For this purpose, both
problem spaces (as in Simon & Lea, 1974) must
interact: activities in the hypothesis space activate
operations in the experiment space. There is also the
opposite direction of influence: If no hypothesis is
made about observations on the object of investiga-
tion (search in the hypothesis space), it is possible
to use operators (search in the experiment space).
Hypotheses can then be derived by observing the
results of these experiments.
For an illustration of their approach, they choose a
programmable toy truck “BigTrak” (see Figure 9.2),
whose moving behavior can be predetermined by
certain keys (e.g., two steps forward, honking, two
steps to the right). The keys on the car are divided
into 11 instruction keys (e.g. GO, CLS, HOLD) and
10 number keys (0-9). The subject’s task is to find
out the meaning of the unexplained RPT key (so-
lution: RPTx repeats the last x instructions). The
search for the meaning of this function key leads
to the formation of hypotheses and the execution of
experiments (see Shrager & Klahr, 1986).
A total of 20 participants in this experiment
learned to program BigTrak within 20 minutes. They
had to think aloud while working on the problem.
Then they had to explore the RPT key, which had
not been used before and had not been explained
either. Of the many results of this investigation, only
one is described here, which refers to a typology of
the participants. According to the authors, 7 par-
ticipants can be called “theorists”, the remaining
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13 participants were labelled as “experimentalists”.
On average, theorists needed 24.5 minutes to solve
the problem and performed 18.3 experiments (12.3
with specific hypotheses), whereas the experimental-
ists needed only 11.4 minutes to solve the problem
and performed 9.3 experiments (8.6 with specific
hypotheses). While the theorists searched in the
hypothesis space, the experimentalists concentrated
on the experiment space and attempted to derive
generalizations from their experiments.
With the dual space model, the results can be ex-
plained in terms of strategies, semantic embedding
(cover story), goal specificity, hypothesis testing,
and knowledge acquisition. The model also points
to the issue that many studies with interactive tasks
like BigTrak did not distinguish between an explo-
ration phase and an application phase (an unknown
system is explored in the exploration phase; in the
application phase, explicitly specified goals have to
be reached), i.e. the test persons knew the target
values or the goal state of their system (specific tar-
get) from the outset. Thus, the task could also be
solved in such a way that persons with a means-end
analysis try to reach the goal (search in the instance
space) without formulating hypotheses. They do not
acquire knowledge about the system, but learn how
to reach the goal (implicit knowledge; see Berry &
Broadbent, 1988). For example, Geddes and Steven-
son (1997) have explained the dissociation of knowl-
edge and goal attainment. If, on the other hand,
explicit knowledge is acquired, hypothesis genera-
tion and testing are present (search in the rule space).
The search within the rule space can be demanded by
the fact that a systematic strategy should be used and
no target values are given. A semantic embedding
of a problem (instead of a mere abstract description)
as well as the specification of a hypothesis have the
consequence that more hypotheses are tested and
thus the search in the rule space is also required.
With the help of the dual space model, the results
of the BigTrak experiment and of similar interactive
tasks can be interpreted easily, and it becomes appar-
ent why something was learned in some tasks and
not in others. Nevertheless, there are findings that
make an extension of the model necessary. One such
finding is, for example, that sometimes a specific
goal leads to better performance if the subjects have
an incomplete model of the task (Burns & Vollmeyer,
1996). Even the specification of false hypotheses
(Vollmeyer, Burns, & Holyoak, 1996) leads to im-
proved performance in complex problems, which
can be interpreted indirectly as an indication of an
intensified search in the hypothesis space (see also
Burns & Vollmeyer, 2002).
Definition of a problem: According to informa-
tion processing theories, a problem is defined as a
barrier between a given and a goal state, requiring in-
put from a bridging operator, which cannot be taken
from the library of already known operators but has
to be constructed on the fly. Problem solving is seen
as a search for a solution within the problem space.
9.4 Methods for Assessing and
Measuring Problem Solving
Because problem solving occurs in the head of a per-
son, it is not easy to assess the process of problem
solving itself. Different proposals have been made to
solve this problem (see also Chapter 3, “Methods”).
On the one side, there is access via self-report (e.g.,
introspection and think-aloud; see below), on the
other side, access via behavioral data (e.g., behav-
ior traces and log-files; see below). Last but not
least, physiological data (e.g., eye movements and
brain-imaging techniques) have been proposed.
9.4.1 Self-Reports
Introspection is the observation of one’s own men-
tal process. It was used in the 19th century by “arm-
chair” psychologists who would rely on their own
inner experience instead of empirical obeservations.
Introspection is deemed unsuitable in modern re-
search because there is no possibility to prove accu-
racy of the given report.
Thinking aloud is the continuous verbalization
of thought processes during problem solving and can
be used as a valid data source under certain condi-
tions (Ericsson, 2003). The spontaneous utterances
accompanying the act of thinking represent objec-
tive expressive behavior that is used for assessment
(Jäkel & Schreiber, 2013).
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Ericsson and Simon (1983) regard thinking aloud
methods as unproblematic if the actual thought con-
tent is only verbalized and described, because this
thinking aloud only slows down the thinking pro-
cess but does not disturb it. Explaining or describing
one’s thoughts carefully, however, disturbs the pro-
cess of thinking and changes the procedure of the
participant (see Ericsson, 2006). Güss (2018) rec-
ommends this method especially for testing theories
cross-culturally.
Verbal data is valid even if there is no 100% agree-
ment between thoughts and verbalizations. Rea-
sons for this deviation are (a) that not all conscious
thoughts are verbalized by a participant and (b) that
other cognitive steps run unconsciously due to rou-
tine/expertise and therefore cannot be verbalized at
all. Additional data sources such as reaction times,
error rates, eye movement patterns, or recordings
of brain activity can increase validity. It is not the
thinking itself that manifests itself as behavior but
rather the consequences that accompany it.
9.4.2 Behavioral Data
Three behavioral measures will be discussed briefly:
sequential problems, computer-simulated problems,
and log-file analyses.
By using sequential problems, one tries to visu-
alize the solution path between the initial and the
target situation (and thus the process of the solution)
as a series of intermediate states. A good exam-
ple of a sequential problem is the Tower of Hanoi
(see below). Sequential problems “materialize” the
solution process by producing a trace through the
problem space.
Computer-simulated scenarios allow the investi-
gation of the effects of connectedness and dynamics
in complex situations by creating realistic simulation
environments. Connectedness (i.e., the relationships
between variables in a system) forces us to create
causal models. The dynamics of a system force us to
anticipate the course of development over time and
to act with foresight. The interaction of human par-
ticipants with such scenarios shows their strategic
approaches and their reaction to certain scenarios.
One can measure how well the connectedness be-
tween the system variables is understood and how
well they deal with the dynamics of the system.
Log-file analyses look at the step-by-step activ-
ities during interactions with computer-presented
problem-solving tasks. Such tasks have been used
for the first time in a world-wide assessment of
student performance in problem solving within
PISA 2012, the “Programme for International Stu-
dent Assessment” run by the OECD from the year
2012. Zoanetti and Griffin (2017) showed the ad-
vantages of going deeper into the specific solution
steps that are documented in the log-files instead of
looking only at the results of certain tasks. For ex-
ample, pupils who repeatedly interacted erraneously
with the software and who ignored negative feed-
back could be easily identified. Solution strategies
became visible.
9.4.3 Physiological Measures
Eye-movement patterns can be used to derive the pro-
cesses underlying thinking. Eye movements consist
of saccades (fast, short movements of the eyeball
to align the fovea with the visual objectives) and
fixations (keeping the visual gaze on a single loca-
tion). It is assumed that a large part of information
processing takes place during the fixations.
Eye-movement measurements are used in addi-
tion to reaction-time and decision-time measure-
ments in specific fields of experimental psychol-
ogy, such as perception psychology. Pupillometric
data allow conclusions to be drawn about working-
memory load, concentration, and emotional and mo-
tivational components. Beatty (1982) describes sev-
eral experimental and correlational studies that war-
rant such statements.
Also, brain-imaging methods can be used to de-
pict physiological changes during thinking. Imag-
ing methods such as functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) are of particular importance for the
investigation of problem solving. The aim of such a
method is to measure haemodynamic changes of the
brain (i.e., changes in the blood flow within the brain
due to cerebral activity) as a marker for neuronal
activation within certain brain structures.
The fMRI is a spatially high-resolution method,
meaning that it allows for a very precise allocation
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of regions in the brain. It is based on the fact that
an increase in neuronal activation leads to an in-
crease in oxygen demand, which in turn leads to
an increased supply of oxygen-rich blood. This in-
crease in oxygen can be made visible by means of
a magnetic field. Changes in neuronal activity thus
become accessible. The application of neuroimag-
ing techniques to research questions in the field of
problem solving is still rare (Anderson et al., 2008)
9.5 Paradigms and Illustrating
Experiments
For illustrative purposes, the following section
presents some of the frequently used tasks in prob-
lem solving research. I will start with examples for
simple tasks, then round off with complex ones.
9.5.1 Simple Tasks
Simple task requirements differ from complex ones
in the low amount of instruction and knowledge re-
quired to process them. With regard to the amount
of knowledge required for understanding the prob-
lem situation, one could also speak of semantically
impoverished problems as opposed to semantically
rich problems. In addition, simple tasks usually
have short processing times of up to 10 minutes,
whereas complex tasks require hours or days. The
simple tasks include (a) classic mental exercises
(such as insight problems), (b) cryptarithmetic prob-
lems (where letters represent numbers), and (c) se-
quential problems like moving disks.
9.5.1.1 Insight Problem Solving
In the early days of problem-solving research, brain
teasers and insight problems were the preferred re-
search material. Classic insight problems were pre-
sented, for example, by Duncker (1935) as part of
his book Psychology of Productive Thinking. He
examined the problem-solving process more closely,
especially with regard to two problems:
(1) The radiation problem: “Looking for a
method to free a person from an inoperable
gastric tumor with the help of rays which, with
sufficient intensity, destroy organic tissue -
while avoiding co-destruction of the surround-
ing healthy body parts” (p. 1). He described
this problem as “practical” because the central
question is “How can I achieve something?”
Figure 9.3 illustrates this problem.
(2) The problem of proof: “Seeking a justifica-
tion for the fact that all six-digit numbers of
the ‘abc,abc’ type, e.g. 276,276, are divisible
by 13” (p. 1). He described this problem as
“theoretical” because the guiding question is
“How? From what do I see?”
Figure 9.3: Duncker’s Radiation Problem: A patient needs a radiation treatment on a tumor inside the body. Normal radiation will harm
the healthy tissue it reaches on the way in. The solution is to target the tumor with low-level rays coming from different di-
rections that have to converge on the tumor (from http://www.jimdavies.org/research/visual-analogy/proposal/node1.html).
164 • Psychology of Human Thought • Chapter 9
Simple Tasks Funke
Figure 9.4: Two examples of matchstick arithmetics: (a) 4 = 3 + 3 (solution: 6 = 3 + 3); (b) 3 = 3 + 3 (solution: 3 = 3 = 3; from
Knoblich et al., 1999).
Duncker’s survey method was not self-
observation (introspection), as practiced, for ex-
ample, by representatives of the historical Würzburg
School (Oswald Külpe, Karl Marbe, Otto Selz) but
observing somebody “thinking aloud”, a method in
which the thinker remains directed at the content
of his or her thinking. His analysis of the proposed
solutions to the radiation problem shows that the
various ideas can be arranged according to their
“functional value”. Duncker calls this list “solution
tree”.
Insight problems using “match-stick arith-
metic” were investigated by Knoblich and cowork-
ers (Knoblich, Ohlsson, & Raney, 2001). An insight
problem occurs when an obstacle appears after the
first exploration (“impasse”, dead end) and the solu-
tion appears subjectively impossible (see Metcalfe,
1986). One can get out of these mental dead ends
only by changing the representation of the prob-
lem. Two examples from the work of Knoblich et
al. (1999) will be presented in more detail (see Fig-
ure 9.4).
Problems in the field of match-stick arithmetic
consist of false arithmetic expressions, which are
composed of Roman numbers (I, II, III etc.), arith-
metic operations (+, -) and the equal sign (=). By
picking up one of the matches, the wrong one has to
be turned into a correct expression. In Figure 9.4a,
for example, the IV can be turned into a VI. This
is the typical representation in which the numerical
values are regarded as variable and the arithmetical
operations as constant. If one loosens this bound-
ary condition and allows that also the operators may
be seen as variable, the task in Figure 9.4b can be
solved by making a “=” out of the “+”. Besides
the loosening of boundary conditions, the problem
representation can also be changed by the decom-
position of chunks (= single elements combined to
groups). Thus, “weak” chunks like “IV” are dis-
tinguished from “strong” chunks like “X”, whose
decomposition into “/” and “\” is more difficult due
to the lack of significance of the individual parts.
Based on these two postulated mechanisms for
changing the problem representation, Knoblich et
al. could make specific predictions about differ-
ent task difficulties and differential transfer effects
for matchstick problems, which were confirmed
in the reported experiments. Accompanying eye-
movement analyses (Knoblich et al., 2001) also con-
firmed the following theoretical assumptions: (a)
at the “dead end” states, there are fewer eye move-
ments and longer fixation times; (b) as a result of
prior arithmetic knowledge, one tends to regard the
numerical values and not the operators as the vari-
able quantities.
Matchstick arithmetic is an interesting problem
type that can be used to investigate elementary
thought processes of insight problems. In con-
nection with eye-movement analyses, this simple
paradigm allows process theories to be tested that
would otherwise hardly be accessible to empirical
research. However, it should also be noted that the
small amount of knowledge that these problems re-
quire to be solved represents an advantage in terms
of empirical and systematic analyses. At the same
time, simple problems do not represent the complex-
ity of problem-solving processes in everyday situa-
tions, let alone in space shuttle catastrophes, since
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much more world knowledge usually is needed in
real-life problem solving.
Anagram tasks. Another approach to gaining in-
sight into the underlying processes of problem solv-
ing comes from the analysis of solution processes for
anagram tasks. Anagrams represent letter sequences
that must be changed around to form a word (e.g.,
HOOLSC -> SCHOOL). In this case, the difficulty
can be influenced by the number of letters that have
to be changed, the total number of letters given, and
word frequency.
Metcalfe and Wiebe (1987) have shown that ana-
gram solutions rely on sudden insight processes and
not on a general, sequential approximation to the an-
swer. They showed that by capturing “hot-cold judg-
ments” (an indication collected every 10 to 15 sec-
onds of how close a problem solver feels to the solu-
tion) one cann accesss the process of gaining insight.
While these judgments gradually increased as equa-
tions were solved, they remained consistently low
for anagrams and only rose steeply shortly before
the solution was found (see Chapter 6, “Metacogni-
tion”, for further research with anagram tasks).
9.5.1.2 Cryptarithmetic Problems
Cryptarithmetic problems require the decoding of
letters into numbers using arithmetic procedures.
Figure 9.5 illustrates an example of such puzzles.
Cryptarithmetic problems are not used so often
nowadays because of their simplicity and uniformity
of required processes: it is a relatively simple con-
straint satisfaction task. The total number of possible
states is reduced by the constraint of a unique digit
for a unique letter in a decimal representation. To
make the task easier, more lettters could be disclosed
at the outset.—The last prominent publication with
that type of problem dates back more than 25 years
(Clearwater, Huberman, & Hogg, 1991).
9.5.1.3 Sequential Problems
Sequential problems are those that require a series
of steps to solve them, steps that are reflected in
externally visible changes in the state space. Let us
start with the “Cannibals and Missionaries” problem
(also known as "Orcs and Hobbits"; more generic
denomination: river-crossing problems, “move” or
“transformation” problems). In this task, represen-
tatives of each group—cannibals and missionaries—
have to be transported from one side of a river to
another. A boat offers space only for a limited num-
ber of people. The major rule for solving the prob-
lem is that on neither of the banks nor on the boat
can the number of cannibals exceed the number of
missionaries because otherwise cannibals would do
what their name suggests. To avoid such a catastro-
phe, a careful maneuver is demanded. According
to the model developed by Jeffries, Polson, Razran
and Atwood (1977), subjects working on this task
consider only single-step move sequences. These
moves are selected according to two simple rules:
(a) search for better states (in terms of less distance
to the goal state), (b) avoid states that have been
previously visited.
Another prominent example of a sequential prob-
lem is called the “Tower of Hanoi” and will be
presented here in more detail because it is widely
used. The problem consists essentially in moving
a given set of differently sized, concentric disks,
which are arranged on a starting rod, to a target rod
using an auxiliary rod. Two rules have to be fol-
lowed: (1) Only one disc may be moved at a time,
(2) never place a larger disc on top of a smaller disc.
Figure 9.6 illustrates the problem by showing the
entire instance space, that is, all possible positions
for the (simple) case of three discs on the three rods.
The instance space shown in Figure 9.6 explains
the attractiveness of the problem for thought re-
Figure 9.5: Example of a cryptarithmetic problem: each letter corresponds to one of the figures 0 to 9 (hint: E=5, Y=2). The numbers
in each line should produce a correct addition.
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search: Every single move of the problem solver
can be represented as a step through this instance
space. At the same time, each intermediate state dur-
ing the solution process can be evaluated in terms
of how far away it is from the required target state.
In addition, it is possible to show which path is the
fastest to the goal for any intermediate state. The
process of problem solving can be described as a tra-
jectory (a temporal sequence of states) in this space
(for an in-depth analysis of the Tower of Hanoi, see
Kotovsky, Hayes, & Simon, 1985). For the problem
solver, this type of problem is easy to recognize, to
define, and to represent. That is much more difficult
in the case of complex tasks.
9.5.2 Complex Problems
A complex problem shows the following features:
(1) complexity in the sense that many variables are
involved, (2) connectivity, reflecting the fact that re-
lations exist between variables, (3) intransparency,
referring to missing or inaccessible information im-
portant for the problem-solving process, (4) dynam-
ics, in the sense of the possible change of a given
situation over time, and (5) polytely (from the Greek
word ‘polytelos’, meaning many goals), in the sense
of there being many goals and objectives involved
that are possible and could be pursued. All five
features will be explained in briefly.
Complexity. Complexity in the sense of the num-
ber of variables involved plays an important role
insofar as human information processing only has
a limited capacity. As a consequence, the problem
solver must take measures to reduce complexity,
such as simplifications. He must also be able to deal
with the fact that the simplified models can be inac-
curate and even wrong in individual cases. For ex-
ample, to model the complex relationships between
world population, energy demand, and resource use,
Meadows and colleagues (Meadows, Meadows, Ran-
ders, & Behrens, 1972) created a world model on
a computer that has reduced the complexity of this
huge problem to around 100 variables. Even if a
large part of the detailed calculations of this model
Figure 9.6: The instance space for a Tower of Hanoi with three disks. On top, all three disks are on the left rod (=start); at the bottom
right all three disks are on the right peg (=goal). The shortest path between start and goal is to follow the edge from top to
right within seven steps.
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are inaccurate from today’s point of view, the conse-
quences and warnings derived from it were correct.
Connectivity. With increasing intervariable de-
pendency and connectivity, the effects of interven-
tions in such a network are difficult to predict. As
a consequence, the problem solver must map the
dependencies into a model that forms the basis of
his or her decisions. An example: Interventions in
an ecosystem can have side effects that were not
expected. One could think of bees dying because of
intensified use of pesticides.
Intransparency. Intransparency is the lack of in-
formation about the problem situation; it makes a
complex problem a decision-making situation under
uncertainty. As a consequence, the problem solver
must collect information that is missing. The prob-
lem solver needs to accept that her decisions may not
include all relevant facts. For example, in a hospital
emergency admission, not all desirable and neces-
sary information about a seriously injured accident
victim is available to the physician. Nevertheless,
action must be taken and with minimal initial infor-
mation a situation picture must be produced, which
always is supplemented later by further facts, piece
by piece.
Dynamics. Dynamics of a system refer to the
changes of a given state over time. As a conse-
quence, the problem solver must consider possible
changes of the given situation and make prognoses
about future developments. Potentially resulting
time pressure has to be endured. For example, any-
one speculating on the stock market usually makes
assumptions about future market developments, but
occasionally has to realize that the dynamics of the
market cannot always be accurately predicted. An-
other example: In the event of a forest fire, a sudden
change in wind direction can considerably disrupt
the planning of the fire brigade and even endanger
its activities.
Polytely. Polytely concerns the number and type
of goals involved that need to be considered. As
a consequence, the problem solver must set prior-
ities and thus solve value conflicts. For example,
company leaders usually strive for the highest possi-
ble profit. One major factor influencing this goal is
the salary of the employers: paying employees high
salaries should lead to more job satisfaction and pro-
ductivity (good for the profit), but at the same time
such salaries are costly (bad for the profit). There-
fore, an optimal balance for this factor needs to be
found, which can be very difficult.
With these descriptions for complex problems
in mind, let us look at two of the most prominent
examples for this type of task, namely, the politi-
cal scenario “Lohhausen” and the business scenario
“Tailorshop”.
9.5.2.1 Lohhausen
The political scenario “Lohhausen”, with around
2,000 variables, is one of the most complex scenar-
ios in terms of the number of variables. “Lohhausen”
is a small computer-simulated town. In the study
with this scenario, 48 student participants were act-
ing as a mayor for a simulation period of 10 years
and were to lead the community as effectively as pos-
sible (Dörner, Kreuzig, Reither, & Stäudel, 1983).
According to the description given by Dörner (1981,
p. 165), the small town has about 3,500 inhabitants
and its main income comes from a clock factory be-
longing to the town. In addition to the town admin-
istration, there are medical practices, retail shops, a
bank, schools, kindergartens, etc. In the simulation,
not only economic relations were mapped but also
social, demographic, and psychological variables
(e.g., satisfaction of the inhabitants). Participants
were able to interact with the system in a variety
of ways: They could influence the production and
sales policy of the municipal factory, they could
change tax rates, create work plans for teachers, set
up and lease doctor’s surgeries, build housing, pro-
vide recreational facilities, etc.
Data analysis was essentially based on the com-
parison of the 12 best with the 12 worst acting partic-
ipants with regard to important measures of success
such as population of the town, number of unem-
ployed people, condition of the local watch factory,
immigration rate, satisfaction of the inhabitants, or
capital of the municipality as well as judgments of
the experimenter about the test-taker (e.g., “partici-
pant makes an intelligent impression”; subjects did
not know these criteria before they started with the
simulation).
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One of the most important (and surprising) results
of this study: intelligence (measured with a conven-
tional intelligence test) was not a predictor of per-
formance in the scenario! This finding questioned
the classical measurement of intelligence as one that
is only assesses analytical intelligence but neglects
“operative intelligence” (Dörner, 1986), which had
not yet been measured by conventional IQ tests. This
apparent shortcoming of intelligence tests has subse-
quently led to a sharp controversy about the benefits
of IQ tests. As a result of this debate, the value of
the intelligence component “information processing
capability” now appears undisputed (see Wüsten-
berg, Greiff, & Funke, 2012; Kretzschmar, Neubert,
Wüstenberg, & Greiff, 2016; for a meta-analysis:
Stadler, Becker, Gödker, Leutner, & Greiff, 2015).
With regard to the successful control of the Lo-
hhausen community, none of the expected predictors
like motivation, test creativity, gender, age, subject
of study, or previous education of the participants
was important. Successful “mayors” were charac-
terized by strengths in other fields: self-confidence,
extraversion, the striving for meaningful informa-
tion search (“controlled divergent exploration”) or
switching between fluctuating and focused thinking
proved to be advantageous.
Three primary errors in handling the complex sys-
tem, which occurred with most participants, were
highlighted: (1) the lack of consideration of tempo-
ral sequences and difficulties in predicting exponen-
tial processes; (2) thinking in causal chains instead
of causal networks; (3) the superiority of the current
motive.
Difficulties in predicting exponential processes
occur because of a natural tendency to linearize our
predictions. Exponential growth can be visualized
by the idea of doubling the grain of rice on a chess-
board square by square, starting slowly with one
grain on the first square, two grains on the second
square, 4 on the third, over 1 million by the 21st
square, over a trillion by the 41st square and ending
up with a number starting with 1.8 and 19 zeros
following by the last 64th square.
Thinking in causal chains instead of causal net-
works is demonstrated by the human tendency to
search for simple cause-effect connections (e.g., “mi-
grants increase the expenses of social security sys-
tems”) instead of a broader view that sees, for exam-
ple, also advantages of migrants (increased diversity,
increased work force, etc.). Political reasoning is
sometimes driven by such causal-chain simplifica-
tions.
Superiority of the current motive means that hu-
mans are driven by their current motives and do not
look much into the future. The problems of sustain-
ability fall into this category: We do not want to
forgo today’s luxury in order to keep our planet in a
good shape for the next generation. Such long-term
problems suffer from this error tendency.
9.5.2.2 Tailorshop
The business scenario “Tailorshop” presents a profit-
based enterprise in which fabrics are made into shirts
by workers using production machines. The shirts
are then sold on the market. The system consists
of a total of 24 variables, 11 of which can be di-
rectly influenced by the respondents’ actions (for a
more detailed description, see Danner et al., 2011,
or Funke, 2010). The system’s core variable is the
“capital” (balance sheet value), which is connected
to 15 of the 24 variables. The task of the problem
solver consists in managing the “Tailorshop” over a
correspondingly extended simulation period in such
a way that a sustainable profit is generated. Without
intervention in the system, the “Tailorshop” would
soon have to file for bankruptcy, as the running costs
(storage costs, wage costs, rent, etc.) quickly lead to
negative figures. This can be avoided by purchasing
raw materials, maintaining the machines, and paying
the workers a reasonable wage. In addition, the shirt
price must be made competitive. Figure 9.7 shows
the variables of the Tailorshop and their connections.
9.5.3 Comparing European and
American Approaches to
Complex Problems
According to Sternberg (1995), a special feature of
European research in dealing with complex prob-
lems compared with American research is that in
European research (as in other studies of European
origin), novices are used as participants who had






















































Figure 9.7: Diagrammatic representation of the variables from the “Tailorshop” simulation (sorted by categories; from Engelhart, 2014,
p. 30).
to take on leadership tasks with their everyday rou-
tines and without any training or preparation. In
the American tradition, research concentrates more
on experts in their respective fields. So, the two
different approaches can be seen as complementary
ways of researching into the psychology of human
thought.
9.6 Conclusions
Problem solving can be seen as one the key compe-
tencies in the 21st century (Care, Griffin, & Wilson,
2018; Fiore et al., 2018). The argument here is
that the labor market is changing more rapidly than
ever. The grandfather who trained to be a shoe-
maker could do this for the rest of his life. Today’s
workforce has to learn and to re-learn new tools day-
by-day. This is why problem solving is becoming
more and more important, not only in the workplace.
But it may be that problem solving is part of an even
more complex competency, namely systems compe-
tency (Funke, Fischer, & Holt, 2018), the ability to
handle complex systems. To control such systems
and to keep them stable requires more than problem
solving. And because systems competency needs in-
formation and reliable knowledge, critical thinking
(Halpern, 2013) becomes important in times of fake
news and indoctrination.
Are there any open questions? First, there is still
no comprehensive theory of problem solving that
applies to the different types of problem. Second,
the best way for assessing problem solving remains
unclear. The validity of different measurement pro-
posals is under scrutiny (Dörner & Funke, 2017).
Third, besides individual problem solving, the fo-
cus will be on collaborative problem solving (i.e.,
two or more persons working together on a problem;
see, e.g., Care & Griffin, 2017) because our modern
times require people to work together. It has yet to
be shown what the best mixture of collaborative and
individual problem solving would be.
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Summary
1. The term problem solving describes the process to overcome barriers between a given and a
goal state.
2. Complex problems differ from simple problems by the degree of background knowledge
needed for the solution process, the sheer number of processes to run, and the time needed for
completion.
3. In addition, complex problems are characterized by complexity (many variables), connectivity
(relations between variables), intransparency (missing information), dynamics (changes over
time), and polytely (multiple goals).
4. Problem solving as a process occurs in different idealized phases: target elaboration, hypothe-
sis formation, planning and decision making, monitoring, and evaluation.
5. Important theories of problem solving come from the Gestaltists, from action theory, and
from information processing theories.
6. Methods for assessment rely on self-reports, behavioral data, and physiological measures.
Review Questions
1. Explain what problem solving is and how to position it in the list of all other cognitive
functions.
2. Why are goals important for problem solving?
3. What methods seem appropriate for measuring problem-solving activities?
4. Why is there no single correct sequence of solutions steps?
5. What is an important assumption of an information-processing theory of problem solving?
Hot Topic
Joachim Funke
In my own research, I have tried to develop new instruments for measur-
ing problem-solving competencies. Inspired by research about complex
problems done by Dietrich Dörner in the mid-1970s, I started with an
adaptation of his simulation scenario Tailorshop, then decided to develop
more formal-based scenarios (MicroDYN, MicroFIN). I will present both
instruments shortly.
Tailorshop is a microworld where subjects have to manage a small
business simulation for a simulated time period of, e.g., 12 months. They
can buy machines, raw material, set the wages for their employees, hire
and fire workers, care for maintenance and for attractive sales conditions.
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In this situation, subjects have to deal with complexity, intransparency, dynamics, and conflicting
goals—most of these features are characteristic for complex problems.
The development of MicroDYN and MicroFIN was driven by the requirement to construct
“batteries” of test items for the purpose of psychometric assessment: what was needed were easy,
medium, and difficult items that could be compared directly. Based on formal systems, such batteries
were constructed for the world-wide PISA 2012 assessment of problem solving (see Csapó & Funke,
2017).
In the end, questions of validity remain most important: if we want to contribute to an under-
standing of problem solving “in the wild”, we have to explain how managers, politicians, and other
leaders make decisions and to predict errors as well as “wise” decisions in the long run (see Dörner
& Funke, 2017).
What we need in the 21st century more than ever is systems competency (which is more than
problem solving; see Funke, Fischer, & Holt, 2018). To understand how people represent complex
systems, how they predict the future states of such systems, and how difficult it might be to make
goal-directed interventions without producing unwanted side-effects: these are goals for my future
research.
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Glossary
behavioral data Behavior traces, in terms of se-
quential problems or computer-simulated sce-
narios, and log-files of human-computer inter-
actions that allow access to processes related
to thinking. 162
collaborative problem solving Problem-solving
activities in a group of persons (two or more)
working together on a problem. 170
complex problem A problem situation that re-
quires a higher amount of world knowledge
and is characterized by complexity, connec-
tivity, intransparency, dynamics, and polytely.
167
ill-defined problem Problems with unclear goals
where success cannot easily be identified. 156
introspection Observation of one’s own mental
process. 162
match-stick arithmetic False arithmetic expres-
sions composed of Roman numbers, arith-
metic operations, and the equal sign, that have
to be turned into correct ones. 165
phase theorem A description of the processes ac-
tually taking place in problem solving as well
as a prescription for how to solve problems.
156
physiological data Eye-movement data and brain-
imaging data allow access to physiologcal
processes that accompany thinking processes.
162
problem solving Activity to reach a certain goal
despite barriers on the way between initial
state and goal state. 155
problem space The internal representation of the
task environment—the space contains tools,
barriers, solution will be sought and poten-
tially found. 159
self-report The observation of one’s own mental
processes: introspection and thinking aloud.
162
simple task A problem situation that require little
amount of previous knowledge. 164
task environment The externally given descrip-
tion of a problem situation, the structure of
the problem and its elements, including all
possible states on the way from initial to goal
state. 159
thinking aloud The continuous verbalization of
thought processes during problem solving.
162
Tower of Hanoi A typical simple problem situa-
tion that requires repeated application of disk
movements. 163, 166
well-defined problem Problems with clear goal
descriptions where success can be measured
easily. 156
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Decision Making
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Choice is ubiquitous, from small decisions such
as whether to bring an umbrella to life-changing
choices such as whether to get married. Making
good decisions is a lifelong challenge. Psycholo-
gists have long been fascinated by the mechanisms
that underlie human decision making. Why do dif-
ferent people make different decisions when offered
the same choices? What are common decision mak-
ing errors? Which choice option is the “best” and
why? These questions are addressed in this chapter.
We first outline models and theories of decision
making, defining key concepts and terms. We then
describe the psychological processes of decision
makers and how these approaches can sometimes
lead to systematic biases and fallacies. We touch on
the related subject of judgment because of the close
relationship with decision making in the literature.
10.1 Types of Models of Decision
Making
Early theories of decision making were often norma-
tive in nature. Normative models characterize opti-
mal or ideal decision making, for example, choos-
ing options consistently that yield greater utility or
overall usefulness of goods (von Neumann & Mor-
genstern, 1944). Often, this boils down to choosing
so as to maximize money. Psychologists, beginning
with Simon (1956), pointed out that humans rarely
choose optimally because their information process-
ing capacities are bounded; hence, he introduced the
term bounded rationality to describe this limited ra-
tionality and described human beings as satisficers,
who choose the first available option that satisfies a
given threshold, rather than optimizers, who choose
the option that is the best of the set (Payne, Bettman,
& Johnson, 1988).
Descriptive models describe real-life behavior in
which decision makers fall short of maximizing. De-
scriptive models characterize how decision makers
actually make choices and explain why they do so.
These models do not prescribe how decision makers
ought to behave if they want to accomplish specific
decision goals.
Prescriptive models attempt to bridge the gap
between normative and descriptive models. These
approaches recommend which steps to take in or-
der to achieve certain normative goals, as for exam-
ple, guidelines or decision aids in real-world con-
texts. These include Bransford and Stein’s (1984)
IDEAL framework, Sternberg’s (1986) problem-
solving model, the GOFER model of decision mak-
ing (Mann, Harmoni, & Power, 1991), and Guo’s
(2008) DECIDE model of decision making.
10.2 Foundational Concepts
One of the foundational concepts that underlies mod-
els of decision making is expected value (EV; Knut-
son, Taylor, Kaufman, Peterson, & Glover, 2005).
EV is calculated by multiplying the objective proba-
bility of the occurence of an event by the magnitude
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of the possible outcome (e.g., winning $10,000).
Probability is expressed as a number ranging from 0
(impossible to occur) to 1 (definite to occur). Thus,
the EV of gaining $10,000 with a 0.50 probability
would be $5,000 because $10,000 x 0.50 = $5,000.
From a mathematical perspective, the option with
the higher objective EV is the “better“ or more desir-
able choice option. However, options that have the
same EV are not equally attractive to many decision
makers. Consider a choice between gaining $5,000
for sure (option A: $5,000 x 1.00 probability =
$5,000) versus a 0.50 probability of gaining $10,000
versus a 0.50 probability of gaining $0 (option B:
$10,000 x 0.50 + $0 x 0.50 = $5,000). Although
both options offer the same EV, economists would
describe option B as riskier than option A because
its outcome is more variable and therefore more
uncertain (Fox & Tannenbaum, 2011). By con-
trast, some psychologists define risk more broadly,
encompassing behaviors such as drug abuse with
potentially negative outcomes (e.g., death due to
drug overdose). Uncertainty differs from ambiguity,
which arises when an option has unknown probabil-
ities. For example, if option B instead consisted of
an unknown chance of gaining $10,000 (otherwise
gaining $0), the level of uncertainty associated with
this choice option would be ambiguous.
Characteristics of a choice option—such as its
EV or its levels of risk and uncertainty—are im-
portant determinants of the choices a person will
make. However, decisions are also influenced by
the individual characteristics and preferences of the
decision maker, such as their tendendies to avoid or
embrace ambiguity and risk.
Although there are exceptions where decision
makers are ambiguity-indifferent or ambiguity-
seeking (e.g., cancer patients with an unfavorable
prognosis; Innes & Payne, 2009), most individuals
demonstrate ambiguity aversion (Camerer & We-
ber, 1992). This means that most people will favor
choice options that are unambiguous over options
that are ambiguous. Similarly, most decision makers
are risk-averse: When choosing between the risk-
free option A and the risky option B we described
above, most people will choose A. Nevertheless,
this does not mean that option B is never favored. In
fact, risk-seeking individuals would be expected to
choose the risky option B, and risk-neutral or risk-
indifferent individuals would be expected to choose
one of the two options at random. As such, it is
impossible to classify risky or risk-free options as
better than the respective alternative—which one is
preferred will depend on the specific choice at hand,
as well as the subjective perspective of the decision
maker.
10.3 Theoretical Frameworks
10.3.1 Expected Utility Theory
One theory that accounts for subjective effects such
as the phenomenon of risk-aversion is expected util-
ity theory (EUT), which describes a classic norma-
tive model of decision making. Unlike EV, EUT
represents outcomes non-linearly via a negatively
accelerated function of objective magnitude (von
Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). Using this func-
tion, if the objective magnitude of a reward was
continuously increasing at a set rate, the subjective
magnitude of the same reward would increase at an
increasingly slower rate, hence “negatively acceler-
ated.” In other words, particularly at large magni-
tudes, the subjective value of a reward will be less
than its objective value. When EV is equal, objec-
tive outcomes are larger in the gamble, and so the
value of risky options is discounted more steeply
than the value of risk-free options.
For instance, option B may only be worth $9,950
to a decision maker. This subjective value is then
multiplied by the objective probability of the ex-
pected outcome to derive a choice option’s expected
utility. Comparable to options with high EV, op-
tions with high expected utility are expected to be
preferred over options with low expected utility. A
negatively accelerated utility function for outcomes
also explains why many decision makers will choose
option A with the certain outcome over option B
with the more uncertain or risky outcome. However,
in most studies measuring risk preferences, deci-
sion makers learn about probabilities and outcomes
through written (or spoken) description rather than
through experience. Learning about outcomes and
their probabilities by experiencing them encourages
risk-taking. When decision makers rely on feed-
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back, instead of verbal descriptions, to learn about
outcomes, they can become risk-neutral or even risk-
seeking in the gains domain (and risk-averse for
losses; Barron & Erev, 2003; see also Weber, Shafir,
& Blais, 2004).
10.3.2 Subjective Expected Utility
Theory
In 1954, the statistician L. J. Savage further refined
the idea of subjectivity by introducting subjective
expected utility theory (SEU). SEU accounts for
a subjective perception of probabilities through a
nonlinear transformation of objective probabilities.
(This work was one of the major influences on
prospect theory, described below, which also as-
sumes nonlinear perceptions of probabilties.) Ac-
cordingly, SEU posits that a choice option’s subjec-
tive value is multiplied by its subjective probability
to estimate its subjective expected utility. Options
with higher subjective expected utility are hypothe-
sized to be favored over options with lower utility.
10.3.3 Prospect Theory
In 1979, psychologists Kahneman and Tversky pro-
posed an alternative to both EUT and SEU called
prospect theory (PT; Figure 10.1). PT not only ac-
counts for subjectivity in perceived outcomes and
probabilities but also proposes the notion of relative
change (i.e., from a specific reference point or sta-
tus quo; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). According
to PT, outcomes, even when they are objectively
equivalent, are subjectively perceived as either up-
ward (“gains”) or downward (“losses”) adjustments
away from a reference point (Tversky & Kahneman,
1986). As a result, PT can explain crucial decision
making phenomena such as the framing effect or
loss aversion.
10.3.3.1 Framing Effect
The framing effect describes a shift in risk prefer-
ences that arises when the same information is either
framed as a “loss“ (which typically leads to risk-
taking, that is, choosing a risky gamble over a sure
option) or a “gain“ (which leads to risk-avoidance,
that is, choosing a sure option over a gamble). To il-
lustrate this effect, remember the two choice options
we introduced earlier: A, gaining $5,000 for sure,
and B, a 0.50 probability of gaining $10,000 versus
a 0.50 probability of gaining $0. As we discussed,
many decision makers prove risk-averse when con-
fronted with these choices, and will therefore select
the first option (A).
Now, assume that instead of being faced with
the possibility of winning money (that is, a “gain“
frame), decision makers are given $10,000 and told
they might lose money (“loss“ frame). Specifically,
decision makers can either lose $5,000 for sure
or take the risk of a 0.50 probability of losing all
$10,000 versus a 0.50 probability of losing $0. In
this context, many decision makers are risk-seeking.
This means they prefer the risky option B to the
sure loss of $5,000 in option A. Accordingly, many
decision makers reverse their preferences from risk-
seeking to risk-avoidance depending on the refer-
ence point they are given.
By showing that decision makers prefer different
choice options depending on the way choices are be-
ing presented to them, PT challenges the traditional
economic belief that a person’s risk preferences are
consistent. A psychological approach would be to
say that risk preference is not a fixed disposition
(Becker, 1976). However, decision science is con-
cerned with the fact that framing effects violate the
invariance assumption of EUT, thereby challenging
a fundamental assumption that human beings are
rational (i.e., have coherent preferences).
10.3.3.2 Reference Point
Like EU and SEU theory, PT hypothesizes that de-
cision makers become less sensitive to changes in
gains or losses the farther these values move away
from the reference point. For example, the differ-
ence between gaining either $5,000 or $10,000 is be-
lieved to feel more significant to the decision maker
than the difference between $105,000 or $110,000.
This is true even though in both cases, the two choice
options differ by an absolute value of $5,000. This
is because $105,000 and $110,000 are much farther
away from zero than both $5,000 and $10,000 are.
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10.3.3.3 Loss Aversion
PT further holds that decision makers not only per-
ceive changes differently when they move away
from the reference point, but also depending on their
direction compared to the reference point (that is,
based on whether changes represent gains or losses).
The concept of loss aversion follows from the obser-
vation that to decision makers, losses “feel“ worse
than gains of the same magnitude “feel“ good (Tver-
sky & Kahneman, 1992). Consequently, decision
makers are believed to be more motivated to avoid a
loss of a certain value than they are to obtain a gain
of objectively equivalent value. PT’s framework in-
corporates loss aversion by modeling a steeper loss
function than gain function in its valuation of out-
comes, yielding a distorted S-shape, with a flatter
top and a longer bottom.
10.3.3.4 Probability Weighting Function
In addition, PT proposes a probability weighting
function. According to the probability weighting
function, decision makers do not perceive differ-
ences in probabilities realistically either. Instead,
they underestimate moderate to high probabilities
and overestimate small probabilities. As a result,
decision makers may wrongfully anticipate the oc-
curence of very unlikely events, such as winning the
lottery or dying in a plane crash, but fail to antici-
pate more common events, such as experiencing a
car crash.
In sum, theories of decision making such as EUT,
SEUT, and PT predict that decision makers rarely
make decisions grounded in the objective charac-
teristics of the choice options they are considering.
Instead, decision makers seem to base their choices
on subjective perceptions of objective information
and personal preferences relating to risks, rewards,
and losses. However, predictions made by EUT,
SEUT, and PT are not always good descriptions of
actual decision making, even at the group level (e.g.,
Reyna, Chick, Corbin, & Hsia, 2014); we return to
this topic below when we discuss an alternative to
these theories, fuzzy-trace theory.
10.4 Dual Process Theories of Decision
Making
10.4.1 System 1 and System 2
More recently, decision making researchers includ-
ing Nobel Laureate Daniel Kahneman have pro-
posed so-called dual process theories of judgment
and decision making. This type of theory con-
trasts intuitive, impulsive decision making (also
called “System 1“ reasoning) with rational and log-
ical deliberation (“System 2“ reasoning; Kahne-
man, 2003, 2011; Stanovich & West, 2008; see
Figure 10.1: The value function that passes through the reference point is s-shaped and asymmetrical. The value function is steeper for
losses than gains indicating that losses outweigh gains. ©Marc Oliver Rieger, CC BY-SA 3.0, https://en.wikipedia.org/
180 • Psychology of Human Thought • Chapter 10
Developmental Dual Process Theories Nolte, Garavito & Reyna
also “Type 1” and “Type 2” processes in Evans &
Stanovich, 2013).
Dual process theories generally characterize fast,
automatic “System 1” reasoning as the major source
of decision making biases (Kahneman, 2003, 2011;
but see Duke, Goldsmith, & Amir, 2018, for contra-
dictory evidence). According to EUT and PT, biases
such as the framing effect can lead to seemingly
irrational judgments of reality or decision making
that is not always advantageous. To reiterate, the
framing effect occurs when people‘s subjective per-
ception of different choice options varies depending
on how the options are portrayed or phrased, even
when, objectively, the choice options are equivalent.
We return to the framing effect later in this chapter
to discuss when such technically irrational biases
can actually turn out to be smart (Reyna, 2018).
10.4.1.1 Temporal Discounting
Dual process theories have also been applied to tem-
poral discounting. Temporal discounting is the
tendency to assign a smaller subjective value to a
delayed reward compared to an immediate reward
(Kirby, 2009; McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, &
Cohen, 2004; but see Kable & Glimcher, 2007). Dis-
counting distant outcomes can lead decision makers
to choose smaller, immediate rewards over greater,
delayed rewards, and therefore decrease the mag-
nitude of their overall gains. Depending on their
patterns of discounting in time preferences, their
choices can also violate consistency.
In psychological research, higher rates of tempo-
ral discounting have been linked to impulsivity and
unhealthy risk-taking such as drug and alcohol abuse
(Bickel, 2012; Bickel et al., 2012; Story, Vlaev, Sey-
mour, Darzi, & Dolan, 2014). Accordingly, some
researchers have drawn connections between im-
pulsive “System 1“ reasoning and higher rates of
temporal discounting (that is, higher rates of making
suboptimal choices). For example, McClure and col-
leagues (2004) suggest that distinct neural systems
activate when people make impulsive versus patient
(willingness to wait for larger rewards) choices in
temporal discounting tasks. Alternatively, according
to Ballard and Knutson (2009), some brain regions
are more sensitive to the magnitude of future re-
wards while other brain regions are more sensitive
to the delay of future rewards. This can affect the
perceived value of immediate and delayed choice
options and may lead decision makers to perceive
delayed rewards as less desirable than immediate
rewards.
10.4.2 Developmental Dual Process
Theories
“System 1” reasoning is traditionally assumed to be
phylogenetically and ontogenetically less advanced
than “System 2” reasoning, which increases with
maturation (Steinberg, 2008). Thus, dual process
theories cannot explain why, rather than becoming
less pronounced, the strength of the framing effect
has been shown to increase with age and experience
(Reyna & Ellis, 1994; Reyna & Farley, 2006; Reyna
et al., 2011, 2014). In the context of standard dual
process theories, this finding is out of place, as ma-
ture decision makers are expected to become less
susceptible to reasoning biases that have been ex-
plained in terms of “System 1“ processing, not more.
For that and many other reasons, more recently de-
veloped theories aim at rethinking some of the core
assumptions of standard dual process theories.
10.4.3 Fuzzy-Trace Theory
One such theory is fuzzy-trace theory (FTT). Put
forward by psychologists Reyna and colleagues
(e.g., Reyna, 2012), FTT is a modern dual process
theory that distinguishes between developmentally
advanced intuition and mere impulsivity, which is
believed to be developmentally inferior (Reyna, Wel-
don, & McCormick, 2015). FTT posits that a per-
son encodes information simultaneously into verba-
tim representations, which are composed of surface-
level details, and gist representations, which capture
bottom-line meaning. Although roughly categorized
as a dual process theory, FTT technically assumes
that information is being processed and represented
on a continuum between precise, verbatim details
on the one end and vague, abstract gists on the other.
Verbatim details include concrete numbers, exact
wording, and other surface-level information (e.g.,
“Treatment A has a 30% risk of experiencing side
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effects.“). Conversely, gist describes the fuzzy mean-
ing underlying such details (e.g., “Treatment A is
risky“).
10.4.3.1 Hierarchy of Representations
The theory posits that the gist of information is en-
coded at varying levels of abstraction to form a hier-
archy of representations, and evidence supports this
prediction: The simplest level of gist representation
is grounded in categorical yes-or-no distinctions,
such as whether or not a choice option entails any
level of risk. Imagine deciding between treatment
A with a 10% risk of side effects and treatment B
with a 0% risk of side effects. Here, a categorical
gist representation could be “Treatment A is risky.
Treatment B is not risky“. More refined represen-
tations require ordinal less-or-more distinctions. If
treatment A comes with a 10% risk and treatment
B with a 5% risk, the corresponding representation
might take the shape of “Treatment A has a higher
risk than Treatment B“. Finally, the most precise
representations of information call for exact details,
such “Treatment A has a 10% risk of reducing life
expectancy by 1 year while treatment B has a 5%
risk of reducing life expectancy by 2 years“. Which
representation will be relied on is ultimately deter-
mined by the specificity of the choice at hand, with a
preference for the least-detailed representation that
allows for a decision (dubbed the “fuzzy-processing
preference”; Corbin, Reyna, Weldon, & Brainerd,
2015; Reyna & Brainerd, 2008; Reyna & Lloyd,
2006).
10.4.3.2 Developmental Trajectories
According to FTT, decision makers shift from verba-
tim to gist-based processing as they develop (Mills,
Reyna, & Estrada, 2008; Reyna, 2012; Reyna &
Brainerd, 2011; Reyna & Lloyd, 2006). In the con-
text of FTT, gist-based processing serves intuition,
here defined as an advanced ability to extract mean-
ing and recognize patterns (Reyna, 2012). Since
intuition is acquired through age, experience, and
expertise, intuitive decision making is believed to
be different from impulsive decision making, which
peaks in adolescence and becomes less common
with age (Romer, Reyna, & Satterthwaite, 2017).
As a consequence, adults are predicted to rely more
strongly on fuzzy, gist-based processing (as opposed
to verbatim processing) than adolescents.
10.4.3.3 Risk-Taking and Risk Avoidance
Reducing choice options to their bottom-line gist
enables decision makers to categorically reject catas-
trophic risks, without trading off risk for the reward
a risky choice option offers. Gist-reliance is of-
ten negatively associated with unhealthy risk-taking,
whereas verbatim-based processing and impulsiv-
ity are often positively related to risk-taking (along
with reward sensitivity and impulsivity, explaining
unique variance in why adolescents are more risk-
prone; Mills et al., 2008; Reyna & Farley, 2006;
Reyna & Mills, 2014; Reyna et al., 2015; Wil-
helms, Reyna, Brust-Renck, Weldon, & Corbin,
2015). Verbatim-based reasoning leads decision
makers to weigh risks against benefits, which can
facilitate risk-taking if the risks associated with a
choice option are perceived as low and benefits are
perceived as sufficiently high. For example, the risk
of contracting HIV from unprotected sex is low, so
decision makers relying on verbatim representations,
when weighing the risk of contracting HIV against
the benefits from unprotected sex, will consider tak-
ing this risk because the benefits outweigh the risks
(Wilhelms et al., 2015). Decision makers relying on
gist representations, such as that it only takes once
to get HIV, would not take the risk of contracting
HIV, a catastrophically bad outcome (i.e., no risk
of contracting HIV is better than some risk of con-
tracting HIV). Evidence supports these theoretical
tenets.
10.4.3.4 Standard and Reverse Framing
When comparing choice options whose risks
and benefits differ considerably in size, this
can lead children—whose processing veers closer
to verbatim-based processing than gist-based
processing—to process risks more objectively, and
thus to not show irrational framing biases. Some
young people, especially those who are sensitive
to rewards (e.g., adolescents), may exhibit reverse
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framing when rewards are large, preferring gambles
for gains and sure losses over risky losses (Reyna et
al., 2011; Reyna & Farley, 2006). In reverse fram-
ing, a person tends to make the opposite choices that
one would make in the typical framing effect (that
is, choosing the risky gamble in the “gain“ frame
and the sure option in the “loss“ frame). This ef-
fect, however, does not carry over into adulthood:
Adults, with their greater tendency to rely on the sim-
ple gist of choices (such as “losing something for
sure“ versus “losing something or losing nothing“
if presented with a “loss“ frame), tend to produce
the standard framing effect (Chick & Reyna, 2012;
Reyna et al., 2011). Young children do not show
framing effects (Reyna & Ellis, 1994). Standard
framing first emerges when differences in outcomes
are small. When differences are substantial, older
children and adolescents display reverse framing by
favoring larger but risky rewards over smaller but
safe rewards. A preference for reverse framing be-
comes stronger as adolescents’ reward sensitivity
develops. The increasing tendency to rely on gist
develops with adulthood, in which most decision
makers demonstrate standard framing.
10.4.3.5 Developmental Reversal
As initially predicted by FTT, the standard fram-
ing effect increases with age and experience (e.g.,
Kim, Goldstein, Hasher, & Zacks, 2006; Reyna et
al., 2014), which is at odds with assumptions of
standard dual process theories. Greater develop-
ment, according to these theories, leads to greater
reliance on the slow, labored “System 2“ reasoning,
leading to fewer biases, like the framing effect, in
judgments and decisions, in contrast to what litera-
ture has shown (Wilhelms & Reyna, 2013; but see
Peters et al., 2006). FTT conceptualizes the increase
in the framing effect with age, and other develop-
mental biases that disagree with the predictions put
forward by standard dual process theories (such as
an increase in the production of false memories), as a
developmental reversal (Brainerd, Reyna, & Ceci,
2008; De Neys & Vanderputte, 2011; Reyna & Ellis,
1994; Reyna et al., 2011). Per FTT, developmental
reversals occur when less mature decision makers,
such as children and adolescents, “outperform” ma-
ture decision makers on certain types of decision
tasks. Research grounded in FTT suggests that de-
velopmental reversals are the result of an increase in
gist-based reasoning with age and experience, which
makes mature decision makers more susceptible to
reasoning biases that originate from gist-based rea-
soning than children and adolescents are (Reyna &
Brainerd, 2011; Weldon, Corbin, & Reyna, 2013).
10.5 Heuristics and Biases
10.5.1 Bounded Rationality
Bounded rationality assumes that decision makers
are often unable to deliberate each decision slowly
and carefully (Simon, 1957; 1991). In other words,
decision makers will not always be able to rely on
“System 2” processing as it is described through
standard dual process theories, even if they are ma-
ture and experienced in making decisions. Instead,
finite cognitive resources, time constraints, and in-
complete information can drive decision makers to
fall back on so-called heuristic processing, which is
associated with “System 1” processing.
Heuristics are “recipes” or rules-of-thumb that
serve as fast and efficient mental shortcuts to sim-
plify many of the decisions and judgments we need
to make every day (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011).
The use of heuristics is assumed to be adaptive and
can be highly successful, but heuristics also give
rise to biases similar to the reasoning errors we have
already introduced in this chapter. When psychol-
ogists Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman intro-
duced the heuristics-and-biases research program in
the 1970s (e.g., 1974), multiple heuristics and bi-
ases were identified. Here, we describe some of the
most well-known heuristics and biases. Although
Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011) emphasize the
adaptive nature of heuristics and biases, Tversky
and Kahneman also argued in favor of overall adap-
tiveness (and similarly relied heavily on Simon),
but designed tests that revealed human limitations
and fallacies. One difference in these approaches
is definitional, describing heuristics as processing
only part of information in a simpleminded way
(Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier) as opposed to substitut-
ing one kind of judgment (that comes more readily
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to mind, e.g., similarity) for another judgment (e.g.,
probability; Kahneman, 2003) or processing mean-
ingful gist rather than superficial details (Reyna,
2012). Although some scholars have challenged
traditional norms of rationality, assertions about
alternatives such as ecological rationality (the de-
gree to which a heuristic is adapted to the struc-
ture of the environment) are difficult to test scientif-
ically.
10.5.1.1 Availability Heuristic
To judge the relative probability or frequency of an
event, the availability heuristic relies on the ease
with which people recall examples associated with
different choice options or events. For instance,
when asked whether there are more words in the
English language that have R as their first or as their
third letter, most people—incorrectly—choose the
former (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). This occurs
because words that start with a certain letter are more
readily available for us to recall than other types of
words. In everyday life, decision makers often rely
on salient information in their environment (such
as information publicized in the news) to evaluate
how likely they are to contract certain diseases or
to experience specific events, such as a shark attack
(e.g., Read, 1995). Because rare and unexpected
events are more likely to be publicized than expected
events, people will sometimes overestimate the like-
lihood of uncommon events and underestimate the
likelihood of more common events.
More generally, it is crucial to read original ar-
ticles (rather than only secondhand summaries of
them) to fully understand the arguments and coun-
terarguments in the decision making literature. For
example, Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011) say that
“Neither version of the availability heuristic could
predict participants’ frequency estimates. Instead,
estimated frequencies were best predicted by actual
frequencies” (p. 458), but the second sentence of
Tversky and Kahneman’s (1973) article on the avail-
ability heuristic makes a similar point (p. 207): “In
general, availability is correlated with ecological
frequency, but it is also affected by other factors.“
10.5.1.2 Recognition Heuristic
In a similar vein, decision makers employ the recog-
nition heuristic to make judgments about pairs of
objects or events they have limited knowledge about.
Students from Germany and the U.S. were tasked to
compare pairs of American or German cities with
regard to the size of their populations (Gigerenzer
& Goldstein, 1996; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002).
Since Americans lacked detailed knowledge about
German cities and vice versa, participants simply
relied on whether or not they recognized the name
of foreign cities (a less-is-more effect). If they rec-
ognized only one of the two cities in a pair, they
inferred that this city had a bigger population, sub-
stituting familiarity for knowledge.
10.5.1.3 Affect Heuristic
People can rely on a different heuristic when evalu-
ating which of two choice options is the riskier one:
When comparing risks, the affect heuristic implies
that dread increases perceived risk, even when ob-
jective probabilities do not warrant this inference
(Slovic, 1987). This can skew individuals’ under-
standing of risk-benefit tradeoffs: Although in real
life, risks and benefits can be positively correlated
(meaning high risks come with high rewards), re-
lying on the affect heuristic has been linked to the
perception of an inverse relationship between risks
and benefits. Objects or activities that elicit positive
affect are typically believed to be high in benefits
and low in risks, whereas the opposite is true for ob-
jects or activities that evoke negative feelings such
as dread (Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson,
2000; Slovic, 1987).
10.5.1.4 Confirmation Bias
Another bias that affects decision makers’s ability
to reason objectively is confirmation bias. This
bias describes people’s tendency to selectively seek,
attend to, or recall evidence that sides with one’s
initial opinion (Plous, 1993). Similarly, people
have been found to be biased in their interpretation
of information lacking clear meaning, construing
whichever meaning best fits their personal attitudes.
In a seminal experiment, proponents and opponents
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of the death penalty read two scientific studies ex-
amining whether or not the death penalty deterred
murder (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979). While one
study found that murder rates decreased in those
U.S. states that had introduced the death penalty,
the other study found no effect of the death penalty.
Unbeknownst to the participants, both studies were
entirely fictional. In line with a confirmation bias,
participants thought that the study that supported
their personal stance on death penalty was more pro-
bative than the study that contradicted their beliefs,
of which they were markedly more critical.
10.5.1.5 Hindsight Bias
Also referred to as the “I-knew-it-all-along” effect,
hindsight bias is observed when, after an event oc-
curs, decision makers overestimate how predictable
the outcome was in the first place (Fischhoff, 2007).
In one of the first studies designed to test the hind-
sight bias, decision scientists Fischhoff and Beyth
(1975) tasked decision makers to evaluate the proba-
bility of several possible outcomes associated with
President Nixon’s then-upcoming visit to China and
Russia. Following Nixon’s return to the U.S., par-
ticipants overestimated the probabilities they had
assigned to those outcomes that ended up occurring,
exaggerating how foreseeable these events had fac-
tually been.
10.5.1.6 Endowment Effect
Some phenomena have not been labeled biases, even
though they produce biased judgments and decisions.
For example, the endowment effect leads individ-
uals to overestimate the objective value of objects
they own, simply because they own them (Kahne-
man, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991). This means that
people are more partial to the same object if it is in
their own possession than when it is in somebody
else’s possession. In transactions, the endowment
effect manifests as an unwillingness to trade objects
one owns (Knetsch, 1989), or to demand an exag-
gerated price in exchange for parting with them. In
a famous demonstration of this effect, decision mak-
ers who were given a mug charged approximately
twice as much money to part with it than they were
willing to spend to acquire the mug when they did
not own it (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990).
10.5.1.7 Sunk-cost Fallacy
Similar to the attachment people feel towards their
belongings or property, people also grow attached to
past investments. As a result, decision makers often
continue to invest time, money, or effort into previ-
ously made commitments, even when these commit-
ments fail to pay off. This bias, labeled sunk-cost
fallacy, arises because people dislike incurring the
loss of resources they have already invested into an
endeavor (Arkes & Blumer, 1985). To provide an
example, imagine that you have made a nonrefund-
able downpayment on a nice watch that you plan on
gifting to your father. After making the downpay-
ment, you come across a different watch that you
like better. But since you do not want to waste the
money you have already invested, you purchase the
watch you saw first instead of the watch you prefer.
This fallacy is typically explained in terms of loss
aversion (which we introduced earlier in this chap-
ter), as it aligns with the assumption that decision
makers are more motivated to avoid losses (e.g., los-
ing the money invested in the first watch) than to
acquire gains (e.g., buying the nicer watch, Tversky
& Kahneman, 1986).
10.5.1.8 Status Quo Bias
But even if no prior investments are involved, many
people perceive any change away from an existing
choice to another choice option as a loss of sorts:
The status quo bias (also known as the default ef-
fect) treats default settings or previous choices as
reference points that are typically preferred over al-
ternative choice options (Samuelson, & Zeckhauser,
1988). For instance, countries that have imple-
mented an opt-out policy for organ donation report
much higher consent rates to organ donations than
countries in which willing potential donors have to
manually opt in (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003). Ac-
cording to Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky
(1982), this could be because individuals regret their
choices more strongly when they suffer negative
consequences as a result of a new action than when
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they experience negative consequences as a result
of inertia. PT suggests that the status quo acts as
a reference point for all subsequent decisions, and
that the prospect of potential losses associated with
leaving the reference point outweigh the prospect
of potential gains (because losses loom larger than
gains).
10.5.1.9 Anchoring Effect
The anchoring effect, another bias, is evident when
individuals base their decisions around an initial “an-
chor value“ they encounter, even when this value is
unrelated to the question at hand (Tversky & Kah-
neman, 1974). Once an anchor is in place, subse-
quent decisions are made by deviating away from
this value, which leads to substantial biases in the
estimation of prices and other numbers. For exam-
ple, Ariely, Loewenstein, and Prelec (2003) asked
MIT students to write down the last two digits of
their social security number and then prompted them
to bid for objects such as chocolate or computer
equipment. Individuals with higher numbers made
notably higher bids than those with lower numbers,
suggesting that people anchored their judgments on
their social security numbers—despite the fact that
these numbers held no relevant information about
the value of the auction items. While any salient
number can serve as an anchor, anchors do not have
to be random or meaningless: often, anchors are
highly relevant to the choice context, such as exist-
ing baseline values.
10.5.1.10 Base-rate Fallacy
Anchor values are not the only way seemingly irrel-
evant information can bias our judgments. Individ-
uals also engage in what is known as the base-rate
fallacy, a reasoning error that ignores generic, sta-
tistical information in favor of specific, qualitative
information (Tversky & Kahneman, 1985). Con-
sider the case of a person named Steve (Kahneman,
2011), who is known to be shy, withdrawn, helpful,
and tidy, with great attention to detail and a love for
structure but little interest in engaging with people
or the real world. When asked whether Steve is more
likely to be a farmer or a librarian, many decision
makers agree that his personality best outfits him to
work as a librarian. However, this response neglects
to take the underlying base rate into account. In the
experiment, this base rate had been presented to fa-
vor farmers (also see representativeness heuristic,
Kahneman & Tversky, 1973).
10.5.1.11 Conjunction Fallacy
When passing judgment, people are similarly prone
to committing what is commonly referred to as a
conjunction fallacy: the incorrect assumption that
a combination of two or more conditions is more
likely to occur than one of these conditions by itself.
The most well-known example in this context is that
of the fictional “Linda”, who is “31 years old, single,
outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philoso-
phy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with
issues of discrimination and social justice, and also
participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations“ (Tver-
sky & Kahneman, 1983, p. 297).
Given this information, is it more likely that Linda
is a bank teller or that Linda is a bank teller who is
active in the feminist movement? Since the latter
is more aligned with Linda’s personality, the major-
ity of people side with the second rather than the
first option. This type of reasoning, however, is erro-
neous, as the probability of a single event (i.e., Linda
being a bank teller) must necessarily be higher than
or the same as the probability of two joint events that
are a subset of the more inclusive event (i.e., Linda
being a bank teller and an activist). This fallacy
is often explained through the use of the represen-
tativeness heuristic (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972).
This heuristic draws comparisons between specific
cases (e.g., Linda’s characteristics) and a standard
or parent population (e.g., feminists), sometimes re-
sulting in the incorrect conclusion that just because
something is more representative, it is also more
likely to be probable.
Finally, decisions and judgments are often aided
by social factors. Attribution bias is the common
tendency to generate different explanations for one’s
own behavior as opposed to other people’s behav-
ior (Ross, 1977): When people evaluate their own
actions (such as cutting in line while waiting in a
queue), they often attribute them to external or con-
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textual factors (e.g., being late for work). However,
when interpreting other individuals’ actions, peo-
ple often believe that behavior is driven by internal
factors that are characteristic of the person (such as
cutting in line due to rudeness)—possibly because
they are unaware of the external factors that affect
other people’s lives. Aside from such internal and
situational factors, judgments and choices will often
be governed by social norms. Norms act as implicit
or explicit guidelines to inform individuals whether
to make a certain decision or not based on what other
people around them do or expect them to do.
In this context, psychologists typically differenti-
ate between injunctive and descriptive norms that
influence decision making (Cialdini, Reno, & Kall-
gren, 1990). Injunctive norms outline which be-
haviors are socially desirable or acceptable, such
as tipping a waitress, stopping at a red traffic light,
or abstaining from underage drinking. Descriptive
norms are perceptions of other people’s actual be-
havior. Consider, for example, an adolescent who
is attending a party at a friend’s house. This ado-
lescent may decide to embrace underage drinking
because she knows or believes that other guests are
illegally consuming alcohol as well—even if injunc-
tive norms (such as the law, or her parents’ rules)
prohibit it. As a result, injunctive and descriptive
norms will not always overlap, even though in many
cases, they do.
10.6 Decision Strategies
As discussed, cognitive, social and situational fac-
tors lead decision makers to base their decisions on
seemingly irrelevant cues or skew the accuracy of
their judgments. In the following part of our chapter,
we review which strategies individuals employ to
engage with and integrate evidence when sufficient
information is available to them. These kind of deci-
sion strategies are typically categorized in two ways.
The literature distinguishes between compensatory
and non-compensatory strategies (Hogarth, 1990;
von Winterfeldt & Edwards, 1986). Compensatory
strategies allow trade-offs between positive and neg-
ative values on different choice attributes whereas
non-compensatory strategies take the opposite ap-
proach: A positive value in one choice attribute can-
not make up for a negative value in another attribute.
In practice, this means that some non-compensatory
strategies dismiss any choice option that performs
poorly on essential choice attributes.
Some of the most commonly studied strate-
gies (e.g., Mata & Nunes, 2010; Svenson &
Maule, 1993; Wichary & Smolen, 2016) include
non-compensatory, satisficing strategies, such as
elimination-by-aspects (EBA; Tversky, 1972) and
the take-the-best strategy (TTB) (Hogarth, 1990;
von Winterfeldt & Edwards, 1986). EBA requires
decision makers to determine which choice at-
tribute is the most important to them and to exclude
all choice options from consideration that do not
achieve a high enough value on this attribute. This
process is then repeated for the second most impor-
tant attribute (and so forth) until only one choice
option prevails (Tversky, 1972). In contrast, TTB
simply chooses that option which outperforms other
options on a single choice attribute that is deemed
“important enough” to enable a decision (or corre-
lated with the outcome; Gigerenzer & Goldstein,
1996). How decision makers know which attributes
outperform others is an open question.
Compensatory, optimizing take a different ap-
proach than non-compensatory, satisficing strate-
gies do. For example, the weighted additive rule
(WADD) weighs the attributes associated with each
option by their importance (or other means) and then
adds up the different attributes to decide which op-
tion is the most favorable. Tallying (TALLY) is a
special case of the WADD rule in which pros and
cons are just added up without assigning them differ-
ent weights (EW, equal weighting). EW selects the
choice option with the highest sum of all attribute
values, treating all attributes as equally important.
Unlike EW, WADD assigns different importance to
different choice attributes. To choose the choice op-
tion with the highest sum of attribute values, WADD
first multiplies the value of each piece of information
with the importance of the relevant choice attribute
and then calculates the sum of these products, as in
EV and EUT.
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10.6.1 Satisficing versus Optimizing
Since using non-compensatory or satisficing deci-
sion strategies requires less cognitive effort than
using compensatory or optimizing strategies, satis-
ficing becomes more common with age (e.g., Bru-
ine de Bruin, Parker, & Strough, 2016). Although
this suggests that older adults could be more prone
to making uninformed choices, simulations demon-
strate that employing more demanding strategies
only leads to small gains in decision quality when
compared to non-compensatory or satisficing strate-
gies (Mata & Nunes, 2010). Put differently, some
scholars interpret these null effects (no difference
between strategies detected for these decisions) to
mean that even resource-efficient choice strategies
such as TTB and EBA can allow decision makers
to make rather advantageous choices. However, re-
search shows that people generally do not optimize
in the strict sense of thoroughly processing all avail-
able information, but they do seem to process both
outcome and probability information along with
other simpler representations of that information,
as predicted by FTT (see Reyna, 2012).
10.7 Conclusion
At the beginning of this chapter, we set out to an-
swer key questions about human decision making:
Why are certain choice options favored over others,
why do people make different choices when offered
equivalent options, and which types of errors com-
monly occur when people make decisions? Taken
together with the models and theories we outlined at
the beginning of this chapter, knowing which strate-
gies people employ and which biases they produce
now gives us the means to describe, explain, and
predict how decision makers will choose between
choice options when facing certain types of deci-
sions.
The theories we have reviewed expect decision
makers to favor safe and unambiguous choice op-
tions, to pursue options with higher EVs, to adopt
simplified choice strategies, or to emphasize gist-
based processing when possible. A fundamental
finding is that decision makers shift their choice
preferences in accordance with the standard fram-
ing effect. However, many individuals are not “av-
erage” decision makers: which choice options or
strategies people consider desirable will depend on
their risk and reward preferences, their subjective
appraisal of objective choice characteristics such as
magnitude and probability, their cognitive resources
and processing style, and their susceptibility to both
standard and reverse framing. Importantly, these
determinants can evolve across the lifespan and in
response to situational demands and constraints, sug-
gesting that the same individual may well employ
different strategies or come to a different decision
when facing the same choice twice. In sum, decision
making is a complex synthesis between the choice at
hand, the decision makers’ individual make up, and
the context in which the decision is made, including
time constraints and whether there is information
available that can help people to come to a decision.
Summary
1. Normative, descriptive, and prescriptive models distinguish how decision makers make
choices (descriptive) and how they should ideally behave (normative) to reach certain decision
goals. Normative models propose that decision makers are rational, trying to optimize
outcomes. In contrast, descriptive models hold that decision makers often violate assumptions
of rationality. Prescriptive models make recommendations on how to achieve certain decision
goals.
2. According to various theories of subjectivity, decision makers decide between different
choice options by subjectively evaluating objective information about choice outcomes and
the probability with which these outcomes occur. Whereas expected utility theory only
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considers subjective evaluations of choice outcomes, subjective expected utility theory also
accounts for subjective evaluations of probabilities. Prospect theory combines both of these
assumptions with additional hypotheses about reference points, sensitivity to changes from
that reference point, and the influence of gains versus losses.
3. Dual process theories of decision making predict that decision makers evaluate choice
options using one of two information-processing mechanisms: fast and impulsive “System 1”
processing or slow and careful “System 2” processing. Standard dual process theories
propose that decision makers default to “System 1” processing, which gives rise to various
decision biases such as the framing effect or temporal discounting. Conversely, “System 2”
processing is thought to increase with advanced reasoning and with maturity from childhood
to adulthood.
4. Fuzzy-trace theory builds on previous theories of decision making, but also is the source
of predictions that falsify those theories. The theory introduces novel assumptions about
mental representations of choices: surface level verbatim representations and bottom-line, gist
representations. FTT further deviates from standard dual process theories by differentiating
between impulsiveness, which peaks in adolescence and leads to unhealthy risk-taking, and
intuition based on reliance on gist representations, which is developmentally advanced and
generally encourages healthy decision making (e.g., avoidance of HIV risk). According to
FTT, mature decision makers rely more strongly on simple meaning (or gist) whereas younger
decision makers resort to verbatim processing of rote information. As predicted, this theory
can explain an increase in certain biases (e.g., the framing effect) with age, dubbing this
general phenomenon of increasing gist-based biases as developmental reversal.
5. Bounded rationality assumes that decision makers are constrained in their ability to reason,
especially under time pressure, when information is limited, or cognitive resources are low.
Kahneman/Tversky, Gigerenzer and others have assumed that decision making exhibits
cognitive economy, relying on fast-and-frugal mental shortcuts called heuristics (Nisbett &
Ross, 1980). However, research since the 1990s has called these assumptions (that capacity
limitations cause decision biases) into question (Reyna, 2012; Stanovich & West, 2008).
6. Under cognitive, time, or information constraints, decision makers are expected to fall back
on heuristics—decision rules that help us make good decisions fast but that can also lead to
reasoning biases that skew judgments or lead to suboptimal decisions. Well-known examples
include the representativeness, recognition, and affect heuristic. Research suggests that
these heuristics are due to intuitive processes.
7. When information is available, decision makers can employ thorough or frugal choice strate-
gies to navigate the information, but that might not identify the most beneficial choice option
as traditionally assumed. Satisficing and non-compensatory strategies were thought to op-
erate under time constraints or limited cognitive resources, considering only some of the
information available, but more recent research suggests that simpler gist processing is used
even when people have information and time. Optimizing and compensatory strategies
represent time- and resource-intensive choice strategies that consider much of the available
information before allowing for a choice, but they do not necessarily yield superior choices.
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Review Questions
1. Define what a “heuristic” is and under which circumstances decision makers may use heuristics.
Describe at least two examples of heuristics.
2. Explain the difference between the standard framing effect and the reverse framing effect.
Which types of decision makers are likely to engage in standard or reverse framing, and why?
3. Describe the difference between normative, prescriptive, and descriptive models of decision
making.
4. What are the differences between fuzzy-trace theory and standard dual process theories of
decision making?
5. Summarize how to calculate the expected value (EV) of a choice option. If two options have
the same EV, how might decision makers decide between them?
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Latest Research Highlights
Differences between description and experience, such as greater risk aversion when gains are
described verbally rather than experienced. For example, suppose that the rate of car thefts is about
1 in 10 in a city (9,989 for every 100,000 people); many people would buy insurance in this situation
to protect against the risk of car theft. However, suppose you left your car unlocked for months and
never experienced car theft or any other problem with your car. Not experiencing the statistically
rare outcome of car theft (or experiencing it rarely) tends to lower the perception of risk, compared
to describing the risk verbally.
Developmental reversals, a growing list of heuristics and biases that emerge with development from
childhood to adulthood, contrary to traditional cognitive theories. For example, given a choice
between winning two prizes for sure versus spinning a spinner to win four prizes or nothing, most
adults choose the sure thing. However, when given four prizes and offered a choice between losing
two prizes for sure or spinning a spinner to lose four prizes or nothing, most adults choose the
risky option. Adults avoid the sure loss even when the total number of prizes is a net gain. This
bias is not present in children; they pick the risky option about 70% of the time for both gains and
losses, responding to the objective outcomes when they are explained simply and displayed clearly.
FTT explains framing effects in terms of the qualitative gist of the options (get something or take a
chance on getting nothing), as opposed to objective (verbatim) tradeoffs between risk and reward.
Dual-process models and their counterarguments, including differentiating different kinds of dual
processes. For example, people with higher processing capacity who think carefully will sometimes
censor their responses to gains and losses, making their choices more consistent, when they are
presented with both gains and loss versions of the same decision. Dual-process theories suggest
that this censoring is an example of deliberative System 2 thinking inhibiting intuitive System 1
thinking.
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Glossary
affect heuristic Infers unknown properties of a
choice option (such as its relative level of risk)
from the emotional response the choice option
elicits. 184, 189
ambiguity The degree to which a decision maker
does not know the properties of a decision.
178
anchoring effect Evident when individuals base
their judgments or decisions on an initial “an-
chor value“ they encounter, even when this
value is irrelevant to the task at hand. 186
attribution bias The tendency to explain one’s
own behavior through external factors while
explaining other people’s behavior through
internal factors. 186
availability heuristic Judgments or decisions
based on the ease with which people recall
examples associated with different choice
options. 184
base-rate fallacy A reasoning error that ignores
generic, statistical information in favor of spe-
cific, qualitative information. 186
bias A cognitive error that skews judgments or
leads to suboptimal decision making. 189
bounded rationality The notion that finite cogni-
tive resources, time constraints, and incom-
plete information limit decision makers’ abil-
ity to make careful, deliberate decisions. 183,
189
compensatory choice strategies Allow favor-
able choice attributes to compensate for unfa-
vorable choice attributes. 187, 189
confirmation bias The tendency to selectively
seek, attend to, or recall evidence that sides
with one’s initial opinion. 184
conjunction fallacy The incorrect assumption
that a set of specific conditions is more likely
to occur than one general condition. 186
descriptive decision models Frameworks that
seek to describe the state things are in and
explain how that state came about. 177, 188
descriptive norms Norms formulated based on
how other people behave, or one’s perception
of how they behave. 187
developmental reversal A developmental effect
that goes against most assumptions about cog-
nitive development (i.e., cognitive heuristics
and biases becoming stronger throughout the
lifespan). 183, 189
dual process theories of decision making
Theories that explain decision-making as
a conflict between rational and logical deliber-
ation (i.e., System 1) and impulsive intuition
(i.e., System 2). 180, 189
elimination-by-aspects (EBA) strategy First
determines which choice attribute is the most
important and then excludes all choice op-
tions from consideration that do not achieve a
high enough value on this attribute. 187
endowment effect Leads decision makers to
overestimate the objective value of objects
they own, simply because they own them. 185
equal weights (EW) strategy Selects choice
option with the highest sum of all attribute
values, treating all choice attributes as equally
important. 187
expected utility (EU) theory An economic the-
ory that posits that decision makers scale
down the objective magnitude of an outcome
(e.g., due to risk aversion) before multiplying
magnitude and probability to determine the
expected utility of a decision. 178, 188
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expected value (EV) An economic principle that
uses the product of probability and outcome
to discern a decision’s likely value. 177, 188
framing effect A phenomenon that occurs when
decision makers, choosing between a safe op-
tion and an equivalent gamble, choose the
gamble when choices are framed as loss and
the safe option when choices are framed as a
gain. 179, 188, 189
fuzzy-trace theory (FTT) A dual process theory
of decision making that distinguishes between
verbatim representations of information (en-
coding details and surface features of informa-
tion) and gist representations (encoding the
bottom-line meaning of information). Unlike
traditional dual process theories, FTT distin-
guishes gist-based intuition, which is devel-
opmentally advanced, from mere impulsivity.
181, 189
heuristic A fast and frugal rule-of-thumb that can
lead to biases in judgment and decision mak-
ing. 183, 189
hindsight bias When, after the fact, decision mak-
ers overestimate the predactibility of a factu-
ally unforeseeable event. 185
injunctive norms Outline which behaviors are so-
cially desirable or acceptable. 187
loss aversion Decision makers are often more
strongly motivated to avoid losses than to ob-
tain equivalent gains, as losses feel ca. twice
as painful as equivalent gains feel good. 179,
180
normative decision models Frameworks that
seek to define optimal decision making or
choices that result in the most efficient alloca-
tion of resources. 177, 188
prescriptive decision models Pragmatic frame-
works that seek to both explain how behav-
ior should occur in reality, given that norma-
tive assumptions are often violated, and pre-
scribe steps in order to achieve many norma-
tive goals. 177, 188
prospect theory (PT) A theory of behavioral
economics that accepts expected utility the-
ory and subjective expected utility theory’s
subjective perception of outcomes and proba-
bilities but further posits that decision makers
are influenced by relative change from a refer-
ence point. 179, 189
recognition heuristic Judgments or decisions
based on which of two or more choice options
is the more recognizable. 184, 189
representativeness heuristic Draws compar-
isons between specific cases and a standard
or parent population, sometimes resulting
in the incorrect conclusion that just because
something is more representative, it is also
more likely to be true. 186, 189
reverse framing A phenomenon, witnessed most
often in adolescents, in which a person tends
to make the opposite choices than those seen
in the typical framing effect (i.e., choosing the
gamble in the gain frame and the sure option
in the loss frame). 182, 188
risk A concept measured in economics terms as
“increased variance of outcomes” but given
broader meaning in social scientific research,
often incorporating anti-social and unhealthy
behaviors (e.g., drug and alcohol abuse). 178
satisficing When decision makers strive to make
“good enough” rather than ideal decisions on
the basis of limited information or under time
pressure. 189
status quo bias Treats default settings or previ-
ous choices as reference points that are typi-
cally preferred over alternative choice options.
185
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subjective expected utility (SEU) theory An
economic theory that incorporates subjec-
tive perception of probability in addition to
expected utility theory’s (EUT) negatively-
accerating function of objective magnitude.
Accordingly, this theory posits that decision-
makers will rely on the product of subjective
magnitude and subjective probability of an
outcome (i.e., the subjective expected utility)
to make a decision. 179, 189
sunk-cost fallacy Continued investment into an
endeavor even if the endeavor proves unsuc-
cessful, resulting from people’s unwillingness
to waste or abandon previously made invest-
ments. 185
take-the-best (TTB) strategy Chooses the
first option that outperforms another option
on any choice attribute deemed “sufficient
enough” to enable a decision. 187
tallying (TALLY) strategy a special case of the
weighted additive (WADD) rule in which pros
and cons are just added up (see EW, equal
weighting). 187
temporal discounting The tendency of a person
to assign smaller subjective values to a de-
layed rewards compared to immediate re-
wards. 181, 189
uncertainty The amount of variance in the possi-
ble outcomes of a particular decision. 178
weighted additive (WADD) rule Multiplies
the value of each piece of information with the
perceived importance of the relevant choice
attribute before comparing choice options
based on the sum of these value X relevance
products. 187
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The Nature of Language
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University of Duisburg-Essen & Heidelberg University
Imagine you meet a friend after the summer and
start a conversation about your holidays. In a flu-
ent and easy exchange you get a lively idea of your
friend’s experience, what the places she went to
looked like and even how the people were. Your
friend in turn shares your embarrassment about a
mishap you had at the airport when you mistook an-
other passenger’s suitcase for yours. This situation
reveals a lot about the nature of language: the com-
mon ease and fluency when we use it, the context
of conversing with others as its most natural and
frequent use, the vividness and detail with which we
can express and also understand things that are no
longer present.
More formally, language can be described as a
system of symbols by means of which human beings
express an infinite variety of content, given finite re-
sources. Its enormous expressive power is based
on three basic features: First, meaningful elements
are created from a set of units which themselves are
not meaningful (the so-called duality of patterning;
the phoneme s, e.g., is not meaningful by itself but
together with the phonemes k and y it may form
the meaningful unit sky). Second, an infinite set of
sentences can be created from a finite set of rules
(productivity or generativity of language). Finally,
there is the feature of displacement, meaning that we
can express anything irrespective of it being present
in the current moment (Fitch, 2010; Hockett, 1959).
Language is not bound to one modality but can be
spoken, written, or signed.
The faculty of language evolved not only in re-
sponse to biological but also to cultural demands and
is continuously adapted and changed through cul-
tural transmission. This results in a great diversity of
forms and structures so that the notion of universal
features shared by all languages (so called language
universals) nowadays is highly controversial (Evans
& Levinson, 2009; Hauser, Chomsky & Fitch, 2002;
Levinson & Evans, 2010). Giving the sentence “The
farmer kills the duckling” as an insightful example,
Edward Sapir (1921, p. 65-96) shows how concep-
tual information is coded in the grammar of the
English language: The noun “farmer” signifies a
doer, the verb “kills” marks something being done.
The categories subject and object tell us who initi-
ates and who receives an action. The grammatical
category of number indicates how many of a kind
were involved. The category of tense tells us when
the event happened, etc. Sapir identified thirteen
of these grammatical-conceptual units in this sen-
tence. In certain other languages, this information
may be coded differently or not at all, whereas still
other languages may grammatically code aspects
that are missing in English (e.g., was the action ob-
served or only received by hearsay?, see Chapter 12,
“Language and Thought”).
While languages differ widely regarding forms
and structures, at their core, they all enable a de-
tailed and abstract representation and description
of the world that is independent of the current con-
text. Against this background, in the present chapter,
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we discuss the nature of language as a means which
allows for representation and communication, which
in turn lie at the core of the human faculty of think-
ing and problem solving.
First, we lay grounds in sections on how lan-
guages are usually learned (language acquisition;
implict grammar leaning) and how we deal with
more than one language (Bi-/Multilingualism). We
then turn to research on language as a tool for rep-
resentation and communication (Language as em-
bodied simulation; Alignment in dialogue). We
close with a look at studies that show the role
of language in shaping our views of the social
world.
11.1 Language Acquisition
How do people acquire language? If you had been
born and grown up in China, would you be able to
speak Chinese? The answer to this question is obvi-
ously “yes”. According to the hypothesis of Noam
Chomsky, an American linguist, people are born
with a universal grammar, a “language acquisition
device” (LAD; see, e.g., Chomsky, 2011). Most im-
portantly, learning a first language is possible with-
out much instruction (implicit learning, grammar
learning). Arthur Reber is an American researcher
who first analyzed this process of implicit learning
by means of artificial grammars (see Textbox 11.1
below and Reber, 1967, 1989).
Textbox 11.1: Implicit learning with artificial grammars
People learn the (inherently complicated) grammar of their first language L1 without explicit
instruction. How is this possible? To experimentally research the processes behind grammar
learning, Arthur Reber had the idea to use artificial grammars. Grammars are sets of rules, in the
case of language, for example, rules for correct positions of words in sentences. A correct sentence
can be understood as a series of transitions between different types of words. Instead of words,
Reber decided to set up a simple grammar that constitutes transitions between letters. See, for
example, the following graph with six knots (S0 to S5). The labelled arrows indicate the transitions
between knots which are allowed according to the grammar. All transitions here are unidirectional,
the arrows’ labels are the letters A to H, respectively:
Figure 11.1: Artificial grammar with six knots, S0 to S5, and eight unidirectional transitions between them shown as labelled
arrows; the labels are the letters A to H, respectively. The graph is similar to the one used by Reber (1967).
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Imagine you start working with the graph at S0, where you can choose either the way up to S1,
thereby producing an „A“, or the way down to S2, producing a „B“. We choose S1, move on to S3
(we have no other choice), producing a „C“. Then at S3, we could either stay there and produce
a single „E“ (or a series of them), or move on to S5, producing an „F“ and reaching the end. We
have produced a trail of letters: ACEF. This is a letter sequence that is compatible with the shown
grammar. Other acceptable letter sequences could be BDG, BHCEEF, ACEEEEF. A sequence like
ABCD would be equally incompatible with this grammar as would be GDB, as according to the
shown grammar, there is no arrow back from G to D or from D to B.
Reber found that participants, when presented with sequences of letters without being told about
underlying rules, could differentiate compatible from incompatible sequences far beyond random
despite their inability to explain the reasons (i.e., they were not aware of the hidden structure of the
grammar). Reber concluded that participants had learned about correct and incorrect sequences
in an implicit way: they could not explicitly give reasons for their grammaticality judgements but
showed with their above-random decisions that they had learned the rules of transitions.
The Leipzig-based anthropologist Michael
Tomasello developed another idea concerning lan-
guage acquisition. He argues for a Usage-Based
Theory (UBT; Tomasello, 2003) without innate
grammar detection. Instead, more general cogni-
tive “modules” come into play. Children use their
innate faculty to categorize, to use analogies, and to
understand action intentions. Through listening in
social interactions, within a context of joint attention
where the child and adult(s) coordinate their atten-
tion toward each other and toward a third object,
children extract grammatical categories and rules.
They first produce simple constructions (e.g., There
is x, I x this) which they apply by analogy to new
situations. Further on in the acquisition process they
then combine the constructions to more complex
utterances (There is the X that mummy Yed). The
UBT offers a challenging alternative to the idea of
innate grammar learning.
Typically developing individuals acquire a lan-
guage by passing through a sequence of stages. In
a rough sketch, it starts with the first sounds, fol-
lowed by babbling, then the first words (“milk”),
then a two-word stage (“sit chair”) up to full use
of language. Acquisition of syntactic rules and a
growing size of vocabulary is part of this sequence.
An important fact is that there are sensitive periods
for the different stages.
An interesting question concerns the ability of
primates such as chimpanzees to learn a language.
There have been a lot of experiments to train chim-
panzees. The most prominent case of alleged lan-
guage acquisition in chimpanzees is reported by
Gardner and Gardner (1969). They trained an in-
fant female chimpanzee named "Washoe" to use the
gestural language of the deaf, American Sign Lan-
guage (ASL). After 22 months of training, Washoe
could use 30 signs appropriately and spontaneously.
Transfer to new referents as well as combinations
and recombinations of signs have been observed.
From other studies it is known that nonhuman pri-
mates can indeed learn to manipulate symbols to
gain certain rewards (Snowdon, 1990). But in the
end, there not only remains a quantitative difference
between chimps and humans but also qualitative dif-
ferences. An example is the level of meta-language
(i.e., speaking about speaking) or figurative language
including the understanding of irony which have not
been found in animals at all.
11.2 Bi- and Multilingualism
Is there a price to pay if a child grows up, for exam-
ple, with parents who speak two different languages,
or if a child grows up in Germany (learning Ger-
man as their first language, L1) and then, say at
the age of 3, moves to the US to learn English as
a second language, L2? The case of bilingualism
(two languages) or multilingualism (more than two
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languages) is an interesting and rather common phe-
nomenon.
The Critical Age Hypothesis states that during
the first years of life, a person would learn any lan-
guage as L1, given that enough verbal stimulation is
present. After that critical period, learning another
language requires much more attention and explicit
instructions. This points to different mechanisms of
acquisition and learning behind L1 and L2 respec-
tively. The hypothesis, including critical remarks, is
described in more detail by Vanhove (2013).
In the beginning of bilingualism research, the as-
sumption was that a bilingual person might have
disadvantages due to the increased load of keeping
two language systems separate. In later research,
however, it was hypothesized that bilinguals might
have advantages through better trained executive
functions (EF) (e.g., Bialystok, Craik, Klein, &
Viswanathan, 2004). These EF are part of self-
regulation and thought control. Traditionally, they
comprise three control functions: updating of in-
formation, shifting/switching of attention, and in-
hibitory control of distractions. By now, several
studies have challenged the hypothesis of cognitive
benefits through bilingualism. Paap et al. (2015,
2017), for example, tested the hypothesis that bilin-
guals might have advantages in EF and found no
evidence for such positive effects. However, the de-
bate is ongoing and recent publications again argue
for cognitive benefits of multilingualism (cf. Quin-
teros Baumgart & Billick, 2018).
11.3 Language as Embodied
Simulation
It is commonly agreed that language recruits neuro-
logical structures that have been around for a longer
time than language itself (Zuidema, 2013). The the-
oretical approach of language as embodied simula-
tion draws upon this idea: it assumes that language
processing is principally grounded in sensorimotor
experience and shares representational formats with
non-linguistic processes, such as perceiving and act-
ing (see Chapter 5, “Knowledge Representation and
Acquisition”). Such experiences leave traces in our
minds that become reactivated in comprehending
language. Thus, language comprehension basically
is simulating the reality that is being described lin-
guistically (Zwaan & Madden, 2005). This contrasts
with the traditional view of language comprehen-
sion as the process of manipulating abstract symbols
and creating amodal representations, and only then
to interact with other cognitive systems (Weiskopf,
2010).
Empirical evidence supporting the embodied lan-
guage view stems from experiments that show ef-
fects of linguistically described reality on people’s
behavior and on neuronal responses which cannot
easily be reconciled with the idea of amodal and
abstract representations (Buccino, Colage, Gobbi, &
Bonaccorso, 2016). To give an example of the effect
of appearance (cf. Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001), a de-
scription of a nail that is pounded into a wall implies
a different orientation of the nail than one of a nail
pounded into a floor. After reading respective de-
scriptions of objects, participants had to determine
if a presented picture showed an object mentioned in
the previous sentence. Response times were shorter
when the verbal description matched the appearance
of the object in the picture, suggesting that the ap-
pearance of an object in a described context is part of
the mental representation of the sentence, even when
it is in no way relevant to solving the task. Besides
their appearance, objects are also characterized by
their pragmatic features that determine how and for
what purpose we deal with these objects. Studies on
the role of these pragmatic features, also called af-
fordances of objects, in comprehension showed that
participants processed information faster or found it
more sensible when it matched affordances of afore-
mentioned objects (e.g., filling a sweater with leaves
(afforded) versus water (not afforded) to substitute
for a pillow; Glenberg & Robertson, 2000).
Effects of action compatibility can be observed
when an experimental task comprises movements
toward or away from the body that are compatible
or not with a linguistically described movement. Ac-
tion compatibility effects even occur for abstract
movements such as radioing a message or telling a
story (Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002). Further studies
support the notion that not only simple and concrete
objects are subject of simulation. Objects that are
part of negated sentences appear to be simulated,
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too (e.g., There was no eagle in the nest/sky; Kaup
et al., 2007), as are contents of figurative language
and abstract concepts (e.g., the balance of justice, cf.
Gibbs & Perlman, 2010).
Recent discussions of the approach of embod-
ied language focus less on the question of whether
representations are in principle either grounded in
sensory experience or symbolic but rather on the de-
gree to which language users simulate the content of
linguistic input during comprehension. This seems
to depend on their expertise regarding the content,
their linguistic skill, and the content itself, as, for
example, the description of a cooking show is eas-
ier to simulate than the content of a legal document
(Zwaan, 2014, 2016). Neurophysiological data ten-
tatively but not yet conclusively support the notion
of language processing as simulation (e.g., Buccino
et al., 2016; Mollo, Pulvermüller & Hauk, 2016).
This approach highlights the possible role of lan-
guage in problem solving. Capturing a problem
space in language does not necessarily translate it
into an abstract amodal code but may rather help to
properly represent perceptual aspects of the situa-
tion, spatial relations, temporal or spatial dynamics,
or a perceiver’s perspective by simulating what is
being described in an experience-based manner. In
this sense, solving problems that comprise sensori-
motor aspects should benefit from experience-based
simulation through language.
11.4 Alignment in Dialogue
Dialogue represents the most natural use of lan-
guage and is closest to the conditions of its early
stages in evolution (as opposed to monologue, as
well as reading and writing; written language was in-
vented only about 7000 years ago; Zuidema, 2013).
In terms of problem solving, dialogue is a powerful
form of action that enables the exchange of ideas,
joint planning, and transfer of experience and exper-
tise independent of context (see Chapter 5, “Knowl-
edge Representation and Acquisition”). From a psy-
cholinguistic point of view, dialogue is characterized
by a constant exchange between interlocutors, re-
quiring listeners to be prepared to speak, and speak-
ers to listen throughout the process.
Traditionally, language production and compre-
hension have often been studied separately and
mostly out of social or even out of larger linguis-
tic context. Representations underlying production
and comprehension were not considered to be nec-
essarily linked and the separate stages of planning
an utterance—from preverbal concepts via syntac-
tic, lexical and phonological encoding to phonetic
realization (cf. Levelt, 1989)—were supposed to
be irrelevant to the listener. The listener would in
turn create their representation of the utterance in
stages—from decoding sounds through to a concep-
tual understanding—which used to be considered
irrelevant to the speaker. An interesting question is
that of how can a dialogue, with its constant changes
of roles in real time, its overlapping complex pro-
cesses of interpreting and planning, be so easy and
effortless, even for young children?
Pickering and Garrod (2004) proposed an interac-
tive alignment model of dialogue stating that inter-
locutors adjust and align their representations on all
linguistic levels: on the level of the situation model
representing the described content in context, on the
level of syntax and the lexicon, through to the level
of articulation and speech rate. According to this
approach, comprehension and production draw upon
the same representations and are based on closely
intertwined processes, not only intra- but also inter-
individually. Each linguistic level in a speaker’s ut-
terance influences the respective level of the listener
in comprehension and in turn the planning of follow-
ing utterances. A word that has been comprehended
is more likely to be produced; repeating a word or
using semantically similar words enhances the align-
ment of syntax, and so forth (see Figure 11.2; cf.
Garrod & Pickering, 2009). When, in a dialogue,
the listener becomes the speaker, the process contin-
ues with changed roles. The ease with which this
constant role change takes place and with which
interlocutors, for example, complete each other’s
utterances is enabled by highly automatized priming
processes, with each level on the production side
priming the respective level of the hearer on the
comprehension side. The result is a high level of
repetition and a high level of imitation in dialogue
(Pickering & Garrod, 2004).
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Figure 11.2: The figure shows the different levels of linguistic representation involved in language comprehension and in language
production and the relatedness between the levels within and between two interlocutors A and B in dialogue, according
to the interactive alignment model (Fig. 2 from Pickering & Garrod, 2004; reproduced by permission of Cambridge
University Press).
The approach of interactive alignment locates and
studies language in the context of its function as an
action (Garrod & Pickering, 2009; Pickering & Gar-
rod, 2013). It thereby places language in line with
other strategies of coordinating one’s behavior with
others, based on perception-action links (Garrod &
Pickering, 2004). Perceiving a facial expression or
body posture often results in (overt or covert) im-
itation (Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001). In a similar
way, comprehending language (i.e. perceiving) goes
along with emulating the interlocutor’s action of
language production - this in turn facilitates one’s
own production (Pickering & Garrod, 2013). As
Dijksterhuis and Bargh (2001, p. 3) put it “In sum,
perception is for doing”.
Alignment in dialogue has been studied in diverse
paradigms. Garrod and Anderson (1987) presented
participants with a maze game in which dyads of
players who were seated in separate rooms had to
find their ways through a maze, made up of paths,
nodes, and gates, to reach a goal. Coordination
was required since, for a player, only his or her
own position in the maze was visible and move-
ments of one player could change the configuration
of gates in the partner’s maze. Thus, players were
motivated to work out each other’s position in di-
alogue and to coordinate their movements toward
the goal. Dialogues showed that, without explicit
negotiation, partners quickly converged on specific
representations of the maze and respective ways
of describing it (e.g., by moving along a path, by
referring to a line intersection or describing a sub-
section of the maze figuratively). These patterns
of description changed between games, suggest-
ing that they emerged locally in a specific dialogue
through alignment. In an experimental demonstra-
tion of alignment of syntax, Branigan, Pickering,
and Cleland (2000) developed a “confederate script-
ing technique”, with two persons participating in a
dialogue about pictures describing actions involving
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an agent, a patient, and a beneficiary. One partici-
pant was a confederate who described the depicted
scene with systematically varying syntactic struc-
ture (The A gives/hands/offers/. . . the B to the C
or The A gives/hands/offers/. . . the C the B). The
study shows that participants adjusted their syntax
to the confederate’s, for example, tending to use a
prepositional phrase when the confederate had just
used one. The effect was stronger when confederate
and participant used the same verb but also occurred
between descriptions with different verbs.
The universal quality and robustness of align-
ment has been underlined by studies showing effects
across modality (people align their speech styles to
words that they listen to or lip read; Miller, Sanchez,
Rosenblum, 2010) as well as across languages (as
shown in code switching by Kootstra, van Hell &
Dijkstra, 2010, and in dialogues of bilingual speak-
ers with differing L1 and a shared L2; Trofimovich
& Kennedy, 2014).
As mentioned earlier, alignment is assumed to
happen implicitly and automatically. This contrasts
with other views on dialogue. Coordination in di-
alogue, for example, was supposed to go back to
the common ground (Clark, 1996), shared knowl-
edge based on communal experience (such as cul-
ture, language, ethnicity) and personal experience.
Common ground in the traditional view has to be es-
tablished and updated in working memory to make a
dialogue aligned. In the interactive alignment frame-
work, however, common ground is created bottom
up through what is shared between interlocutors.
Well-aligned interlocutors do not have to infer mean-
ing because they both sample from very similar rep-
resentations, including situation models. Only in
case of apparent misalignment may common ground
be established as an explicit strategy. It is part of a
repair process, not of the regular process of align-
ment (Pickering & Garrod, 2004).
The fact that linguistic behavior is deeply em-
bedded in a larger social and behavioral context is
underlined by findings that show the influence of
non-linguistic factors (e.g., gender or quality of a
relationship) on the degree of conversational conver-
gence (Gambi & Pickering, 2013; Pardo, Gibbons,
Suppes, & Krauss, 2012).
The interactive-alignment model of human dia-
logue underlines the deeply social function of lan-
guage, which means efficiently communicating and
coordinating with our fellow human beings. In the
final part of the chapter, we further broaden our per-
spective on the social nature of language and present
evidence for its influential role in shaping our under-
standing of social reality.
11.5 The Role of Language in
Representing and Constructing
Social Reality
Because language use is both ubiquitous and autom-
atized, the influence of language on representing and
constructing social reality is both powerful and sub-
tle (see Chapter 12, “Language and Thought”). Sev-
eral linguistic biases have been identified in the lit-
erature. Semin and Fiedler (1988) proposed the Lin-
guistic Category Model stating that different kinds
of descriptions of persons and their behaviors vary
in terms of abstractness. This, in turn, affects how
informative a description about a person is and how
temporally stable a described quality is perceived
to be. For example, descriptive action verbs refer
to a particular activity in a specific situation (e.g.,
kiss, talk, stare) and do not reveal lasting features
of a person. Interpretive action verbs (such as help,
inhibit, imitate) still refer to observable actions that,
however, belong to a more general class of behav-
iors and require interpretation. Still more abstract
is a description with state verbs referring to mental
or emotional states with no clear beginning and end
(hate, like, notice). Finally, descriptions based on
adjectives (e.g., honest, reliable, creative) abstract
characteristics from observable behavior and a con-
crete context and assign dispositional qualities that
are rather stable over time.
Relying on this model, studies on Linguistic In-
tergroup Bias showed that descriptions of persons
and their behaviors differ in their level of abstract-
ness, depending upon the person belonging to an
observer’s ingroup or outgroup and on the behav-
ior being desirable or not (Maass, Salvi, Arcuri &
Semin, 1989). Favorable behaviors by outgroup
members are described in a more concrete way (e.g.,
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X helped somebody as opposed to X acted in an
altruistic way), implying that this behavior might
not be stable over time. In contrast, undesirable
behaviors of outgroup members are described in
rather abstract ways (e.g., X is being aggressive as
opposed to X hit somebody), inviting one to general-
ize from the situation and thus suggesting stability
over time. Descriptions of ingroup behavior follow
the opposite pattern, with desirable behavior being
described more abstractly and unfavorable behavior
more concretely. This implies stability of the desir-
able and dependence on the situational context of
the undesirable behavior.
Further research suggests that the dimension of
abstractness versus concreteness underlying person
descriptions may reflect observers’ expectations,
called the Linguistic Expectancy Bias (Wigboldus,
Semin & Spears, 2000). Behaviors that are expected
on the basis of stereotypes about social groups are
described on a more abstract level (Alice is emo-
tional) and lead to inferences regarding a person’s
disposition whereas behaviors that violate stereo-
types and are therefore unexpected are described in
concrete terms (Paul brushes tears from his eyes).
Such behavior is rather attributed to the situational
context and not to a person’s disposition. Besides
the level of abstraction, the use of negation may also
indicate if a behavior is expected or not. Beuke-
boom, Finkenauer, and Wigboldus (2010) showed
that participants used more negations to describe
a behavior that violated stereotypical expectations
(e.g., Mary is not bad at math rather than Mary is
good at math). Furthermore, they interpreted nega-
tions as indicating that a described behavior deviated
from the speaker’s expectancies (i.e., the speaker
did not expect Mary to be good at math), attributed
them more strongly to situational than dispositional
factors and evaluated negated descriptions as more
neutral than affirmative descriptions (i.e., being not
bad at math is not as good as being good at math;
the analogue applies to negative attributes: being
not kind is less unkind than being unkind).
Aspects of interpersonal context have been shown
to affect these biases and that in principle they can
be used strategically, such as when the communica-
tive goal is to convince an interlocutor or to mitigate
a negative description (e.g., stating that someone is
not smart is less offensive than saying he or she is
stupid; cf. Beukeboom, 2014). However, on a daily
basis of communication and based on highly autom-
atized processes of stereotype activation in language
use, these biases work implicitly beyond people’s
awareness.
The previous research shows that expectations
based on social stereotypes are expressed linguisti-
cally in subtle ways. The following studies further
underline how deeply interwoven processing lan-
guage is with our ideas about (social) reality. Using
eye-tracking methodology during reading and there-
fore assessing the process of understanding on a
moment-to-moment basis, these experiments show
that violations of our expectations concerning social
reality slow down fundamental aspects of language
comprehension, such as interpreting pronouns or
assigning thematic roles.
In a study by Reali, Esaulova, and von Stock-
hausen (2015), participants read descriptions of typ-
ical activities of a person being in a specific profes-
sion. The person was denoted by initials only, so
that gender was not indicated. The professional role
could either be typically male, typically female, or
neutral. A typically male description read, for ex-
ample, M.F. repairs and produces furniture, works
with wood. Each description was followed by a
target sentence that contained a personal pronoun
referring to the described person, such as Usually
he/she has a sufficient income. When the pronoun
was not congruent with the gender stereotype of
the described role (such as carpenter + she, florist
+ he), participants had greater difficulties to resolve
the pronoun as reflected in longer fixation times. It
is worth noting that neither was gender explicitly
indicated in the descriptions nor did they contain
role nouns that directly denote the profession. Thus,
the gender-related expectations could only be based
on the gender typicality of the described behavior.
Effects were independent of participants’ individual
gender attitudes.
Esaulova, Reali, and von Stockhausen (2017)
showed effects of expectations regarding gender typ-
ical roles and behavior on comprehending thematic
structures. Take as an example the two sentences
The flight attendant who observed many tourists
is attentive and The flight attendant whom many
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tourists observed is attentive. These sentences dif-
fer regarding the thematic roles of the protagonists
that relate to the performed action. In the first sen-
tence, the flight attendant takes the agent role (i.e.,
initiates or causes the action), the tourists take the
patient role (i.e., receive the action). In the second
sentence, roles are swapped with the flight attendant
now receiving the action and the tourists causing it
(taking the agent role). In the English translation
of the materials, thematic roles are clearly indicated
by the relative pronoun who/whom. However, in the
original (in German), both versions were identical
until the end of the relative clause was reached and
the verb form indicated who did the observing (sin-
gular form in case of the flight attendant, plural form
in case of the tourists). That is, only after reading
both nouns were participants able to solve the ambi-
guity regarding thematic roles. By then they were
expected to have built up expectations regarding
agent and patient depending on the role nouns’ gen-
der typicality (flight attendant is a typically female
role, tourist is neutral) and depending on grammati-
cal gender (masculine or feminine). Eye movements
showed that participants took longer to resolve the
relative clause and found it more difficult to assign
the agent role to a role noun in feminine rather than
masculine grammatical gender and to typically fe-
male as opposed to neutral role nouns. Feminine
grammatical gender (which usually indicates female
biological gender) and female gender typicality bet-
ter qualified a noun for the thematic role of patient
than agent, reflecting the strong link between mas-
culinity and agency in gender stereotypes (Koenig,
Mitchell, Eagly, & Ristikari, 2011).
The reported effects in eye movements oc-
curred within the very first stages of understand-
ing, based on highly automatized processes and
not being strategically controlled (for replications
see Esaulova, & von Stockhausen, 2015; Reali,
Esaulova, Öttl, & von Stockhausen, 2015).
To summarize, there are implicit biases in lan-
guage production and comprehension that express
social stereotypes and, in both listeners and speak-
ers, lead to stereotype congruent inferences (Beuke-
boom, 2014). It is in that sense that language does
not only reflect but also shapes and maintains social
reality. The underlying mechanisms are deeply em-
bedded in lexical, semantic, and syntactic features
of language and our use of them: the verbs we use
for a description, our use of negation, interpreting
pronouns and relative clauses, our assignment of
thematic roles. In this way, we are dealing with an
essential aspect of the nature of language, that of
representing and expressing our sense of reality.
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Summary
1. The term language covers a number of cognitive processes that enable humans to represent
and communicate information efficiently and independently of context. Examples include the
simulation of perceptual experience in language, the alignment of interlocutors in dialogue
and the representation of social reality in language structure.
2. Language is acquired in the first years of life without explicit instruction through implicit
strategies. In later years, language acquisition requires active attention.
3. Language has its roots in perception and is a tool for action. According to the approach of
language as embodied simulation, language comprehension basically is simulating what is
being described.
4. The most natural use of language is in dialogue. The interactive alignment model accounts
for the typical fluency and ease in dialogue by assuming that interlocutors automatically align
on all levels of linguistic representation.
5. Our views of social reality are reflected in language use, for example, in how abstractly or
concretely we describe a person’s behavior, in patterns of negation, or in thematic structures.
Production and interpretation of these language-based social cues occurs automatically.
6. Through representation and communication, language carries our experiences and ideas into
problem solving, reasoning, decision making, goal setting and planning.
Review Questions
1. What makes human language different from animal communication?
2. In what way can language be considered a tool for action?
3. How does the close relation between perceptual experience and language contribute to planning
and problem solving?
4. What cognitive mechanisms are considered to make common dialogue so fluent and easy?
5. Where do expectations about social groups surface in language use?
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Lisa von Stockhausen
My research program addresses the question of how linguistic structures and
cognitive processes reflect social reality. Specifically, in my lab we study
automatic processes underlying the representation of gender in language. In
our experiments, participants are confronted with linguistic input that may
conflict with their expectations concerning social reality, such as men working
in typically female occupations or taking passive (patient) thematic roles.
Using methods of measurement with high temporal resolution (such as
eye-tracking), we could show that violating expectations regarding social cate-
gories slows down language comprehension in its earliest stages, indicating the
highly automatized ways in which social cognition is embedded in language.
Another area of my research are cognitive mechanisms underlying mindful-
ness. The focus here lies on the question of and how guiding one’s attention
(to the present moment and without judgment) can be trained, how this affects our basic faculty of
attention regulation and in turn processes of self-regulation.
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Glossary
alignment model of dialogue Models dialogue
as a process of adjusting all levels of language
processing to one’s partner and thereby draw-
ing on representations shared by both inter-
locutors. Explains how dialogue is complex
(constant change between comprehension and
production at high speed) and easy at the same
time. 200, 203
bi-/multilingualism Definitions differ depending
on research traditions but basically the term
denotes the regular use of more than one lan-
guage by a person. Often one language is
more dominant than another depending on its
proficiency and share in daily use. 200, 201
dialogue Language use in a social context with two
interlocutors. Comprises constant changes be-
tween comprehension and production. Most
natural form of language use. 203
embodied simulation Denotes a theoretical ap-
proach to language processing that concep-
tualizes the process of understanding as simu-
lating actual sensory experiences. 200, 202
executive functions Human faculty of executing
several complex cognitive tasks in parallel.
Usually broken down into the components of
forming and updating a mental set, set shift-
ing (cognitive flexibility) and set maintenance
(inhibitory control). 202
implicit learning Process of learning (i.e. poten-
tial of behavioral change) by way of associ-
ating co-occurrent information that does not
need instruction and often happens unnoticed
by the learner. 200
language A system of communication that is gov-
erned by a system of rules (a grammar) that
allows an infinite number of ideas to be ex-
pressed given finite resources. 199
language acquisition Process of learning a (first)
language without instruction. Healthy chil-
dren in common social conditions acquire lan-
guage within their first years effortlessly, go-
ing through rather defined stages. 200
language universals For a long time prominent
idea in linguistics that there are features
shared by all languages. Nowadays highly
controversial. 199
linguistic biases Point to the subtle ways in which
language contributes to constructing social
reality. Behavior that violates expectations
about social groups is described in more con-
crete ways or by using negations. Typical
gender roles are reflected in language seman-
tically and grammatically. 205
phoneme Smallest sound unit of language that
by itself is not meaningful but differentiates
meaning. For example, k and h alone are
not meaningful but sky and shy are different
meaningful units of language. The smallest
non-meaningful unit of written language that
differentiates meaning is called grapheme, the
smallest signed unit chereme. 199
representation Mental process that reflects con-
tents of the mind (from memory, perceptions,
etc.) and allows other mental processes to
draw upon (repeat, elaborate, etc.). 199





Language is not indispensable for thought. Non-
human animals solve complex cognitive tasks while
lacking anything close to the human communica-
tion system; and human children achieve incredible
cognitive feats long before they are able to partic-
ipate in conversations. Still, language is our most
powerful tool for the bulk of cognitive activities we
frequently engage in, from the categorization of our
perceptions to the planning of our actions. But the
language we speak as our mother tongue is also a
tool with a history and of a specific shape. It is struc-
tured through and through, in ways that differ from
one language to the next, and it comprises classifi-
cation systems, sets of contrasts, and requests for
specifications that would seem to afford and sug-
gest some lines of thought more easily than others.
As we know from research on problem-solving (see
Chapter 9, “Problem Solving”), tools are typically
used in a specific context and for specific purposes,
while using them in novel ways is challenging for hu-
mans (e.g., Duncker, 1935). A similar phenomenon
might therefore be expected for language when used
as a tool for describing observations, categorizing
them, or drawing inferences from them. This anal-
ogy raises a tantalizing question: Do speakers of
different languages develop different views of the
world?
Suggestive phrasings that influence interpretation
and memory (Carmichael et al., 1932; Loftus &
Palmer, 1974), requests for using gender-neutral
or -inclusive language to reduce gender discrimina-
tion (Irmen & Kurovskaja, 2010; Prewitt-Freilino et
al., 2012), and the finding that repetitions of wrong
statements make them sound true (the illusory truth
effect; Bacon, 1979; Hasher et al., 1977), all attest
to the power that language can unfold in shaping the
social world (see Chapter 11, “The Nature of Lan-
guage”). But does it gain this power by only shaping
the world we live in or also by directly affecting our
cognition? To what extent do systematic differences
between languages and their grammatical structures
cause differences in how their speakers perceive,
categorize, reason, or make decisions?
To address these questions, we first present the
principle of linguistic relativity and its various read-
ings (sections 12.1 and 12.2). Two of the most plau-
sible readings are then examined in more detail, il-
lustrated with one example each: color perception
and numerical cognition (section 12.3). Against this
backdrop we then elaborate on the role of language
as a cognitive tool (section 12.4).
12.1 The Principle of Linguistic
Relativity
The idea that language may affect thought can be
traced back at least to the 18th century, to schol-
ars like Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803) or
Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835). Today, how-
ever, it is most strongly associated with the names
of ethnolinguists Edward Sapir (1884–1939) and
Benjamin Lee Whorf (1897–1941), which is why
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the idea in more recent literature is often referred
to as the “Sapir Whorf hypothesis” or the “Whor-
fian hypothesis”. Whorf (1956) himself used the
term “principle of linguistic relativity”, deliber-
ately in the style of Einstein’s principle of relativity
in physics—for two reasons. First, Whorf made
a claim similar to Einstein’s, namely, that objec-
tive or absolute descriptions of the world indepen-
dent of a given viewpoint are impossible (hence
“relativity”), in this case because our perceptions
and categorizations are influenced by the linguistic
structures implicit in our native languages. Second,
Whorf considered this linguistic relativity a premise
for research, not its target (hence a “principle” and
not a “hypothesis”). In the cognitive sciences, and
specifically in cognitive psychology, this idea is still
highly controversial, even to this date.
12.1.1 Fundamental Theses
The principle of linguistic relativity is based on three
general theses (Lucy, 1997; Wolff & Holmes, 2011):
• Languages differ with regard to how they de-
scribe the world. [Thesis 1]
• The specific way in which a language de-
scribes the world affects the experiences made
by its speakers. [Thesis 2]
• Speakers of different languages therefore ex-
perience the world differently. [Thesis 3]
Let us illustrate this argument with a concrete ex-
ample. Even closely related languages differ with
regard to classes into which they sort their nouns
(Thesis 1). So-called formal gender languages as-
sign a grammatical gender to every single noun. Ro-
mance languages like French, Italian, or Spanish,
for instance, contain two of these classes: masculine
and feminine. Other Indo-European languages like
Greek, German, or Russian make use of a neuter
in addition to the masculine and feminine. Parts of
Norwegian, Swedish, or Dutch conflate two of these,
namely, masculine and feminine gender as common
gender in opposition to the neuter gender. And En-
glish has given up all gender distinctions (at least
those that are not grounded in biological gender)
and hence is no longer a formal gender language.
Still, it differentiates gender in personal pronouns
(“he”, “she”, “it”), but even this apparently basic
categorization is not a linguistic universal. Polyne-
sian languages such as Tongan, for instance, distin-
guish between a single person, pairs of persons, and
groups of persons, and between selections of people
that do or do not include the addressee, but they do
not care about gender.
According to Thesis 2, linguistic categorizations
like gender classes or inclusion criteria for personal
pronouns help us to organize and structure the “kalei-
doscopic flux of impressions” in which the world
is presented (Whorf, 1956, p. 213f.). Since the lin-
guistic categories constitute the largely indiscernible
background against which our conscious considera-
tions take place, they do their organizing work with-
out our noticing it. It may appear only consistent,
therefore, to assume that linguistic categories in the
language in which one forms one’s thoughts would
contribute to shaping those very thoughts. Applied
to our example, such organizing would be at work if
speakers of German associated the sun more strongly
with female attributes because die Sonne is feminine,
and the moon more strongly with male attributes be-
cause der Mond is masculine—in contrast to, for
instance, speakers of Spanish, for which el sol is
masculine and la luna feminine (Koch et al., 2007).
Thesis 3, finally, implies that speakers of Ger-
man differ in their associations of sun and moon
from speakers of Spanish precisely because the two
languages assign grammatical gender reversely to
these two words. Examples like these are the key
target of crosslinguistic studies on linguistic relativ-
ity, and we come back to findings from such studies
in section 12.2.
12.1.2 Do Languages Differ in their
Description of the World?
As you may have noticed, if you read Chapter 7 on
deductive reasoning carefully, the three theses form
a syllogistic argument, in which Thesis 3 follows
logically from Theses 1 and 2. In other words, if
the first two theses are considered true, the third
one must also be considered true. But even the ap-
parently least controversial Thesis 1 was rejected
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for several decades in both psychology and linguis-
tics. Distinguished scholars advocated the position
that the commonalities of human languages, which
they attributed to a “universal grammar” module in
humans, by far outweigh the differences between
languages (e.g., Chomsky, 1986; Pinker, 1994). On
this account, the diversity in, for instance, gender
categories and gender assignment to nouns across
languages would be considered a minor detail that
would be irrelevant to how people perceive objects
and their properties.
With more indepth investigations of a broad range
of languages, however, the differences between lan-
guages are now taken more seriously (Dabrowska,
2015; Evans & Levinson, 2009), and some of these
differences are involved in coding and emphasizing
relevant information in sensible, if even in language-
specific ways. For instance, when expressing motion
by way of verbs, some languages (such as English,
Russian, or Chinese) emphasize the manner of the
movement over its path whereas others (including
Spanish, Greek, or Japanese) emphasize path over
manner. For illustration, compare the following two
sentences which are borrowed from Papafragou and
Selimis (2010, p.227, footnote 2):
(1) The bird is flying out of the cage.
(2) The bird is exiting from the cage (flying).
In (1), the emphasis rests on the manner of motion
(here: flying in contrast to, say, tripping), while in
(2) it rests on the path of motion (exiting in contrast
to, say, entering). In English, the manner of motion
is expressed by the verb itself (“flying”), whereas
path information is expressed by way of a prepo-
sition (“out of”). A roughly comparable statement
in Greek (2) expresses information on the path of
motion in the verb (“exiting”) whereas the manner
of motion would have to be explicated by way of an
attribute (here as “flying”) or actually in a second
sentence with a new verb.
Such language-specific differences are also docu-
mented for other types of semantically meaningful
categories (such as tense in verbs, or the distinc-
tion between countable objects and substances; see,
Wolff & Holmes, 2011, for an overview). For this
reason, the controversial debate has shifted in re-
cent years and is now focusing on Thesis 2: Does
the specific way in which a language describes the
world really affect the experiences of its speakers?
In other words: Do speakers of English and of Greek
perceive motions in distinct and different ways?
12.1.3 Do Different Descriptions of the
World Affect Our Experiences?
The most radical position with regard to the relation
of language and thought is the position of behav-
iorism, as represented by John Watson. Watson
conceived of thought simply as inner speech—a po-
sition that soon turned out to be untenable. The
position at the opposite end of the spectrum is advo-
cated, for instance, by Noam Chomsky, the linguist
who became famous in the 1950s for crushing be-
haviorist accounts of language. The view he made
popular is that language and thought are two entirely
separate and distinct modules (e.g., Chomsky, 1986),
hence precluding, by definition, any potentiality of
linguistic relativity (Pinker, 1994). Prevailing for
decades, this view still has supporters, but is slowly
losing ground. Specifically, developmental psychol-
ogists in the tradition of Lev Vygotsky and Jean
Piaget have been arguing that, while cognition and
language may emerge and develop independently
from one another, they become entangled later on
in a complex relationship. This view is further sup-
ported by empirical evidence that cognitive develop-
ment more generally spurs on language development
(overview in Harley, 2014).
The principle of linguistic relativity differs from
both the behaviorist and the modular position in that
it considers language and thought neither as iden-
tical nor as entirely separate. Nor do proponents
of linguistic relativity dispute that thought is pos-
sible without language or that it (at least ideally)
precedes language use. However, they emphasize
more strongly than others the possibility that prop-
erties of the language one speaks may also affect
aspects of how one thinks. Unfortunately, neither
Sapir nor Whorf elaborated their ideas on linguis-
tic relativity into a coherent theory. As one con-
sequence, research in this field is plagued to this
date by a plurality of possible readings. Our attempt
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to systematize these readings follows the overview
presented by Wolff and Holmes (2011).
One of the central dimensions on which possible
readings differ is concerned with the question of
whether language and thought are structurally paral-
lel or different. The former case would support the
position of linguistic determinism: In this case we
would be able to engage only in those thoughts that
our language permits. This most extreme form of lin-
guistic relativity—frequently associated with Whorf
even though he himself was rather ambivalent on
this view (Whorf, 1956; and see Lee, 1996)—is of
little intuitive plausibility and also refuted by empir-
ical research (overview in Wolff & Holmes, 2011).
This research demonstrated clearly that thought is
more strongly guided by properties of the world than
by linguistic labels (Imai & Gentner, 1997; Malt &
Wolff, 2010).
Even if one accepts that language and thought
may be structured in distinct ways, linguistic relativ-
ity could still unfold in one of several ways (Wolff
& Holmes, 2011; and see Figure 12.1). Depend-
ing on the specific reading, these would assume an
influence of language during
• thinking before language, that is, when we
organize our thoughts to prepare a linguistic
utterance (i.e., thinking for speaking),
• thinking with language, that is, when linguis-
tic representations enter into conflict with, or
instead support, non-linguistic representations
(language as meddler or as augmenter, respec-
tively),
• thinking after language, that is, when linguis-
tic effects linger on and thereby ‘color’ our
thoughts in language-specific ways (language
as spotlight and language as inducer).
In section 12.2, we explain in more detail the
first and third reading (thinking before and after lan-
guage) as they are closely associated, before turning
to two examples of the second reading (thinking
with language) in section 12.3.
12.2 Thinking before and after
Language
12.2.1 Thinking before Language
(“Thinking for Speaking”)
Lexical items make differentiations possible, as for
distinguishing between pastel green, moss green,
and turquoise. Grammatical structures do not simply
afford such differentiations but require them. When
we put our thoughts into words—and even before we
can begin doing this—a number of decisions need
to be made. These include having relevant informa-
tion available that need to be specified according to
the grammar/grammatical rules of the language we
intend to use. For illustration, take the categories of
tense and aspect that in many languages tend to be
realized in the verb. Both categories provide infor-
mation on time, but they focus on different facets
Figure 12.1: The most plausible ways in which language may affect thinking (according to Wolff & Holmes, 2011), and the relation
between them.
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of time: Tense specifies the time in which an event
takes place (e.g., in the past, present, or future),
while aspect specifies how this event extends over
time (e.g., whether it is ongoing versus terminated,
or whether it is progressive versus habitual).
In German, each verb form always requires an in-
stantiation of tense—for example, the present tense
in (3) and the past tense in (4)—but largely disre-
gards aspect.
(3) Dieser Papagai redet. [“This parrot talks”]
(4) Dieser Papagai redete. [“This parrot talked”]
In English, aspect needs to be specified in ad-
dition to tense, with (5) indicating habitual action,
whereas (6) indicates progressive action:
(5) This parrot talks.
(6) This parrot is talking.
In Tongan and other Polynesian languages, or in
Chinese, neither tense nor aspect is expressed in the
verb.
In order to form a grammatically correct sentence,
speakers of German therefore need to specify when
an event is happening, but need not specify whether
it is or is not ongoing. In other words: The aim
to express something in language forces one to pay
attention to specific types of information while we
may safely ignore others. This effect of language on
thought, famously labeled “thinking for speaking”
by Slobin (1996), emerges before language is actu-
ally used and can be observed in various domains
(Gennari et al., 2002; Papafragou et al., 2008). A
second example for this type is the distinct focus,
described earlier (in section 12.1.2), that languages
direct at either the manner or the path of motion
(Papafragou & Selimis, 2010).
12.2.2 Thinking after Language
If we accept an influence of thinking for speaking,
it follows almost naturally that an entire life of oc-
casions in which we need to verbalize our thoughts
would form habits regarding what we pay attention
to. These habits should have a certain likelihood to
linger on also in contexts in which respective infor-
mation is not immediately required for verbalization,
that is, during thinking without imminent need for
speaking. In emphasizing some distinctions—say,
with regard to time point or temporal course—more
than others through compulsory grammatical cat-
egories (here: tense or aspect), languages would
therefore still direct attention to the same types of
information in a regular and sustained manner, like
a spotlight (this is why Wolff & Holmes, 2011, dub
this instance of thinking after language the spotlight
effect). One of the instances Wolff and Holmes cite
for this effect is the gender distinction mentioned
earlier.
Yet, both in terms of theoretical plausibility and
of empirical support, the category of grammatical
gender has remained a rather controversial case. Se-
mantic gender languages assign a gender only to
living things that possess a biological gender (sex),
whereas formal gender languages extend the gender
distinction to all nouns regardless of whether their
referents have a sex. English is an example of the
former, German of the latter. The two languages
alike assign masculine gender to living things like
“man”, “son”, or “rooster”, and feminine gender to
“woman”, “daughter”, or “hen”. But while almost
all inanimate things are neuter in English, a large
proportion of them are categorized as masculine or
feminine in German (e.g., der Mond [themasc moon],
die Sonne [thefem sun]). Hence, as a formal class,
grammatical gender does not reflect genuine differ-
ences in the world. It serves the purely linguistic
function to generate congruence within sentences,
and particularly between the noun and the accompa-
nying article and adjective, as in (7) and (8):
(7) ein_ heller Mond [“a bright moon”]
(8) eine helle Sonne [“a bright sun”]
Notably, also, relatively few languages distin-
guish exactly between the two genders of interest,
namely, masculine and feminine gender; many oth-
ers categorize on different grounds, with some even
conflating the two (such as Swedish or Dutch) and
some distinguishing up to 20 different genders (Cor-
bett, 1991).
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Gender distinctions have still attracted consider-
able interest as a subject for studies on linguistic rel-
ativity (e.g., Boroditsky et al., 2003; Konishi, 1993).
A popular measure in these studies is the gender
congruency effect (see Chapter 11, “The Nature of
Language”). It emerges if the grammatical gender of
a noun (e.g., masculine in the case of Mond) is con-
gruent with the association of the respective referent
with a specific sex (here: moon as male). How-
ever, the more sophisticated the methods used for
investigation (e.g., adopting implicit tasks instead of
direct assessments), the more difficult it turned out
to replicate the initially positive findings (overview
in Bender et al., 2018).
For better suited and more convincing examples
of the spotlight effect we therefore need to turn to
domains in which linguistic categories do reflect—
and make salient—genuine characteristics of the
world. Only then do they have the potential and
the power to habitually redirect attention to these
characteristics.
One such example is spatial referencing. A frame
of reference (FoR) is a linguistic tool for describing
relations between entities. It provides a coordinate
system for locating a thing (say: a ball) in reference
to another thing (say: a boy) and comes in three
types (Levinson, 2003): The absolute FoR is aligned
with external fixed points such as the cardinal direc-
tions or a river; the intrinsic FoR is aligned with the
point of reference (here the boy); and the relative
FoR is aligned with the perspective of an observer.
Importantly, languages differ in which of these FoRs
they can use or prefer, and this in turn affects peo-
ple’s wayfinding skills, their cospeech gestures, how
they memorize relations and orders, or how they
think about time (Bender & Beller, 2014; Levinson,
2003; Majid, Bowerman, Kita, Haun, & Levinson,
2004).
12.3 Thinking with Language
Besides the obvious case of thinking for speaking
and the likely case of the spotlight effect, both of
which arise from the need to focus on information
requested by one’s grammar, two more readings of
linguistic relativity have been investigated quite ex-
tensively in the past decades: one focusing on the
possibility that linguistic representations enter into
conflict or interfere with non-linguistic representa-
tions (language as meddler), the other focusing on
the possibility that linguistic representations support,
augment, or even make possible non-linguistic repre-
sentations (language as augmenter). In both of these
cases, it is the role of language as a cognitive tool
that opens up an influence of language on thought.
12.3.1 Language as Meddler: The Case
of Color Perception
Color is an excellent example for investigating the
influence of language on perception and other cogni-
tive processes because colors can be exactly defined
and measured in terms of the wavelength of light.
The color terms we use to denote different colors
verbalize a categorical system that we impose on the
physically unstructured color spectrum, and hence
are a product of thought. The interesting question
now is whether these color terms, once established,
also impact on thought. That is: If two languages
divide the color spectrum in different ways, will the
speakers of these languages also perceive the colors
in different ways?
That languages indeed differ in how they divide
the color spectrum has been well known for half
a century (Berlin & Kay, 1969), systematically
documented in the World-Color-Survey, a large-
scale research program at the University of Califor-
nia, Berkeley (http://www1.icsi.berkeley.edu/wcs/).
This research program focuses on basic color terms—
words that are elementary, generally applied, and
broadly understood. In order to qualify as elemen-
tary, a color term needs to be a single word; com-
posed expressions like “dark red” or “forest green”
are therefore excluded. A color term is considered
general if it can be applied to any kind of object;
a term like “blond” is hence excluded because its
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usage is restricted to hair. Terms like “magenta” or
“burgundy”, finally, do not qualify because they are
not widely known.
Following these specifications, English is consid-
ered to comprise eleven basic color terms: “black”,
“grey”, and “white” for achromatic colors, and “red”,
“yellow”, “green”, “blue”, “orange”, “pink”, “pur-
ple”, and “brown” for chromatic colors (Berlin &
Kay, 1969). Many languages have fewer basic color
terms than English, but some languages also have
more. For instance, English uses different terms for
green and blue, whereas Welsh subsumes them un-
der one term (Lazar-Meyn, 2004), and both Italian
(Paggetti et al., 2016) and Russian (Davies & Cor-
bett, 1994) distinguish blue further into a light blue
and a dark blue (Table 12.1).
Do, therefore, speakers of Welsh, English, and
Italian or Russian perceive the respective colors dif-
ferently? This question can be investigated by select-
ing colors with equal intervals in their hue so that the
selected colors in one language all fall into the same
category (e.g., blue), while they are separated by a
categorical boundary in the other language, as with
goluboj versus sinij (see Figure 12.2a). If the lin-
guistic categorization has an impact on perception,
the difference between hues that are separated by
the categorical boundary should be overestimated,
compared to the identical difference between two
hues that belong to the same category. In our exam-
ple, this would be the case for speakers of Russian,
but not English. In adopting this strategy, several
studies could demonstrate that such a categorical
boundary does not influence color perception per
se, but does influence other cognitive processes in-
volved in similarity judgments, rapid distinctions
between hues, learning of new color categories, or
the recognition of hues (Kay & Kempton, 1984;
Mitterer et al., 2009; Roberson et al., 2005).
One such study (Winawer et al., 2007) investi-
gated whether a categorical boundary affects color
discrimination in speakers of Russian compared
with speakers of English, using stimuli from the
color range denoted as “blue” in English (Fig-
ure 12.2a). Participants were shown squares in dif-
ferent shades of blue arranged in a triad and were
asked which of the two on the bottom matches the
one on the top (Figure 12.2b). In some trials, the
non-identical hue at the bottom was from the same
color category as the target hue; in others, it was
from the complementary color category. It turned
out that shades of blue were indeed easier to distin-
guish if they belonged to different categories than
if they belonged to the same category. Interestingly,
this holds particularly for stimuli projected onto the
right visual field, which is connected to the left hemi-
sphere in the brain (Gilbert et al., 2006). Brain areas
involved in color perception and language process-
ing are activated faster and more strongly by the
distinction of colors that belong to different cate-
gories (Siok et al., 2009) and of colors that are easy
to name (Tan et al., 2008).
Whether such effects of categorical boundaries
originate from conscious processes has not been con-
clusively clarified. At first glance, it seems plausible
that people use a naming strategy and that different
naming of colors leads to differently remembered
Table 12.1: Basic color terms in four Indo-European languages for the green-blue section.
Welsh glas
English green blue




Psychology of Human Thought • Chapter 12 • 219
Bender Language and Thought
Figure 12.2: Stimuli used in the study by Winawer and colleagues (2007): the different shades of blue (a) and an example of a stimuli
triad (b). Participants were asked to pick one of the two squares from the lower row that matched the color of the single
square above (©(2007) National Academy of Sciences, U.S.A.; permission to reprint granted).
colors (Mitterer et al., 2009). However, participants
themselves reported that the colors they categorized
as different actually looked different (Kay & Kemp-
ton, 1984, p.75). At least in this type of task, it
seems, therefore, that what tips the scales is not the
explicit verbal naming of the color but rather an
automatic, non-conscious activation of categorical
information.
The studies on color perception are the classic in
the field of linguistic relativity and have contributed
greatly to advancing the field in terms of both the-
oretical clarification and methodological elabora-
tion. Still, the potential effects of the (color) lexicon
should not be overrated. While the lexicon provides
options for differentiation from which speakers can
choose, these options can easily be complemented
in case they turn out to be insufficient. If you deem
neither “red” nor “brown” the appropriate label for
the color of a chestnut, you can consider using “red-
brown” or “chestnut-colored” or simply invent a
new label such as “maroon”. But the fact that color
perception is strongly determined by biological and
anatomic factors renders findings in this domain still
significant. After all, color vision is based on the ex-
act same mechanism in all members of our species
(apart from those with color blindness); the photore-
ceptor cells responsible for human color vision are
particularly sensitive for certain wavelengths of light
and hence for certain color experiences. In other
words: If verbally mediated differentiations are able
to modify cognitive processes even in this funda-
mental domain, an even stronger influence might be
expected in domains in which biological constraints
are less pronounced.
12.3.2 Language as Augmenter: The
Case of Numerical Cognition
Handling numbers is a key skill in modern daily
lives. While mathematics is something that many
people try to keep at arm’s length, the ability to pre-
cisely assess the number of a set of items certainly
strikes most as utterly simple. And yet, competently
dealing with numbers is not at all natural. A bio-
logically evolved precondition that we share with
many other species is the ability to perceive quan-
tity. This includes the ability to keep track of up to
four distinct items by way of immediate perception
(called subitizing) and to approximately estimate
larger quantities (Feigenson et al., 2004). By con-
trast, the ability for exact quantification (i.e., accu-
rately assessing, remembering, and reconstructing
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numbers beyond the subitizing range) is uniquely
human. It presupposes cultural mediation, specifi-
cally a cultural tool, and extensive training (Núñez,
2017). The prototypical tool essential for acquiring
this competence is a conventionalized counting se-
quence: an ordered list of number representations
(numerals), each of which refers to a clearly defined
exact number (Wiese, 2003).
Not all natural languages used by humans com-
prise such counting sequences. Mundurukú, for in-
stance, a language spoken in Amazonia, is counted
among the few attestable cases in which numerals
do occur, but lack precise numerical meaning. The
fifth numeral pũg põgbi, for instance, does not mean
precisely 5, but only roughly 5, and can refer to val-
ues from 4 up to 12, depending on context (Pica
et al., 2004). Pirahã, another Amazonian language,
is claimed to comprise no numerals at all (Everett,
2005). Psychological studies in these two Amazo-
nian groups indicate that the lack of precise numer-
als impairs the ability to exactly memorize, recall,
and match larger quantities (Frank et al., 2008; Gor-
don, 2004; Pica et al., 2004). Similar issues are
also observed in home-signers. A home-sign is a
rudimentary sign language typically developed by
deaf children to hearing parents. As home-signs
are created in the absence of linguistic input, they
typically lack conventionalized and stable counting
sequences (Spaepen et al., 2011). And even students
of US American Ivy League universities experience
the very same challenges in numerical tasks if they
are prevented (e.g., by verbal interference) from ac-
tively using number words (Frank et al., 2012).
However, the potential for differences between
languages is not confined to the presence or absence
of counting sequences. Counting sequences them-
selves can also vary extensively in terms of their
properties, which depend on the number and shape
of the elements in a sequence, their order and re-
lations, or the modality in which they are realized
(Bender & Beller, 2012; Chrisomalis, 2010; Widom
& Schlimm, 2012). No two number systems on
this planet would therefore be exactly alike. Even a
number as simple and small as 5 can be denoted in
Table 12.2: A selection of possibilities for representing 5.
Language/Cultural Example Representation Decomposition / Translation Range
Pirahã (Amazonia/Brazil) “hói”, “hoí”, or
“baágiso” (depending
on elicitation order)
“somewhat larger size or
amount”
[1 – 6] (hói)
[2 – 10] (hoí)
[3 – 10] (baágiso)
Mundurukú (Amazonia/Brazil) “pũg põgbi“ one hand [4 – 12]
English (various places) “five” 5 [5]
French (various places) “cinq” 5 [5]
Tongan (Polynesia) “nima” 5 [5]
Adzera (Papua New Guinea) “iru? da iru? da bits” 2 + 2 + 1 [5]
various ||||| or |||| 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 [5]
various 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 [5]
Roman (Early Middle Ages;
Mediterranean)
5 [5]
Sources: Beller & Bender (2008), Frank et al. (2008), Pica et al. (2004), and Turner (1951).
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fundamentally different ways (for some concrete ex-
amples, see Table 12.2): vaguely as “many”, by an
elementary word like “five”, by a compound trans-
lating into “2 + 2 + 1”, by five distinct notches on
a stick (or four upright notches crossed by a trans-
verse notch), or by presenting a hand with all fingers
extended (or closed).
The most obvious property in which counting se-
quences can differ is the modality in which they are
implemented: through objects such as tally sticks
or knotted strings (in the case of material systems);
through fingers and body parts more generally (in
the case of body-based systems); through number
words (in the case of verbal systems); and through
written notation such as the Hindu-Arabic digits or
the Roman numerals (in the case of notational sys-
tems). Other properties (illustrated below) involve
the presence or absence of a base and perhaps a
sub-base, the size of such bases, or the regularity
and transparency of how larger number words are
composed.
Crucially, these properties have cognitive impli-
cations, that is, they affect how numbers are rep-
resented and processed (Bender & Beller, 2017;
Bender et al., 2015; Schlimm & Neth, 2008). The
Hindu-Arabic digits, for instance, constitute a deci-
mal system; digits from 1 through 9 are represented
by distinct symbols, the base 10 and the powers to
which it is raised (e.g., 100, 1000, etc.) are repre-
sented by position (this is why the principle is often
called “place-value”: the value of a number is co-
determined by its place). The Roman numerals, by
contrast, constitute a system that uses sub-base 5 in
addition to base 10; basic numbers are largely repre-
sented in a cumulative manner (as I, II, III), whereas
sub-base, base, and their powers are represented by
distinct symbols (V, X, L, C, D, and M). Due to this
cumulative representation of basic numbers instead
of a place-value principle, it is actually easier to ex-
ecute basic arithmetic operations such as addition or
multiplication with the (original) Roman numerals
than with Hindu-Arabic digits (Schlimm & Neth,
2008).
Let us illustrate this for the addition of 16 and 27.
All additions require both declarative and procedural
knowledge. Declarative knowledge in the Hindu-
Arabic system includes the numerical value to which
a symbol refers as well as the sums of all relevant
100 single-digit addition facts. In other words: One
need to know beforehand that the sum of 6 and 7 is
13, and that adding 1, 1, and 2 yields 4. Procedural
knowledge includes, minimally, that numbers need
to be written so that the smallest values (the most
rightward number in each number representation)
are aligned, that numbers need to be added by po-
sition, starting from the right, and what to do with
carries:
Adding the very same numbers with Roman nu-
merals (XXVI and XVII) also requires declarative
and procedural knowledge. Here, however, the
declarative knowledge only needs to include the
order of the basic symbols (according to their value)
and the simplification rules inherent in the counting
sequence, such as IIIII→ V and VV→ X. Procedu-
ral knowledge gets by with a few very simple tricks:
start by joining the symbols of the addends
X X V I X V I I
order them according to their values
X X X V V I I I
and then simplify, with V V→ X:
X X X X I I I
As this example illustrates, the manner in which
numbers are represented in each of the two sys-
tems has an impact on how numerical information is
processed—some operations are just more straight-
forward with one type of representation than with an-
other. This phenomenon is called representational
effect (Zhang & Norman, 1995), and it emerges not
only for notational systems but for number systems
in general (Bender & Beller, 2012, 2018).
Another instance of this effect is that a system will
be understood, learned, and mastered more easily if
it is regularly structured and transparent. Compared
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to number systems in East-Asian and Polynesian
languages (Bender et al., 2015; Miura, 1987), the
systems in many Indo-European languages includ-
ing English are pretty irregular. The number words
from 1 through 10 are distinct and arbitrary, as in all
decimal verbal systems. Once base 10 is reached,
starting a new counting cycle with regularly com-
posed number words such as “ten-and-one”, “ten-
and-two”, etc. would reveal the base 10 structure.
English, however, blurs this structure with its spe-
cific number words “eleven” and “twelve”. Not
even “thirteen” is recognizable as “ten-and-three”,
which is why only at “fourteen” may a novice begin
to sense a recurrent pattern in the suffixed “-teen”
(Bender & Beller, 2018). Moreover, the difference
between numerals like “thirteen” and “thirty” hinges
on a crucial distinction between -teen and -ty, both
of which refer to the same number (10) though and
should therefore actually be identical. As a con-
sequence of these irregularities, English-speaking
children take more time than Chinese-speaking chil-
dren to learn their system and require more effort
for grasping its decimal structure and the algorithms
based on it (Fuson & Kwon, 1991; Miller et al.,
1995).
12.4 Language as Tool for Thought
As should have become clear by now, language is an
important tool for thought, aiding the coding, cate-
gorization, and storing of information as well as pro-
cesses of reasoning, decision making, and problem
solving. As we know from classic experiments in
psychology (see Chapter 9, “Problem Solving”), the
properties of a tool and the habits acquired during its
usage tend to affect how the tool is applied. One in-
stance illustrating this influence is the phenomenon
of functional fixedness: the tendency to use a tool in
conventional ways even if a new problem requires
a novel application (Duncker, 1935; Glucksberg &
Danks, 1968). A second instance is the so-called set
effect (or Einstellung effect): the tendency to stick
to a procedure that has worked before even if the
new problem requires a novel approach (Luchins &
Luchins, 1959). Applied to the case of language, we
distinguish in this last section two states of familiar-
ity: the standard state of a familiar language serving
as a well-known tool (sections 12.4.1), and the im-
plications that arise from using a foreign language
as an unfamiliar tool (sections 12.4.2). In contrast
to the familiar tool, which reinforces our cognitive
habits, the unfamiliar tool seems to reset these habits
to some extent.
12.4.1 Familiar Tool: Thinking by
Language
The first language we acquire is our native language
or mother tongue, and this language is with us dur-
ing major parts of cognitive development, while we
learn to categorize the things we perceive, discover
the world of numbers, or try to figure out solutions
for reasoning tasks and decision problems. As noted
by developmental psychologists in the tradition of
Vygotsky and Piaget, language and thought become
entangled in a complex relationship during this pro-
cess. In other words: language itself is like a glue
that keeps our non-domain-specific, cross-modular,
propositional thoughts together, “not just in the
sense that language is a necessary condition for us to
entertain such thoughts but in the stronger sense that
natural language representations are the bearers of
those propositional thought-contents” (Carruthers,
2002).
An example of the crucial role of language is the
emergence and development of a “theory of mind”
in children, which seems to benefit greatly from
linguistic support (Pyers & Senghas, 2009; de Vil-
liers, 2007). Theory-of-mind abilities emerge in all
normally developing human children; their onset,
however, depends on the amount of mental-state talk
in parent-child interactions. For instance, whereas
in the Western world, reflections on others’ mental
states are a topic of widespread interest and conver-
sation, numerous societies across the world appear
to adopt a perspective according to which mental
states are private and opaque (Luhrmann 2011). This
reluctance to openly speculate about the feelings, in-
tentions, or thoughts of others affects the ease with
which children acquire an understanding of such
notions (Vinden 1996; Wassmann et al. 2013).
A second example for illustrating the role of lan-
guage for cognition in a more general sense is nu-
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merical cognition, for here the invention of number
words was indispensable for processes of counting
and calculating (see section 12.3.2). In this case, spe-
cific linguistic representations are so essential for
cognitive processing that they are considered a com-
ponent of cognition itself. Such instances constitute
cases of extended cognition, in which information is
distributed to both mental and non-mental states and
in which cognitive processing involves both types
of information (Clark & Chalmers, 1998; Hutchins,
1995; Norman, 1993). For instance, the computation
of 26 and 17 described earlier requires information
on what each numerical symbol means or how to ex-
ecute a column addition (stored mentally), but also
relies on the presence of the numerals (stored on a
piece of paper).
Explanations of why using language as a tool
would affect thought follow a slightly different track,
where perception and categorization are concerned.
Explanations in this domain are based on the well-
known fact that information processing unfolds as
an interplay between bottom-up processing of sen-
sory signals and top-down predictions about what
these signals might be. In this interplay, language
plays a key role in that it serves as a main source for
generating predictions. If these predictions happen
to match the stimulus perceived, they help to dis-
cover things that would have otherwise been missed
(Lupyan & Clark, 2015; Lupyan & Ward, 2013).
This approach is refined by Cibelli and colleagues
(2016) for the controversial case of color perception.
It takes its point of departure in the category ad-
justment model proposed by Huttenlocher and col-
leagues (1991), according to which we tend to use in-
formation from two different sources when we have
to draw inferences under uncertainty. One source is
a fine-grained representation of the perceived stim-
ulus itself, the other source is a categorical system
devoted to the organization of perceptions and mem-
ories. If, for instance, we try to recall the exact color
of a stimulus, the two sources would be the color
seen and the linguistic color category in which it
falls. An influence of language on memory would
here be diagnosed when the recalled color shade
shifts in the direction of the prototypical shade of
the respective color category. This should be the
stronger, the less certain we are with regard to our
sensory impression, for instance because the stimu-
lus perception itself was imprecise or because our
memory of it is fading away.
It is exactly this correlation that Cibelli and col-
leagues (2016) observed, both in empirical studies
in which they manipulated the time span between
the presentation of the stimulus and the recall of the
memory, and in computer simulations of data from
cross-linguistic studies. Their account also provides
an elegant explanation of why effects of linguistic
relativity are not always reliably replicated—namely,
when experimental designs enable relatively high
degrees of certainty in participants’ perception or
memory. Finally, this model also allows account-
ing for influences of language on cognition while at
the same time supposing a universal foundation for
cognition.
In the two instances described in sections 12.3.1
and 12.3.2, language is actively used as an aid to cod-
ing, storing, and reasoning: the color terms provided
by language as a tool for identifying and memorizing
color, and number words as a tool for counting and
calculating. In these cases, language directly affects
cognitive processes, either because the linguistic rep-
resentations enter into conflict with non-linguistic
representations (language as meddler) or because
the linguistic representations support, augment, or
even make possible the non-linguistic representa-
tions (language as augmenter). Typically, this kind
of online influence diminishes when participants are
prevented from making use of language, for instance,
by way of a verbal interference task (e.g., Frank et
al., 2012; Roberson & Davidoff, 2000). The same
holds, of course, for instances of thinking for speak-
ing, as in the absence of a need for speaking the
effect will not arise. Instances of thinking after lan-
guage are different. Here, the language-inherent
need to pay attention to some information more than
other information has led to a form of habituation
that renders grammatically relevant aspects salient
(spotlight effect) even without immediate involve-
ment of language. An indirect or offline influence of
language like this is less likely suppressed by verbal
interference.
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Table 12.3: Framing variants of the Asian Disease task.
Alternative A (certain) Alternative B (uncertain)
positive framing 200 people will be saved. 1/3 probability that all 600 will be saved,
2/3 probability that none will be saved.
negative framing 400 people will die. 1/3 probability that nobody will die,
2/3 probability that all 600 will die.
12.4.2 Unfamiliar Tool: Thinking in a
Foreign Language
Speaking a second language has implications for
how one thinks. While habituated patterns of
thought typically develop in line with the dominant
language, bilinguals seem to switch between pat-
terns of thought, rather than transferring the pattern
from their dominant to the non-dominant language
(Kousta et al., 2008). In fact, learning a new lan-
guage with novel grammatical categories appears
to entail a cognitive restructuring in the bilingual
mind (Athanasopoulos, 2007). But using a sec-
ond language while thinking may also have more
general effects on the outcome of the thinking pro-
cess.
Keysar and colleagues (2012) first described what
has since been called the foreign language effect:
When their participants worked on a set of classic
decision tasks in a foreign language, their decisions
differed significantly from those observed with the
same type of problems in their native language. A ro-
bust finding in this research field is, for instance, that
the decisions we make depend upon framing (Tver-
sky & Kahneman, 1981): We avoid risks if the task
is framed positively (as something we can gain), but
are risk-seeking if the—actually identical—result is
framed negatively (as a loss), as in the case of the
“Asian disease” task (Table 12.3).
The participants in the study by Keysar and col-
leagues (2012) exhibited the well-known pattern
when working on the task in their native language.
When working on it in a foreign language, however,
the extent to which they opted for the safe versus
risky option was independent of the framing.
A series of studies has now documented such a
foreign language effect for various tasks and con-
texts, including gambling, mental book-keeping,
risk awareness, or moral judgments (overview in
Hayakawa et al., 2016). In moral dilemmas, for in-
stance, people using a foreign language are more
inclined to make utilitarian decisions by weighing
the result more strongly than the means or inten-
tions that lead to it (Geipel et al., 2016). When
confronted with the (hypothetical) dilemma of sac-
rificing one human life to save five others, par-
ticipants find it more acceptable to do so if they
only have to hit a switch (thereby diverting a trol-
ley so that it runs over a single person instead of
five people) than if they were to actively push the
single person from a bridge (thereby bringing the
trolley to a halt and preventing it from running
over the five people). The outcome is the same
in both cases (five lives saved at the cost of one), but
the reluctance is much greater in the second case—
normally. If, by contrast, the dilemma is presented
in a foreign language, the greater good outweighs
the moral rule of not inflicting damage on another
person, and pushing the single person appears much
more acceptable (Costa et al., 2014; Geipel et al.,
2015).
The exact mechanism underlying such effects of
foreign language usage is not yet clear. Keysar and
colleagues (2012) interpret their findings as evidence
for the assumption that the cognitive processing in
the foreign language is accompanied by a greater
psychological distance and is not anchored emotion-
ally to the same extent as is the case for processing
in the native language (see also Hayakawa et al.,
2016; Pavlenko, 2012). This would also explain
why swearwords appear less insulting, declarations
of love less romantic, and books less exciting in a
foreign language (Caldwell-Harris, 2015).
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12.4.3 Conclusion
For several decades, the principle of linguistic rel-
ativity was disregarded as a topic of interest in the
cognitive sciences, largely due to Chomsky’s influ-
ence. Reintroduced as a topic worthy of scientific
investigation in the 1990ies (Gumperz & Levinson,
1996; Lee, 1996; Lucy, 1992a, 1992b, 1997), it is
today one of the most thriving and thrilling fields in
cognitive science (e.g., Boroditsky, 2001; Dolscheid
et al., 2013; Gentner & Goldin-Meadow, 2003; Haun
et al., 2011). As mentioned in the introduction, the
discussion is still controversial, but evidence in sup-
port of at least some versions of linguistic relativity
is accumulating. The same is true for theoretical
attempts to reconcile the idea that cognition may
be susceptible to influences of language on the one
hand with one of the key assumptions of cognitive
science, the universality of cognitive processes, on
the other (e.g., Cibelli et al., 2016; Lupyan & Clark,
2015).
Language provides structure that leads us to pay
more attention to some information than to other
information; it provides categorical systems that are
used to adjust uncertain assessments, and it provides
conceptual bricks that help scaffold cognitive skills.
Still, we are not at the mercy of these tools—if they
cease to serve their purpose or to achieve their goal,
we are able and apt to adjust them, for instance by
simply inventing new color terms or increasing the
range of number words needed for counting (Beller
& Bender, 2008). It is exactly for this reason that
humans in the history of their species were able to at-
tain ever greater goals with increasingly well suited
tools (Miller & Paredes, 1996). This also holds for
language as our most important tool for thought.
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Summary
According to the principle of linguistic relativity, most prominently proposed by Whorf, the language
we speak affects the way we think. Three theses are central to this account: that languages differ
in how they describe the world; that the way in which a language describes the world affects the
experiences had by its speakers; and that speakers of different languages therefore have different
experiences. The underlying idea is still controversial in parts of cognitive science, but evidence
is accumulating in support of its three most plausible readings, namely that language may affect
thought in terms of thinking before language (as thinking for speaking), with language (as meddler
or as augmenter), and after language (as spotlight). In this chapter, we summarize research on
four domains, to illustrate arguments and approaches in the field. In order to raise awareness for
critical issues, we begin with grammatical gender, originally claimed as an instance of the spotlight
effect, but used here as a counter-example. More convincing instances are spatial references (for the
spotlight effect), the influence of the color lexicon on color categorization (language as meddler),
and the role of number words for numerical cognition (language as augmenter). In conclusion, we
elaborate on the role of language as a tool for thought, including the differences that occur when
using a foreign language while thinking.
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Review Questions
1. In section 12.1.3 we briefly present several accounts of the relation between language and
thought. Which of these qualify as versions of linguistic relativity?
2. Why is grammatical gender a tempting candidate for investigations of linguistic relativity, and
why is it still not the most suitable candidate?
3. How are thinking for speaking and the spotlight effect related?
4. In section 12.3.2, we claimed that a conventionalized sequence of number representations is a
crucial tool for counting and calculation. How important is it that this sequence consists of
number words rather than, say, notches on a stick?
5. How does the foreign language effect speak to the claim that language affects thought?
Hot Topic: Is Grammatical Gender an Instance of Linguistic Relativity?
Andrea Bender
The relationship between culture, language, and cognition, as well as their
(co-)evolution, has fascinated me since the beginning of my academic career
when I was working as a cultural anthropologist, and it constitutes the main
area of my research in cognitive science and psychology today. My interests
include number representations and their cognitive implications, spatial and
temporal references, the evolution and cultural constitution of causal cogni-
tion, and the possible influence of linguistic categories on thought (known as
linguistic relativity).
A topic that has been controversially debated for decades is whether gram-
matical gender qualifies as an instance of linguistic relativity. In languages
with a formal gender system, all nouns are assigned to one of several classes that determine the
declension of associated words. For instance, the moon has masculine gender in German (der Mond),
whereas the sun has feminine gender (die Sonne). Is, therefore, the sun conceived as more feminine
than the moon by German speakers? One indicator for such an influence is the “gender congruency
effect”. It emerges if the grammatical gender of a noun (masculine for Mond) is congruent with the
association of its referent with a specific sex (here: as male).
In previous research, participants were often directly asked for such associations. A major issue
with explicit measures like this is that information on grammatical gender can be actively used
to aid the decision. In our own work with speakers of German, we therefore used an implicit
measure. Participants were asked to categorize nouns according to criteria not obviously related to
gender associations. Critically, the stimuli themselves constituted either congruent or incongruent
cases; faster and/or more accurate responses in the congruent than the incongruent cases would
then attest to a gender congruency effect. We examined nouns for which grammatical gender
and biological sex were congruent or incongruent (Bender, Beller, & Klauer, 2016a), for which
grammatical gender and allegorical association were congruent or incongruent (Bender, Beller, &
Klauer, 2016b), or for which grammatical gender was related to sex (masculine/feminine) or not
related to sex (neuter) (Bender, Beller, & Klauer, 2018). Across these studies, a gender congruency
effect emerged for all those nouns that had strong male or female connotations, almost regardless of
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their gender, suggesting that the semantic association of the nouns has a much stronger effect than
their grammatical gender.
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Glossary
foreign language effect Processing information
in a foreign language affects decision mak-
ing under uncertainty, moral judgments, and
emotional responses. 225
linguistic determinism Strongest version of lin-
guistic relativity, according to which peo-
ple would be able to engage only in those
thoughts that their language permits; is of lit-
tle intuitive plausibility and largely refuted by
empirical research. 216
principle of linguistic relativity Proposed by
Whorf and others, stating that humans cannot
objectively describe the world because they
are influenced in their perceptions and catego-
rizations by the linguistic structures implicit
in their mother tongue. 214
representational effect Information is processed
differently depending on how it is represented.
222
thinking for speaking Coined by Dan Slobin for
the fact that, in order to put our thoughts into
words, we need to organize our thoughts in
such a way that they specify all those aspects
that are required by the grammatical structure
of the respective language. 217






People are capable of remarkable feats. Examples
range from the everyday—such as the waiter who
can remember a dozen orders without writing them
down—to the esoteric—such as the chess master
who simultaneously plays (and beats) dozens of op-
ponents while blindfolded—to the epic—such as
Bob Beamon’s belief-defying long jump of over 29
feet in the 1968 Mexico City Olympics.
What sets elite performers apart from everyone
else? Invariably, they have a history of training
in their domain. This is true even of people who
progress extremely rapidly. For example, the Nor-
wegian chess great Magnus Carlsen took around
5 years of serious involvement in chess to attain
grandmaster status (Gobet & Ereku, 2014). Simply
put, there are no “instant” experts.
As a scientific concept, expertise may be defined
as a person’s current level of performance in a com-
plex task. This could be a hobby, such as playing a
musical instrument, or a sport, or an occupational
task, such as diagnosing a patient. It could also be
an everyday task, such as recognizing faces or driv-
ing. A major unanswered question in research on
expertise is the extent to which performers’ history
of training in a domain account for individual dif-
ferences in expertise (i.e., differences across people
in domain-specific performance). For example, is it
the amount of intensity of training alone that distin-
guishes Serena Williams from her highly skilled, but
less successful, competition on the Women’s Tennis
Association Tour?
This chapter reviews evidence concerning this
question and is divided into four sections. The first
section provides a brief history of research on exper-
tise, from prehistory to present. The second section
focuses on theoretical debates in contemporary ex-
pertise research, and particularly the role of training
history in explaining individual differences in ex-
pertise. The third section describes a multifactorial
perspective on expertise, and the final section dis-
cusses directions for future research.
13.1 The Science of Expertise: A Brief
History
There is no denying that some people acquire com-
plex skills much more rapidly, and reach a much
higher level of ultimate performance, than other peo-
ple. Consider the American golfer Babe Didrikson
Zaharias, pictured in Figure 13.1. An extraordi-
nary athlete, Zaharias was an All-American bas-
ketball player in high school, and went on to win
gold medals in the hurdles and javelin in the 1932
Los Angeles Olympics (van Natta, 2013), equaling
her world record in the former. Reports of when
Zaharias began playing golf vary. According to
legend, she shot a respectable 91 the first time she
ever played golf. This is almost certainly not true;
as a Sports Illustrated profile noted, “In truth she
had played a great deal of golf, beginning as a high
school student in Beaumont and continuing in Dal-
las, where she often hit 1,000 balls a day” (Babe,
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1975). Nevertheless, it is clear that Zaharias’ ascent
to golfing greatness was rapid. Her first significant
victory came in 1935 at the Texas Women’s Am-
ateur, and only five years later, she won a major
championship, the Western Women’s Open. She
went on to become one of the best golfers in history,
winning 41 professional tournaments, including 10
major championships. In 1951, she was inducted
into the World Golf Hall of Fame (Babe, 1975; van
Natta, 2013).
Figure 13.1: Babe Didrikson Zaharias.
Millions of people play golf, but only a handful
have played it as well as Zaharias did. Why is this
so? What characteristics did Zaharias possess that
set her apart from nearly everyone else who has ever
played the game? And did she acquire all those char-
acteristics through training? More generally, what
underlies individual differences in expertise? To pro-
vide context for the contemporary debate surround-
ing this question, let’s begin with a brief history of
scientific research on expertise.
13.1.1 Prehistory to Antiquity
The term expertise did not come into common usage
in the English language until the 1950s (Hambrick
& Campitelli, 2018). However, there is no reason to
doubt that even early humans differed in their skill in
complex tasks. Presumably, some prehistoric people
were more skilled than others at producing and us-
ing tools, painting on cave walls, and other tasks of
prehistoric life. What did these people think about
the origins of these differences? It is impossible to
know—by definition, prehistory is the period before
written records—but they likely attributed them to
supernatural forces. We do get a sense from prehis-
toric art that early humans were just as captivated
by displays of skill as we are today. Paintings from
the paleolithic era in the Lascaux cave in France
estimated to be 20,000 years old include images of
wrestlers and sprinters, and in the Cave of Swim-
mers in present day Egypt, depictions of archers and
swimmers date to 6,000 B.C.E.
Many millennia later, the Ancient Greeks laid
the foundation for the contemporary debate over
the origins of expertise. In The Republic (ca. 380
B.C.E.), Plato made the innatist argument that “no
two persons are born alike but each differs from
the other in individual endowments.” Aristotle coun-
tered with the empiricist argument that experience
is the ultimate source of knowledge (Stanford En-
cyclopedia of Psychology, 2015). More than two
thousand years later, in the mid-19th century, these
contrasting philosophical views would frame the sci-
entific debate over the origins of expertise in the new
field of psychology. The debate has raged on ever
since.
13.1.2 The Classical Era
Born in 1822 into a prominent family of British sci-
entists, Francis Galton was a polymath—a person
with wide-ranging learning and knowledge. Over
the course of his long career, he published hundreds
of scholarly articles, on topics as varied as sociology,
geography, anthropology, meteorology, psychology,
and statistics (Gillham, 2001). Galton also popular-
ized what is undoubtedly the most often repeated
phrase in the social and behavioral sciences: nature
and nurture (Fancher, 1979).1 “Nature is all that
1 Galton is often credited with coining (originating) the phrase “nature and nurture”, but the juxtaposition predates him by centuries
(see Fancher, 1979). In his 1582 pedagogical guide Elementarie, Richard Mulcaster observed, “Nature makes the boy toward,
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a man brings with himself into the world; nurture
is every influence without that affects him after his
birth”, he wrote in English Men of Science: Their
Nature and Nurture (1874).
In 1859, Galton’s half-cousin Charles Darwin had
published On the Origin of Species, laying out his
theory of evolution. In a nutshell, Darwin’s the-
sis was that the distinctive features of a species—
whether the length of giraffe’s neck or the the pea-
cock’s brilliant plumage—emerge through a pro-
cess of natural selection whereby traits that help the
species survive and reproduce in their habitat are
passed from parents to offspring. Galton believed
that natural selection operates on human abilities,
too. As he wrote in his book Hereditary Genius, “a
man’s natural abilities are derived by inheritance, un-
der exactly the same limitations as are the form and
physical features of the whole organic world” (Gal-
ton, 1869, p. 1). To make his case, using biographi-
cal dictionaries, Galton identified nearly a thousand
“men of reputation”—people who had made emi-
nent contributions in various fields, such as Wolf-
gang Amadeus Mozart, Isaac Newton, and Napoleon
Bonaparte. By analyzing their family trees, he then
documented that these people represented just 300
families, suggesting that biological relatedness had
something to do with their success. For example, he
noted that the “Bachs were a musical family, com-
prising a vast number of individuals, and extend-
ing through eight generations. . . .There are far more
than twenty eminent musicians among the Bachs”
(p. 240). Galton concluded that eminence arises
from “natural ability” and went so far as to conclude
that “social hindrances cannot impede men of high
ability, from becoming eminent [and] social advan-
tages are incompetent to give that status, to a man
of moderate ability” (p. 41). For Galton, greatness
overwhelmingly reflected nature.
Darwin was effusive in his praise for Hereditary
Genius. “I do not think I ever in all my life read any-
thing more interesting and original”, he wrote to Gal-
ton in a letter dated December 23rd [1869]. Others
were less enthusiastic. One reviewer took issue with
Galton’s definition of eminence, complaining that
one family of lawyers that Galton had included in
his analysis “possessed a most extraordinary heredi-
tary genius—for getting on at the bar” (Hereditary
Talent, 1870, p. 119). Another reviewer, writing
in the British Quarterly Review (1870), dismissed
Galton as a “Darwinite”—an intended insult Galton
almost certainly took as a compliment—and chas-
tised him for oversimplifying genius. More substan-
tively, based on results of his own study of the back-
grounds of eminent scientists, the Swiss botanist
Alphonse Pyrame de Candolle (1873) argued that
Galton had drastically underestimated the role of fa-
vorable environmental circumstances (causes favor-
able) in achieving greatness. He noted, for example,
that Switzerland had produced 10% of the scientists
in his sample despise representing just 1% of the
European population (Fancher, 1983).
Decades later, the learning theorist Edward
Thorndike (1912) entered the fray, observing that
“when one sets oneself zealously to improve any
ability, the amount gained is astonishing” (p. 108),
and adding that “we stay far below our own possi-
bilities in almost everything we do. . . not because
proper practice would not improve us further, but
because we do not take the training or because we
take it with too little zeal.” (p. 108). Taking a more
extreme stance, John Watson (1930), the founder of
behaviorism, famously wrote:
Give me a dozen healthy infants, well-formed,
and my own specified world to bring them up
in and I’ll guarantee to take any one at random
and train him to become any type of specialist
I might select—doctor, lawyer, artist, merchant-
chief and, yes, even beggar-man and thief, re-
gardless of his talents, penchants, tendencies,
abilities, vocations, and race of his ancestors.
(p. 104)
The pendulum had swung from nature—the view
that heredity places strict limits on what a person
can achieve—to nurture—the view that there are
nurture sees him forward” (Teigen, 1984). And in Shakespeare’s The Tempest, Prospero describes Caliban as “A devil, a born devil,
on whose nature / Nurture can never stick.”
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essentially no limits to what a person can achieve
under the right circumstances.
13.1.3 The Modern Era
In the 1930s, the behaviorist mantle was picked up
by B. F. Skinner. Skinner rejected as unscientific
any notion of mental constructs—the mind—in psy-
chological theorizing (Skinner, 1938). He believed
that the science of psychology must focus only on
what could be objectively observed: environmental
stimuli and behavioral responses. Skinner’s “S-R
psychology” had a monumental influence on psycho-
logical research. By the 1950s, however, there was
growing dissatisfaction with behaviorism as an ap-
proach to answering important questions in psychol-
ogy, such as how we humans acquire our marvelous
capacity to use language (Fancher & Rutherford,
A.Rutherford, 2012; Gardner, 1985). In a critique
of Skinner’s book Verbal Behavior (1957), which at-
tempted to explain language in purely S-R terms, the
linguist Noam Chomsky (1959) commented that the
“magnitude of the failure of this attempt to account
for verbal behavior serves as a kind of measure of
the importance of the factors omitted from consid-
eration” (p. 28). Around the same time, computer
science emerged as an academic discipline. The
digital processing device—the computer—provided
psychologists with a powerful new metaphor for con-
ceptualizing human thought and behavior. Rather
than being seen only in terms of S-R relationships,
behavior could now be seen as the product of mental
operations carried out on information. The cognitive
revolution was underway.
A pioneer of this new paradigm was the Dutch
psychologist Adriaan de Groot (1946/1965). An in-
ternational chess master who twice represented the
Netherlands in the Chess Olympiad, for his disser-
tation research de Groot endeavored “to carry out
an experimentally based psychological analysis of
chess thinking” (p. 13). To this end, he recruited
chess players representing a wide range of skill—
from grandmaster to master to less skilled—and had
them perform “choice-of-move” problems in which
they were given game positions and asked to verbal-
ize their thoughts (to “think out loud”) as they delib-
erated on what move to make. de Groot found that
the grandmasters were no different than less skilled
players in how many moves ahead they thought.
Instead, he found that the grandmaster “immedi-
ately ‘sees’ the core of the problem in the position,
whereas the expert player finds it with difficulty—
or misses it completely...” (p. 320). de Groot also
had chess players representing different levels of
skill briefly view chess positions and then attempt
to reconstruct the positions by placing pieces on an
empty board. de Groot found a large advantage of
chess skill in recall: the grandmaster and master
averaged over 90% correct, the expert only about
70%, and the weakest player just over 50%.
Inspired by de Groot’s research, beginning in
the 1970s the Carnegie Mellon University scien-
tists William Chase and Herbert Simon conducted a
series of studies on chess expertise (Chase & Simon,
1973). (Simon, incidentally, was another polymath:
in 1978, he won the Nobel Prize in economics for
his concept of bounded rationality.) Replicating de
Groot’s (1946/1965) study using more controlled
procedures, Chase and Simon began by showing
participants representing three levels of chess skill—
novice, intermediate, and master—arrangements of
chess positions that were either plausible game po-
sitions or random, and then had the participants at-
tempt to recreate the arrangements from memory by
placing chess pieces on a board. Chase and Simon
found that chess skill facilitated recall of the game
positions but not the random positions, and there-
fore concluded that the primary factor underlying
chess skill is a large “vocabulary” of game positions
that automatically elicit candidate moves. More gen-
erally, they concluded that although “there clearly
must be a set of specific aptitudes...that together
comprise a talent for chess, individual differences
in such aptitudes are largely overshadowed by im-
mense differences in chess experience. Hence, the
overriding factor in chess skill is practice” (Chase &
Simon, 1973, p. 279).
A research movement—the Carnegie Mellon
School—emerged around Chase and Simon’s work.
In the spirit of Watson (1930), the main argument of
this movement was that nurture prevails over nature
in expert performance: the “software” of the cogni-
tive system—acquired knowledge structures—rather
than the “hardware”—genetically-influenced abili-
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ties and capacities—underlies skilled performance.
In one dramatic demonstration of this point, Erics-
son, Chase, and Faloon (1980) reported a case study
of a college student (S.F.), who after more than 230
hours of practice in the lab increased the number of
random digits he could recall by a factor of ten, from
a typical 7 to 79 digits. Verbal reports revealed that
S.F., an accomplished track runner, recoded 3- and
4-digit sequences as running times, ages, or dates,
and developed a strategy for encoding the groupings
into long-term memory retrieval structures. Eric-
sson et al. concluded that there is “seemingly no
limit to improvement in memory skill with practice”
(p. 1182; the current record for digit memorization,
set by Lance Tschirhart at the 2015 World Memory
Championships, is a bewildering 456 digits.) In an-
other fascinating study, Ericsson and Polson (1988)
studied a waiter (J. C.) who could remember up to
20 dinner orders without writing them down using a
mnemonic system.
The movement gained momentum in the early
1990s with publication of the article that is now the
most highly cited article in the expertise literature
(to date, the article has been cited nearly 10,000
times). K. Anders Ericsson and his colleagues (Eric-
sson, Krampe, & Tesch-Römer, 1993) proposed that
individual differences in performance in domains
such as music, chess, and sports largely reflect dif-
ferences in the amount of time people have spent
engaging in deliberate practice. Reminiscent of
Thorndike’s (1912) idea of “proper practice”, Erics-
son et al. defined deliberate practice as engaging in
structured training activities that have been specifi-
cally designed to improve performance in a domain.
To test this idea, Ericsson and colleagues reported
results of two studies showing that elite musicians
(violinists and pianists) had accumulated thousands
of hours more deliberate practice than less accom-
plished counterparts.
Applying their framework to several domains, Er-
icsson et al. (1993) concluded that “high levels
of deliberate practice are necessary to attain expert
level performance” (p. 392), and in the next sentence
added:
Our theoretical framework can also provide a
sufficient account of the major facts about the
nature and scarcity of exceptional performance.
Our account does not depend on scarcity of in-
nate ability (talent). . . .We attribute the dramatic
differences in performance between experts and
amateurs—novices to similarly large differences
in the recorded amounts of deliberate practice
(p. 392).
For the next two decades, the deliberate practice
view was the dominant theoretical perspective on
human expertise.
13.2 Testing the Deliberate Practice
View
The research movement that de Groot set in motion,
Chase and Simon cultivated, and Ericsson and col-
leagues advanced has had a tremendous impact not
only on scientific thinking about the origins of ex-
pertise, but on the lay public’s understanding of the
topic. Particularly over the past decade, there has
been an explosion of popular interest in expertise. In
his bestselling book Outliers: The Story of Success,
the writer Malcolm Gladwell described Ericsson and
colleagues’ research on musicians and quipped that
10,000 hours is the “magic number of true exper-
tise” (p. 40). The “10,000 hour rule” was, in turn,
the inspiration for Macklemore and Ryan Lewis’s
rap song by the same title, which was used as the
theme music for a Dr. Pepper soft drink commer-
cial. Other popular books that have featured find-
ings from Ericsson and colleagues’ research include
Bounce: The Myth of Talent and the Power of Prac-
tice (Syed, 2010), Talent is Overrated: What Really
Separates World-Class Performers from Everybody
Else (Colvin, 2010), The Talent Code: Greatness
Isn’t Born, It’s Grown. Here’s How (Coyle, 2009),
and The Genius in All of Us (Shenk, 2010). In their
own popular book, Peak: Secrets from the New Sci-
ence of Expertise, Ericsson and Pool (2016) stated,
“There is no reason not to follow your dream. De-
liberate practice can open the door to a world of
possibilities that you may have been convinced were
out of reach. Open that door” (p. 179).
Nevertheless, Ericsson and colleagues’ view has
been highly controversial in the scientific literature
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from the start (see Hambrick et al., 2016, for a dis-
cussion). The major criticism is that Ericsson and
colleagues have overstated the importance of delib-
erate practice (for a sample of critiques, see Ack-
erman, 2014; Anderson, 2000; Gagné, 2013; Gard-
ner, 1985; Marcus, 2012; Schneider, 1998, 2015;
Tucker & Collins, 2012; Winner, 1996). The critical
question is whether the deliberate practice view is
supported by evidence. A theory is scientific insofar
as it generates testable predictions: propositions that
can be evaluated by collecting and analyzing data. A
central claim of the deliberate practice view is that
“individual differences in ultimate performance can
largely be accounted for by differential amounts of
past and current levels of practice” (Ericsson et al.,
1993, p. 392, emphasis added).
In any straightforward sense of the word largely,
this claim leads to the prediction that deliberate prac-
tice should, at the very least, account for the major-
ity of the between-person differences in expertise.
Does it? The available evidence indicates no. My
colleagues and I reanalyzed the results of studies
from two of the most popular domains for exper-
tise research: chess and music (Hambrick, Oswald,
Altmann, Meinz, Gobet, & Campitelli, 2014). On
average, after correcting for the unreliability of the
measures2, deliberate practice accounted for 34%
of the between-person variance in chess expertise
and 30% of the between-person variance in music
expertise, leaving the rest of the variance potentially
explainable by factors other than deliberate prac-
tice. A meta-analysis focusing on music by another
group of researchers (Platz, Kopiez, Lehmann, &
Wolf, 2014) revealed similar results: deliberate prac-
tice explained 37% of the reliable variance in music
performance (see Figure 13.2). Subsequently, my
colleagues and I performed a meta-analysis of the
relationship between deliberate practice and perfor-
mance in five domains: music, games, sports, educa-
tion, and professions (Macnamara, Hambrick, & Os-
wald, 2014). In each domain, deliberate practice left
more of the variance in performance unexplained
than it explained, even assuming liberal corrections
for the unreliability of the measures.
In practical terms, this evidence implies that peo-
ple may require vastly different amounts of deliber-
ate practice to reach a given level of expertise. This
point can be illustrated with results of a study of
chess skill by the cognitive psychologists Guillermo
Campitelli and Fernand Gobet (Gobet & Campitelli,
Figure 13.2: Results of Platz, Kopiez, Lehmann, and Wolf’s (2014) meta-analysis of the deliberate practice-music performance
relationship. The pie chart represents the total reliable variance in music performance (i.e., avg. corrected r = .612 x 100
= 37%). The light gray slice represents the amount of reliable variance explained by deliberate practice; the dark gray
slice represents the amount not explained by deliberate practice. The meta-analysis included 14 studies.
2 The reliability of a measure, which is an index of how much random measurement error it contains, limits the degree to which that
measure can correlate with any other measure.
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2007; Campitelli & Gobet, 2011). Recruiting their
participants from a Buenos Aries chess club, they
had chess players provide estimates of the amount of
time they had spent on deliberate practice for chess
and report their official chess rating. As expected,
there was a positive correlation between deliberate
practice and chess rating; the higher-rated players re-
ported having accumulated more deliberate practice
than the lower-rated players. However, the corre-
lation was only moderate in magnitude (r = .42),
indicating that some players required much more de-
liberate practice to reach a given level of skill than
other players did. Indeed, the amount of deliberate
practice requited to reach “master” status ranged
from 3,016 hours to 23,608 hours—a difference of
nearly a factor of 8. Furthermore, some players had
accumulated more than 25,000 hours of deliberate
practice without reaching the master level.
A further illustration of this point comes from a
study in which children were trained to identify mu-
sical pitches. Sakakibara (2014) enrolled children
from a private Japanese music school in a training
program designed to train absolute (or “perfect”)
pitch—the ability to name the pitch of a tone with-
out hearing another tone for reference. Nearly all
the children (22 of 24) completed the training and
reached the criterion (the drop-outs were for reasons
unrelated to the training). Based on these findings,
Ericsson and Pool (2016) argued that “perfect pitch
is not the gift, but, rather, the ability to develop per-
fect pitch is the gift—and, as nearly as we can tell,
pretty much everyone is born with that gift” (xvi).
Clearly, no one is born with a “prepackaged” abil-
ity to identical musical pitches; some exposure to
music is required to acquire this skill. However,
based on Sakakibara’s findings, Ericsson and Pool’s
claim that “pretty much anyone” is born with the
ability to develop this skill is unjustified because
the children in the study were not representative of
the general population—they were pupils in a pri-
vate music school and may have been high on music
aptitude, among other factors. It is also not clear
that the children exhibited perfect pitch, because
the criterion test assessed children’s ability to iden-
tify a limited number of pitches. Finally, while the
findings do demonstrate that it is possible to teach
people how to identify musical pitches, there was
a large amount of variability in the amount of time
it took them to complete the training: from around
2 years to 8 years (see Figure 13.3). Thus, there
Figure 13.3: Histogram depicting time to completion of pitch identification training in Sakakibara’s (2014) study (N = 22).
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would appear to be factors that interact with training
to influence acquisition of this skill.
Taken together, the available evidence suggests
that deliberate practice is not as important as a pre-
dictor of individual differences in expertise as Erics-
son and colleagues originally argued. Ericsson has
responded to this theoretical challenge with a vigor-
ous defense of his view (Ericsson, 2014; Ericsson,
2016). However, his defense has been undermined
by repeated contradictions, inconsistencies, and ma-
terial errors in his arguments (see Hambrick et al.,
2014; Hambrick et al., 2016; Macnamara, Ham-
brick, & Moreau, 2016). Most notably, Ericsson’s
definition of deliberate practice and his criteria for
determining whether an activity qualifies as deliber-
ate practice have shifted, making it difficult to test
claims about the importance of deliberate practice
(see Macnamara et al., 2018, for a discussion). For
a theory to remain scientifically viable, theoretical
terms must be used in consistent ways.
Two limitations of past research on deliberate
practice should be noted, as well. The first is that
Ericsson and colleagues have built the case for their
view almost entirely on correlational evidence—that
is, the finding of positive correlations between delib-
erate practice and performance from cross-sectional
studies in which people representing different levels
of skill estimate their past engagement in deliber-
ate practice. The problem with this is that people
may differ in accumulated amount of deliberate prac-
tice because they differ in aptitude (or talent) for
the domain. As Sternberg (1996) noted, “deliberate
practice may be correlated with success because it
is a proxy for ability: We stop doing what we do not
do well and feel unrewarded for” (p. 350). And as
Winner (2000) added,
Hard work and innate ability have not been
unconfounded. Those children who have the
most ability are also likely to be those who are
most interested in a particular activity, who be-
gin to work at that activity at an early age, and
who work the hardest at it. Ericsson’s research
demonstrated the importance of hard work but
did not rule out the role of innate ability. (p. 160)
Responding to this point, Ericsson argued that
“[d]eliberate practice does not involve a mere ex-
ecution or repetition of already attained skills but
repeated attempts to reach beyond one’s current level
which is associated with frequent failures” (Ericsson,
2007, p. 18). Ericsson’s argument seems to be that,
because deliberate practice is not simply “more of
the same” but rather is designed to push a person’s
performance to new heights, there should be no re-
lationship between past performance in a domain
and engagement in deliberate practice. This claim
has the appearance of being a logical argument—but
it is not. It is also implausible. What seems more
likely is that compared to a person who has experi-
enced little success in a domain, a person who has
experienced a great deal of success will be more
likely to engage in an activity to elevate their per-
formance, for the simple reason that they are more
likely to have some reason to do so. To illustrate,
imagine two high school basketball players. One
is among the best players in the state and is a top
prospect for a college scholarship; the other is the
worst player on his team—a “benchwarmer.” Who
seems more likely to engage in a grueling regimen
of deliberate practice to elevate his current level of
performance—the superstar or the benchwarmer?
The second limitation of past research on de-
liberate practice is that nearly all of the stud-
ies of the relationship between deliberate practice
and performance—beginning with Ericsson et al.’s
(1993) study of musicians—have relied on retro-
spective self-reports to assess deliberate practice.
That is, people are asked to estimate how much they
have practiced in the past. To be sure, some proce-
dures (e.g., structured interviews) may yield more
accurate estimates than other procedures (e.g., brief
questionnaires). However, no retrospective method
can ensure perfectly accurate retrospective estimates
of practice. (Imagine being asked to estimate how
much time you spent practicing the piano or a sport
when you were 10 years old. Could you do so with
much confidence?) Furthermore, rather than relying
on their memory to generate practice estimates, peo-
ple may base their practice estimates on their current
skill level, and their beliefs about the importance of
practice may influence their estimates. For exam-
ple, a person who believes that practice is the most
important factor in developing expertise may overes-
timate their past engagement in practice, whereas a
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person who believes that talent is the most important
factor may underestimate their past engagement in
practice. The degree to which these biases influence
estimates of the correlation between deliberate prac-
tice and performance is unknown. The relationship
between deliberate practice and performance could
be stronger than current estimates indicate, but it
could just as well be weaker.
13.3 Beyond the Deliberate Practice
View
To sum up, Ericsson and colleagues’ deliberate prac-
tice view is not supported by the available evidence:
however operationally defined, deliberate practice
leaves a large amount of the between-person vari-
ability in expertise unexplained. Thus, while de-
liberate practice may be an important predictor of
individual differences in expertise, it is not the only
important predictor or even necessarily the largest.
Furthermore, Ericsson and colleagues’ case for the
importance of deliberate practice is based almost
entirely on correlational evidence that does not rule




Expanding on existing theory (e.g., Gagné, 2013),
the Multifactorial Gene-Environment Interac-
tion Model (MGIM) of expertise provides a frame-
work for thinking about what factors influence exper-
tise (Ullén, Hambrick, & Mosing, 2016). As shown
in Figure 13.4, the MGIM assumes that (1) exper-
tise arises from influences of both domain-general
traits and domain-specific knowledge on expertise
(i.e., domain-specific performance); (2) these factors
may influence expertise both indirectly and directly;
and (3) genetic and environmental factors operate
together to produce individual differences in exper-
tise.
At the core of the MGIM is the concept
of gene-environment interplay, including both
gene-environment correlation (rGE) and gene-
environment interaction (G×E). As illustrated
in Figure 13.5, rGE occurs when people are exposed
to different environments as a systematic function
of their genetic differences rather than at random
Figure 13.4: The Ullén-Hambrick-Mosing multifactorial gene-environment interaction model (MGIM) of expertise (used with permis-
sion of Routledge from Hambrick, Campitelli, & Macnamara, 2018).
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(Plomin, DeFries, & Loehlin, 1977). There are three
types of rGE, each of which can be seen as funda-
mental for understanding the development of exper-
tise (see Tucker-Drob, 2018). The first is passive
rGE: parents create a home environment that is in-
fluenced by their own genetic characteristics, which
they pass to their children. For example, parents
who have high levels of music aptitude may cre-
ate a musically-rich environment for their children.
The second is active rGE: a person’s genetically-
influenced traits influence him or her to actively
seek out certain experiences. For example, a child
with a high level of music aptitude may beg his or
her parents for music lessons and seek out musical
experiences on their own. The final type is evocative
rGE: a person’s genetically-influenced characteris-
tics elicit particular reactions from other people. For
example, a child possessing a high level of music
aptitude may be noticed by music teachers, who pro-
vide special opportunities for the child to develop
musical expertise.
G×E, on the other hand, occurs when the magni-
tude of genetic influence on an outcome varies as a
function of the type or amount of an environmental
experience. (In Figure 13.5, G×E is illustrated with
intersecting G and E pathways.) In the context of
developing expertise, G×E could occur is if train-
ing diminished genetic influence on performance.
Ericsson et al. (1993) alluded to the former possibil-
ity when they claimed that general cognitive ability,
which is genetically influenced, is predictive of per-
formance in the initial stages of skill acquisition, but
then loses its predictive power (see also Ericsson,
2014). Or it could occur if training enhanced genetic
influence on performance. For instance, while Erics-
son (2007) claimed that deliberate practice activities
“dormant genes that all healthy children’s DNA con-
tain” (Ericsson, 2007, p. 4, emphasis added), it may
also activate otherwise dormant genes, variants of
which differ across individuals.
13.3.2 Evidence for Genetic Influence
The basic goal of behavioral genetic research is
to explain variation across people in some pheno-
type—an observable behavior or characteristic—in
terms of variation in those people’s genotypes—
their genetic makeup (Knopik, Neiderhiser, DeFries,
& Plomin, 2016). The most commonly used BG
research design is the twin study, which compares
identical twins with fraternal twins (for reviews, see
Mosing & Ullén, 2016; Mosing, Peretz, & Ullén,
2018). Identical twins are monozygotic (MZ), mean-
ing that they were derived from a single ovum and
share 100% of their genes, whereas fraternal twins










































Figure 13.5: Illustration of gene-environment interplay, including gene-environment correlation (rGE) and gene × environment
correlation (G×E), in the context of the development of musical expertise.
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from separate ova and share only 50% of their genes
on average. Thus, to the extent that variation in a
trait is influenced by genes, MZ twins should be
more similar to each other on that trait than DZ
twins are to each other on that trait. In statistical
terms, the MZ correlation should be greater than the
DZ correlation.
There is evidence from twin studies for a genetic
influence on individual differences in expertise. Us-
ing a twin design, Coon and Carey (1989) used a
sample of over 800 twin pairs to estimate the heri-
tability of musical accomplishment. The twins com-
pleted a survey to determine whether they were iden-
tical or fraternal, and then completed a survey that
included several questions about both music accom-
plishment and music practice. For a measure of
musical achievement, the heritability estimate was
38% for males and 20% for females. In another
twin study, Vinkhuyzen, van der Sluis, Posthuma,
and Boomsma (2009) analyzed data from a study
in which 1,685 twin pairs rated their competence
in chess, music, and several other domains. Heri-
tability ranged from 50% to 92% for endorsement
of exceptional talent.
More recently, in a large sample of adolescent
twins, Plomin and colleagues found that genetic
factors accounted for over half of the variation be-
tween expert and less skilled readers, where experts
were defined as individuals who scored above the
95th percentile on a standardized test of reading abil-
ity (Plomin, Shakeshaft, McMillan, & Trzaskowski,
2014). Drayna, Manichaikul, de Lange, Snieder,
and Spector (2001) reported heritability estimates of
80% for performance on the Distorted Tunes Test,
which requires the participant to identify incorrect
pitches from familiar melodic stimuli.
There is also emerging evidence for rGE and
G×E in the development of expertise (see Mos-
ing & Ullén, 2016; Mosing, Peretz, & Ullén, 2018).
Using data from the National Merit twin sample,
Coon and Carey (1989) found heritability estimates
of 38% for males and 20% for females for mu-
sic achievement. In a more recent analysis of this
dataset, Hambrick and Tucker-Drob (2015) found
that heritability was substantial not only for musical
achievement (26%), but also for a measure of music
practice (38%). This finding is readily interpretable
as an instance of rGE—the idea that people’s geno-
types influence on whether they engage in music
practice. More generally, as mentioned earlier, a per-
son with high aptitude for some activity is probably
more likely to practice that activity than a person
with lower aptitude (see Sternberg, 1996). Ham-
brick and Tucker-Drob also found evidence for a
G×E: the heritability of musical accomplishment
was higher for a group that reported practicing reg-
ularly than for a group that did not. This evidence
is in line with an earlier twin study on training of
the rotary pursuit task, which found that genetic
influences on performance as well as learning rate
increased after three days of training (Fox, Hersh-
berger, & Bouchard, 1996).
In a much larger study, Mosing, Madison, Ped-
ersen, Kuja-Halkola, and Ullén (2014) had over
10,000 twins complete a test of musical aptitude (the
Swedish Musical Discrimination Test). The heri-
tability was 50% for rhythm discrimination, 59% for
melody discrimination, and between 12% and 30%
for pitch discrimination, and averaged around 50%
for accumulated amount of music practice. Further-
more, intra-twin pair modeling revealed that iden-
tical twins who differed massively in accumulated
amount of music practice did not perform signifi-
cantly different on the tests of music aptitude. Thus,
while certain types of knowledge and skill neces-
sary to play music at a high level must be acquired
(e.g., how to read music), basic sensory capacities
involved in playing music may not be influenced by
music practice.
Taken together, findings of these twin studies
indicate that there are both direct and indirect ef-
fects of genetic factors on expertise. More spe-
cific information about the role of genetic factors
in expertise comes from molecular genetics, a type
of behavioral genetic research that seeks to iden-
tify associations between specific genes and per-
formance. In a series of studies, North and col-
leagues documented correlations between genotype
for the ACTN3 gene, which codes the alpha-actinin-
3 protein in fast-twitch muscles, and performance
in various sprint events. For example, in one study
(Yang et al., 2003), compared to 18% of control
subjects, only 6% of 107 elite athletes from various
short-distance events had a variant of ACTN3 that
Psychology of Human Thought • Chapter 13 • 245
Hambrick Expertise
made them alpha-actinin-3 deficient. Furthermore,
none of the most elite athletes in the sample—the
32 Olympians—were alpha-actinin-3 deficient.
There is also an emerging molecular genetic
literature on music (see Tan, McPherson, Peretz,
Berkovic, & Wilson, 2014, for a review). Di Rosa
and colleagues (Di Rosa, Cieri, Antonucci, Stuppia,
& Gatta, 2015) used Ingenuity Pathway Analysis
(IPA), a procedure for identifying links between bi-
ological functions and genes, to identify possible
interactions between genes potentially related to mu-
sical ability and those deleted in individuals with
Williams Syndrome—a genetic disorder that is as-
sociated with serious deficits in some cognitive do-
mains but surprisingly good musical skills. Di Rosa
et al. reported a potential interaction between a gene
related to Williams Syndrome (STXX1A) and one
related to music skills (SLC6A4) gene. Both of
these genes are involved in serotonin transporter ex-
pression, suggesting that serotonin may be involved
in the development of musical abilities.
13.3.3 The Future of Genetic Research
on Expertise
Expertise is a complex phenotype. For example,
expertise in a sport reflects multiple, interacting cog-
nitive, motoric, and perceptual subcomponents, each
of which may be influenced by different genetic fac-
tors. Consequently, it is unreasonable to expect that
scientists will ever discover a single genetic variant
(or even a small number of genetic variants) that
will account for all, nearly all, or even most of the
phenotypic variance in expertise in various domains.
Instead, what Chabris and colleagues have termed
the Fourth Law of Behavioral Genetics will almost
certainly hold true for expertise: “A typical human
behavioral trait is associated with very many genetic
variants, each of which accounts for a very small
percentage of the behavioral variability” (Chabris,
Lee, Cesarini, Benjamin, & Laibson, 2012, p. 305).
Just as astronomers may never fully understand
the exact sequence of events leading to the creation
of the universe, expertise researchers may never be
able to fully explain how genetic factors translate
into exceptional performance in complex domains.
The task may exceed the powers of scientific imagi-
nation, not to mention computing power. However,
just as astronomers will not abandon the idea that
the universe can be explained in physical terms, ex-
pertise researchers should not abandon the idea that
genetics must play an important role in expert per-
formance. Moreover, just as neuroscientists do not
wait for a complete understanding of how the brain
controls thought and behavior to apply their findings
to practical problems (e.g., diagnosis, treatment),
expertise researchers should not wait for a complete
understanding of how genetics influences expert per-
formance to begin making practical use of findings
from behavioral genetics. For example, across a
range of domains, using information about gene-
environment interplay, it may one day be possible
to tailor training using information about people’s
genotypes, as is already being done in sports (e.g.,
Mann, Lamberts, & Lambert, 2011). This type of
intervention promises to bring high levels of per-
formance within the reach of more people than is
currently the case. As Plomin (2018) noted:
The importance of gene-environment correlation
suggests a new way of thinking about the in-
terface between nature and nurture that moves
beyond a passive model, which assumes one-
size-fits-all training regimes that are imposed on
individuals, to an active model in which peo-
ple select, modify, and create their own environ-
ments that foster the acquisition of expertise, in
part on the basis of their genetic propensities.
(p. xvi)
Scientific understanding of the genetics of ex-
pertise will presumably always be incomplete, but
this is no reason forestall capitalizing on knowledge
from this area of research to inform the design of
applications that can make people’s lives and society
better.
13.4 Conclusions
From prehistory to the present, people have proba-
bly always been interested in the origins of expertise.
For nearly a century, the nurture view of expertise
has held sway in psychology. This view argues that
individual differences in expertise overwhelmingly
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reflect the role of environmental factors, with no im-
portant role for genetic factors. Most notably, over
the past 25 years, Ericsson and colleagues’ (Erics-
son et al., 1993) deliberate practice view has had a
major impact on both scientific and popular views
on the nature and origins of expertise. With the
caveat that the evidence is almost entirely correla-
tional, research inspired by this view suggests that
training history may well be an important determi-
nant of individual differences in expertise. At the
same time, the available evidence indicates that train-
ing history is probably not as important as Ericsson
and colleagues have argued—and that other factors
are probably more important than they have argued,
including genetically-influenced abilities and capac-
ities. Accordingly, my colleagues and I have argued
that the science of expertise must embrace the idea
that the origins of expertise can never be adequately
understood by focusing on one, or one class, of
determinant (see Hambrick et al., 2016; Ullén et
al., 2016). We believe that research guided by this
perspective will shed new light on factors that con-
tribute to expertise, which in turn will provide solid
scientific grounding for interventions to accelerate
the acquisition of expertise.
Summary
Scientific research on human expertise focuses on the nature and origins of complex skill in domains
such as music, sports, and games. A central question in this area of research is why some people
reach a higher level of ultimate performance than do other people in these domains. Research
reveals that training history cannot account for all, or even most, of the differences across people
in expertise. The practical implication of this finding is that people may require vastly different
amounts of training to reach a given level of skill. This chapter describes a multifactorial perspective
on expertise, which seeks to identify all factors contributing to individual differences in expertise,
including both experiential factors (“nurture”) and basic abilities and capacities (“nature”).
Review Questions
1. Describe the two major perspectives on the question of what explains individual differences in
expertise.
2. What does the available evidence indicate about the strength of the relationship between
“deliberate practice” and expertise?
3. Describe three different types of gene-environment correlation (rGE), with an illustration of
how each might contribute to the development of expertise.
4. Ericsson and colleagues’ case for the importance of deliberate practice as a predictor of
individual differences in expertise is based largely on correlational evidence. Why is this a
problem?




Though I can hardly believe it, I have been studying the same topic
(expertise) for nearly 25 years—since my first year of graduate school at
Georgia Tech, in 1995. Time flies when you’re having fun. These days,
I am fortunate to have a job as a professor. However, my daily activities
as a researcher are much the same as they were when I was a graduate
student.
Most days, I write something having to do with my research. This
includes working on manuscripts of various types, including scientific
reports of research from my lab, book chapters like the one you are
reading right now, and grant applications to secure funding for my lab. It also includes writing
reviews of manuscripts I have been asked to evaluate for publication in scholarly journals (having
an expert from the field evaluate a manuscript that another researcher has submitted to a journal for
publication is called “peer review”). Over the years, I have written hundreds of reviews. I can’t say
that this is my favorite task, but it’s an essential form of professional service, and I take it seriously
(after all, someone has taken time out of their busy schedule to review my manuscript submissions).
I also do a lot of writing in my role as editor of the Journal of Expertise. Of course, I also spend a
good deal of time on any given day reading what other researchers have written.
I also spend a great deal of time interacting with my students and colleagues about various aspects
of the dozen or so research projects that we have going on at any given time. We discuss (in person,
or via Skype or e-mail) everything from the logistics of recruiting participants for a project, to
questions about how best to analyze data we have collected, to conceptual issues at the core of
designing a project. This also includes what is undoubtedly the most important part of my job:
mentoring. Whether formally or informally, I advise students almost every day. This is the part
of my job that I love the most. More than 20 years ago, my mentors took time out of their busy
schedules to help me develop my ideas for research, to read drafts of my manuscripts, and to give
me career advice. I can’t thank my mentors enough for the help they gave me, and I try to do the
same.
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Glossary
deliberate practice A structured training activity
designed to improve a person’s current level
of performance in a domain. 239
expertise A person’s current level of performance
in a domain. 235
gene-environment correlation (rGE) A phe-
nomenon that occurs when people are exposed
to different environments as a systematic func-
tion of their genetic differences rather than at
random. 243
gene-environment interaction (G×E) A phe-
nomenon that occurs when the magnitude of
genetic influence on an outcome varies as a
function of the type or amount of an environ-
mental experience. 243
genotype A person’s unique genetic makeup. 244
molecular genetics The subfield of genetics that
studies the relationship between specific ge-
netic factors and behavioral characteristics.
245
multifactorial model of expertise A perspec-
tive on expertise that seeks to identify all
factors underlying complex skill. 243
phenotype An observable behavior or characteris-
tic. 244
twin study A behavioral genetic research design
in which identical twins, who share 100% of
their genes, are compared to fraternal twins,
who share 50% of their genes on average, are
compared on some phenotype. 244
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Most other chapters in this volume tackle the nature
of human thinking from the perspective of cognitive
psychology, for example how humans derive deduc-
tions. In most of these chapters, human subjects
are treated uniformly; that is, an attempt is made
to describe and explain the cognitive principles of
deductive reasoning that are common to all people.
In this chapter, the focus will instead be placed on
what makes people different: individual differences
between persons. The areas of cognition discussed
in most other chapters provide the required back-
ground information on what exactly humans engage
in while working on an intelligence test. Whereas
some measures stress deductive inference, others
might provoke complex problem solving behavior.
The focus of this chapter is to study why some sub-
jects answer those intelligence items correctly while
others get them wrong, and why these differences
are meaningful and interesting.
In the first section of this chapter, we will ap-
proach the concept of intelligence by briefly sum-
marizing the history of relevant psychometric intel-
ligence models. While a historical overview might
seem somewhat inappropriate in an introductory
chapter, in the case of intelligence research, this
perspective provides us with a set of competing ac-
counts essential for understanding intelligence data
and intelligence theories. We will then proceed by
describing an established taxonomy of intelligence
factors and discuss intelligence as an overarching
concept for all measures that provoke maximal cog-
nitive effort. The second section will be very prag-
matic, showing how intelligence can be measured,
how it can be used for predictive purposes, and
whether it can be changed through interventions. We
will conclude the chapter by examining important
issues for future intelligence research. A very broad
and relatively developed field such as intelligence
and its assessment cannot be addressed exhaustively
in an introductory chapter. We hope that the refer-
ences provided in this chapter will be helpful for
further reading and will enrich one’s understanding
of contemporary research in the field.
14.1 Understanding Intelligence
Research on the structure of individual differences
in intelligence follows an atypical strategy, relative
to most other psychological research. Typically,
theories and hypotheses are proposed, followed by
the development of adequate means for testing and
evaluating; intelligence research instead proceeds
in reverse. For instance, in the beginning of in-
telligence research as an independent field, factor
analytic methods were invented and refined, with
corresponding theories of intelligence developed af-
terwards. This approach to intelligence research
places the focus on competing explanations of indi-
vidual differences in a broad variety of intelligence
tasks. Unfortunately, we must skip some important
early contributions: for example, Galton (1883) de-
veloped several simple tests of intellectual function-
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ing and made early contributions to the heredity of
intelligence. Binet deserves credit for compiling one
of the original intelligence tests, although his efforts
could hardly be considered a clear theoretical con-
tribution on the structure of intelligence. Moreover,
Ebbinghaus (1895) developed several intelligence
tests that were reused in other fields before mak-
ing a much later comeback in intelligence research
(Ackerman, Beier, & Bowen, 2000).
14.1.1 The History of Intelligence
Models and the Usual Suspects
In the following section, we will present differ-
ent ways of conceptualizing intelligence (see Fig-
ure 14.1). We start with Spearman (1904a, 1904b),
who made two seminal methodological contribu-
tions in the year he completed his dissertation (on
a completely different topic) with Wilhelm Wundt
in Leipzig. In one of these contributions, he laid the
foundation for what is known today as classical test
theory (Lord & Novick, 1968). In his other contribu-
tion, he established the groundwork for the general
factor theory. This theory is based on two central as-
sumptions. First, a latent factor (g) accounts for the
correlations between all intelligence tasks. Second,
besides this general factor, there are test-specific
individual differences. Apart from these two compo-
nents, there is only unsystematic measurement error
in intelligence tasks.
The first assumption is an idea prevalent through-
out research on individual differences and applies
to traits such as extraversion and achievement mo-
tivation. The assumption is that there is a stable
disposition within persons to act in specific ways. In
the case of the g-factor, this disposition is to do well
Figure 14.1: Psychometric models of intelligence.
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on tasks requiring cognitive effort. This disposition
is deemed causal for the correctness or swiftness of
responses on each intelligence item. The ideas of a
latent trait also apply to most other theories of intelli-
gence structure. Usually, these traits are deemed sta-
ble over time, that is, the rank-order of subjects does
not change dramatically over time. They are consid-
ered broad, in the sense that they do not only apply
to a highly-specific test but also to similar exami-
nations. They are expected to be relevant, meaning
they predict real-life outcomes that are of individual
or societal relevance. In the case of the g-factor,
only one such latent variable is specified for the
field of intelligence. Spearman’s theory states that
the correlation between any two intelligence tasks is
because of the g-factor (Figure 14.1, panel A). As a
side note, the g-factor theory competed in the early
days of intelligence testing with the so-called bond
theory (Thomson, 1919). The bond theory stated
that the magnitude of the correlation between any
two intelligence tasks indicates the proportion of
overlapping processes—the higher the correlation,
the larger the number of shared processes. Some-
what more cognitively, the componential theory of
intelligence proposes that the correlation between
two intelligence tasks is a function of shared compo-
nents and the theory was put to the test for example
in the area of analogical problem solving (Sternberg,
1977). This approach has recently gained new attrac-
tion (van der Maas et al., 2006). A somewhat related
approach pursued with different methods is called
facet theory. Here, the overlap of task attributes de-
termines the correlations between intelligence tasks,
while the magnitude of correlations is graphically
represented by proximity (Guttman & Levy, 1991).
A major competitor of the g-factor theory arose
with the development of multiple factor analysis
(Thurstone, 1931). This procedure allowed for the
extraction of more than one factor (Figure 14.1,
panel B). Combined with the development of factor
rotations, the interpretation of intelligence factors
was greatly facilitated (Thurstone, 1934). Thurstone
subsequently proposed 7 primary mental abilities
(Thurstone, 1938). Thurstone initially proposed
reasoning, spatial visualization, verbal comprehen-
sion, word fluency, number facility, associative mem-
ory, and perceptual speed—and he updated and pro-
longed this list jointly with his wife three years later
(Thurstone & Thurstone, 1941).
Disentangling different contributions to perfor-
mance on intelligence tasks was also the main pur-
pose of the so-called bifactor approach (Holzinger
& Swineford, 1937). Similarly, Schmid and Leiman
(1957) proposed rotation techniques to distinguish
between independent performance contributions to
individual differences in intelligence tasks. Both
approaches (Figure 14.1, panel C) are early hierar-
chical perspectives on intelligence.
Higher-order factor models are another way to
conceptualize intelligence because the ubiquitous
positive correlation between any two intelligence
tasks also leads to correlations between intelligence
factors. These factor correlations are the basis for
higher-order models of intelligence (Figure 14.1,
panel D). In these models, a second-order factor
accounts for the correlations between first-order fac-
tors, which in turn accounts for the correlations be-
tween intelligence tasks (Carroll, 1993).
14.1.2 Accepted Views on the Structure
of Intelligence
Among the more contemporary models, Cattell’s
theory of fluid and crystallized intelligence (Cattell,
1971; see also Brown, 2016) has become a widely
accepted and applied model for the description and
testing of intelligence. The gf-gc-theory also heav-
ily stimulated theory building, as can be seen in the
investment theory (Cattell, 1971) or the PPIK the-
ory (Intelligence-as-Process, Personality, Interests
and Intelligence-as-Knowledge, Ackerman, 1996).
Furthermore, the integration of the gf-gc-theory into
personality research and its validation and use in
aging research has contributed to its popularity. In
the current version, the gf-gc theory assumes nine
primary factors (McGrew, 2009), of which fluid and
crystallized intelligence are central (see Table 14.1).
A closely related milestone in intelligence re-
search is the seminal work of Carroll (1993). The
comprehensive synopsis and reanalysis of decades
of factor-analytic intelligence research and the
theory-guided integration of these findings led to
a structural model that, in view of the factors pos-
tulated, bears much resemblance to the model of
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Table 14.1: Overview of the central factors of cognitive ability.
Label Description Example Task
gf Fluid
intelligence
Reason, plan, solve abstract and complex problems; basically the
ability to maintain, to mentally manipulate, and to store information;




Describes the breadth and depth of cultural knowledge that is passed
on to the individual through acculturation (e.g., formal learning). Is










Perceive, manipulate, store, and retrieve visual images such as shapes,
forms, colors, etc., and more complex visual stimuli. This also in-




Analyze, manipulate, understand, and synthesize sound elements,
sound groups, and sound patterns. The key feature is the cognitive
control in perception of auditory material (i.e., handle the competition






Store and consolidate new information in long-term memory. Fluently




Perform over-learned or elementary cognitive tasks under time con-






Quickly make elementary responses (i.e., simple reaction time) or sev-




Note. Labels in the first column are taken from the CHC model.
Cattell and Horn. Carroll (1993) reanalyzed 461
data sets from factor analytic intelligence research
including diverse populations, countries, decades,
and a full variety of cognitive tasks developed by
that time. To this day, Carroll most likely compiled
the most comprehensive overview of cognitive abil-
ity measures. His analyses led to a structural model
distinguishing three levels of generality (see Fig-
ure 14.2).
At the middle level of generality, eight broad abil-
ity factors are distinguished (see Table 14.1). Once
again, any two intelligence tasks will always show
a positive correlation and these eight factors will
therefore show positive manifold. This positive
manifold is captured with an overarching general
intelligence factor at the apex of the higher-order
model of intelligence. Such models have become
more prevalent and popular recently (e.g., Gustafs-
son 1999), because they a) explicitly address and
capture the substantial positive correlations between
intelligence tasks and intelligence factors, and b)
deliver the best from the two worlds of group factor
theories and a general factor theory. In pragmatic
terms, the factors from the middle level of generality
are not all of equal importance. Whereas fluid and
crystallized intelligence are indispensable in intelli-
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Figure 14.2: A slightly revised version of Carroll’s Three-Stratum Theory.
gence tests, other factors are mostly needed to give
a comprehensive picture of an individual’s cogni-
tive abilities. Unsurprisingly, fluid and crystallized
intelligence (and mixtures of both factors) are also
most predictive for outcomes such as educational
achievement or job performance. Please note that
fluid intelligence has been found repeatedly to show
the strongest relation with the overarching general
factor. Therefore, if only a single task can be used to
measure intelligence, your choice should be to pick
a fluid intelligence task.
At the lowest level of the hierarchy there are many
specific intellectual abilities that serve to underline
the breadth of factors at the middle level and to
illustrate the exhaustiveness of the model. Taken to-
gether, the work of Cattell, Horn, and Carroll by and
large converges on the model shown in Figure 14.2.
The discussion of research on this model integrates
and successively extends the common ground on in-
dividual differences in intelligence (McGrew, 2009).
In the current version of the model, more specific
abilities, such as specialized knowledge in the sense
of expertise or reading and writing skills, have been
included. Importantly, in the last two decades, popu-
lar and frequently used intelligence tests switched to
the Cattell-Horn-Carroll (CHC) model—a change
that was desperately needed for various Wechsler-
tests in particular.
Despite its unifying character, the CHC model
must not be misunderstood as a final model of in-
telligence structure. There are many open ques-
tions, some of which we will discuss in later sec-
tions of this chapter. In addition, our presentation of
intelligence relies on psychometric, mainly factor-
analytical approaches for studying individual dif-
ferences in cognitive abilities. However, we want
to mention that there are several theories of intelli-
gence that cannot be given full consideration in the
course of an introductory chapter. A theory that is
popular, especially among educators and teachers,
is the theory of "Multiple Intelligences" by Gard-
ner (1983, 1991) who advocated against g, pro-
posed distinct forms of intelligence and claimed
that students can be categorized in eight differ-
ent types of learners (i.e., visual-spatial, bodily-
kinesthetic, musical-rhythmic, interpersonal, intrap-
ersonal, verbal-linguistic, logical-mathematic, nat-
uralistic). However, multiple intelligences appear
to be a blend of g, broad ability factors below g,
and other non-cognitive factors (Visser, Ashton, &
Vernon, 2006) and there is no adequate empirical evi-
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dence to justify incorporating learning-styles into ed-
ucation (Pashler, McDaniel, Rohrer, & Bjork, 2008).
The concept of emotional intelligence has also
gained considerable attention (Salovey, Mayer, &
Caruso, 2004) and received substantial criticism
(Davies, Stankov, & Roberts, 1998). It is argued
to comprise the abilities to perceive emotions, the
abilities to access, generate, and use emotions, the
abilities to understand and regulate emotions and
finally to enclose knowledge about emotions (Sa-
lovey et al., 2004). For most of these abilities it is
difficult to come up with an unequivocal response
standard, i.e. what might work to regulate Persons
A’s emotions might be counterproductive for person
B. Nevertheless, recent efforts to include some as-
pects of emotional intelligence into a higher-order
model of intelligence were successful (MacCann,
Joseph, Newman, & Roberts, 2014) and future re-
search in this area might be promising.
14.1.3 Intelligence as Overarching
Concept of Maximal Cognitive
Effort
Our discussion of intelligence has yet to include an
actual, clear definition of intelligence. Indeed, prior
attempts of specifying what intelligence is and what
it is not were of limited success. The infamous def-
inition that intelligence is what the test measures
(Boring, 1923) begs the question of which tasks or
factors of intelligence are indispensable and what
should not be part of the concept “intelligence”. In
response to public controversy over the term intelli-
gence, Gottfredson and 52 other researchers (1997,
p.13) gave a very broad definition of intelligence:
“A very general mental capability that, among other
things, involves the ability to reason, plan, solve
problems, think abstractly, comprehend complex
ideas, learn quickly and learn from experience.” Sim-
ilarly, Neisser et al. (1996, p. 77) defined intel-
ligence as individual differences between persons
“[. . . ] in their ability to understand complex ideas, to
adapt effectively to the environment, to learn from
experience, to engage in various forms of reason-
ing, to overcome obstacles by taking thought.” The
essential components of these definitions center on
aspects of fluid intelligence and neglect other factors
we described above. In addition, both definitions
are opaque with respect to concepts such as abil-
ity, achievement, aptitude, competence, proficiency,
talent, skill, and so on (Schroeders, 2018). Some
of these terms are used in specific research tradi-
tions or serve to set a specific focus. For example,
competency or proficiency are preferred in an ed-
ucational setting because within the spectrum of
abilities under consideration, the abilities trained
in formal learning (e.g., schooling) are perceived
as malleable and acquired. In contrast, talent often
labels an inherited or an exceptional ability (e.g., mu-
sical or artistic talent). The subtle nuances between
these concepts, which are all related to effortful cog-
nitive processing, are best seen in the context of the
research tradition from which they originate. If you
were asked to classify existing measures of intelli-
gence, competence, aptitude, skill, etc., you would
hardly be able to come up with a dependable clas-
sification of tasks. Therefore, these terms should
be characterized as “fuzzy” and insufficient when
it comes to explaining relations between tasks or to
assigning tasks to factors.
In order to derive a dependable and inclusive un-
derstanding of what constitutes an intelligence task,
we recommend using intelligence as an overarching
concept of maximal cognitive effort. The distinction
between typical behavior and maximum cognitive
performance dates back to Cronbach (1949): typi-
cal behavior refers to the ways individuals usually
behave and what they like or dislike. It is usually
captured through self-reports on behaviors, prefer-
ences, and valences. For example, the question “Do
you like solving math puzzles?” arguably describes
an individual’s preference for engaging in mathemat-
ical problem solving. Responses to such questions
presuppose the willingness and ability of subjects
to introspect. As well, these responses are very
vulnerable to subjective judgments and biases (e.g.,
social desirability). In contrast, maximal cognitive
performance refers to the measurement of abilities,
achievements, skills, talents, etc. An item such as,
“What is the solution to f (x) = 3x2 + 12?” differs
fundamentally from the assessment of typical behav-
ior in several ways. Items of maximal behavior will
only be used in contexts in which a) the person be-
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ing examined is aware of the performance appraisal,
b) the person is willing and able to show maximal
cognitive effort, and c) the standards for evaluating
the response behavior are adequate for the purpose
of making a diagnostic judgment (Sackett, Zedeck,
& Fogli, 1988). Preferably, objectively correct so-
lutions are used as a benchmark for actual response
behavior. In some domains, providing a veridical
response standard is not feasible. For example, it is
very difficult to provide such a standard for written
essays and tasks designed to tap into interpersonal
intelligence factors such as understanding emotions
(for a recent though incomplete summary concern-
ing intrinsically personal tests, see Mayer, 2018).
Rather, these tasks often rely on situational judg-
ment methodology (Oostrom, DeSoete, & Lievens,
2015).
One important aspect that we want to stress
is the unfortunate division between psychological
and educational testing of maximal effort concepts.
More than a century ago, Binet (1904) distinguished
between medical, pedagogical, and psychological
methods in intelligence testing. The medical method
aims “to appreciate the anatomical, physiological,
and pathological signs of inferior intelligence” (Bi-
net, 1904, p. 194). Thus, this method will receive no
further consideration in this chapter. The psychologi-
cal method “makes direct observations and measure-
ments of the degree of intelligence” (Binet, 1904, p.
194) and focuses on reasoning and memory-related
abilities. The pedagogical method “aims to judge
intelligence according to the sum of acquired knowl-
edge” (Binet, 1904, p. 194). It is clear in our earlier
presentation of essential intelligence factors that the
psychological and the pedagogical method roughly
correspond to fluid and crystallized intelligence re-
spectively. This early distinction by Binet, unfor-
tunately, led to a subsequent separation of efforts
related to his two methods. Consequently, fluid intel-
ligence or equivalent concepts such as decontextual-
ized thinking, academic intelligence, etc., are hardly
accepted determinants of educational outcomes and
have often been considered taboo in an educational
context. Conversely, elaborating on crystallized in-
telligence or related concepts such as expertise and
how they could enrich cognitive ability testing has
yet to become popular in psychometric research con-
texts. Unfortunately, the separation between these
two fields has yet to be overcome. As a remedy,
we propose that the term intelligence be used as an
overarching concept that encompasses mechanical
abilities such as fluid intelligence, memory, and pro-
cessing speed, as well as knowledge-driven aspects,
such as crystallized intelligence with its myriad of
facets.
Next, we want to relate intelligence assessment
with educational assessment to illustrate the over-
arching/unifying aspect of intelligence. The debate
regarding the extent intelligence tests and educa-
tional achievement tests measure the same under-
lying abilities has a long history (Baumert, Lüdtke,
Trautwein, & Brunner, 2009). We propose that the
problem of distinguishing between intelligence tests
and other measures for assessing cognitive abilities
(e.g., educational achievement tests) is not whether a
person’s scores on both methods are perfectly corre-
lated (Bridgeman, 2005). To understand differences
between both fields, it is more instrumental to study
attributes in which such measures differ: for exam-
ple, where they are located on the continuum "de-
contextualized" vs. "contextualized" and which pre-
dictions the contextualization of measures affords
(Brunner, 2008). This approach clearly places the
competencies studied in educational psychology be-
low crystallized intelligence. For example, Baumert
and colleagues (2009) suggested that international
education studies, such as PISA (Program for In-
ternational Student Assessment), primarily capture
the cumulative outcomes of a knowledge acquisi-
tion process. This understanding of competence
is broadly identical to Cattell’s definition of crystal-
lized intelligence (1971), according to which crystal-
lized intelligence encompasses the totality of knowl-
edge that people acquire and use to solve problems
throughout their lives. Whereas the nature and con-
tent of educational tests are usually carefully studied,
many traditional tests of crystallized intelligence ne-
glect content validity—a lesson that can and should
be learned from educational testing.
We advise against relying on a test’s purpose to
understand what the test measures. College admis-
sion tests do not measure the ability to study. Such
tests usually include measures of fluid intelligence
along with domain-specific crystallized intelligence
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tasks. School readiness tests do not capture the abil-
ity to attend school—instead, they are best seen as a
composite of gc tasks and social skills. If you want
to understand what a measure of maximal cognitive
performance captures, it is not wise to focus on the
purpose of testing. Instead, it will be more useful
to classify a measure according to the intelligence
factors described here.
Figure 14.3: Example item for fluid intelligence: verbal, numeric,
and figural.
14.2 Measuring and Using Intelligence
14.2.1 Tasks for Measuring Intelligence
In this section, we introduce selected intelligence
tasks designed for use with adults and discuss the
cognitive demands of these tasks. We focus on the
two factors of fluid and crystallized intelligence be-
cause these factors are the most decisive and im-
portant predictors in most applied settings, such as
college admission or personnel selection.
14.2.1.1 Tasks for Measuring Fluid Intelligence
Earlier in this chapter, we argued that a fluid intelli-
gence task should be chosen when only a single task
can be used to measure intelligence. Such a fluid
intelligence task would then serve as a marker task
for intelligence. Below the fluid intelligence factor,
Carroll (1993) distinguished three reasoning factors:
• Sequential reasoning tasks require drawing
conclusions from certain premises. The cogni-
tive operations that are required to solve such
tasks can be many, particularly when compar-
ing stimuli with regards to their properties or
determining class membership of elements.
The focus of sequential reasoning tasks is
not on finding or discovering regularities (in-
duction), but on successfully applying rules.
For prototypical tasks of sequential reason-
ing, Carroll (1993) listed deductive reasoning
(identifying logical inferences from a verbal
problem), syllogisms (evaluating the correct-
ness of a conclusion based on two premises),
and verbal reasoning (see Figure 14.3 a) for
an illustration).
• Inductive reasoning tasks require finding sim-
ilarities or differences in features or relations
between stimuli. In contrast to the deduc-
tive reasoning tasks, the difficulty lies in iden-
tifying the underlying rules rather than ap-
plying them. These rules may represent a
concept, a class membership, or a causal re-
lationship. Typical tasks include classifica-
tion (identifying a figure that does not belong
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in an ensemble of similar figures) or work-
ing with matrices (identifying a figure that
replaces a placeholder within a matrix so that
the pattern found in rows and columns per-
sist) (see Figure 14.3 c) for an illustration).
Formally, all inductive intelligence tasks are
essentially enthymemes, that is, deductive in-
ferences in which one or more premises are
implicitly "added" rather than explicitly for-
mulated (Wilhelm, 2004).
• Quantitative reasoning tasks assess
quantitative-numerical components of rea-
soning. These demands may be deductive,
inductive, or a combination of both. Typical
examples of quantitative reasoning are mathe-
matical word problems or number series (see
Figure 14.3 b) for an illustration). In general,
the difficulty lies in mathematical modeling,
the numerical-formalization of a problem,
rather than in the actual calculation (Carroll,
1993).
A closer examination of the tasks subsumed below
Carroll’s three reasoning factors suggests that the se-
quential reasoning factor is predominantly a verbal
reasoning factor, the inductive factor is mostly cov-
ered by tasks with figural content, and quantitative
reasoning relies on numeric content. This interpre-
tation is also supported by Carroll’s observations
(see Table 6.2 in Carroll, 1993, pp. 217) and his
interpretation of the factors of the individual studies.
Wilhelm (2004) used confirmatory factor analysis to
examine this relationship between 12 different fluid
intelligence tasks more closely. Among these tasks,
prototypical indicators of deductive reasoning (e.g.,
propositions and syllogisms) and inductive reason-
ing tasks (e.g., series and matrices) were selected.
The comparison of competing measurement models
revealed that a model in which the correlation be-
tween inductive and deductive thinking was freely
estimated described the data as well as a model in
which inductive and deductive thinking were mod-
eled as a common factor. Thus, a distinction be-
tween inductive and deductive thinking is artificial
and unnecessary from the perspective of differen-
tial psychology. Another important finding was that
a model with three correlated content factors, cov-
ering verbal, numeric, and figural stimulus mate-
rial, described the data much better than a model
with a single reasoning factor (Wilhelm, 2004). The
model with three correlated content factors (with
no other covariates) is statistically equivalent with a
higher-order model in which the content factors load
on a higher-order fluid intelligence factor. In line
with previous research (e.g., Marshalek, Lohman, &
Snow, 1983), the figural reasoning task showed the
strongest relation with the overarching fluid intelli-
gence factor, which suggests that the figural content
is the best single indicator of fluid intelligence. In
summary, the classification of fluid intelligence tasks
based on its content is both theoretically and empir-
ically well supported (see Figure 14.3 for example
items). Please note that broad visual perception
includes spatial ability parts that are close to the
reasoning factors discussed here (Lohman, 1996).
Developing a sound and efficient fluid intelligence
task is more of an art than a science (Kyllonen &
Christal, 1990). This position is predominantly due
to a theoretical deficit: most available intelligence
tasks suffer from a lack of well-founded theoretical
assumptions about the cognitive processes required
to successfully complete the tasks in question. Such
an underlying theory could be used to derive proce-
dures that generate items automatically, and it could
provide a priori estimates of item difficulty. For
example, for the figural aspect of fluid intelligence,
numerous taxonomies for constructing matrix items
have been proposed (Carpenter, Just, & Shell, 1990).
In his review, Primi (2001) reduced the complexity
of influencing factors on item difficulty to four main
attributes: (1) the number of elements, (2) the num-
ber of transformations or rules, (3) the type of rules,
and (4) the perceptual organization. The success
of this proposal and similar efforts is mixed, and
moreover, most efforts are limited to specific types
of tasks.
A promising approach to circumvent these prob-
lems and to gain a more profound understanding of
reasoning is to instead rely on the concept of work-
ing memory capacity (WMC). With respect to go-
ing beyond task-specific models of what changes
the difficulty and nature of a task, WMC can be ap-
plied to many working memory items by specifying
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the storage and processing demands of a task. In a
memory updating task, for example, subjects might
be shown digits presented in four different locations.
These digits disappear, and subjects briefly receive
instructions for simple computations at the location
of individual digits, one after another. After several
such computations, subjects are asked to provide the
final results for each of the locations. Such tasks
can easily be generated by computers, and their diffi-
culty can be predicted very well with just a few task
attributes. WMC tasks might not only prevent some
of the problems prevalent with reasoning measures
but they are also the key to understanding fluid in-
telligence and intelligence in general (Engle, 2018;
Oberauer, Farrell, Jarrold, & Lewandowsky, 2016).
The relation between WMC and fluid intelligence
has received considerable attention (Kane, Ham-
brick, Tuholski, Wilhelm, Payne & Engle, 2004;
Oberauer, Schulze, Wilhelm, & Süß, 2005) and there
is a broad consensus that this relation is very strong,
though not perfect (Kyllonen & Christal, 1990). The
main reasons for the very strong, but not perfect,
relation might be twofold. First, despite being un-
wanted, many reasoning tasks do have knowledge
requirements that might bias the relation with WMC
in a downwards fashion. Second, many WMC tasks
have an intrinsic speed requirement by limiting stim-
ulus exposition or time windows for responding. If
these biases were adjusted for, the relations between
fluid intelligence and WMC might be perfect (Wil-
helm, Hildebrandt, & Oberauer, 2013).
14.2.1.2 Tasks for Measuring Crystallized
Intelligence
According to Cattell (1971), crystallized intelli-
gence should be seen as the result of the investment
of fluid intelligence in learning situations, but also
depends on additional sources such as investment
traits (Ackerman, 1996) and interests (Su, Rounds,
& Armstrong, 2009). Thus, gc reflects the impact of
education, learning, and acculturation on knowledge-
related intelligence tasks. During school years, the
item universe for gc measurement is at least partly
predetermined through the canon of formal educa-
tion and through cultural standards that roughly pre-
scribe what children and adolescents are expected to
learn and know (Cattell, 1971). This notion suggests
an assessment of gc via factual knowledge tests that
captures both school and extracurricular content (for
an example item see Figure 14.4). As learning op-
portunities become more and more diverse across
one’s lifespan and after regular schooling, the as-
sessment of gc becomes increasingly difficult. An
ideal measurement of gc must include the whole
variety of knowledge that people can acquire during
their lives (and that are somewhat valued culturally).
Consequently, it would require as many different
tasks as there are occupations, recreational activities,
and other differential learning opportunities. The
central role of knowledge in the concept of crystal-
lized intelligence is also emphasized by Ackerman
(1996), who stated that gc measures should not be
an in-depth assessment of knowledge within a spe-
cific domain or a few selected domains; rather, gc
measures should be conceptually broad.
Figure 14.4: Example item for crystallized intelligence.
In reality, gc is predominantly assessed via ver-
bal indicators such as vocabulary and verbal flu-
ency tasks. There is no doubt that language skills
are important and a result of formal education and,
thus, culturally-shared knowledge. This idea is also
consistent with the description of gc in Carroll’s
Three-Stratum Theory (1993). However, the factor-
analytic results could instead be an artifact of current
assessment practices which have an overrepresenta-
tion of verbal ability measures.
But it is also apparent that language command
describes only a section of culturally-shared knowl-
edge. In fact, in a large-scale educational assess-
ment study, Schipolowski, Wilhelm, and Schroed-
ers (2014) administered various language tasks, in-
cluding reading comprehension, listening compre-
hension, language use and writing, together with a
broadly sampling knowledge test covering 16 con-
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tent domains (e.g., physics, art, law) to an unse-
lected sample of 6,071 adolescents. The correlation
between latent variables representing language com-
mand and knowledge was very high (ρ = .91), but
significantly different from unity. About 17% of
the variance in the knowledge factor was indepen-
dent of individual differences in language command
and fluid intelligence (and vice versa). Thus, a re-
striction to purely language-related content must
be regarded as deficient in light of the abovemen-
tioned definition of gc because it equates a part of gc
with the overarching gc factor (Amthauer, Brocke,
Liepmann, & Beauducel, 2001). Please note that
command of language may or may not be differ-
ent from a concept-labeled verbal ability by some
researchers.
Cattell (1971) also drew attention to the fact that
verbal ability tasks do not necessarily cover gc ade-
quately, especially if the verbal content is strongly
over-trained knowledge or decontextualized. Fur-
thermore, knowledge tests also have the greatest
potential to minimize the risk of being confounded
with fluid intelligence. The maximum separation
of gc and gf should be an overriding principle in
constructing efficient and distinct measures of cog-
nitive ability (Carroll, 1993). Language skills and
reasoning abilities are minimal requirements for
knowledge tests, as they are necessary to under-
stand the question and answer options at a basic
level. Taken together, we conclude that declarative
knowledge tests should take into account as many
areas of knowledge as possible to be used as marker
variables of gc, as they include a variety of learn-
ing experiences that go beyond language skills and
competencies.
14.2.2 Validity of Intelligence Tests
Up until this point, we have presented different con-
ceptualizations of intelligence and ways to measure
it. We can also take a very pragmatic position while
discussing the strengths and benefits of intelligence
testing. Intelligence tests are used in psychology, ed-
ucational research, and other behavioral sciences for
a wide range of purposes because intelligence is one
of the best predictors of educational, vocational, aca-
demic success, and job performance (e.g., Schmidt
& Hunter, 1998; Schmidt, 2002). Intelligence in
this context mostly refers to the ability to reason
(gf) and domain-related knowledge (gc). The pre-
dictive validity of both components seems to vary
during the course of life. In a comprehensive re-
view, Baumert and colleagues (2009) compared the
results of various educational-psychological studies
and showed that the predictive power of domain-
specific knowledge in comparison to reasoning be-
comes more important the older students are. Ob-
viously, the contributions of gf and gc are hard to
distinguish because they are strongly correlated. The
relevance of knowledge on significant outcomes and
its underrepresentation in contemporary intelligence
assessment led Ackerman (2000) to the conclusion
that domain-specific knowledge is the “dark matter”
of adult intelligence. His PPIK theory (intelligence-
as-process, personality, interests, and intelligence-
as-knowledge; Ackerman, 1996), builds on Cattell’s
gf-gc-theory. It distinguishes several types of knowl-
edge (e.g., occupational knowledge) to give domain-
specific knowledge the space it deserves.
Much research was conducted to shed light on
the developmental interplay between gf and gc. In
the investment theory, Cattell (1971) proposed that
crystallized knowledge develops through the invest-
ment of fluid ability. However, empirical evidence
for this assumption is sparse. For example, Ferrer
and McArdle (2004) used linear dynamic models
to study the trajectories of gf and gc from child-
hood to early adulthood. The results showed no
coupling between gf and gc within the studied age
range, which clearly contradicts the investment the-
ory. When reviewing available empirical evidence
and methodological approaches on the development
of gf and gc, it becomes evident that there is no
direct or simple explanation to account for the de-
velopment and mutual relation between cognitive
abilities in general, and gf and gc in particular. To
overcome this issue, Savi, Marsman, van der Maas
and Maris (2018), for example, proposed to abandon
factor analytic methods in intelligence research and
instead conceptualize intelligence as evolving net-
works in which new knowledge and processes are
wired together during development. This approach
might also bridge the gap between the study of in-
dividual differences in intelligence and phenomena
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primarily studied in cognitive psychology, such as
forgetting.
The great importance of intelligence is evident
not only in school or university education (Kuncel
& Hezlett, 2007; Schmidt & Hunter, 1998), but also
in professional training (Ziegler, Dietl, Danay, Vo-
gel, & Bühner, 2011). As a cautionary note, even
though intelligence is the most influential single pre-
dictor of academic achievement, it still accounts
for only about a quarter of variation in the out-
come. Accordingly, successful learning at school
and the university depends on a plethora of indi-
vidual characteristics—such as the personality trait
conscientiousness (Barrick & Mount, 1991) or inter-
ests (Holland, 1997)— in addition to intelligence.
A last aspect of predictive validity we would like
to touch upon has to do with death. Initially labeled
“ultimate validity” (O’Toole & Stankov, 1992), the
relevance of intelligence for longevity becomes in-
creasingly clear. It turns out intelligence might be an
essential contributor to epidemiological outcomes
in that premorbid intelligence predicts all sorts of
health related behaviors and diseases which in turn
are related with mortality (Batty, Deary, & Gottfred-
son, 2007).
14.2.3 Training of Intelligence
“How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic
Achievement” was the title of an influential and
very controversial paper published in the late sixties
(Jensen, 1969). In this paper, Jensen drew a some-
what pessimistic conclusion concerning interven-
tions intended to improve IQ or scholastic achieve-
ment. In their notorious book, “The Bell Curve:
Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life”,
Herrnstein and Murray (1994) also concluded with
negative inferences concerning the improvement of
IQ and scholastic achievement. The contributions
by Gottfredson (1997) and Neisser et al. (1996) for
defining intelligence as a concept (discussed earlier
in this chapter) were, in fact, both reactions to the
controversy triggered by the Hernstein and Murray
book. Importantly, both publications suggested rel-
atively explicitly that many of the observed group
differences in IQ and scholastic achievement are de-
termined genetically. Obviously, today’s scientists
working in the fields of behavior or molecular genet-
ics of traits have gained a more profound understand-
ing of heritability and use more advanced statistical
methods and designs to study the relevance of nature
and nurture.
For example, Plomin and von Stumm (2018) sum-
marized recent findings on genome-wide association
studies, identifying genome sequence differences
that account for 20% of the 50% heritability of intel-
ligence. Such reports on the genetic transmission of
intelligence seem to be contradicted by the fact that
schooling affects both scholastic achievement (for a
comprehensive account, see the classes of evidence
described by Ceci, 1991) and intelligence (Becker,
Lüdtke, Trautwein, Köller, & Baumert, 2012; Clif-
fordson & Gustafsson, 2008). However, there is
nothing contradictory about these findings once
genetic effects are interpreted correctly (Johnson,
Turkheimer, Gottesman, & Bouchard, 2010). Also,
in a recent meta-analysis of quasi-experimental stud-
ies with strong designs (i.e., those that allow state-
ments about increases in intelligence as a function
of schooling), Ritchie and Tucker-Drob (2018) sum-
marized overwhelming evidence for education being
the most consistent, robust, and durable method for
raising intelligence. They found an increase between
1 and 5 IQ points for every additional year of school-
ing.
Somewhat related, it can be shown that non detri-
mental or supporting environments have a positive
effect on intelligence over a broader time period
(Flynn, 1984). Despite contradicting results, the
so-called Flynn-effect might in fact not have lev-
eled off in the past two decades (Trahan, Stuebing,
Fletcher, & Hiscock, 2014). Beside the aforemen-
tioned changes in the educational system, different
factors have been discussed for being responsible
for the IQ gains. In particular, education and health-
related factors such as better nutrition and reduced
pathogen stress appear to be related to IQ gains
(Pietschnig & Voracek, 2015).
The evidence presented so far is correlative and
at a macroscopic level. If we want to answer the
question laid out at the beginning of this section,
we should take a closer look at the experimental
evidence. Prior to evaluating such evidence, the
benchmark for such an evaluation should be clear.
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Training effects on intelligence should a) persist af-
ter the training ended (effect duration), b) be present
in non-trained tasks (effect transfer), c) be specific
to the targeted intelligence so that not everything is
improving but only trained aspects, d) be stronger in
trained than in non-trained subjects (who should be
engaged in other training instead of simply waiting),
and e) be rational and sensible in the way that the
intervention is tailored to what it should accomplish
and it provides a non-trivial gain.
Moreover, bearing in mind the current replication
crisis (Open Science Collaboration, 2015), training
studies should fulfill the requirement of experimen-
tal studies concerning sample size, sound measure-
ment instruments, a priori specified outcome vari-
able, etc.. Unfortunately, many popular studies that
received extensive mass media coverage do not ad-
here to these requirements (Melby-Lervag, Redick,
& Hulme, 2016). Accordingly, many of the bold
claims about successfully training intelligence or
its most important facets (e.g., Jaeggi, Buschkuehl,
Jonides, & Perrig, 2008) can be attributed to method-
ological flaws and are not due to some miraculous
interventions (Melby-Lervag et al., 2016).
Reviewing most interventions shows that they
were designed with the hope that a few hours of
training would bring about long-lasting, transfer-
able, and relevant improvements in highly general
intellectual abilities. This claim is not only bold;
it is completely unrealistic. Even if we adhere to
a lifestyle that spares us intellectual effort, we can
hardly be functioning members of society if we do
not regularly engage in effortful, intellectual, and
challenging thinking. In other words, our everyday
lives provide daily intellectual exercises, no mat-
ter how trivial and dull they feel from time to time.
Whether we like it or not, we use our intellectual
capacity constantly. Training must provide a suffi-
ciently large additional dosage to make a real differ-
ence. Moreover, the mechanisms being stressed by
intelligence training should also be suited to bring
about the desired change. Alas, most training—in
a sense of over-learning rather simple tasks—just
have people repeatedly completing different varia-
tions of the same type of question. Simply adjusting
the difficulty of questions to say 50% is not an im-
pressive improvement of the retesting-ad nauseam-
approach. Studies with a more substantial dosage
provide a much better read and a more realistic pic-
ture (Schmiedek, Lövdén, & Lindenberger, 2010).
Another field in which fostering intellectual func-
tioning was studied is cognitive ageing. The use-
it-or-lose-it hypothesis (Hultsch, Hertzog, Small, &
Dixon, 1999) suggests that being intellectually ac-
tive prevents an age-associated cognitive decline.
Obviously, it is difficult to collect strong data on
cognitively-active lifestyles over decades and, thus
unsurprisingly, there still seems to be no conclusive
evidence (Salthouse, 2006). Given that intellectu-
ally engaging activities will hardly have adverse
effects, living a mentally active life is not a bad
choice. However, if you are hoping to maintain or
improve your intelligence by skipping physical ac-
tivity in exchange for intellectual activity—this is
probably a bad idea in the long run, as physical exer-
cise has been shown to be beneficial for intellectual
functioning (Kramer & Colcombe, 2018).
14.3 Conclusions
We want to use this section to point out a few per-
vasive problems in intelligence research, raise open
questions, and hint to potential solutions for such
problems. We began this chapter by highlighting
that intelligence research is about individual differ-
ences and covariation, whereas most other chapters
in this book are about the general psychology of
cognition and experimental effects. There is some
lamentation about the unfortunate nature of the barri-
ers between these two disciplines (Cronbach, 1957).
Indeed, the intelligence model we introduced as
widely accepted has a substantial lack of cognitive
sophistication. For example, despite its essential
role in intelligence research, our understanding of
most reasoning tasks is severely limited. Popular
definitions of the construct often stress the novelty
of reasoning tasks as an essential feature, yet we
have no clear idea of what novelty actually means.
Usually, these discussions move on by pointing to in-
duction, deduction, and sometimes abduction—but
rarely is there ever a connection between reason-
ing tasks used in intelligence research and the same
tasks being used in experimental settings to study
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competing theories about inductive thinking, for ex-
ample. Taken together, the lamentation about these
two disciplines of psychology remains justified.
In the end, gc can be considered as a collec-
tion of all sorts of pragmatic and knowledge-driven
thinking. We have merely begun to understand the
breadth of all the aspects we are subsuming here:
wisdom, command of a language, foreign-language
aptitude, declarative and procedural knowledge of
all sorts etc.. Crystallized intelligence needs a lot
more attention. And research on gc demands spe-
cific methods due to its intrinsic orientation towards
change and its idiosyncrasy that grows over the
course of one’s life.
A closer look at the general learning and recogni-
tion factor provokes a few questions, too. The fac-
tors below glr mostly refer to specific methods for
measuring memory. Of course, no one can claim that
associative memory is a different memory store than
free recall memory, for example, even though the
factor labels suggest so. Additionally, researchers
are at a loss when it comes to choosing a glr test be-
cause the method selected heavily affects outcomes.
A much stronger connection with experimental ap-
proaches is essential to further our understanding of
this factor.
The discussion of potential shortcomings of
the taxonomy we actually endorse seems endless.
Should originality and creativity really be located be-
low learning and retrieval? What about interpersonal
abilities, such as emotional competence? Clearly,
there is no shortage of questions and problems. It is
therefore important to understand this taxonomy as
a starting point rather than as an end result. There is
much to be improved, but intelligence testing in all
its varieties is also a major success story from an ap-
plied perspective. It is a strong predictor for several
desirable outcomes and it is no doubt essential for
determining how cognitively rich our lives are.
Summary
1. We began this chapter by briefly reviewing milestones of intelligence research and juxtaposed
competing models of individual differences in intelligence.
2. We described contemporary accepted models on the structure of intelligence in which fluid
and crystallized intelligence are the most important factors.
3. We argued for an extension of the use of the term intelligence to all tasks essentially reflecting
individual differences in maximal cognitive effort.
4. In the second section, we presented prototypical tasks for fluid and crystallized intelligence.
5. We discussed a number of weaknesses in contemporary intelligence models and argued that -
from a pragmatic viewpoint - the measurement of intelligence is still a success story.
6. We discussed several efforts to improve intelligence, a class of interventions that should
interest not only individuals but also society as a whole.
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Review Questions
1. Think about the models in Figure 14.1. Which one do you think best captures individual
differences in human intelligence? Why?
2. Can you think of maximal cognitive effort concepts that are not part of the CHC-model?
3. Where in Figure 14.2 would you locate emotion perception? What skills and abilities make a
good insurance broker?
4. Can you come up with example items for a fluid intelligence task? Are these items deductive
or inductive; are they verbal, numeric, or figural?
5. Why is the enthusiasm concerning interventions for working memory premature?
Hot Topic: Sex Differences in Crystallized Intelligence?
Oliver Wilhelm
Few topics in ability research are regarded as controversial as sex/gender dif-
ferences in cognitive abilities. According to the Gender Similarity Hypothesis
(Hyde, 2005), sex differences in cognitive abilities are mainly small and unsys-
tematic. This general conclusion is empirically supported for fluid intelligence
but is challenged for crystallized intelligence, when measured with knowledge
tests. Most studies show that males outperform females in general knowledge,
with an average overall effect of d = .26 (Schroeders, Wilhelm, & Olaru, 2016).
A closer examination on the level of domains reveals a more complex pattern:
for example, females clearly outperform men in health-related domains, such
as aging and nutrition, but large differences in favor of males were found
for technology and the natural sciences (Ackerman, Bowen, Beier, & Kanfer,
2001). It is striking that such stereotypic sex-related differences in knowledge
domains seem to match the sex differences in interest as reported in the famous
"Men and Things, Women and People" meta-analysis by Su and colleagues (2009). On the other
hand, we should avoid overgeneralizing such differences. For example, the magnitude and direction
of sex or gender differences in mathematical competencies varies dramatically across countries




An aspect that is often neglected in studies on group differences in cognitive
abilities is the aspect of item sampling. The same way participants of a study
are selected from a population (person sampling), items can be thought of as
being drawn from a population of items (item sampling). In the construction
and validation of psychological measures, we usually assume that we draw
items from a theoretically infinite item universe. In a recent study, we put
this idealistic assumption to the test (Schroeders et al., 2016). We used
metaheuristic sampling procedures (i.e., ant-colony-optimization algorithms)
to compile psychometrically sound short forms of a knowledge test. The
algorithm was set for two criteria, a) to select items from an initial set that
adhere to strict psychometric criteria concerning fit of the data to a model, and
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b) to deliberately tilt sex differences to either favor males or females. The results show that sex
differences vary considerably depending on the indicators drawn from the item pool. In other words,
we could compile knowledge tests for sciences and technology in which females outperformed males.
They also could compile health tests in which males outperformed females. This result questions
the generalizability of previously reported findings on sex differences in crystallized intelligence.
On a more general stance, the results corroborate the notion of Loevinger (1965, p. 147) that the
random sampling assumption of items (and tests) is unrealistic because test development is "almost
invariably expert selection rather than sampling". Unfortunately, many studies concerning group
differences in cognitive abilities fail to acknowledge item selection effects.
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Glossary
content validity A form of validity that addresses
whether or not the items of a test or the tests
of a battery represent a predefined or circum-
scribed item universe. 261
crystallized intelligence Breadth and depth of
cultural knowledge often measured with
declarative knowledge tests or tests of lan-
guage proficiency. 264
fluid intelligence Reason, plan, solve abstract and
complex problems that can not be solved with-
out effortful thinking. 262
predictive validity Extent to which measures such
as gf-tests predict relevant outcomes such as
college grade point average. 265
working memory capacity A person’s capacity
to simultaneously store and process informa-
tion. 263
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Creativity refers to original thinking that leads to
new productions that have value in their social con-
text (see Runco & Jaeger, 2012). Creative thinking
can be distinguished from routine thinking, in which
regular cognition yields run-of-the-mill, common
ideas. Many human activities involve regular think-
ing; creativity comes into play when a new idea or
a new solution is sought. The topic of creativity, as
a fundamental aspect of human thinking, can be un-
derstood through a “7 C’s” approach (Lubart, 2017).
Just as the “Seven Seas” refer historically to all the
major bodies of water on Earth, the 7 C’s of creativ-
ity refer to all the main aspects of the topic helpful
to mapping its territory: Creators (person-centered
characteristics), Creating (the creative process), Col-
laborations (co-creating), Contexts (environmental
conditions), Creations (the nature of creative work),
Consumption (the adoption of creative products) and
Curricula (the development and enhancement of cre-
ativity). In this chapter, the main concepts for each
“C” will be surveyed and presented.
15.1 Creators: Person-Centered
Characteristics
Creators refer to all those who engage in creative
thinking. In fact, every human being can be charac-
terized as a creator and as “creative” to some degree.
We tend to think spontaneously of great, eminent cre-
ators such as Leonardo da Vinci, Marie Curie, Jane
Austin, or Pablo Picasso. However, these eminent
creators represent the pinnacle of a much larger set
of creative people, who deploy their original think-
ing in their everyday lives and work (Kaufman &
Beghetto, 2009).
Thus, professional or workplace creators refer to
those who are creative, or “innovative” in their job
context. Some jobs, such as visual artists, writers,
designers, musical composers, or engineering inven-
tors require creativity as a core part of the work.
However, there is a much broader set of jobs in
which creativity can be very important on a regular
but more intermittent basis, as is the case for man-
agers, lawyers, teachers, doctors and other health-
care workers. Finally, in still other jobs, creativity
can sometimes be very useful, albeit on a sporadic
basis, such as for pilots, accountants, and security
agents. In all these cases, the professional environ-
ment recognizes the value of new ideas and aims,
at least in theory, to promote their development and
implementation.
Beyond professional settings, creativity can oc-
cur in daily-life situations, at home, with family or
friends, or in leisure activities. Some people may
invent a new recipe for family meals, even though
they are not professional chefs. Others may have
a new idea for a club activity or a novel solution
to problems between friends, and some people may
https://doi.org/10.17885/heiup.470.c6678 Psychology of Human Thought • Chapter 15 • 277
Lubart & Thornhill-Miller Creativity
find a way to fix a broken item in their home. All
of these examples illustrate creativity in “everyday
life” settings, usually with some recognition by other
people in the immediate social environment.
Finally, creativity can be conceived at a strictly
intra-personal level. Indeed, when people learn
about new topics, they create cognitive structures
that allow them to understand the topics; they gener-
ate concepts that are new to them, although possibly
already very well known to others. This is a kind
of creative thinking at the individual level, which
perhaps serves the person him- or herself. It is rem-
iniscent of Piaget’s proposal that children act like
little scientists, generating their own hypotheses and
rediscovering concepts. It is also possible to view a
person’s life path and self-development as a creative
act, event, or process. In this humanistic tradition,
each person designs his or her life path and sculpts
who he or she is, as an ongoing, lifelong creative
work.
Needless to say, there are large individual dif-
ferences in creativity. Some people produce more
highly creative work than others in their profes-
sional setting, in their everyday life activities, or
in their intrapsychic sphere. For example, in science,
some creators propose groundbreaking contributions
(such as Einstein), whereas others propose original
ideas that gain some recognition in their specific
scientific domain; many scientists work within ex-
isting paradigms, doing “normal” science, which
may replicate or slightly extend existing findings
(see Kuhn, 2012). There has been debate on the
extent to which the same basic psychological “ingre-
dients”, such as mental flexibility and risk taking,
underlie these diverse manifestations of creativity.
Essentially, variations in the quantity and quality
of each ingredient, as well as the specific combi-
nation of the multiple ingredients, can lead to the
wide range of creativity observed across individuals,
yielding sometimes the eminent, field- or culture-
changing big “C” cases of creativity (Kaufman &
Beghetto, 2009; Sternberg & Lubart, 1995). This is
the basis for the multivariate approach, according to
which multiple factors are necessary for creativity,
and the interaction of these ingredients during the
creative process leads to the wide range of creative
achievement (see Amabile, 1996; Lubart, 1999).
More than a century of work has investigated
the “ingredients” that play a role in creativity. In
other words, are there some characteristics that cre-
ative people tend to share? From early studies of
“creative imagination” to modern neuroscientific
research on brain networks (Vartanian, Bristol &
Kaufman, 2013), from case studies of great creators
such as Sigmund Freud and Martha Graham (see
Gardner, 1993), to correlational studies of cognitive
and personality characteristics related to creative
achievement (Batey & Furnham, 2006; Feist, 1998;
Feist, Reiter-Palmon & Kaufman, 2017), to con-
trolled experimental studies and neural imaging, a
large number of person-related characteristics have
been identified as relevant to creativity. The exact
set of these characteristics varies to some extent with
the domain of creative thinking (such as visual art,
literary, social problem solving, etc.) and the spe-
cific task to be accomplished. The specific set of
ingredients and the relative weights of these ingre-
dients can be identified through a task analysis, and
by comparing and contrasting people who achieve
relatively more creative output compared to those
who achieve less.
We will describe two main kinds of ingredients:
abilities and traits. Creativity-relevant abilities re-
fer to information-processing capacities that favor
the encoding, comparison, and combination of infor-
mation for purposes of original thinking (Sternberg
& Davidson, 1995). Creativity-relevant traits re-
fer to preferred ways of behaving (these traits are
expressed through personality, thinking styles, or
motivational patterns) that favor original thinking
(see Sternberg & Lubart, 1995).
In Table 15.1, several abilities and traits that often
have been found to be important for creativity are
listed. This table presents a representative set of
ingredients for creativity but is not exhaustive.
In Figure 15.1, the relationships between the in-
gredients indicated in Table 15.1 and other key con-
cepts concerning creativity are illustrated. First,
there are several ingredients–cognitive and non-
cognitive (conative or affective)–which are person-
centered. Second, there are also ingredients that are
environment-centered (these will be described in the
section concerning the “C” of “Context”). These
ingredients (person-centered and context-centered)
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Table 15.1: Examples of person-centered ingredients for creativity.
Cognitive Ingredients Description
Divergent thinking Capacity to generate a variety of different possible ideas or solutions
Convergent thinking Capacity to identify the best solution, given a set of constraints and
sources
Mental flexibility Capacity to adjust thinking, change perspectives, or switch between
different frames or concepts and process several kinds of informa-
tion
Analogical and metaphorical thinking Capacity to see and use structural, logical, or symbolic parallels
and similarities between ideas or systems
Associative thinking Capacity to make connections between different subjects and ideas
Analytic-evaluative thinking Capacity to examine information and assess strengths and weak-
nesses
Knowledge General and domain-specific informational building blocks that
are pre-requisite to understanding a problem and synthesizing a
solution
Conative Ingredients Description
Openness to experience Interest in experiencing new things and a wide-range of stimuli
Idiosyncrasy Tendency to experience and interact with the world in non-standard
ways; for example, having unusual cognitive, perceptual, or emo-
tional experiences and a preference for nonconformity
Risk taking The tendency to engage deliberately in behaviors in which there is
potential for gain, the outcome is not fully predictable and failure
will result in loss
Tolerance of ambiguity The extent to which contexts where information is missing, unclear,
or contradictory are deemed acceptable for continued engagement
or experienced with relatively little anxiety and stress
Creative self-concept Core beliefs about oneself as being creative to some degree (gener-
ally or in a particular domain or context)
Intrinsic motivation Drive to do or achieve something because of its internal rewards (e.g.
out of pure interest or for a sense of satisfaction or accomplishment)
rather than for any external rewards or gains.
provide the basis for a person’s creative potential.
Creative potential refers to the resources that a per-
son can profitably invest in any given activity, such
as writing a story or inventing a machine. The po-
tential is latent and may not be put into play unless
a person actively engages in a task. The ensuing
process, called “Creating”, is a chain of events in
which the ingredients are deployed and work thereby
advances. This chain of events leads ultimately to
a resulting production, a “Creation”, which will be
more or less original and valuable.
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Figure 15.1: Multivariate approach to creativity.
It is important to note that a given person’s in-
gredients can be seen as offering various degrees of
creative potential, depending on the task or domain
of work. For example, in Figure 15.2, a hypothet-
ical “radar” profile of a person’s ingredients is de-
picted together with the expected ingredients that are
needed to be highly creative in task A and B; the in-
dividual depicted (i) has relatively more potential to
be creative in task A compared with task B, because
the required ingredients are somewhat different for
each task and the individual’s profile matches best
the profile needed for task A. For task A, only some
extra risk taking may be needed, whereas in task
B, additional mental flexibility, knowledge, risk tak-
ing, idiosyncrasy, and intrinsic motivation will be
required. This type of model shows how the partial
domain specificity of creative ability can be under-
stood. The correlations of people’s performance
across creativity tasks are positive, in general, but
weak to moderate ranging often from .20 to .60
(Baer, 1993). The correlations observered between
creative performance tasks reflect the fact that even
when some ingredients are shared in common across
all tasks, some of them are weighted” differently in
each tasks’ own specific mix of ingredients.
To illustrate these person-centered ingredients for
creativity, consider the following examples. Two
“cognitive” ingredients and two “conative” ingre-
dients will be described, although there are many
others that play important roles as well.
First, the capacity to engage in flexible thinking
can be highlighted. Cognitive flexibility refers to the
ability to approach a topic from an alternative per-
spective compared to the standard view, it involves
letting go of one idea in order to explore a different
one. Cognitive flexibility is the capacity to sidestep
thinking habits, to get out of a stereotyped way of
seeing an issue or solving a problem; it is the oppo-
site of rigid thinking, which characterizes a locked
perspective, more likely to lead to being conceptu-
ally blocked in problem-solving. Habits are learned
patterns that facilitate cognition, and often reduce
the mental workload. However, habits also inhibit
original thinking. In this regard, flexibility supports
creativity.
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Figure 15.2: Individual profile and two sample task profiles.
With respect to cognitive capacities, one issue
that has been studied consistently for more than
half a century is the relationship between creativity
and intelligence. Guilford and Christensen(1973)
noted that studies on intelligence tests and creativity
(mainly through divergent-thinking tasks) showed
weak positive correlations and the scatterplots often
had a “triangular-shaped” distribution of data points,
with few people who had low intelligence test scores
showing moderate to high levels of creativity. Later,
a meta-analysis of studies correlating intelligence
and creativity showed an average correlation of .17
(Kim, 2005). Whereas there is no clear consensus
concerning a threshold beyond which more intel-
ligence does not matter, Karwowski et al. (2016)
used necessary condition analysis—which tests for
the systematic absence of a phenomenon (creativity)
at certain levels of a variable (intelligence)—and
found that low levels of intelligence are a limiting
condition for the manifestation of creativity.
A second example of a characteristic that is impor-
tant for creativity is knowledge. Knowledge refers to
information that may be characterized by its depth
or its breadth. Both facets of knowledge are impor-
tant for creativity. In general, knowledge about a
topic potentially allows a person to build on exist-
ing ideas, to avoid repeating what has been done in
the past, and to focus attention on what is new and
valuable in a field. In this sense, depth of knowledge
can facilitate creativity to some extent. However,
too much of a good thing can be a problem. In fact,
some research suggests that high levels of exper-
tise can hinder creative thinking because experts get
stuck in routine ways of approaching an issue, even
when new ways may be more appropriate (Dror,
2011; Frensch & Sternberg, 1989; Simonton, 1984).
Breadth of knowledge offers the opportunity to asso-
ciate concepts that may not be habitually connected.
Knowing about diverse topics may facilitate analog-
ical or metaphorical thinking because one can apply
concepts from a different domain to the topic or
problem. Analyses of Charles Darwin’s notebooks
during his trip to the Galapagos Islands, when he pro-
posed the theory of evolution, for example, clearly
illustrate the ways in which his botanical knowledge
served as a basis for thinking about the mechanisms
at work in animal species (Gruber, 1981).
A third example can be drawn from the conative
domain, which refers to the wish, intention and mo-
tivation to engage in an activity. The proclivity for
risk taking refers to the tendency to engage in be-
haviors in which there is potential for gain or loss
and the outcome is not completely predictable. For
example, in a high-risk situation, the odds may be
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low that a new approach to a problem could lead
to a desired, valued solution. In this case, a person
oriented toward risk taking may choose to invest his
or her resources, energy, and time in this nascent
idea. Despite the probability of failure, some people
will go “against the odds” and pursue a new idea.
Risk taking supports creativity, in general, because
creativity by nature requires breaking away from
what exists already, what is tried-and-true, what is
known (and perhaps not optimal) but predictable.
Research suggests that people’s preferred levels of
risk taking can vary from one domain of activity to
another. For example, a person may be willing to
take a risk in sports and attempt a new style in ice
skating during a competition, but will not necessar-
ily be willing to try a new style in a visual-arts task;
another person may invest his or her energy in a new
entrepreneurial business idea but not be at ease with
proposing new ideas in a writing task. Therefore, it
is useful to consider risk taking patterns by activity
domains instead of referring to a general risk-taking
trait. In the investment theory of creativity, Stern-
berg and Lubart (1995) highlight the importance of
risk taking, which supports the engagement in the
search for new ideas which break from tradition.
Even if a person has the needed cognitive abilities,
there may be no engagement with new ideas if the
person fears failure.
A fourth and final example of an ingredient for
creativity is idiosyncrasy or the tendency to expe-
rience the world in non-standard ways (Bierhoff
& Bierhoff-Alfermann, 1973; Eysenck, 1995). Id-
iosyncrasy can be considered as a personality trait
that may express itself in one’s way of perceiving
and acting in the world. One form of idiosyncrasy
that has been extensively explored and shown to
be related to creativity is known as “positive schizo-
typy”, which is a tendency to have unusual cognitive,
perceptual, or emotional experiences that is well dis-
tributed in the normal population (Claridge, 1997).
Idiosyncrasy in several forms may apply in all facets
of life. For example, in the emotional sphere, a
person may experience non-standard emotions, or
express their feelings in atypical ways. This could
be termed “emotional idiosyncrasy.” It is a potential
source of personalized non-typical associations, or
approaches to a situation, a topic, or a problem to
be solved (Averill, 1999). For example, people with
unusual affects associated with a given topic can ben-
efit from this idiosyncrasy by developing unusual
associations or approaches that people experiencing
“standard” emotions about the same topic would not.
A poet can, for example, use this affective richness
to provide a unique, fresh perspective when engaged
in literary creation.
15.2 Creating: The Creative Process
The creative process refers to the sequence of
thoughts and actions that characterizes the genera-
tive act, resulting in an original, valuable production
(Lubart, 2001, Finke, Ward & Smith, 1992). This
act has traditionally been decomposed in terms of
stages, steps, or sub-processes (Sternberg, 2017).
Early work based on introspective accounts of emi-
nent creators and observational studies using think-
aloud protocols or analyses of traces of activity (such
as creators’ notebooks or drafts), suggested four
main stages, traditionally labeled, preparation, incu-
bation, illumination, and verification (Sadler-Smith,
2015). Preparation refers to the accumulation of
background knowledge and active thinking that may
span a relatively long period when a topic is en-
gaged. Incubation notes a type of mental activity
in which ideas may be associated, explored in the
fringe of consciousness, or reworked in the “back
of one’s mind” (Sio & Ormerod, 2009). Illumina-
tion is the “eureka” moment when a promising, new
idea appears. This may in some cases be called an
insight and is marked in particular by the novel na-
ture of the idea that emerges. Verification is usually
considered a mode of thinking in which new ideas
are tested and refined. Numerous authors have pro-
posed and examined additional steps, sub-processes,
or modes of thinking, including problem-finding,
problem formulation, frustration, divergent think-
ing, association, idea resonance, benefiting from
chance events, analysis, and synthesis (Mumford et
al., 1991; Yokochi & Okada, 2005). All of these
have enriched and expanded our understanding of
the creative process.
Guilford (1950), in a classic presidential speech
to the American Psychological Association, empha-
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sized the topic of creativity and highlighted diver-
gent thinking as a special part of the creative pro-
cess. Divergent thinking characterizes an idea search
conducted in multiple directions in order to obtain a
large number of possibilities. In particular, “fluency”
of a performance on a divergent-thinking task refers
to the number of ideas generated, whereas flexibil-
ity refers to the diversity of the ideas generated. It
has been shown that generating many different ideas
is likely to enhance chances of generating an orig-
inal idea; this is at least partly attributable to the
nature of a typical sequence of ideas, which is char-
acterized by more common ideas coming first and
more idiosyncratic ones arriving later on in the se-
quence once the common, shared ideas have been
exhausted. Guilford’s (1985) work, including his
contribution to the structure of intelligence model
(SOI), provided attention to two other processes that
play a major role in creative thinking. These are
“evaluative” and “convergent” thinking. Evaluation
refers to an analytic mode of thinking, in which
strengths and weaknesses are assessed and then pro-
vide guidance for further action. Convergence refers
to thinking that leads to a single answer. Conver-
gent thinking has often been associated with get-
ting the single “right” answer, but this meaning of
convergence is relevant in run-of-the-mill cognitive
tasks, which tend to yield relatively non-creative,
standard ideas. Instead, consider the more general
sense of convergence in which various elements are
brought together to lead to a single response. This
act of converging may be achieved through an inte-
gration and synthesis of disparate elements, or their
transformation, and leads—in the case of creative
thinking—to a new idea. Thus, Guilford’s legacy
leads us to describe a three-mode process involving
divergent-exploratory thinking, evaluative thinking,
and convergent-integrative thinking.
Based on Guilford’s research as well as seminal
work by Binet and Simon, in 1904, and other pio-
neers, creativity tests such as the Torrance Tests of
Creative Thinking and Wallach and Kogan’s Cre-
ative Thinking measures were developed to assess
the degree to which people can successfully engage
the creative process (see Glaveanu, 2019; Torrance,
1974; Wallach & Kogan, 1965). In these batteries
of creativity tests, people are essentially asked to
generate many different original ideas using verbal
or image-based stimuli. There are, for example,
tasks that require thinking of ways to use a common
object, drawing tasks in which a basic geometric
form needs to be used in each different drawing,
and title-generation tasks based on a picture that is
provided. The number of ideas (called “fluency”),
flexibility, and originality of ideas are often scored.
Other measures, such as the Test of Creative Think-
ing – Drawing Production (Urban, 2005), or the
Remote Associate Test (Mednick, 1962), involve
several elements (graphic, or verbal) that the indi-
vidual must find a way to synthesize and combine
to express an original idea. In these later cases, the
production of one synthetic idea is required rather
than the production of many different ideas.
Based on these process-oriented measures of
creative thinking, Lubart, Besançon, and Barbot
(2011) proposed the Evaluation of Potential Creativ-
ity (EPoC). This test battery is organized by domain
of creation (visual art, literary-verbal, social, mathe-
matical, scientific, music, and body movement). In
each domain, there are two types of tasks: divergent-
exploratory thinking to generate as many original
ideas as possible, and convergent-integrative think-
ing that involves generating one elaborated produc-
tion that takes into account the elements provided.
As illustrated in the graphic-artistic domain, one
task is to generate as many sketches as possible in
a limited time using a graphic form or image that
is provided. In Figure 15.3, a child produced 10
drawings using the banana shape. Using norms for
children of the same age, it can be noted that this is a
relatively large number of ideas, slightly more than
the average child. In Figure 15.4, several children’s
drawings from the convergent-integrative task are
illustrated. In this particular task, photos of eight
objects are presented and the children made a single
elaborated drawing that integrated at least four ob-
jects. The extent to which the drawing integrates the
objects, the number of objects used, and the original-
ity of the drawing are assessed. In the first drawing
illustration (drawing 4A), the child has arranged
the objects in a typical fishing scene, whereas in
drawing example 4B there is a greater integration
of objects, which form a single “rabbit” composed
of a valise, light bulbs for feet, and carrots for ears.
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Figure 15.3: Responses to a divergent-exploratory task in the EPoC battery.
Finally, in example drawing 4C, a highly original
idea of a “Samurai” warrior (as named by the child)
uses all eight objects, integrated in unusual ways,
with the sword formed by a carrot and a wooden
manikin’s body, the warrior’s head being made of
the fish, and the arm made of a shovel. The creativ-
ity of the integrative drawing is assessed by judges
who examine the number of objects used and the
originality of the resulting drawing production.
Emotions are an integral part of the creative pro-
cess. Engaging in creative productive work may
allow individuals to express their emotions, or al-
ternatively may lead people to experience emotions
resulting from their creative thinking process. A
large number of studies have examined the impact
of positive and negative mood states, and emotional
arousal on the creative process (Baas, de Dreu &
Nijstad, 2008). There are mixed results, but one
of the main findings is enhanced divergent-thinking
productivity in the presence of a positive mood state,
perhaps due to more relaxed evaluative criteria for
deciding that an idea is worthy of some attention
(Davis, 2009).
Part of understanding the natural creative process
involves recognition of the diversity with which it
can unfold. The creative process varies from indi-
vidual to individual, but also across tasks and within
the different domains. Thus, the creative process
in the visual arts is not necessarily the same as the
creative process in engineering or musical compo-
sition. Within these domains, the creative process
of sculpting is not necessarily the same as the pro-
cess of painting. Additionally, each creator may
engage in his or her own personalized sequence, and
bring the ingredients to bear at different moments
during the creative act. Recent work has sought to
compare and contrast the creative process across do-
mains (Lubart, 2018). For example, using an action-
theory approach focusing on the impetus, activity
engaged, materials used, and social connections in-
volved, Glaveanu and colleagues (2013) observered
differences and similarities across descriptions of
the creative process based on interviews with vi-
sual artists, writers, scientists, designers and music
composers.
In addition, it is possible to contrast the process
traces of individuals who show relatively high levels
of creativity in their productions in a given task, with
those who show relatively low levels of creativity in
the same task (Lubart, 2018). The results of this type
of study show that contrasting sequences of specific
activities (such as idea evaluation, association, tak-
ing a break from work, etc.) characterize the more
successful creators in comparison to less successful
ones. For example, in a study of fine-arts students in
a sculpture task, those who were judged to be highly
creative showed different process traces (based on a
self-report diary), when compared with those who
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Figure 15.4: Children’s responses to a convergent-integrative task in the EPoC battery (4A: fishing scene, 4B: Rabbit, 4C: Warrior).
©2011. Editions Hogrefe France. Reproduced by permission from Hogrefe France.
were not very creative: after defining the problem
those who were more creative in the end tended to
seek information whereas those who were less cre-
ative tended to start their sculpture right away. In
addition, when returning from a break, students who
reengaged the sculpture by associating new ideas
with their project tended to be more creative in the
end than those who reengaged their sculpture work
by critiquing what they had accomplished up to that
point. In other process tracing work, Pringle and
Sowden (2017) examined the creative process in
a garden-design task and found that tightly linked
shifts between associative and analytic processing
modes were characteristic of the most creative work.
In general, it is increasingly recognized that the cre-
ative process is a dynamic flow that offers nearly
unlimited opportunities for individual differences
(Beghetto & Corazza, 2019).
Some work has, additionally, focused on meth-
ods that formally structure the process of creating,
in order to help creators enhance the originality
of the resulting productions. Thus, a large litera-
ture exists on creative thinking methods designed to
guide the creative process through brainstorming
(divergent thinking-based procedure), lateral think-
ing (flexibility-based techniques), creative problem
solving methods (strategies sequencing and integrat-
ing divergent and convergent thinking techniques),
TRIZ (Russian acronym for the “Theory of Inven-
tive Problem Solving”, based on analyses of inven-
tors’ methods), and design thinking (user-oriented
techniques), just to mention some of the most de-
veloped methods (Brown, 2008; De Bono, 2010;
Osborn, 1953; Puccio & Cabra, 2009). The term
“creative thinking method” is used here to describe a
structured-process approach that may be composed
of several steps and may deploy several specific
thinking techniques within the global method. For
example, creative problem solving is a formalized
method composed of several steps, such as explor-
ing the challenge (problem finding and formulat-
ing), generating solutions, and generating an action
plan for solution implementation. Within each step,
which can occur in dynamic sequences, several tech-
niques can be employed. One example is a problem-
exploration technique in which an initial problem
statement is proposed and then each word is ex-
panded to become a list of synonyms. Based on
the alternative words, the problem space can be ex-
plored and perhaps a new problem formulation will
offer original opportunities and approaches for idea
generation. For example, given an initial problem
statement, “How can we raise sales of toys in our
store?”, several alternative words could be listed for
“sales”(profits, client satisfaction), “toys” (games,
hobby items), and “store” (internet site, shopping
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mall outlet). Based on the alternate words, a new
problem formulation could be: “How can we raise
client satisfaction of game items in our shopping
mall outlet?”. This problem may lead to very differ-
ent solutions than the initial one, because divergent
exploratory thinking applied in the problem formu-
lation phase opens up the range of options. As John
Dewey noted, a problem well stated is half solved.
In general, it is also important to note that the
creative process is a meaningful endeavor, which
assumes that it is, and should be, to some extent
goal-driven and purposeful. The meaning and goal
of creating may of course be defined at a strictly
personal level (intrapsychic), or at a social level, as
in productions generated for one’s familial or pro-
fessional setting. Thus, special cases in which an
agent engages in random acts with no goal or recog-
nition of seeking a creative production (such as a
human or non-human typing random keys that yield
a “text”) will not typically be considered part of
authentic “creating”, even though a production that
has some interest may eventually result from this
random activity.
15.3 Collaboration: Co-Creation
Collaboration refers to the process through which
two or more people, often with different or com-
plementary skills, engage in shared creation, fre-
quently producing something that they could not
or would not produce on their own. From the sci-
ence of Marie and Pierre Currie to the cubism of
Pablo Picasso and Georges Braque and the music
of the Beatles, the history of great cultural contri-
butions demonstrates that much creative genius re-
sults from collaboration—from the extraordinarily
important and enhancing effects of support, differ-
ing and complementary skills and dispositions, and
even the competition that dyads and groups provide
(see Clydesdale, 2006; John-Steiner, 2006). Today,
thinkers from many different fields believe that the
future of human work will be both more creativity-
focused and more collaborative in nature. A study
of almost 20 million research papers and 2 million
patents over 45 years, for example, showed the num-
ber of coauthors had almost doubled during that
time, and also that multi-authored papers were more
likely to be cited in the future (Wuchty, Jones, &
Uzzi, 2007). The lone creative genius may still
appear in some fields, but given the effects of glob-
alization, increasing technological complexity, and
the concomitant specialization of expertise, in many
areas of endeavor, collaboration is becoming more
of a necessity.
From another perspective, however, one can also
clearly argue that all creativity is, and always has
been—at least implicitly—collaborative. Every
work of art or scientific discovery, for example, is
based on shared, pre-existing foundations of cul-
ture and language, as well as the ideas and methods
borrowed from more immediate disciplinary prede-
cessors. Some creativity is simply more easily rec-
ognized and labeled as “collaborative” because of its
proximity in time or space to the others that helped
make it happen. Einstein’s discoveries, no matter
how single-handed and revolutionary they might
seem, are impossible without the history of science
before him. And, as commonly observed, no single
individual knows how to make a new pen, automo-
bile, or the majority of common cultural objects in
their entirety because the materials and knowledge
are coming from everywhere.
Thus, the enterprise of understanding creativity
should not, in fact, be confined to intra-individual
psychological investigations, but must instead also
be pursued social psychologically or sociologically
at inter-personal and systemic levels. Such multi-
leveled approaches to creativity were relatively un-
common until recently, but they do have some good
foundations in the field. For example, Csikszent-
mihalyi (1988) proposed a “systems model”, and
helpfully asked not “what is creativity” but “where
is creativity?” The answer, as Figure 15.5 suggests,
is that “creativity”—whatever one decides it is—is
found in the triangular inter-relationship between
the individual talent, the parameters of the particu-
lar creative domain in which a person works, and
the field of experts that help define and identify the
other two components. Another good starting point
within psychology can be found in Vygotsky’s so-
ciocultural developmental approach (John-Steiner
& Mahn, 1996), which (seeing human cognition as
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Figure 15.5: Csikszentmihalyi’s (1988) system’s view of creativity.
developing through social dialogue) also offers the
possibility of a multilevel approach to creativity.
Psychologists could learn a great deal from en-
tirely sociological work, such as Farrell’s (2001)
description of the life cycles of “collaborative cir-
cles” of people who participate in the co-creation
of a movement in art, literature, science or other
fields. Gleaned from close study of groups like
Sigmund Freud’s early followers, and the famous
Oxford “Inklings”, which included J.R.R. Tolkien
and C.S. Lewis amongst its ranks, Farrell shows how
the group dynamics that accompany and generate
creativity often seem to pass through seven stages:
1) group formation; 2) rebellion against authority;
3) questing and the development of new visions; 4)
creative work (a stage when ideas are refined, often
in direct dialogue and collaboration); 5) collective
action, when larger projects are taken on; 6) sepa-
ration, when differences cause disintegration of the
group; and 7) nostalgic reunion. Working in similar
directions and developing some of his own tools,
psychologist Keith Sawyer’s notion of “collabora-
tive emergence” aims to supplement individual level
explanations with appropriately collective ones for
more ephemeral or entirely collaborative creativity
like jazz and improvisational theater (see Sawyer,
2010, 2017).
Most research on creative collaboration can be cat-
egorized further into two types: 1) small, laboratory-
based “group studies”, usually with no more than
two to four members—often students—who are tem-
porarily assigned to a group and observed under
carefully controlled conditions, and 2) “team stud-
ies” of groups that are embedded in organizations
and whose members are, therefore, in longer-term,
less artificially arranged relationships and whose
size and structure vary, as decided by supervisors
for practical reasons, rather than being scientifically
structured for experimental purposes. Although lab-
oratory groups and organizational teams appear to
engage in collaborative processes that can be de-
scribed similarly (Mullen, Driskell, & Salas, 1998),
most of the research on task performance and group
creativity consists of lab group studies, whose weak-
ness is their distance from the real-world contexts
and relationships. With team studies, on the other
hand, it can be very difficult to determine if results
are caused by differences in group composition or
by the processes in which they engage (Paulus, Dzin-
dolet, & Kohn, 2012).
The actual goal of collaboration can be seen
somewhat differently in different settings. In small-
group research, the target is usually “creativity”;
with the short life of these groups focused on idea-
generating stages of the process. Team research in
organizational settings, in contrast to small-group
research, more often claims “innovation” as its
target. In this regard, the distinction often made
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(but not always finding support) is that innova-
tion as a concept is larger or more encompassing
than creativity, innovation including an emphasis
on successful implementation following initial, idea-
generation.
Whereas some theorists are less accepting of the
creativity/innovation difference, in practice, organi-
zations tend to make the distinction, with CEOs, for
example, generally seeing three types of innovation
as shaping their goals at work:
(a) traditional innovation of products, markets, or
services;
(b) innovations of efficiency or effectiveness; and
(c) more structural, or fundamental business-
model innovations (Berman & Korsten,
2013).
Leadership has become inextricably linked to cre-
ativity through collaboration and their common,
fundamental focus on problem-solving and orga-
nizational and social change (Puccio, Mance, &
Murdock, 2010). The recent rise of the more
empathy- and collaboratively-centered approaches
to creativity, such as design thinking and even
“design leadership”, further underscore this impor-
tant relationship (Thornhill-Miller & Muratovski,
2016).
As we have argued, creativity is often collabora-
tive and distributed. Economic history suggests it
is, in fact, collective creativity and intelligence—
the swift trade of ideas possible with a critical
mass of population density and division of labor
through specialized occupations—that has helped
make humanity the planet-shaping force that it
is (Ridley, 2010). The internet economy, vir-
tual teams, online distributed problem-solving, and
other forms of “crowdsourcing” creativity are all
now established enough to become subjects of
study (Gippel, 2018). Further applications and the
rise of future technologies of collaboration seem
poised to magnify the processes that already ex-




The creative context is comprised of both physi-
cal and social spheres. It can be described as a
multilayered environment in which a person’s lo-
cal family, school, and work contexts are nested
in their larger geographical, regional, national, and
international contexts. There is a large literature
on the impact of context on creativity (see Harring-
ton, 2011). For example, children in a classroom
with stimulating posters on the wall compared with
children in a classroom without posters tend to pro-
duce a greater number of ideas, and more original
ideas on a divergent-thinking task (see Beghetto
& Kaufman, 2017). Some companies have a cre-
ative space, with colorful walls or furniture, white
boards, and some play spaces featuring a basket-
ball hoop or table football. Research has examined
features of workplace environments, such as the
presence of windows, a view of nature, wall color,
odors, noise levels, temperature, light levels, the
presence of green plants, and office organization in
open space. All of these environmental features can
impact creativity although the ideal conditions vary
to some extent across the samples studied. The envi-
ronment provides the affordances that set the stage
for creativity to be able to occur; for example, if
an individual has access to musical instruments and
role models, this access offers a greater opportunity
for musical creation compared to a person with more
limited access.
Dul (2019), in a survey of these studies, suggested
that environments can support creativity in three fun-
damental ways, by providing,
(a) access to needed resources (such as mate-
rials to conduct a project and a sufficient
workspace which can be individualized),
(b) symbolic content that sets the stage for cre-
ative work (such as inspiring statements like
“Celebrate your originality”) or symbolic ob-
jects that emphasize the value placed on cre-
ativity (such as a lamp in the form of a giant
lightbulb, symbolizing the emergence of an
idea), and
288 • Psychology of Human Thought • Chapter 15
Contexts: Environmental Conditions Lubart & Thornhill-Miller
Figure 15.6: Conditions from a study of virtual environments (6A: Real meeting room; 6B: Virtual meeting room; 6C: Virtual artist’s
house, see Guegan, Nelson, & Lubart, 2018). Credits: J. Guegan & J. Nelson.
(c) a socio-emotional context that supports idea
generation (such as a positive ambiance sup-
ported by “happy” colors and music).
A recent series of studies, looked at the ef-
fects of various environments using a virtual reality
paradigm. Working within Linden Lab’s Second
Life, an online multi-user virtual environment, we
created several workspaces, which were designed to
represent a neutral meeting room and a supportive
artist’s studio’ with many objects and attributes that
previous research showed participants associate with
a positive, creative space. These workspaces are il-
lustrated in Figure 15.6. Students in preliminary
studies described features of creative workspaces
and these were then designed in the virtual world.
New participants were assigned randomly to one
of the rooms in this experimental study (in which
they worked via their avatar), and a “real-life” con-
trol condition with a real meeting room was also
included (in which participants worked being physi-
cally present, termed “first life”). Using a standard
divergent-thinking task to find unusual uses for a
common object, we observed that students assigned
to the “artist’s house” produced significantly more
ideas than those in the virtual meeting room and the
real meeting room (Guegan, Nelson & Lubart, 2017).
These latter conditions did not differ significantly
between each other. In addition to fluency, the orig-
inality of ideas showed the same pattern, favoring
significantly the artist’s house condition. Thus, this
study demonstrated the direct effect of the physical
environment on creative output.
In another line of work, numerous studies focus-
ing on organizational environments examined the
social-contextual features related to creative work-
place behavior. In most studies, respondents de-
scribed their workplace by questionnaire and re-
ported on their creative accomplishments. Based
on the meta-analysis by Hunter, Bedell & Mumford
(2007), there is clear evidence for the importance of
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(a) a positive social climate witinh a team, close
colleagues and direct managers;
(b) the importance of a conducive “task” envi-
ronment that allows for autonomy, flexible
work schedules, resource availability (includ-
ing time), and goal setting that focuses on
original productions; and
(c) an organizational mission statement, reward
structure, and top management support for
creative work and risk taking.
Case studies in diverse fields, such as businesses
inventing new products, provided further evidence
for these findings. The invention of Post-Its® at 3M,
for example, was facilitated by the presence of sup-
port for risk taking and trying new ideas (time and
budget resources made explicitly available for such
projects), support for idea development with inter-
nal competitions for new ideas and idea champions
(who are resource people to help inventors move
their project forward), and top management goals
for the company to generate a large percentage of
its future revenues from products that remain to be
invented.
Beyond the workplace, research has investigated
a wide range of contexts from the family environ-
ment to macrosocial units such as cities, nations
and international settings (Harrington, 2011). With
respect to the family context, many important vari-
ables have been identified, including an enriched
home environment with stimulating activities, ac-
cess to cultural activities, role models of creative
people (who may be a child’s own parents), a flexi-
ble parenting style that provides structure but also
liberty, and support for a child’s expression of their
originality, and perhaps idiosyncratic and imagina-
tive interests. All of these factors are supportive of
later creative development and accomplishment, ac-
cording to biographical studies of eminent creators.
However, some studies also point out that distress,
trauma, stress and adversity that is also present in
the family environment, may lead to resilience and
character-building, which also serves to support later
creative accomplishment (Kohanyi, 2011). There is
therefore some evidence that family environments fa-
voring creative development are complex, with some
positive features supporting creativity (epitomized
by Carl Roger’s theory of parents who provide psy-
chological safety and freedom) and perhaps some
negative conditions or hardships which help develop
perseverance, motivation and other traits that are
important for creativity (see Kohanyi, 2011).
Historically, there are numerous examples of cul-
tural spaces, like Florence in the Renaissance, late
16th century London, and early 20th century Paris,
which illustrate the effects of a fertile setting for cre-
ative activity. These “creative cities” are typically
located near other cultural centers, and offer the op-
portunity for multicultural experiences, which have
also been positively linked to creativity. Creative
cities provide a critical mass of people interested
in cultural events and financial support for creative
work which, in turn, attracts the creative class of
artists, writers, designers, scientists and others in
creative fields (Florida, 2005).
Research on cultural variations and creativity in-
dicate that nuances of the definition of creativity,
domains in which creative work is valued, and the
extent to which creative work is encouraged are all
subject to variation. Some cultures value the pro-
duction that provides evidence of creative thinking
whereas others focus relatively more on the creative
act itself. In some cultures, creativity is more an in-
dividual act, whereas in others it is inherently more
collective. Some cultures express a strong need for
certainty or respect of tradition, which may place
less value on risky, culturally novel endeavors (see
Lubart, Glaveanu, De Vries, Camargo & Storme,
2019). According to the sociocultural approach, cre-
ativity is embedded as a phenomenon in a cultural
time and space. It is inconceivable to separate cre-
ative thought from the cultural matrix that supports
it and ultimately is shaped by it (Glaveanu et al.,
2019).
15.5 Creations: The Nature of Creative
Work
The creative process results, in general, in a new
state (outcome state) that is more or less different
from the starting state (initial state). This new state
may range from being slightly different to being
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radically different from the initial state. In general,
the new outcome state will be substantiated by a
production—a “creation”—that was not present ini-
tially. For example, an artist may start with a blank
canvas and he or she paints and transforms it into
a painting. A writer may start with a blank page
and a pen and end with a poem written on the page.
These creations are “traces” indicating that a process
was engaged. The creation, or production, may be
tangible (such as a sculpture) or intangible (such as
an idea). The extent to which the resulting creation
is deemed to be original and valuable, however, is
what will determine the creativity of the work. Not
all creations are original or valuable. For example,
a perfect copy of a famous painting is a creation; it
may be valuable and appreciated by viewers for the
technical skill that was required, but it is not original.
To take another example, a very original sequence
of words, generated perhaps by choosing words at
random pages from a dictionary, that makes no sense
to readers or the author him or herself, is a textual
creation: a sequence of words. However, because it
has no meaning, it is not considered creative. Thus,
productions which are strange or bizarre and orig-
inal but without value are not considered creative
work.
The creative nature of a production can be deter-
mined by appreciating the originality and value of
the work. In the first instance, creativity can be as-
sessed by the creator, but ultimately, in most cases,
this evaluation is made socially: there is a peer or
expert review of the production, which situates the
work with respect to other existing work. Thus,
most creative work exists in a social setting, is des-
tined to exist in a social context, and the evaluation
is made by informed others. This social concep-
tion of creativity was formalized by Amabile (1996)
in the “consensual assessment technique”. In this
measurement approach, qualified judges evaluate
independently a set of productions on a rating scale
using their own criteria for creativity, and then the
average judgment is calculated for each production.
In most cases, the judges need to be knowledgeable
in the domain to be assessed. Some studies have ex-
amined the criteria that judges use and the variability
in these criteria across judges. In general, the most
important criteria are originality (or novelty) and
the value of the work. Some authors have proposed
creative product rating scales that help structure the
judgment process by using a set of detailed descrip-
tors. For example, Besemer and O’Quin (1986)
have a rating scale in which descriptors concerning
novelty, surprise, utility, authenticity, and other char-
acteristics can be attributed to a product to code its
degree of creativity. Studies of ratings on creativity
as a global score, related to variability of diverse as-
pects of productions to be judged, show how judges
may weigh more or less strongly the diverse criteria,
and integrate the information about these criteria in
various ways.
In general, the dual criteria of originality and
value may have particular nuances in each domain
of activity. For example, in engineering, the value
may be the utility of an invention to solve an exist-
ing technical problem with a minimum of resources,
whereas in visual arts, value may be framed in terms
of the positive aesthetic experience or feeling of
surprise or connection that the work produces in
viewers. In addition, the relative importance of orig-
inality and value may differ in these two exemplary
fields, engineering and visual art. Perhaps, for some,
creativity judgments in the visual arts depend mainly
on originality and secondarily on aesthetic value of
the work, whereas in engineering, these two main
criteria have equal importance.
The criterion of originality deserves special atten-
tion. It is possible to code originality in a statistical
way, in terms of the prevalence with which an idea is
produced in a given sample of people. Thus, when
asked to list unusual uses for a box, a person may
say it can be used to store things. This idea is quite
common and not at all original. In contrast, the
response that the box can be burned to provide a
source of heat is quite rare, and statistically infre-
quent. It is “original” because it is rare or has a
low frequency in a statistical sense. This statistical
coding can provide support for evaluating the cre-
ativity of productions, but it has several limitations,
including the significant burdens of requiring a com-
parison sample and the counting of the frequencies
of all responses given for the task, as well as the fact
that the value dimension is not taken into account.
A creation is a reflection of an individual’s cre-
ative ability and the environmental context that con-
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tributed to or supported the expression of this abil-
ity. It is possible that the judged creativity of a
production (through social consensus of judges or
by the creator him or herself) does not reflect the
“true” originality or value of the work. In this case,
the judges may be biased and inaccurate estima-
tors of the originality or value, because they may
lack contextual knowledge of the field to ground
their evaluation. Alternatively, the judgments of a
work at the moment of the creative act do not reflect
the potential value of the production in the future.
Corazza (2016) suggested that the potential of a cre-
ation should also be considered when evaluating it.
This potential can be linked to a work’s generative
potential, what it may become in the future. This
issue suggests that the creation is always context-
dependent. A creation may also continue to evolve
in terms of its value once it encounters the social
world. For example, Nietzsche’s literary work was
not particularly appreciated when he wrote it, but
much later was evaluated by literary critics as very
creative. Furthermore, as previously discussed, there
are several kinds of creative contributions that range
from advancing ideas within a paradigm to reorient-
ing work in a new direction (Sternberg, Kaufman, &
Pretz, 2002)
The originality and value of a creation is appre-
ciated with respect to a culturally meaningful ref-
erence group. Some cultures especially value con-
tributions that break with tradition, whereas other
cultures value creations that work within traditions
but renew or extend them. Some cultures value cre-
ative work in specific fields like science and technol-
ogy more than others, such as the arts or humanities.
Thus, just as originality is defined with reference
to a comparison group, the value of creative contri-
butions is also socio-culturally defined. For exam-
ple, creative productions that contribute positively
to societal development are generally valued across
societies, but malevolent creativity, such as novel
criminal activity, is not necessarily recognized as
a creative production in every context due to the
negative impact it has on society (Cropley, Cropley,
Runco & Kaufman, 2010). This is, however, a sub-
ject of debate and related to cross-cultural variation
in the conception and domains in which creativity is
valued.
15.6 Consumption: The Adoption of
Creative Products
Creative productions are embedded in a social con-
text, and may ultimately be adopted by it, becoming
an accepted or important part of a particular culture
or context. In the case of creativity in professional
contexts, this is in principle one of the goals of the
creative act. The “C” of consumption highlights the
link between creativity and innovation. For many
authors, an innovation refers to creativity in its ap-
plied context of consumption, with a focus on new
products or services.
At a macro-economic level, the consumption of
creative goods or services has been recognized as
one of the main sources of long-term sustained eco-
nomic growth since the industrial revolution (Lubart
& Getz, 2011). Indeed, the creation of new prod-
ucts, new services, or more generally, new ideas
that have some market value lead to opportunities
to increase the diversity or quality of goods and ser-
vices. Sometimes the introduction of new goods
eliminates the value of previously existing goods,
which Schumpeter (1942) called “creative destruc-
tion”. For example, the creation of automobiles
has essentially eliminated the need for horse-pulled
buggies. In general, novel productions or services
that meet a need will attract attention and create
economic growth. Thus, creativity is recognized
by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) as a crucial part of economic
activity. In the educational domain, creativity is con-
sidered a 21st-century skill and the World Economic
Forum lists creativity as a key capacity for employa-
bility in the next decade (World Economic Forum,
2016).
At the microeconomic level, some consumers are
attracted to creative goods for their inherently stimu-
lating value. They offer an unknown and a discovery-
oriented experience, which the consumers value. To
the extent that people seek these creative goods and
services, the market will value these creative goods
and potential creators will be attracted to invest their
mental and financial resources in the production of
more new ideas. Thus, the consumption of creativity
fosters more creativity.
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Some members of the public are more ready than
others to adopt new ideas, new products, or new
processes. The characteristics of lead users, or early
adopters of creative goods, are somewhat similar to
those who create themselves; they tend to be open
minded, curious, and sometimes they are themselves
creative individuals. Furthermore, it is possible to
consider that when people consume creative goods,
they may contribute themselves to inventing unex-
pected uses of the product. In some cases, con-
sumers are directly involved in the product design
process. This co-design, or user-based participatory
design, illustrates how the public can be associated
directly with the creative process.
Another way in which consumers express their
creativity is through the customization of products.
Customization enhances the utility of a product,
thanks to the creative act of the consumer. This
customization can range from a small act of individ-
ual expression, such as decorating one’s computer
with decals that reflect personal interests, to mod-
ifying a piece of standard furniture or painting a
motorcycle in a special way. An example of large-
scale consumer participation in the creative process
of product development is the invention of new SMS
acronyms or abbreviations by telephone users that
enhanced the value of SMS messages for commu-
nication by leading to a linguistic corpus of new
shared terms that are particularly useful.
15.7 Curricula: Developing Creativity
The term “Curricula” focuses on the development,
education, or enhancement of creativity. This topic
is the subject of growing interest at all levels of
the educational system: primary, secondary, post-
secondary, and continuing adult training. Here we
can summarize several lines of work to provide a
broad overview.
First, there are pedagogies that seek to stimulate
creative thinking in a global way. These pedago-
gies have been most often used at the elementary
and secondary-school levels. Two examples are
Maria Montessori’s or Celestin Freinet’s approaches.
These pedagogies can be considered active learn-
ing methods because the child thinks in inventive
ways by engaging in activities to discover concepts.
In these pedagogies, domain-situated content (such
as creating a school newspaper) is produced in the
course of project activities in the classroom. Thus,
these active pedagogies serve as a form of creativity
training, by engaging pupils in creative activities
and results comparing these types of pedagogies to
more passive learning approaches suggest benefits
for developing creativity (see Besançon & Lubart,
2016).
A number of studies have examined how school
grades are related to creative thinking. A meta-
analysis by Gadja, Karwowski, and Beghetto (2017)
showed the there was, in general a positive but weak
correlation, suggesting that school performance was
slightly related to creativity, which may be due to
factors such as general motivation and knowledge
of particular disciplines being important for both
creativity and school achievement. Other research
on characteristics that are important for creativity,
such as risk taking and failure tolerance, suggest that
school reward systems focusing on good grades for
getting the “right” answer, may actually diminish
risk taking behavior over the long term (Clifford,
1988). The impact of school environments on the
development of creativity is a complex topic that
is increasingly drawing attention (see Beghetto &
Sriraman, 2017).
Second, there are training programs or activity
modules which can foster creativity. These pro-
grams tend to focus either
(a) on building up expertise about creativity and
its mechanisms by learning about the nature
of creativity and practicing creative thinking,
or
(b) learning specific techniques which are
process-oriented skills or procedures that a
person can implement to boost their creative
thinking.
In the first kind of learning programs, knowledge
and expertise on creativity can be taught in order to
raise awareness. For example, it is possible to ex-
plain the concept of creativity to children or adults,
which will demystify it and facilitate the adoption
of a view of creativity as an ability that can be devel-
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Table 15.2: Example Creativity Enhancing Strategies & Techniques.
Brainstorming-like techniques
A group of techniques that encourage the production or listing of ideas without constraints. They may involve
differing rules about how ideas are generated and subsequently shared with other people, but tend to be more focused
on exhaustive listing than on employing any specific technique for thinking differently.
“Brainstorming”: any of several variations on the classic creativity
technique guiding individuals or groups to (a) generate as many new
ideas as possible, (b) defer judgement and/or favor unusual ideas, and (c)
encourage the integration and cross-fertilization of the ideas produced.
Osborn (1953)
“Brainwriting”: A variant of brainstorming which reduces some social
pressures and group biases and enhances idea interactions by requiring
participants to write down their ideas individually and silently share
them with one another in a systematic, group format, thereby delaying
public sharing and allowing ideas to interact and receive more equal
consideration.
Rohrbach (1969)
Perspective- & Frame-changing Techniques
A broad family of techniques with different subtypes all aiming to change the frame of reference in which a topic or
problem is considered. Deformation techniques produce new ideas by changing or distorting the topic or reality
in some systematic way, for example by removing part of it, looking at it backwards, magnifying it, or making it
smaller, seeking serendipitous input, etc.. Projective techniques involve using the imagination to place oneself in
another mental perspective or another person’s emotional situation. These include role-playing games, empathy- or
imagination-based projective profiling techniques, and other “detour” techniques to radically shift one’s point of
view and processes of considering a problem.
“Lateral thinking”: Used as a generic term can refer to a large group
of procedures helping to approach a problem from a new angle. For ex-
ample, “deforming” the problem through exaggeration or minimization,
reversing the order involved, deleting elements, or inverting the goal (i.e.,
if the goal is improving a product or a process, instead exploring all the
ways to make it worse, as means of pursuing insights to make it better).
De Bono (2010)
“Disney method”: a process for creative generation attributed to film
pioneered Walt Disney, according to which one produces ideas by taking
on different roles and the thinking styles of the dreamer, the realist, and
finally, the critic or spoiler in successive steps.
Dilts (1994)
“Daydream” (“Rêve éveillé”): A technique fostering a “detour” in per-
spective that involves pretending to enter into the world of dreams and
imitating them in various ways, thus creating distance from reality and
facilitating the emergence of new ideas.
Aznar (2005)
Continued on next page
oped. Another form of training provides examples
of more and less creative productions so that people
have a knowledge base against which they can com-
pare their own ideas or judge other people’s ideas
(Storme et al.,2014). This knowledge about the cri-
teria for creativity allows a person to be a better
judge of their own ideas. Additionally, creativity
can be taught through role modeling of creative be-
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Table 15.2: Example Creativity Enhancing Strategies & Techniques. Continued from previous page.
Associative & analogic techniques
A group of techniques focused on making connections between the problem or topic of interest and other topics,
ideas, or objects. The target for association can be unspecified and left open for individuals to freely find any
and all relationships (in a manner more similar to brainstorming techniques). Or the targets can be “forced” on a
particular topic, often requiring more remote associations and leading to more analogic thinking (in a manner similar
to perspective- and frame-changing techniques).
“Mindmapping”: A drawing-based method of escaping linear thinking
and generating new ideas by drawing the central concept in its web of
associations with other issues, characteristics, and ideas.
Buzan & Buzan (1996)
“Bisociation”: A technique, and fundamental creative process, whereby
two objects, frames of reference or systems of relationships that are usu-
ally separate, are combined or applied to each other allowing something
new to emerge. Word puns or Edison’s combining the once separate ideas
of “electricity” and “light” to invent the light bulb, are good examples.
Koestler (1964)
haviors demonstrated by the teacher, or case studies
of creative people who can be sources of inspira-
tion (see Starko, 2014; Kelly, 2016). Finally, some
training programs, such as sequences of exercises to
stimulate divergent thinking, have been developed
(see Isaksen & Treffinger, 1985; Mansfield, Busse
& Krepelka, 1978). These training sequences fo-
cus, in most cases, on practicing divergent thinking
or insight problem solving and mental flexibility.
Ma (2006) conducted a meta-analysis of the impact
of these creativity training programs and found an
average effect size of being able to boost creative
thinking skills by a half a standard deviation after
participation in a multi-week training program.
In terms of programs that teach specific creativity
techniques, these are often geared to adults in work-
place contexts. The long history of idea-generating
strategies and creative problem-solving techniques
provides substantial support for the “trainability”
of creativity on the individual and group levels
(Nickerson, 1999; Scott, Leritz, & Mumford, 2004).
From Osborn’s contributions to creative problem
solving and the idea of “brainstorming” (Osborn,
1953) and Gordon’s (1961) synectics (an analogy-
based creativity technique), to Buzan and Buzan’s
(1993) mindmapping (a visual representation tech-
nique) and more recent work on design thinking
(e.g., Brown, 2008; Darbellay, Moody, & Lubart,
2017), a wide range of strategies and techniques
have gained popularity due to their perceived prac-
tical value in applied situations. Although there
is substantial overlap and they can be classified in
different ways, a brief taxonomy of some important
strategies and techniques might include at least three
general categories which are presented in Table 15.2:
brainstorming-like techniques, associative and ana-
logic techniques, and perspective or frame-changing
techniques (see Thornhill-Miller & Dupont, 2016;
Debois et al., 2015, for more detailed taxonomies
and further explanations).
The neurophysiological enhancement of creativity
has recently become another prominent topic in the
creativity-training literature. There are many com-
peting neurobiological theories of creativity, ranging
from hemisphere-dominance theories (see Mihov et
al., 2010, for a review) and more specific regional
specialization theories (e.g., Flaherty, 2005) to gen-
eral neurological connectivity theories (e.g., Thal-
bourne, Houran, Alias, & Brugger, 2001) and lines
of research now focusing on the brain activity at the
moment of insight (Kounios & Beeman, 2014). The
neuroscience of creativity is providing a growing
understanding of the brain areas involved in creative
thinking (e.g. Abraham, 2013; Arden et al., 2010;
Beaty et al., 2016; Dietrich & Kanso, 2010; Gonen-
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Yaacovi et al., 2013; Jauk et al., 2013; Jung et al.,
2010; Vartanian, Bristol & Kaufman, 2013).
Martindale conducted an important series of ex-
periments demonstrating that low cortical arousal
was associated with superior performance on
creative-thinking tasks, and creative individuals
showed more variability in arousal especially during
moments of creative inspiration (Martindale, 1978;
1999). He observed a clear decrease in levels of cor-
tical arousal (as measured by alpha waves) among
highly creative study participants as they shifted
from analytic thinking to convergent creative think-
ing (on the Remote Associates Test) to divergent
thinking (using the Alternate Uses Test). Similar
results with different tasks and also suggesting dif-
ferential recruitment of the parietal and frontal cor-
tex of high versus low creatives have also appeared
more recently (Jauk, Benedek, & Neubauer, 2012).
Particular patterns of cortical arousal could be im-
portant to induce the different kinds of cognitive
activation observed in successful execution of each
stage of the creative process.
More directly important, however, is a strand
of research on non-invasive brain stimulation (e.g.,
transcranial direct current stimulation techniques,
tDCS, and transcranial alternating current stimula-
tion, tACS). Transcranial stimulation of brain areas
involves passing a weak electrical current between
two poles over the scalp that modulates the excitabil-
ity of neural tissue in the region, either increasing or
decreasing it depending upon the polarity. Of partic-
ular interest, a small group of studies showed that
tDCS and related techniques can enhance creative
thinking and problem-solving ability. In one par-
ticularly dramatic example, Chi and Snyder (2012)
found that 40% of their study participants who re-
ceived tDCS over their anterior temporal lobes (in
order to shift them toward right-hemispheric dom-
inance) were able to solve a difficult insight prob-
lem (the “9 dot problem”) that none of the unstim-
ulated participants in their study solved. Cerruti
and Schlaung (2009) were able to use tDCS to en-
hance convergent creative thinking using the the
Remote Associates Test. And Goel et al. (2015)
have now also shown that it can be used to differen-
tially modulate convergent/insight problem thinking
and divergent thinking (see Zmigrod et al., 2015).
One major challenge that methods of brain stim-
ulation must overcome to make even larger con-
tributions to the enhancement of creativity (or the
understanding of any complex state) is, of course,
the difficulty of identifying the entire complex pat-
tern of scattered activations involved in a particular
mental state (e.g., the moment just before insight)
or over time (e.g., during the different stages of the
problem-solving process). Here the brain “connec-
tome” approach—a wiring diagram or mapping of
neural connections in the brain to study the struc-
ture of networks—is promising (Sporns, 2014, Deco
et al., 2018 ). Much like biofeedback, neurofeed-
back based on EEG oscillations (alpha / beta) can be
used to enhance cognition through mental training.
Recently the causal role of beta oscillations on diver-
gent thinking performance was highlighted in some
seminal research showing that training self-control
over brain activities specifically related to creative
thinking could be particularly effective in producing
a significant increase in individual creative potential
(Agnoli, Zanon, Mastria, Avenanti, Corazza, 2018).
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Summary
1. Creativity is a multifaceted phenomenon that can be understood by examining 7 aspects,
called the 7 C’s: Creators (person-centered characteristics), Creating (the creative process),
Collaborations (co-creating), Contexts (environmental conditions), Creations (the nature of
creative work), Consumption (the adoption of creative products) and Curricula (developing
creativity).
2. Creative people have a set of cognitive capacities, personality traits, affective and motivational
characteristics that favor their engagement in original thinking.
3. Person-centered factors, environmental conditions and task-centered factors need to be jointly
considered to describe creative potential and achievement.
4. The creative process involves multiple sub-processes, which can be described as divergent-
exploratory and convergent-integrative phases.
5. Creative potential and achievement can be measured with production tasks, and other assess-
ment tools in diverse domains of expression.
6. Creativity can be collaborative and collective as expressed in team, group and societal forms
of creativity.
7. Creativity is influenced by the physical and sociocultural context, which may boost or inhibit
it, and direct creativity to certain expressive outlets.
8. Creativity is a topic that concerns both the production and the public who consum the creations,
pointing to a co-constructive link between creators, consumers, and cultures.
9. Creativity can be developed through education. The school curriculum, or specific training
activities and creativity techniques have been shown to boost original thinking in children and
adults.
Review Questions
1. What mix of person-centered and environment-centered ingredients supports creativity?
2. Is creativity a general ability that unfolds in the same way across different tasks, domains, or
contexts?
3. What makes a production creative?
4. How can we conceive of the adoption of creative ideas as part of creative activity?
5. How can creativity be enhanced or developed?
6. How does creativity relate to culture and manifest itself in different contexts?
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Hot Topic: Navigating the Future of Creativity
Complexity of measurement, Connected Constructs and Computer Technology
Todd Lubart
Readers might find it surprising that after almost a century of concerted
empirical effort, the measurement of creativity actually remains a chal-
lenge in research and applied settings. Following the “multivariate ap-
proach” (discussed in section 15.1 and also illustrated by Table 15.1 and Fig-
ure 15.2), the authors have been developing the “Creative Profiler”, a multi-
dimensional psychometric tool that gathers together research-validated
measures of the full range of cognitive, conative, socio-emotional, and
environmental resources that the literature suggests contribute to creative
potential and performances of all kinds.
The Creative Profiler aims to enhance our understanding of creativity in
general by offering “high resolution” mappings of the different resources
that actually contribute to more or less creative performance in different
professions (e.g., among designers, managers, lawyers, clinicians or teach-
ers), in different domains (e.g. visual arts vs scientific research), or on different specific tasks (e.g.
writing a poem vs writing a story). More information about the components, methods, and kinds of
groups we are seeking to profile and train can be found on the Creativity and Innovation Profiling
Project’s website, CreativityProfiling.org.
Creativity’s complexity and cultural embeddedness also links it to a constellation of other “hot
topics” in psychology and society—such as leadership, intelligence, design, culture, and spirituality—
many of which have also proven challenging to operationalize in research.
Branden Thornhill-Miller
Creativity’s long association with “madness” in the popular imagination,
for example, has now been scientifically redefined in a manner that suggests
some of this creativity might be linked, instead, with group-enhancing and
culture-shaping individual differences in the tendency to experience more
wonder and/or to have more unusual emotional or mystical experiences
(see Thornhill-Miller, 2007; 2014). In any event, the status of creativity as
a universal human capacity and its close association with other quintessen-
tially human activities—from art and spirituality, to language and scientific
invention—has led both of us to reflect more deeply on the central role
that creativity seems to play in the fundamental question of what it means
to be human. Branden coined the terms “Homo mirans” (the “wondering
ape”) and “Homo syntheticus” (the concept-synthesizing creature that lives
more and more in a world of its own idiosyncratic and synthetic making)
to address these definitively human phenomena (Thornhill-Miller, 2007; 2014). Todd Lubart has
placed the entirety of the creative process squarely at the center of human identity, in his work by
adopting the epithet “Homo creativus” (Lubart, Mouchiroud, Tordjman & Zenasni, 2015).
Looking forward towards humanity’s creative future—computers and computational technologies
offer an exciting new range of possibilities for both research and creativity enhancement, from
artificial intelligence, brain-computer interfaces, and whole-brain emulation, to technologies of
distributed creativity and direct brain stimulation—some of which we have already discussed. For
both of us, however, our work in this area has focused more specifically on the ready accessibility of
virtual reality technologies. Our research suggests virtual worlds offer great promise for exploring
and expanding our understanding of human creativity (see Burkhardt & Lubart, 2010), and as a
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means of optimizing traditionally available creativity training and enhancement options (Thornhill-
Miller & Dupont, 2016). As current reality now surpasses much of the science fiction of the recent
past, it is only a matter of time before our creative capacities will again exceed our imaginations.
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Glossary
brainstorming A technique proposed initially by
Alex Osborn to encourage the unrestrained
production of ideas. 285
creative potential The latent capacity that might
be developed into creative achievements given
sufficient environmental support and opportu-
nity. 279
creative process The sequence of thoughts and
actions that characterizes the generative act,
resulting in an original, valuable production.
290
creativity Ability to generate productions that are
novel and valuable in their context. 277
creativity techniques A range of specific proce-
dures that structure the work process in order
to facilitate the generation of creative ideas.
295
divergent thinking Capacity to generate a variety
of ideas or solutions through an idea search
conducted in multiple directions in order to
obtain a large number of possibilities. 283
innovation The generation, development, promo-
tion, adoption, assimilation, and exploitation
of novelty that offers economic and social
value. 287






“Wisdom is not a product of schooling but of the
lifelong attempt to acquire it.” (Albert Einstein)
Most people would probably like to develop wisdom
in the course of their lives. However, few people ac-
tually become very wise—advice-givers that many
turn to, exemplars in the way they live their own
life. What is wisdom, how can we study it from a
psychological perspective, and why is it so rare? For
a long time, psychologists did not consider wisdom
as something that could actually be measured and
studied using our empirical research methods. Only
since the 1980s has wisdom become a topic of psy-
chological research. This chapter first describes how
wisdom has been defined by psychologists. Then, it
discusses how wisdom can be measured, how it de-
velops, and how it can be fostered by psychological
interventions.
16.1 What is Wisdom?
When psychologists first took up wisdom as a topic
of empirical research in the 1970s and 1980s, they
were not quite certain how this complex and some-
what vague concept could be defined at all. Rather
than define wisdom based on theoretical considera-
tions, several researchers decided to start by study-
ing how so-called laypeople—people who had no
specific knowledge of the subject—defined wis-
dom.
16.1.1 People’s Conceptions of Wisdom
Studies of what people mean when they talk about
wisdom typically start by asking participants to
write down all characteristics that they associate
with wisdom and wise persons (e.g., Clayton &
Birren, 1980; Holliday & Chandler, 1986; Stern-
berg, 1985; overview in Weststrate, Bluck, & Glück,
2019). Then, researchers go through the lists that
participants generated and put together a “master
list” that includes all aspects that have been men-
tioned. New samples of participants are then asked
to rate each aspect for how central or typical it is
for wisdom. As it turns out, there is considerable
agreement between people about the most important
characteristics of wisdom. Typically, researchers
use statistical methods like factor analysis to group
the individual attributes into broader dimensions. A
classical study by Clayton and Birren (1980) identi-
fied three such dimensions: an affective dimension
(including the adjectives peaceful, understanding,
empathetic, and gentle), a reflective dimension (in-
trospective, intuitive), and a cognitive dimension
(knowledgeable, experienced, pragmatic-observant,
intelligent). Other studies have found similar com-
ponents. These studies show that while wisdom
involves knowledge and thinking, it also includes
non-cognitive aspects such as empathy, intuition,
and self-reflection. In other words, wisdom inte-
grates capacities that are usually studied in different
fields of psychology, such as cognition, emotion,
and motivation.
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Other research looked at how people describe a
concrete wise person: whom do they consider as
wise and why? When people are asked to name an
exemplar of wisdom, certain names come up again
and again, for example, Mahatma Gandhi, Jesus
Christ, Martin Luther King, or Mother Teresa (Paul-
hus, Wehr, Harms, & Strasser, 2002; Weststrate,
Ferrari, & Ardelt, 2016). What do these people have
in common? While political figures such as Abra-
ham Lincoln and philosophers such as Socrates are
also often mentioned (Weststrate et al., 2016), it
seems that the most typical as wisdom exemplars
dedicated their lives to a great cause that involved
the well-being of many—they changed the world by
peaceful means. Thus, in addition to the cognitive,
reflective, and affective characteristics that people
associate with wisdom, there is also an ethical or
moral aspect to it: wisdom is applying one’s capaci-
ties for a greater good than just one’s own well-being
(Sternberg, 2019).
16.1.2 Psychological Definitions of
Wisdom
The next step in psychological wisdom research was
to develop more theory-based definitions of what
wisdom is. Different researchers have based their
accounts of wisdom on different theoretical back-
grounds, incorporating people’s conceptions of wis-
dom, philosophical and theological conceptions, and
psychological research on related capacities. For ex-
ample, the first definition of wisdom that became
the foundation of a large-scale research program
was based on studies of expert knowledge, an im-
portant topic of cognitive psychology in the 1980s
(e.g., Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Römer, 1993; see
Chapter 13, “Expertise”).
16.1.2.1 Wisdom as Expertise: The Berlin
Wisdom Model
Generally, expertise is knowledge acquired through
long-term experience and practice in a particular
domain—much expertise research has looked at,
for example, how chess experts differ from chess
novices in how they mentally represent and solve
chess problems. In the 1980s, Paul Baltes and his
co-workers at the Max Planck Institute for Human
Development in Berlin, Germany, argued that wis-
dom is a special form of expertise: expert knowledge
about the fundamental issues of human life (Baltes
& Smith, 1990; Baltes & Staudinger, 2000). Some
people are fascinated by the difficult questions of
our existence: how can we live knowing that we are
going to die? How can we balance autonomy and
intimacy in our relationships? How can we solve
difficult moral dilemmas? While many people do
not care a lot about these questions, some are deeply
motivated to gain a better understanding of them by
observing other people’s lives, reading philosophi-
cal and psychological literature, and, perhaps most
importantly, contemplating their own experiences
and trying to learn from them (Ardelt, 2003; Glück
& Bluck, 2013). Such people are likely to become
experts as they go through life—they accumulate
knowledge, experience, and ways of thinking that
are well-suited for solving problems and giving ad-
vice to others. Importantly, according to Baltes and
colleagues, the knowledge that wise people acquire
is not only about how problems can best be solved
but also about variability and uncertainty: wise in-
dividuals know that people can have very different
values and priorities, that worldviews and behaviors
are shaped by people’s life situations and broader
life contexts, and more generally, that most things
in life are uncertain—that unexpected events can
happen at any time and we can only predict the fu-
ture to a very limited extent. All these insights have
taught wise people to be cautious when they suggest
problem solutions or give advice. In other words, a
wise person is unlikely to just tell somebody what
to do in a difficult situation: he or she will listen
to the advice-seeker’s account carefully, try to take
different perspectives on the problem, and suggest
more than one possible approach.
16.1.2.2 Wisdom as a Personality Constellation:
The Three-Dimensional Wisdom
Model
While the Berlin wisdom model considers
wisdom-related knowledge—knowledge about
facts and strategies, but also about variability and
uncertainty—as the key component of wisdom,
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Monika Ardelt has argued that wisdom really is
a personality characteristic (Ardelt, 2003; Ardelt,
Pridgen, & Nutter-Pridgen, 2019). Based on the
findings by Clayton and Birren described earlier
and on theoretical considerations, she argues that
wise individuals have a specific personality struc-
ture which combines three dimensions: a cognitive
dimension that consists of the deep desire to un-
derstand life; a reflective dimension defined as a
general willingness to take different perspectives
and to reflect upon oneself and one’s behavior; and
an affective dimension characterized by compas-
sionate love for others. Ardelt certainly agrees with
Baltes and colleagues that wise people have a lot
of knowledge about life, but she believes that the
personality dimensions are what enables people
both to acquire that knowledge and to apply it to
real-life problems. While the Berlin model assumes
that wisdom can be learned from observing other
people such as wise mentors, Ardelt has argued that
wisdom is not gained by reading books or observ-
ing other people’s lives: she believes that wisdom
comes from personal, internalized insights that de-
velop as people experience and navigate difficult
challenges in their own lives (Ardelt, 2004. 2005).
Such challenges, according to Ardelt, can change
a person and make him or her wiser. Thus, while
Baltes and colleagues assume that wisdom is a body
of knowledge that can exist outside individuals—for
example, in books or proverbs (Baltes & Kunzmann,
2004)—, Ardelt says that wisdom is inextricably
connected to an individual’s personal life story.
16.1.2.3 Other Definitions of Wisdom
The Berlin Wisdom Model and the Three-
Dimensional Wisdom Model are probably the two
most-studied conceptions of wisdom. They are also
typical examples of two types of definitions in wis-
dom literature: some definitions focus on aspects of
wisdom-related knowledge and wise thinking (e.g.,
Grossmann, 2017; Sternberg, 1998, 2019), while
others emphasize non-cognitive, attitudinal aspects
of wisdom such as self-transcendence or humor
(Levenson, Jennings, Aldwin, & Shiraishi, 2005;
Webster, 2007). Table 16.1 gives an overview of
psychological wisdom definitions that can be found
in literature.
At first sight, the definitions shown in Table 16.1
may seem to be about different constructs. How-
ever, few of them are incompatible with one another.
As mentioned earlier, wisdom is a complex, mul-
tifaceted construct that integrates facets of knowl-
edge and thinking, personality, and motivation. One
important aspect that most wisdom definitions have
in common, although not all of them make it explicit,
is an orientation at a greater good than just one’s own
benefit. The common-good orientation of wisdom
is most visible in Robert J. Sternberg’s balance the-
ory of wisdom (Sternberg, 1998, 2019). Essentially,
Sternberg says that wisdom is practical intelligence
that is utilized to balance different interests in a dif-
ficult situation so as to maximize a common good,
rather than the benefit of any particular party.
In sum, wisdom has been defined in many differ-
ent ways, but the definitions share some common
characteristics. Typical elements of wisdom defini-
tions include:
• broad and deep life experience and life knowl-
edge,
• an awareness of the variability and uncertainty
of human life and a willingness to consider
different perspectives,
• self-reflection, self-knowledge, and self-
acceptance,
• and compassionate concern for others and a
motivation to serve a greater good.
16.2 How Can Wisdom Be Measured?
One reason why psychologists consider it important
to have precise definitions of wisdom is that such
definitions are necessary for developing methods to
measure wisdom. Only if we have valid measures
of wisdom, can we study how wisdom manifests
itself and how it develops (Glück, 2018; Glück et al.,
2013). The Berlin Wisdom Model and the Three-
Dimensional Wisdom Model are not just prototypes
for different definitions of wisdom; they are also
good examples of two traditions in the measurement
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of wisdom: one focusing on wisdom-related knowl-
edge and thinking (overview in Kunzmann, 2019)
and one focusing on wise personality characteristics
(overview in Webster, 2019).
Table 16.1: Some definitions of wisdom (adapted from Glück, 2015).
Authors Definition of Wisdom
Ardelt (2003)
Integration of a cognitive (motivation to understand life), a reflective (taking
different perspectives), and an affective (compassionate concern for others) per-
sonality dimension.
Baltes & Staudinger (2000)
Expert knowledge about the fundamental questions of the human existence;
factual and procedural knowledge as well as knowledge about the relativity,
context-dependence, and uncertainty of life.
Brown & Greene (2006)
Self-knowledge, understanding of others, judgment, life knowledge, life skills,
and a willingness to learn.
Brugman (2006)
Eudaimonic life in the face of uncertainty, involving (meta-)cognition (acknowl-
edging uncertainty), personality and affect (emotional stability despite uncer-
tainty), and behavior (ability to act in the face of uncertainty).
Glück & Bluck (2013)
Experience-based life knowledge acquired through an interaction of life expe-
riences with personal resources (openness, reflectivity, emotion regulation and
empathy, and a sense of mastery).
Grossmann et al. (2010)
Six criteria for wise reasoning: perspective-shifting to take different viewpoints,
recognition of the likelihood of change, flexibility of predictions, recognition
of uncertainty and the limits of knowledge, search for conflict resolution, and
search for compromise.
Knight & Laidlaw (2009)
Wisdom as the result of a self-concept and life narrative that incorporates life-
span contextualism, accumulated life experience (“knowing how”), tolerance of
uncertainty, and a balancing of dialectics such as emotion and reason.
Levenson et al. (2005)
Self-transcendence, building on self-knowledge, non-attachment, and integration.
Mickler & Staudinger (2008)
Realizing one’s own potential while considering the well-being of others and
society, combining rich self-knowledge, heuristics of growth and self-regulation,
interrelating the self, self-relativism, and tolerance of ambiguity.
Sternberg (1998)
Use of practical intelligence, creativity, and knowledge as mediated by values
to achieve a common good by balancing intra- (one’s own), inter- (others’),
and extrapersonal (larger) interests by adapting to, shaping, and/or selecting
environments.
Webster (2007)
Using one’s life experience to facilitate optimal development of oneself
and others, which requires life experience, emotion regulation, reminis-
cence/reflectiveness, openness, and humor.
Yang (2008)
Integration (of ideas, interests, modes of operation, and personality traits that
are usually considered as separate or conflicting), embodiment (taking action to
realize one’s ideals), and accomplishment of positive effects for the acting self
and to others.
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16.2.1 The Berlin Wisdom Paradigm
and Other Measures of Wise
Thinking
To measure wisdom as expert knowledge, Baltes
and colleagues developed the Berlin Wisdom
Paradigm (BWP). Participants are presented with
brief descriptions of difficult life problems, such as
“A fifteen-year-old girl wants to move out of her fam-
ily home immediately.” or “Someone gets a phone
call from a good friend. The friend says that he
cannot go on anymore and has decided to commit
suicide.” (e.g., Glück & Baltes, 2006; Staudinger
& Baltes, 1996). They are asked to think aloud
about what one could consider and do in such a sit-
uation. Participants talk about the problem for as
long as they want; their responses are recorded, and
transcribed. The response transcripts are then evalu-
ated by trained raters with respect to the five criteria
shown in Table 16.2.
A total of ten independent raters—two for each
of the five criteria—are trained to rate the response
transcripts on seven-point scales that range from
“very little similarity” to “very high similarity” to
an ideally wise response. The average across the
ten ratings is then used as a participant’s wisdom
score. The Berlin Wisdom Paradigm is a reliable
method, i.e., the two raters per criterion usually show
good agreement and the ten ratings are sufficiently
interrelated to form a meaningful score (Glück et
al., 2013). Validity studies have shown that people
who score highly in the BWP have more life experi-
ence than other people and are more intelligent and
creative, more open to new experiences, and more
oriented toward personal growth and supporting oth-
ers (Kunzmann & Baltes, 2003; Staudinger, Lopez,
& Baltes, 1997). Thus, even though the BWP mea-
Table 16.2: The five criteria for wisdom used in the Berlin Wisdom Paradigm.
Criteria Description Example
Factual knowledge Knowledge about commonalities and dif-
ferences between people, human devel-
opment, interpersonal relationships, life
events, social contexts, etc.
How much does the participant know about
the lives and problems of teenagers or the
reasons why people may want to commit
suicide?
Procedural knowledge Knowledge about how to deal with one’s
own and others’ problems, how to give ad-
vice, how to balance different priorities,
how to make decisions, what to do if a plan
does not work, etc.
How much does the participant know about
ways to talk to teenagers or ways to support
suicidal individuals?
Value relativism Awareness and acceptance of the fact that
people have different values and life priori-
ties and that the protagonist of the vignette
might have very different values than the
participant.
Does the participant consider that the girl’s
family may have a different cultural back-
ground than he or she has?
Lifespan contextualism Awareness of how different life phases, life
situations, social, cultural, and societal con-
texts can influence people’s experiences
and actions.
Does the participant consider possible dif-
ferences in the age and life situation of the
person who wants to commit suicide?
Recognition and man-
agement of uncertainty
Awareness of the limited amount of knowl-
edge that people can have and the inher-
ent unpredictability and uncontrollability
of life.
Does the participant consider alternative
interpretations of the situation and discuss
several possible approaches?
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sures wisdom-related knowledge, this knowledge is
associated with non-cognitive variables relevant to
wisdom.
More recently, Igor Grossmann built upon the
BWP to develop a method for measuring wise rea-
soning (Grossmann, Na, Varnum, Park, Kitayama, &
Nisbett, 2010; Oakes, Brienza, Elnakouri, & Gross-
mann, 2019). Grossmann and colleagues define wise
reasoning as “the use of certain types of pragmatic
reasoning to navigate important challenges of social
life” (Grossmann et al., 2010, p 7246). Wise rea-
soning is characterized by dialectical thinking and
intellectual humility as manifested, for example, in
taking different perspectives, recognizing the limi-
tations of knowledge, making flexible predictions,
and searching for compromise. To measure wisdom,
Grossmann and colleagues developed vignettes that
describe difficult real-life societal or interpersonal
problems, such as political conflicts in foreign coun-
tries or letters written to a newspaper columnist.
Participants are presented with these vignettes and
asked to write or talk about how these situations may
unfold and why. As in the BWP, trained raters eval-
uate the transcripts with respect to criteria for wise
reasoning. People who show high levels of wise
reasoning have been found to be agreeable, non-
depressed, and satisfied with their lives (Grossmann,
Na, Varnum, Kitayama, & Nisbett, 2013).
Another measure of wisdom-related knowledge
focuses on personal or self-related wisdom. As
Ursula M. Staudinger has argued (Mickler &
Staudinger, 2008; Staudinger, 2019; Staudinger,
Dörner, & Mickler, 2005), some people are quite
wise when they are thinking about someone else’s
problems, but have great difficulty applying their
wisdom when it comes to themselves and their own
problems. According to Staudinger, “general wis-
dom” is wisdom about life in general as it concerns
other people, whereas “personal wisdom” is wisdom
about oneself and one’s own life. Measures like the
BWP assess people’s general wisdom. To measure
personal wisdom, Mickler and Staudinger (2008) de-
veloped the Bremen wisdom paradigm (BrWP). In
the BrWP, participants are interviewed about them-
selves as a friend—their typical behaviors, strengths
and weaknesses, how they deal with difficult situ-
ations in friendships, and the reasons they see for
their own behavior. Participants’ responses are rated
for criteria that are somewhat parallel to those of
the BWP, but apply to wisdom about oneself: self-
knowledge (knowledge about one’s strengths and
weaknesses, priorities, and life meaning), heuristics
of growth and self-regulation (knowing how to deal
with challenges and grow from them), interrelating
the self (seeing oneself in the context of one’s social
relations and life situation), self-relativism (being
self-reflective and self-critical, but also having a
healthy amount of self-esteem), and tolerance of am-
biguity (recognizing and managing uncertainty and
uncontrollability). As in the BWP, two raters per cri-
terion rate each transcript, and their average is used
as the wisdom score. People with high scores in the
BrWP are intelligent, open to new experiences, and
mature (Mickler & Staudinger, 2008).
The Berlin wisdom paradigm, Grossmann’s mea-
sure of wise reasoning, and the Bremen wisdom
paradigm all measure wisdom as a competence: a
way of thinking about life challenges that is based
on knowledge, intelligence, and ways of thinking
that reflect an awareness of variability, uncertainty,
and the limitations of one’s knowledge. In all three
approaches, people produce open-ended responses,
which are then rated with respect to certain criteria
as to what makes a response wise. Researchers who
define wisdom as a matter of personality or attitude
take a different approach to measuring it.
16.2.2 The Three-dimensional Wisdom
Scale and Other Measures of
Non-Cognitive Aspects of
Wisdom
To measure wisdom according to her three-
dimensional model of wisdom as a personality char-
acteristic, Monika Ardelt used the typical way psy-
chologists assess personality: self-report scales. The
Three-Dimensional Wisdom Scale (3D-WS, Ardelt,
2003) consists of 39 statements that reflect one
of Ardelt’s three dimensions of wisdom. Partici-
pants indicate the extent to which they agree to each
of these items on five-point scales. For example,
“Sometimes I feel a real compassion for everyone”
is an item for the affective dimension. Many items in
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the 3D-WS are reverse-coded. For example, “Things
often go wrong for me by no fault of my own” mea-
sures the reflective dimension, but wise persons are
expected to disagree with this statement, as they
would always be aware of their own role in things
that go wrong. “Ignorance is bliss” is a reverse-
coded item for the cognitive dimension, as a wise
person is assumed to always want to understand
things in depth. People’s responses to the items are
summed up to form separate scores for the three di-
mensions, and these three scores are then averaged
into a wisdom score. People who score high in the
3D-WS have been found to have a strong sense of
mastery and purpose in life, to be forgiving of oth-
ers, not very afraid of death, and generally happy
(Ardelt, 2003, 2011).
Jeffrey Dean Webster (2003, 2007) developed the
Self-Assessed Wisdom Scale (SAWS), which defines
wisdom as the willingness and ability to learn from
life experiences and to utilize one’s insights about
life “to facilitate the optimal development of self and
others” (Webster, 2007, p.164). The SAWS consists
of 40 items that measure five components of wis-
dom. Critical life experience (having experienced
difficult life challenges, e.g., “I have had to make
many important life decisions”) is considered as a
prerequisite to developing wisdom. Reminiscence
and reflectiveness (e.g., “I often think about my per-
sonal past”) enables people to reflect upon and learn
from their experiences and use them to deal with
new challenges. Three personal characteristics help
people to reflect upon experiences and grow wiser
from them: openness (to perspectives, ideas, and in-
ner experiences, e.g., “I’m very curious about other
religious and/or philosophical belief systems“), emo-
tional regulation (being able to perceive and regulate
complex feelings, e.g., “I can regulate my emotions
when the situation calls for it”), and humor (recog-
nizing ironies and being able to laugh about oneself,
which helps reduce stress and bond with others, e.g.,
“I can chuckle at personal embarrassments”). People
with high SAWS scores are also high in ego integrity,
generativity, forgiveness, and well-being, and they
consider personal growth and supporting others as
important values in their life (Webster, 2003, 2007,
2010).
Michael R. Levenson and colleagues defined wis-
dom as self-transcendence (Levenson et al., 2005).
Drawing on conceptions from Buddhism, philoso-
phy, and identity development in old age, they ar-
gued that wise individuals have acquired in-depth
knowledge about themselves, understood that ex-
ternal things like money, success, or fame are not
really essential to who a person is, and integrated
and accepted the different aspects of their selves.
These insights lead them to be at peace with them-
selves and to become self-transcendent—to care less
about themselves and more about others and to feel
deeply united with humanity, nature, and the world
at large. The Adult Self-Transcendence Inventory
(ASTI; Levenson et al., 2005; see also Koller, Lev-
enson, & Glück, 2017) is a 34-item scale that mea-
sures self-transcendence and its predecessors, self-
knowledge, non-attachment, and integration, using
items like “My peace of mind is not easily upset”
and “I feel that my individual life is part of a greater
whole.” People scoring high in the ASTI are open to
new experiences, extraverted, non-neurotic and ma-
ture, and they often have experience with meditation
and related practices.
Finally, the Brief Wisdom Screening Scale
(BWSS; Glück et al., 2013) is not based on any spe-
cific theory of wisdom. It was developed based on a
statistical analysis of data from a study that involved
the 3D-WS, SAWS, and ASTI. The researchers used
factor analysis to identify a common core across
those three wisdom measures and then identified
those 21 items from the three scales that were statis-
tically most closely related to this common factor. In
other words, the 21 items of the BWSS are closely
related to one another and to what is common across
the three wisdom self-report scales described earlier.
Other self-report wisdom scales include the Foun-
dational Value Scale (Jason, Reichler, King, Madsen,
Camacho, & Marchese, 2001) and the Wisdom De-
velopment Scale (Brown & Greene, 2006; Greene
& Brown, 2009).
16.2.3 How Can Wisdom Best Be
Measured?
The two approaches to measuring wisdom—open-
ended measures and self-report scales—both have
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some advantages, but also disadvantages. Self-
report scales are easy to administer. Study par-
ticipants check their responses to each item, and
researchers just need to sum up or average the re-
sponses into a wisdom score. The problem with self-
report scales, however, is that people’s responses
reflect who they think they are, which may not nec-
essarily be who they really are. As an example,
consider the item “I am good at identifying subtle
emotions within myself.” Wise people, being highly
self-reflective, probably know how difficult it can be
to disentangle the complex and ambivalent feelings
they have in challenging situations. Therefore, they
would probably partially, but not fully agree to this
item. On the other hand, not-so-wise people may
not even notice the complexity of their more sub-
tle feelings in such situations, and might therefore
happily select “fully agree.” The more general prob-
lem is that humility and self-questioning are part of
the wise personality, but a self-questioning person
might be unlikely to describe him- or herself in a
very positive way in a self-report scale. Thus, those
people who receive the highest scores may not be
the wisest ones, but the ones that are most certain of
being “wise.” In addition, of course, it is quite easy
to intentionally “fake” wisdom in a self-report scale.
If you want to try this out, fill out the ten items from
the Brief Wisdom Screening Scale in Table 16.3
twice—once as you would describe yourself, and
once as you think a very wise person would. Thus,
self-report measures of wisdom should always be
taken with a grain of salt because they are suscep-
tible to both socially desirable responding and to
self-deception.
Open-ended measures do not have this problem:
unless you know the criteria by which your response
gets evaluated, it is a lot more difficult to produce a
wise response to a vignette from the Berlin Wisdom
Paradigm than to score high in a self-report scale.
However, one problem remains: it may still be eas-
ier to talk wisely about what should be done in a
theoretical situation involving a suicidal friend or a
difficult teenager than to actually act wisely in such
a situation in real life. Real-life wisdom requires not
just wise thinking but also emotional strength and
balance, self-reflection, and compassion—qualities
that the BWP does not measure and that cannot re-
ally be inferred from a person’s verbal response to a
theoretical problem. Some researchers have tried to
measure wisdom in ways that are closer to real life—
for example, by presenting participants with videos
of real people discussing a conflict (Thomas & Kun-
zmann, 2013) or by asking participants about actual
difficult challenges from their own lives (Brienza,
Kung, Santos, Bobocel, & Grossmann, 2018; Glück,
Bluck, & Weststrate, in press). A practical disadvan-
Table 16.3: Ten items from the Brief Wisdom Screening Scale. Check how much you agree to each item (1 = disagree completely, 5 =
agree completely), then add up the numbers to compute your “wisdom score.”
1. I can freely express my emotions without feeling like I might lose control. 1 2 3 4 5
2. I have grown as a result of losses I have suffered. 1 2 3 4 5
3. I’m very curious about other religious and/or philosophical belief systems. 1 2 3 4 5
4. At this point in my life, I find it easy to laugh at my mistakes. 1 2 3 4 5
5. My peace of mind is not easily upset. 1 2 3 4 5
6. I’ve learned valuable life lessons from others. 1 2 3 4 5
7. I like to read books which challenge me to think differently about issues. 1 2 3 4 5
8. I always try to look at all sides of a problem. 1 2 3 4 5
9. I often have a sense of oneness with nature. 1 2 3 4 5
10. I have dealt with a great many different kinds of people during my lifetime. 1 2 3 4 5
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tage of open-ended measures compared with self-
report scales is that they require far more effort from
both participants and researchers—participants are
interviewed individually, responses have to be tran-
scribed, raters have to be trained and paid. For this
reason, most studies of wisdom used self-report
scales, but more and more researchers try to in-
corporate at least one open-ended measure to en-
sure that their results are consistent across methods
(e.g., Webster, Weststrate, Ferrari, Munroe, & Pierce,
2018; Weststrate & Glück, 2017a).
In sum, it is still an open question as to how wis-
dom can best be measured. While aspects of wise
thinking should be assessed using open-ended mea-
sures, self-report scales may be the only possibil-
ity we have to access certain non-cognitive aspects,
such as a person’s feelings. An optimal measure of
wisdom may need to integrate both approaches.
16.3 Is Wisdom a Stable Personal
Characteristic—Or Are We All
Wise Sometimes?
Most people think of wisdom as a quality of a small
number of very special people. However, recent
research shows that wisdom varies quite consid-
erably by situation (Grossmann, 2017). Most of
us have probably done a few very wise things in
our lives—and a few very unwise things as well.
For example, Glück, Bluck, Baron, and McAdams
(2005) interviewed people about situations where
they thought they had done something wise. Al-
most all participants were able to name at least one
situation—making a difficult life decision, dealing
with an unexpected emergency, learning to deal with
a long-term problem—that they had handled wisely.
Why were they able to do the wise thing in those
situations, even if they weren’t particularly wise
people in general?—How wisely we act in real life
depends not just on our wisdom-related knowledge
and personality but also on whether we are able
to utilize our knowledge and the relevant facets of
our personality in a particular situation. For ex-
ample, experiments have shown that people give
wiser responses when they are instructed to use
certain thinking strategies. Staudinger and Baltes
(1996) found that people responded more wisely
to the BWP problem about the suicidal friend af-
ter spending ten minutes in an imaginary conver-
sation about the problem with a friend. Interest-
ingly, people also scored higher if they actually
discussed the problem with a friend—but only if
they had a few minutes to think about the discus-
sion before responding. Thus, considering someone
else’s perspective on a problem may help us to act
more wisely in a given situation. Similarly, Kross
and Grossmann (2012) showed that so-called “self-
distancing” interventions improved people’s wise
reasoning. For example, Americans reasoned more
wisely about the possible outcomes of U.S. elec-
tions if they tried to think about the elections from
an Icelander’s perspective than if they considered
how the election outcome would affect their own
lives. Grossmann and Kross (2014) showed that
people reasoned more wisely about a relationship
problem if they imagined the problem happening to
a friend than if they imagined it happening to them-
selves. In fact, people even reasoned more wisely
if they thought about a problem in the third person
(“he/she”) than if they were thinking in the first per-
son (“I/me”)!
Together, these findings suggest that people are
wiser when they are able to mentally distance them-
selves from a problem and try to take various dif-
ferent perspectives on it than if they immerse them-
selves in it, taking a self-centered perspective. How
well people can do this in real life, outside psycho-
logical experiments, certainly depends on what kind
of person they are, but it also depends on the situ-
ation. If we are very angry or scared, for example,
it is a lot more difficult to take someone else’s per-
spective or even to think clearly about the best way
to proceed.
Together, these findings show that wisdom is not
just a matter of wise persons but also of situations.
When we are able to take a step back and look at
the broader picture, take the perspective of others,
and acknowledge and regulate our feelings before
reacting to a challenge, our wisdom has a far better
chance to manifest itself. This brings up the ques-
tion of how we can create situational contexts that
foster wisdom. Wouldn’t it be good if we could
identify ways to make political, economic, or med-
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ical decisions wiser? As discussed earlier, Stern-
berg’s balance theory of wisdom (Sternberg, 1998,
2019) states that a wise solution to a complex prob-
lem balances all the different interests involved, so
that a common good is achieved. To be able to
do that, it is necessary to be aware of all relevant
interests and perspectives. Surowiecki (2005) has
shown that groups can act more wisely than individu-
als if their members represent different perspectives
and different areas of knowledge about the problem,
and if all these different voices are heard and re-
spected. It would seem to be possible to change the
conditions under which, for example, political de-
cisions are made so that such a culture can develop.
Groups can, however, also make very bad decisions,
especially if their leaders are unwise, i.e., foolish,
and the group is structured in a highly hierarchical
way.
Sternberg (2005; see also Sternberg & Glück,
2019) identified five fallacies that cause people in
leading positions to make foolish decisions: unreal-
istic optimism (thinking one is so smart that every-
thing one undertakes will end well, even if it looks
to others like a bad idea); egocentrism (consider-
ing one’s own needs and desires as the only thing
that’s really important); false omniscience (believing
one knows everything and doesn’t need to listen to
others), false omnipotence (grossly overestimating
one’s control over things and therefore setting far
too high goals), and false invulnerability (believing
that one will not get caught or will not be hurt by
the outcomes of one’s decisions). These fallacies
are clearly the opposite of wisdom, which is char-
acterized, as described earlier, by a clear awareness
of the limitations of one’s knowledge and power,
a willingness to take different perspectives, and a
strong concern for the well-being of others. Unfortu-
nately, power structures in many large organizations,
including governments and large companies, tend
to reinforce these fallacies: few people will speak
up against their leader if it is likely to cost them
their jobs. One of the most important applications
of wisdom psychology to real life may be to develop
ways to introduce wisdom-fostering structures into
organizations.
16.4 Where Does Wisdom Come From?
In a world that is faced with difficult challenges—
climate change, global inequality, mass migration,
political polarization, failing educational systems,
and so on—, it seems very important to identify
ways to increase wisdom. Broadly, there are two
approaches to studying this question. First, some
research has looked at how wisdom develops natu-
rally over the course of people’s lives. Second, stud-
ies have investigated how wisdom can be fostered
through interventions—for example, by including
teaching for wisdom in school and university curric-
ula.
16.4.1 The Development of Wisdom
How does wisdom develop, and why is it such a
relatively rare phenomenon? Is it true that wisdom
comes with age? And if it isn’t, why do some people
still become wiser over the course of their lives?
16.4.1.1 Wisdom and age
When people are asked to name the wisest person
they know, they usually come up with an older per-
son (Weststrate et al., 2019). It makes a lot of sense
to assume that wisdom comes with age: after all,
wisdom is based on life experience, and life experi-
ence obviously accumulates over time. Older people
have “seen it all”, and they are in a phase of life
where it may be easier to look back and see what is
really important in life when one is no longer strug-
gling to build one’s own life. At the same time, few
people agree that wisdom generally comes with age
(Glück & Bluck, 2011)—we all know some older
people who are anything but wise. How do these
two notions fit together? Most wisdom researchers
believe that many very wise people are, indeed, in
the second half of life, but there are few of those
very wise people in total (Jeste, Ardelt, Blazer, Krae-
mer, Vaillant, & Meeks, 2010). Most older people
are quite happy and well-adjusted, but few are very
wise.
There are a number of studies that looked at the
relationship between wisdom and age in the general
population. Virtually all of this research is cross-
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sectional—that is, people of different ages were com-
pared with respect to their levels of wisdom. These
studies have produced surprisingly inconsistent re-
sults (Glück, 2019)—in fact, their results seem to
be highly dependent on which measure of wisdom
was used. For the BWP, a strong increase in wisdom
has been found between the ages of about 15 and
25 (Pasupathi, Staudinger, & Baltes, 2001), but after
that, wisdom-related knowledge seems to neither
increase or decrease with age (Staudinger, 1999),
although there may be a small decline in very old
age. Scores in the 3D-WS actually are a bit lower
in older age groups, mostly because older people
have lower scores in the cognitive dimension of wis-
dom (Ardelt, 2003; Glück et al., 2013). Many older
adults tend to think in less complex ways than young
and middle-aged people do.
Recent research has found that wisdom as mea-
sured by the 3D-WS is highest in middle and
late middle adulthood (Ardelt, Pridgen, & Nutter-
Pridgen, 2018). The same pattern has also been
found for the SAWS (Webster, Westerhof, &
Bohlmeijer, 2014), whereas no relationship with age
has been found for the ASTI (Glück et al., 2013; Lev-
enson et al., 2005). Together, these findings would
suggest that wisdom peaks in late middle adulthood,
that is, in people’s 50s and early 60s. However,
Grossmann et al. (2010) found a linear positive rela-
tionship of wise reasoning with age well into partici-
pants’ nineties, and Brienza, Kung, Santos, Bobocel,
and Grossmann (2018) actually found a U-shaped
relationship—that is, the lowest scores in middle
age—for the SWIS. In sum, wisdom increases, stays
stable, increases then decreases, decreases then in-
creases, or just decreases with age, depending on
which measure of wisdom is considered.
The most likely explanation for these inconsis-
tencies is that the different measures emphasize dif-
ferent aspects of wisdom. As mentioned earlier,
wisdom is a complex construct that includes sev-
eral different components (Glück, 2019). Some of
these components decrease with age in the general
population—for example, openness to experience or
the ability and willingness to think in very complex
ways. Measures that focus on these components
tend to produce lower scores in old age. Other com-
ponents actually increase with age—for example,
compassion and concern for others or a willingness
to make compromises and accept one’s limitations.
Measures emphasizing these aspects tend to produce
higher scores in old age. It is important to also keep
in mind that findings from cross-sectional studies are
affected by so-called cohort effects: the people we
compare in such a study differ not only in age, but
also in the experiences they have had over their life-
time. The middle-aged and late middle-aged people
who show high wisdom scores in current research
were born in the 1950s and 1960s, that is, they came
of age in the 1960s and 1970s, a period of time in
which wisdom-related qualities may have been val-
ued more highly than was the case for older and,
perhaps, also for younger generations. For all these
reasons, we do not have really conclusive evidence
on the general relationship between wisdom and age
yet. To understand how wisdom develops, it may be
more important to look at individual developmental
pathways over people’s life courses. Longitudinal
studies, which follow the same people over extended
periods of their lives, have the potential to show us
not just how age cohorts differ in wisdom but how
individual life experiences shape a person’s wisdom
over time. For now, we have relatively little such
evidence, but we have some theories about the de-
velopment of wisdom that shed light on important
factors.
16.4.2 Theories of How Wisdom
Develops
As described earlier, Paul Baltes and colleagues
(Baltes & Smith, 1990; Baltes & Staudinger, 2000)
argued that wisdom is expert knowledge about the
fundamental pragmatics of human life. The fun-
damental pragmatics of life are the “big issues” of
human existence such as how we should live with
the knowledge that we are going to die, how we
can balance intimacy and autonomy in our relation-
ships, or the complex moral dilemmas of our mod-
ern times. “Expert knowledge” (see Chapter 13,
“Expertise”) refers to an extraordinary amount of
knowledge about a subject domain that is acquired
through long-term, intense, goal-oriented practice.
Baltes and Smith (1990) discussed in detail how wis-
Psychology of Human Thought • Chapter 16 • 317
Glück Wisdom
dom might develop. They distinguished three types
of factors that facilitate the development of wisdom:
1. characteristics of the person, such as intelli-
gence, mental health, creativity, or openness
to experience,
2. factors that enable people to gain relevant ex-
pertise, such as certain life experiences or hav-
ing wise mentors, and
3. helpful experiential contexts, such as certain
professions, being a mentor oneself, having
children, or advanced age.
According to the Berlin group, people’s pathways
to wisdom are very different depending on their
unique life stories and life experiences. The MORE
Life Experience Model (Glück & Bluck, 2013) spec-
ifies the role of life experiences in more detail. Its
main assumption is that life challenges – experiences
that deeply change people’s beliefs about themselves
or the world—are the main catalysts of the develop-
ment of wisdom. Such challenges are often nega-
tive, such as a serious illness or a difficult conflict,
but they can also be positive. For example, many
people say that having their first child completely
changed their priorities and needs. According to the
MORE Life Experience Model, such experiences
may not only change people’s worldviews but also
show them how much worldviews are shaped by ex-
periences in general. For example, someone might
learn from having a divorce or a baby not just that it
is important to be attentive to one’s partner or that
unconditional love is possible, but also how little we
know about situations that we haven’t experienced
ourselves. In other words, that person might gain
insights that refer to the BWP criteria of lifespan
contextualism, value relativism, and recognition of
uncertainty.
Thus, life challenges can foster wise insights—
but not everybody gains wisdom from them. Espe-
cially after a negative experience, many people are
not very interested in analyzing what happened—
they just want to regain their happiness and emo-
tional balance (Weststrate & Glück, 2017a). Only
those people who are willing and able to become
“experts on life” are likely to explore the meaning
of an experience even if it may be painful for them.
The MORE Life Experience Model proposes that
certain psychological resources enable people on
their way to wisdom to dig deeper into the meaning
of life challenges. The most important resources are
the following.
Openness is a general interest in multiple per-
spectives. People on the way toward wisdom are
interested in how other people’s worldviews, goals,
and values differ from their own. They have no dif-
ficulty with seeking out advice and learning from
others, and they are not afraid of new experiences in
their own lives.
Empathic concern. People developing wisdom
are compassionate with others and deeply motivated
to alleviate their suffering. People who care deeply
about others will strive for achieving a common
good rather than for optimizing their own gain in
complex situations (Sternberg, 2005). However,
wise empathy is not simply taking on others’ pain
as one’s own; it also involves being able to distance
oneself so as to help another person optimally.
Emotional sensitivity and emotion regulation.
People developing wisdom do not only pay attention
to the feelings of others. They are also sensitive to
their own emotions, and they are skilled at dealing
with negative and mixed feelings. They try not to
suppress negative feelings but to understand them
and learn from them, while at the same time appre-
ciating the positive things in life (König & Glück,
2014). They have learned to manage their emotions
as a situation requires, which may sometimes mean
recognizing but not showing one’s feelings.
Reflectivity refers to the idea that people on the
way to wisdom are motivated to understand complex
issues of human life in their full complexity. Highly
reflective people are willing and able to question
their own beliefs because learning more about life
is more important to them than feeling good about
themselves (Weststrate & Glück, 2017a).
Managing uncertainty and uncontrollability.
Most people tend to overestimate how much control
they have over the things that happen in their lives.
They believe, for example, that if they eat well and
work out, they are never going to fall ill, or that pro-
fessional success is simply a matter of hard work.
People on the way to wisdom have learned from
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experience that much in life is uncontrollable—that
even people with a healthy lifestyle can have a heart
attack, and that good or bad luck plays an important
role in people’s careers. While they know that some-
thing unexpected may happen at any time, however,
they are not anxious or overly cautious because they
have also learned to trust their own ability to deal
with whatever may happen.
According to the MORE Life Experience model,
people who have high levels of these five resources
will
a) experience more life challenges that can foster
wisdom because they are not afraid of new ex-
periences and are more willing to think about
them in depth,
b) be able to deal with these challenges in
wisdom-fostering ways because they will pay
attention to others’ perspectives, recognize
and regulate their own feelings, and reflect on
their own behaviors, and
c) gain wiser insights from these challenges in
the aftermath because they think deeply about
them.
In this sense, gaining wise insights may not al-
ways make people happy. In the short run, it may
make people happier to not question their own
views, ignore unpleasant or complicated feelings,
empathize only with their friends and family, and
overestimate their control over their life (Staudinger
& Glück, 2011; Weststrate & Glück, 2017b). Wis-
dom may come at a cost, and the path toward it
requires a willingness to face the darker sides of
human life.
16.4.3 Wisdom Interventions
As discussed earlier, the current state of our world
suggests that we urgently need to find ways to foster
wisdom—in individuals as well as in systems and
institutions. Research, up to now, has focused on
ways to increase individual wisdom. As described in
section 3, several studies have shown that short-term
interventions can help people access their wisdom-
related knowledge and mindset. These interventions
include imagining discussing a problem with some-
one else (Staudinger & Baltes, 1996) or imagin-
ing that the problem does not concern oneself but
someone else (Grossmann & Kross, 2014; Kross &
Grossmann, 2012). Another class of interventions
consists, of course, of actually discussing a problem
with someone else, which has been found to foster
wisdom in an experimental setting (Staudinger &
Baltes, 1996) as well as in retrospective accounts of
real-life experiences (Igarashi, Levenson, & Aldwin,
2018). In this vein, a promising approach to foster-
ing wisdom might lie in simply instructing people to
ask for, and listen to, information and advice from
others if they are facing a difficult problem. But
what characterizes wise advice? It is an interesting
and understudied question how wise people give
advice to others.
As discussed earlier, in addition to increasing wis-
dom in individuals, it seems important that we look
more into the way situational contexts can foster wis-
dom (Grossmann, 2017; Surowiecki, 2005). Why,
for example, do interactions in online discussion
boards often become uncivil and polarized, espe-
cially when they are about an ideological or political
topic? Perhaps simple interventions, such as having
users rate the wisdom of each statement instead of
“liking” or “disliking” it, might create an incentive
for more balanced and constructive conversations.
In addition to such situational short-term interven-
tions, researchers have discussed how wisdom could
be implemented as a goal in more long-term inter-
ventions, such as school curricula or psychotherapy.
Sternberg (2001; Reznitskaya & Sternberg, 2004)
suggested teaching for wisdom in schools, criticiz-
ing that today’s curricula focus on academic intel-
ligence at the expense of wisdom and ethics. He
argued that exercises such as reflecting on and dis-
cussing one’s own values, possible consequences of
decisions, or ethically relevant topics in classes on
history or social sciences can have a long-term effect
on the development of wisdom. Michael Linden and
colleagues, on the other hand, argue that psychother-
apy can explicitly focus on elements of wisdom such
as perspective-taking or emotion regulation (Linden,
Baumann, Lieberei, Lorenz, & Rotter, 2011). In
a broader sense, one could argue that many gen-
eral goals of psychotherapy, such as increased self-
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reflection, awareness and regulation of emotions,
and empathy are also components of wisdom.
In a world that is facing enormous global chal-
lenges, the psychology of wisdom may have im-
portant contributions to make. Globally as well as
individually, we need to learn how to make deci-
sions that are not just smart but wise—decisions that
balance our own interests with those of others and
the world at large.
Summary
1. What is wisdom? There are a number of definitions of wisdom in psychological literature.
Wisdom is a complex and multifaceted construct, and different definitions tend to emphasize
different aspects of it. The most important components of wisdom are (a) broad and deep life
experience and life knowledge, (b) an awareness of the variability and uncertainty of human
life and a willingness to consider different perspectives, (c) self-reflection, self-knowledge,
and self-acceptance, and (d) compassionate concern for others and a motivation to serve a
greater good.
2. How can wisdom be measured? Current measures are either self-report scales or open-ended
performance measures. Self-report scales are easy and quick to administer and score, but
very wise people may be more critical of themselves and therefore describe themselves less
favorably in such measures than less wise people. Open-ended measures require more time
and effort and may not capture emotional aspects of wisdom. An optimal measure should
probably combine both approaches.
3. Is wisdom a stable person characteristic? Recent research shows that wisdom varies across
people, but wisdom also varies across situations: people think more wisely if they take a
broader perspective on an issue and consider possible alternative views. An important topic
for wisdom research is how to create situations that enable wise decisions and behavior.
4. How does wisdom develop? Wisdom is a rare phenomenon—while most people are happy
and satisfied, few people become very wise in the course of their lives. Researchers believe
that wisdom develops through an interaction of life experiences with certain personal charac-
teristics. People who think deeply about their experiences and try to understand their own
behavior are more likely to develop wisdom.
5. How can wisdom be fostered? This is a very important question that few studies have
investigated yet. Wisdom can be fostered through short-term interventions that lead people
to take a broader perspective. Possible long-term interventions include wisdom curricula in
education and wisdom-oriented psychotherapy.
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Review Questions
1. Do you know a truly wise person? Why do you consider him or her as wise? How does this
person fit with the aspects of wisdom discussed in this chapter?
2. When you look at the different definitions of wisdom in Table 16.1, which one seems most
convincing to you and why? Which aspects of wisdom do you consider as most central?
3. How does wisdom manifest itself in real life? Could your ideas on this question be used to
develop a new, more real-life-like approach to measure wisdom? What could that approach
look like? (If you have any good ideas on this one, please email me!)
4. What are the wisest insights you have gained from life? What can you do to foster the
development of your own wisdom?
Hot Topics: Wise Solutions for Complex Global Problems
Judith Glück
(Photo: Barbara Maier)
What can we do to make today’s world wiser? Our world is faced with
enormous global challenges including climate change, global inequality,
political polarization and rising populism, the negative effects of digitalization,
and educational systems that seem to fail at teaching students how to navigate
these challenges. What are wise ways to deal with these problems? While
earlier wisdom research has focused on wisdom as a characteristic of persons,
more recent research is beginning to understand how situations foster or hinder
wisdom. To develop wise solutions to complex world problems, however,
we need to learn more about the processes of making wise decisions. If, as
Robert J. Sternberg (2019) argues, wisdom involves a balancing of different
interests that optimizes a common good, how exactly does it achieve this goal?
There is a large body of scientific research on judgment and decision-making,
but most of these studies have focused on problems that have pre-defined
optimal solutions. New research is needed that identifies wise approaches to solving complex,
ill-defined problems. Another open question is how we can create systems that invite or reward wise
behavior, e.g., from politicians and policymakers. Recent political developments show that voters
are not necessarily attracted by wise political candidates (Sternberg, 2019), so other mechanisms are
required to ensure a certain level of wisdom in politics. All democratic countries have constitutional
checks and balances that are supposed to protect them against undemocratic developments. However,
the recent rise of populism in many Western democracies (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018) sheds doubt
on the efficacy of these processes in a time of social media and ideological polarization. Wisdom
research needs to investigate how political systems can contribute to wise politics, and how people
can be made more aware of the importance of wisdom for the survival of our planet.
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Glück Glossary
Glossary
Berlin wisdom paradigm The Berlin wisdom
paradigm was the first empirical approach to
measuring wisdom. It is based on a concep-
tion of wisdom as expertise about the funda-
mental questions of human life. Participants
are presented with brief descriptions of diffi-
cult life problems. Their responses are tran-
scribed and rated with respect to five wisdom
criteria: factual knowledge, procedural knowl-
edge, value relativism and tolerance, life-span
contextualism, and recognition and manage-
ment of uncertainty. 311
construct In psychological theories, (hypothetical)
constructs are characteristics of people that
cannot be directly observed, but that are as-
sumed to influence people’s behavior. For
example, intelligence, depression, or wisdom
are used to explain why people do certain
things in certain situations, but we cannot
directly observe a person’s intelligence, de-
pression or wisdom. Psychologists try to de-
velop elaborate definitions of constructs, like
the definitions of wisdom discussed in this
chapter, and to use these definitions to devise
methods to measure the respective construct.
309
exemplar Wisdom exemplars are individuals
whom many people consider as extremely
wise. In studies that asked participants to
name particularly wise persons, certain names
came up very often, including Mahatma
Gandhi, Jesus Christ, Martin Luther King,
or Mother Teresa (Paulhus, Wehr, Harms, &
Strasser, 2002; Weststrate, Ferrari, & Ardelt,
2016). There are different types of wisdom
exemplars, but one important thing that most
of them have in common is that they dedicated
their lives to a cause that benefited many peo-
ple and changed the world by peaceful means.
308
intervention Psychological interventions are
things that psychologists do to make people
change their behavior. Usually, experiments
are used to test whether an intervention has
an effect: people are randomly assigned to an
experimental group and a control group. The
experimental group is treated with the inter-
vention. Afterwards, the respective behavior
is measured in both groups. If the control
group shows more (or less) of the behavior
that the intervention was supposed to foster
(or reduce), the intervention is considered
effective. Effective interventions to foster
wisdom include asking people to imagine that
they discuss a problem with someone else
(Staudinger & Baltes, 1996) or that the prob-
lem concerns someone else (Grossmann &
Kross, 2014). Generally, wisdom is fostered
by interventions that help people to mentally
distance themselves from the problem and
take different perspectives into account.. 315
measure(ment) As psychologists try to test their
theories through empirical studies, they need
to be able to measure the constructs that their
theories refer to. To test, for example, a the-
ory of how wisdom develops, we need to be
able to measure wisdom. By “measuring”,
we generally mean a method that describes
a person’s level of the respective construct
by a number. Intelligence tests, for example,
are a method to quantify a person’s level of
intelligence. 309
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Development of Human Thought
KATHLEEN M. GALOTTI
Carleton College
My then fourteen-year-old daughter wanted to up-
grade her cellphone to an expensive smart phone
model. She “mentioned” this topic several days a
week, for several months. At first, she described
all the advantages for her, personally: she’d be able
to take more pictures, use Instagram and Snapchat
more easily, and text more friends for free. Al-
though numerous, none of these reasons were partic-
ularly compelling for me. Eventually, she created a
several-slide powerpoint, describing costs and ben-
efits that did matter to me—including being able
to track where she was, the ability to create a local
hotspot for the internet, and chores she promised
to do if/when she got the model of phone she was
angling for. So persuasive was she that I ended up
getting two iPhones—one for each of us (thanks to
a two-for-one special).
This ability to plan and marshall a convincing
argument illustrates a textbook example of a de-
veloping cognitive ability. In earlier points of her
development, my daughter could do little more than
express her desires (often loudly) or offer one-sided
and non-compelling arguments (“I really, really, re-
ally want it”). Her proclivity to adopt my point of
view and use that to offer reasons and incentives that
persuaded me to adopt her perspective is a gradually
emerging ability, and one that will be the focus of
this chapter.
First, we’ll talk about different realms of thought,
including problem-solving, reasoning, decision mak-
ing, planning and goal setting. All of these terms
come under the broader term of thinking, and we
will explore definitions and connections among
these various instances of thought. We will then take
a chronological look at how these different realms
of thought develop. We will look at some precursors
in infancy and the toddler years. We’ll have much
more to learn about the development of thought in
the preschool years, when children become much
more verbal. Examination of the elementary school
years will show that children gather a lot of infor-
mation to construct a knowledge base, even as they
refine many of their thinking skills. Finally, we’ll see
dramatic improvements in many if not all realms of
thinking when we examine adolescence and young
adulthood.
17.1 Defining the Domain: Realms of
Thought
Let’s start by defining a few key terms that we’ll
be discussing in this chapter. Consider the term,
thinking. It’s a pretty broad term and used to cover
a lot of different kinds of mental activities, includ-
ing making inferences, filling in gaps, searching
through mental spaces and lists, and deciding what
to do when in doubt. I’ll use it in this chapter as
the overall label for mental activities that process
information.
The terms problem solving, reasoning and de-
cision making are often used interchangeably with
the term thinking. Many psychologists see the first
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three as special cases of the fourth. Specifically,
when cognitive psychologists speak of problem solv-
ing, they refer to instances where a person is trying
to see a solution to some sort of impediment (see
Chapter 9, “Problem Solving”). When they speak
of reasoning, they mean a specific kind of thinking
done to draw inferences, such as you might do in
solving certain puzzles or reading a mystery novel
(see Chapter 7, “Deductive Reasoning”, and Chap-
ter 8, “Inductive Reasoning”). Reasoning often in-
volves the use of certain principles of logic. The
term, decision making, then, refers to the mental
activities that take place when one chooses among
alternatives (see Chapter 10, “Decision Making”).
Goal setting as used here means a mental activ-
ity in which one sets specific intentions to achieve
some specific objective or aim. This term is inter-
twined with planning, which indicates a projection
into the future of a trajectory by which goals can
be attained, including sourcing the materials and
resources needed and taking the steps necessary to
achieve an objective.
It is important to note here that thinking tasks
we’ll talk about make use of two other important
cognitive realms: language, and the knowledge base.
Language refers to the ways people comprehend
and produce utterances (whether in speech or in
writing; see Chapter 11, “The Nature of Language”,
and Chapter 12, “Language and Thought”). Being
a proficient language user certainly helps when it
comes to understanding and expressing one’s argu-
ments, decisions, or plans.
The knowledge base refers to the sum total of
stored information that an individual possesses (see
Chapter 4, “Concepts: Structure and Acquisition”,
and Chapter 5, “Knowledge Representation and Ac-
quisition”). For example, I know hundreds of thou-
sands of words; I have previously memorized mul-
tiplication tables up to 12 and can quickly retrieve
from memory many multiplication facts; I remember
names of teachers and classmates from my kinder-
garten year up through graduate school; I also know
about parenting, dog training techniques, mystery
stories, Pokemon Go and some television series (cur-
rently I’m binge-watching Scandal). When peo-
ple think, they think about things, and the richer
their knowledge base, the richer their thinking about
propositions derived from it.
With those introductory remarks in mind, let’s
turn to a chronological look at the development of
thinking in infancy through adolescence.
17.2 Infancy and Toddlerhood
It might seem a little incongruous to have a section
on thought in infancy. After all, one of the great cog-
nitive developmental theorists, Jean Piaget, argued
that infants were at a stage of development where,
essentially, they did not have thought (Piaget, 1952).
Piaget believed that individuals passed through a
series of stages in their cognitive development, with
each stage defined by a qualitatively different set
of intellectual structures through which the individ-
ual processed information and understood the world.
The first stage of cognitive development, which op-
erates from birth to roughly 2 years, was named the
sensorimotor stage by Piaget, because his belief was
that infants and toddlers were limited in their cog-
nition to sensory experiences and motor responses.
Put another way, from birth through the first 18 to
24 months, infants and toddlers were said to lack a
capacity for mental representation, the ability to
construct internal depictions of information.
One of Piaget’s most famous demonstrations of
(the lack of) infant cognition is on the so-called “ob-
ject permanence” task, depicted in Figure 17.1. A
young (say, five- or six-month-old) infant is seated
facing a desirable object or toy. Suddenly, some sort
of screen is placed between the infant and the object.
Typically, the infant fairly immediately appears to
lose all interest, as if the object or toy has some-
how ceased to exist! Piaget’s explanation is that
objects out of sensorimotor contact are truly “out of
mind”, because the infant has no capacity for mental
representation.
Because he believed that infants lack that capac-
ity, Piaget would conclude that infants really don’t
do very much, if any, “thinking.” However, some
recent work has challenged Piagetian interpretations
of infant cognition, and reawakened the idea that
infants do have some knowledge and some rudimen-
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Figure 17.1: According to Piaget, until object permanence develops, babies fail to understand that objects still exist when no longer in
view. Source: Galotti (2017, p.113).
tary mental activity that can be clearly labelled as
“thinking.”
One of the most prolific researchers posing this
challenge to Piaget is psychologist Renée Bail-
largeon. Here, we will only cover a small fraction
of her elaborate body of work. In one classic study
(Baillargeon, 1986), she seated infants (6-8 months
old) in front of a screen set up to the right of an
inclined ramp. During the first phase of the study,
infants saw the screen raised and lowered. Behind
the screen was a track for a small toy car. After the
screen was lowered, infants saw a small toy car go
down the inclined ramp and to the right, behind the
screen.
Next, infants were given the impossible/possible
events task, in which they were tested with one of
two events—the first, a “possible” event, occurred
when the screen was raised. It revealed a box sitting
behind the track. As in the first phase of the study,
after the screen was lowered, the car rolled down
the ramp and across the track behind the screen.
The second, “impossible” event was very similar to
the possible event, except that the box was actually
placed on the track instead of behind it.
Now, according to Piaget, 6-month-old infants
ought not to react any differently to the “possible”
than to the “impossible” event. Lacking a sense of
object permanence, they should be just as unsur-
prised to see a car roll in front of a box as “through”
a box—after all, if infants have no expectations of
objects continuing to exist when hidden behind a
screen, then they would have forgotten all about the
existence of the occluded box anyway. But Bail-
largeon’s results showed something clearly at odds
with Piagetian predictions. Her 6.5- and 8-month-
old participants, and even some 4-month-old female
participants, looked longer at the “on-track” “impos-
sible” event. Baillargeon interpreted this result to
mean that the infants “(a) believe that the box contin-
ued to exist, in its same location, after the screen was
lowered; (b) believed that the car continued to exist,
and pursued its trajectory, when behind the screen;
(c) realized that the car could not roll through the
space occupied by the box; and hence (d) were sur-
prised to see the car roll past the screen when the
box lay in its path” (Baillargeon, 1999, p. 128).
In a related study, Baillargeon and DeVos (1991)
presented infants 3.5 months old with an unusual
stimulus display. Each infant saw one of two events
first. These events presented either a short carrot
or a tall carrot moving behind a large rectangular
yellow screen, followed, a few seconds later, by
the emergence of an identically appearing carrot ap-
pearing from the right-hand side of the screen. In
other words, it looked as though the same carrot
simply traveled behind the occluding screen. After
a 1-second pause, the experimenter slid the carrot
back behind the yellow occluding screen, paused
for 2 seconds, and then slid the leftmost carrot out
from behind the left edge of the screen. This cycle
of carrots disappearing and reappearing continued
until the infant reached a predetermined criterion of
amount of time looking at the stimulus or looking
away having previously attended to it.
Psychology of Human Thought • Chapter 17 • 329
Galotti Development of Human Thought
Next came either a “possible” or “impossible”
event. This event was the same as the corresponding
habituation event, except that the occluding screen
had a new color, blue, meant to draw infants’ at-
tention to the fact that the screen was new. It also
had a new shape: a large rectangle with a smaller
rectangle “cut out” from the top. The idea was that
short carrots ought to fit completely behind the new
screen all the way across, and thus the possible event
ought not to have been perceived as all that surpris-
ing. However, a tall carrot would not have fit behind
the new screen—its top ought to have been visible as
it moved through the “cut out” portion of the screen
if it were moving from one end to the other. Thus,
the tall carrot moving behind the new screen ought
to have been an impossible event.
Results showed that although infants looked for
an equal amount of time at the two habituation
events (i.e., tall vs. short carrots moving behind
the rectangular yellow screen), they looked longer
at the impossible than the possible test event. Bail-
largeon and DeVos (1991) took this result as evi-
dence that their three-and-a-half-month-old infants
“(a) realized that each carrot continued to exist af-
ter it slid behind the screen, (b) assumed that each
carrot retained its height behind the screen, (c) be-
lieved that each carrot pursued its trajectory behind
the screen, and therefore, (d) expected the tall carrot
to be visible in the screen window [the opening in
the blue test screen] and were surprised that it was
not” (p. 1233).
These conclusions (and others from Baillargeon’s
additional studies not described here) strongly sug-
gest that even fairly young infants possess a fair
amount of knowledge about what objects are and
how they behave. Baillargeon (2008) believes that
infants begin with an innate principle of persistence,
“which states that objects persist, as they are, in time
and space” (p. 11). From this initial knowledge,
infants gather perceptual information and use it to
construct more complex and detailed representations
of objects and, in so doing, learn more about how
objects behave and what their properties are. So, if
you believe Baillargeon’s interpretations (and not
everyone does; see Cohen & Cashon 2013 for a cri-
tique), young infants do have some knowledge about
objects. What about knowledge about social beings?
In a recent review, Baillargeon, Scott, and Bian
(2016) present evidence from many different stud-
ies from many different laboratories that young in-
fants and toddlers can reason about agents’ goals
and states and can use this information to predict
an agent’s future actions. Here’s just one example
(from Woodward, 2009): an infant sees an adult
seated at a table with two different toys (let’s call
them A and B) in front of her. She reaches for
and grasps one of the toys (A). Infants watch repeti-
tions of this action for some predetermined amount
of time, becoming habituated to seeing this action.
Next, they see the same adult in front of the same
two toys, which have now traded positions. Infants
as young as five months look longer when the adult
reaches for the new toy (B) than they do when the
adult reaches for (A). According to Baillargeon et
al (2016) these infants: “(a) attributed to the agent a
preference or liking for object A, as the agent always
chose it over object B, and (b) expected the agent to
continue acting on this preference. . .” (p. 162). This
finding has been replicated in several laboratories.
Baillargeon along with other developmental psy-
chologists such as Elizabeth Spelke and Susan Carey
argue that infants are born with some amount of
“core knowledge.” The existence of these innate sys-
tems does not imply that infants can articulate all
their principles. Indeed, infants aren’t known for
their articulation abilities in any domain. Instead,
the implication here is that infants come into the
world prepared to make certain assumptions, enter-
tain certain hypotheses, or hold certain expectations
of the way objects will or won’t behave. Thus, they
do have some knowledge, and thus, they can do
some rudimentary reasoning about it.
17.3 The Preschool Period
It is in the preschool period that we see the first glim-
mers of what cognitive psychologists call “higher or-
der cognitive processes”—processes that operate on
mental representations. These glimmers are fleeting
and fragile, but also unmistakable signs of growing
maturity of thought.
One of my personal favorite demonstrations of
preschooler reasoning competence comes from the
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work of Hawkins, Pea, Glick, and Scribner (1984).
They demonstrated that, under certain circumstances
at least, preschoolers aged 4 and 5 years could draw
deductive inferences (see Chapter 7, “Deductive
Reasoning”). They began by constructing various
reasoning problems, examples of which are shown in
Table 17.1. There were three types of problems. The
first consisted of premises that were congruent with
the child’s world knowledge—for example, “Bears
have big teeth. Animals with big teeth can’t read
books. Can bears read books?” Note that whether a
child actually reasoned from the premises or from
her world knowledge of the general illiteracy of
bears, she would have arrived at the deductively cor-
rect conclusion, “No.” Preschoolers were expected
to do particularly well on these problems, even if
their scores overstated their true reasoning ability.
A second type of problem included informa-
tion that was incongruent with the child’s world
knowledge—for example, “Glasses bounce when
they fall. Everything that bounces is made of rubber.
Are glasses made of rubber?” Here, the real-world
correct answer is directly at odds with the answer a
reasoner would derive from strictly reasoning from
the premises to answer the question. Preschoolers
were expected to do particularly poorly on these
problems, as it was expected they would answer the
questions using their world knowledge rather than
use abstract reasoning to derive a valid conclusion.
The most theoretically interesting type of problem
was one using so-called “fantasy” premises—for ex-
ample, “Every banga is purple. Purple animals al-
ways sneeze at people. Do bangas sneeze at people?”
Notice that in these problems, there is no relevant
world knowledge for the child to call upon. Hawkins
et al. (1984) believed, then, that fantasy problems
would be the ones most likely to reveal whether or
not preschool children could, in fact, draw logical
inferences.
The results were clear-cut. Children were pre-
sented with 8 problems of each kind. Overall, chil-
dren gave correct responses to 7.5, 1.0, and 5.8
congruent, incongruent, and fantasy problems, re-
spectively. A chance level of performance was 4,
and thus children performed significantly better than
chance on the fantasy (and congruent) problems.
Thus, the authors concluded, preschool children, un-
der limited circumstances, can reason deductively.
Moreover, the order in which the problems were
administered was crucially important. Children who
reasoned with fantasy premises first tended to per-
form better on all problems, even the congruent and
incongruent ones, than did the children who received
congruent problems first, incongruent problems first,
or problems in a jumbled order. Hawkins et al.
(1984) argued that presenting fantasy problems first
sets a context for children to help cue them as to how
to correctly solve the problem. When congruent or
incongruent problems were presented first, children
mistakenly recruited their real-world knowledge to
answer the questions, instead of relying strictly on
the premises.
Of course, being able to draw a deductive infer-
ence in certain circumstances does not prove that
preschoolers are fully capable of deductive reason-
ing. Adults can reason better than preschoolers on
just about every problem, but do especially well
with incongruent content. Indeed, Markovits and
Barrouillet (2004) argue that what happens with cog-
nitive development is increasing control over com-
plex forms of reasoning, and being able to divorce
one’s store of knowledge about the world from the
information presented in the premises to a problem.
Another important development in children’s
thinking in the preschool period concerns the de-
velopment of theory of mind. A person’s theory of
mind is the ability to reason about mental states (Ap-
perly, 2012). Thus, theory of mind guides a person’s
beliefs and expectations about what another person
is thinking, feeling, or expecting; it guides one’s
ability to predict accurately what another person’s
reaction will be to a specific set of circumstances
(Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1995). This ability devel-
ops rapidly between the ages of two and five.
One common task used to investigate preschool
children’s theory of mind is the so-called false belief
task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). For example, chil-
dren might be told a story about a boy who puts a
toy in a box and leaves the room. While he is away,
his sister enters the room, takes the toy out of the
box, plays with it, and puts it away in a different lo-
cation. Children are then asked where the boy (who
was not present in the room at the time the toy was
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Table 17.1: Types of problems used by Hawkins, Pea, Glick, and Scribner (1984). Source: Galotti (2017, p. 230), adapted from
Hawkins, Pea, Glick, and Scribner (1984, p. 585).
Model Affirmative Example Negative Example
A is B Every banga is purple. Bears have big teeth.
B is C Purple animals always sneeze at people. Animals with big teeth can’t read books.
A is C Do bangas sneeze at people? Can bears read books?
A has B Pogs wear blue boots. Rabbits never bite.
C is an A Tom is a pog. Cuddly is a rabbit.
C has B Does Tom wear blue boots? Does Cudly bite?
A does B when ... Glasses bounce when they fall. Merds laugh when they’re happy.
B is C Everything that bounces is made of rubber. Animals that laugh don’t like mushrooms.
A has C Are glasses made of rubber? Do merds like mushrooms?
moved) will think the toy is. In other words, can the
children disentangle their own state of knowledge
about the toy from the state of knowledge or belief
of someone who lacks their information?
Another theory of mind task is the unexpected
contents task (e. g., Gopnik & Astington, 1988),
in which a child is handed a box of, say, crayons
but opens it to discover that the box really contains
small candies. The child is then asked to predict
what another child, who has no previous experience
with the crayon box, will think is inside. Typically,
children younger than about 4 years answer that they
knew all along that the box contained candies rather
than crayons, even though they initially answered
“crayons” when asked what was in the box. Further,
young preschoolers respond that someone else com-
ing into the room later will think that the crayon box
contains candies rather than crayons.
Apperly (2012) makes the argument that although
theory of mind is studied widely in preschoolers,
it’s a mistake to believe that only preschoolers strug-
gle with this concept. Infants, as we’ve just seen,
have some (if incomplete) knowledge about others’
goals; adults show stable individual differences in
their ability to predict others’ motivations and inten-
tions. Thus, theory of mind is not something that a
child “finishes” developing at age 5. However, most
researchers agree that there is rapid development in
theory of mind during the preschool period, and it
seems to correlate with developments in language,
pretend play, symbolic understanding, and inhibitory
control, the ability to maintain focus and resist the
temptation to become distracted (Carlson, Moses &
Claxton, 2004; Lillard & Kavanaugh, 2014; Well-
man, Cross, & Watson, 2001).
17.4 Middle Childhood
One of the more noticeable aspects of cognitive de-
velopment in middle childhood is the growth of the
knowledge base (see Chapter 5, “Knowledge Repre-
sentation and Acquisition” ). School-aged children
in the United States learn an incredible amount of
what adults would consider “basic” information—
vocabulary words; how to read; how to use different
punctuation marks; addition, subtraction, multiplica-
tion, and division facts; historical and geographical
facts; information about certain authors; and infor-
mation about animals, planets, and machines, to take
just a few examples from my children’s elementary
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school’s curriculum. Add to that knowledge of do-
mains that aren’t formally taught in schools—how
to play Minecraft, how to operate an iPhone, or char-
acters from the Magic Tree House or Harry Potter
book series are just a few examples.
With this tremendous acquisition of knowledge
going on, children need to find efficient ways of stor-
ing and representing it. (As an analogy, think about
files on your laptop. It didn’t matter very much what
you called them when you only had a small number,
but when you get up into the thousands of files, how
you organize them might well determine whether
or not you are ever going to find a particular one
again.) How children represent and organize their
knowledge is certainly a matter of active debate and
discussion in the field. Presumably, their knowledge
bases underlie their ability to draw inferences from
examples they see. Like so many other topics in this
chapter, we’ll only have space to cover a couple of
examples.
Kalish, Kim, and Young (2012) reported on three
studies of preschoolers and young school-aged chil-
dren that we will focus on. The task presented chil-
dren with a number of individual examples of a cate-
gory, e.g., small plastic frogs or dinosaurs that were
either yellow or blue. Typically, children would
first see a biconditional relation between color and
species. For example, they might be shown four
yellow dinosaurs and four blue frogs, one at a time.
What makes this relationship biconditional is that
all yellow things are dinosaurs, and all dinosaurs are
yellow.
In a second phase of the task, children were pre-
sented (again, one at a time) with examples some
of which undermined the biconditional relationship.
For example, children might see six yellow frogs
and two yellow dinosaurs. So, after this information
is presented, it is no longer true that all yellow things
are dinosaurs, nor that all frogs are blue. However,
there are conditional relationships that remain true
even after this phase of the task. For example, the
relationship, If an item is a dinosaur, it is yellow
remains true, although it allows for the possibility
of other yellow things, for example, frogs, existing.
Older (seven-year-old) children were able to see
that some conditional relationships (if dinosaur, then
yellow) were true after the second phase of the task
even though the biconditional relationship (all and
only yellow things are dinosaurs) were not. That is,
they were able to revise their beliefs about what rela-
tionships held in light of new evidence. The ability
to make this revision seemed, in contrast, to escape
the five-year-olds.
These results echo ones reported earlier by
Deanna Kuhn (1977) who presented children aged
6-14 with conditional reasoning problems all per-
taining to the fictional land of Tundor. She began
with a pretest disguised as a game where she would
give them one piece of information about Tundor
(e.g., “John is tall, and Bob is short”) and then ask
questions (e.g., “Is Bob tall?”) to which the child
could respond “yes”, “no”, or “maybe.” The pretest
gave examples of questions that could be answered
definitively as well as ones that could not, based on
the given information. Only children who correctly
answered both pretest questions were allowed to
continue.
Next, Kuhn (1977) gave children conditional rea-
soning problems. For example, “All of the people
in Tundor are happy. Jean lives in Tundor. Is Jean
happy?” (The correct, logically valid answer is yes,
and this is considered a fairly easy inference to draw)
or, “All people who live in Tundor own cats. Mike
does not live in Tundor. Does he own a cat?” (Here,
the correct answer is maybe; no logically necessary
inference can be drawn; though even adults make
mistakes on this type of problem). Kuhn found that
even the first graders show some reasoning abil-
ity, particularly on easy problems. Children did
less well on the more difficult problems (the ones
adults make mistakes on), unsurprisingly. In simi-
lar studies, Janveau-Brennan and Markovits (1999)
conclude that children are likely reasoning in ways
fundamentally similar to the way adults reason, at
least by the time they are in middle childhood, and
when they are reasoning with concrete kinds of con-
tent rather than abstract propositions.
17.5 Adolescence
Cognitive developmental psychologists have long
noticed another major change in thinking that oc-
curs right around puberty. Adolescents are much
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more capable than younger children of thinking hy-
pothetically, and about the future; and to be able to
think abstractly versus only with concrete instances
as they were in childhood (Byrnes, 2003; Galotti,
2017). A now-classic study by Daniel Osherson and
Ellen Markman (1975) illustrates this last point very
well.
Children, adolescents, and adults were shown
small plastic poker chips in assorted solid colors,
and were told that the experimenter would be saying
some things about the chips and that they should
indicate after each statement if it was true, if it was
false, or if they “couldn’t tell.” Some of the state-
ments were made about chips held visibly in the
experimenter’s open hand. Other, similar statements
were made about chips hidden in the experimenter’s
closed hand. Among the statements used were logi-
cal tautologies (statements true by definition)—for
example, “Either the chip in my hand is yellow, or
it is not yellow”; logical contradictions (statements
false by definition)—for example, “The chip in my
hand is white, and it is not white”; and statements
that were neither true nor false by definition but de-
pended on the color of the chip (e.g., “The chip in
my hand is not blue and it is green”).
Younger children (those in grades 1, 2, 3 and even
6) had difficulty distinguishing between statements
that were empirically true or false (i.e., true in fact)
and those that were logically true or false (i.e., true
by necessity or definition). They did not respond cor-
rectly to tautologies and contradictions, especially
in the hidden condition. They tended to believe,
for example, that a statement such as “Either the
chip in my hand is red, or it is not red” cannot be
assessed unless the chip is visible. Tenth graders
and adults, in contrast, were much more likely to
respond that even when the chip couldn’t be seen, if
the statement was a tautology or contradiction, the
statement about it could be evaluated on the basis
of the syntactic form of the sentence. Said another
way, adolescents and adults are able to examine the
logical!form of a statement, instead of insisting that
none of the “hidden” statements could be evaluated.
Thinking about the future is also an important
emerging capability in adolescence (Nurmi, 1991).
Being able to project oneself into a future context
requires an ability to think beyond the current set of
circumstances. For example, most sixteen-year-olds
in the United States are high school students who
live with parents or guardians. But as they prepare
for adult life, they have to be able to imagine what
it will be like to live independently, find and keep
a job, decided on whether and what kind of further
education they will seek, among other life-framing
decisions.
This kind of thinking is crucial to what cognitive
developmental theorists call identity development.
This term refers to the development of a mature
sense of who you are and what your goals, values,
and principles are. Lifespan developmental psychol-
ogist Erik Erikson (1968) was the first to highlight
the construction or discovery of identity as a major
developmental task, typically first encountered dur-
ing adolescence. Psychologist James Marcia (1966),
however, is the one credited with operationalizing
this idea and developing measures to study it.
Marcia (1966) saw identity development as pro-
ceeding through two or more phases, and these are
depicted in Figure 17.2. Marcia asserted that iden-
tity status is defined jointly by two factors: whether
or not the person had made a definite choice or com-
mitment (e.g., to a career, to a value system, to a
romantic partner) and whether or not the person had
gone through some sort of “crisis”, or period of ac-
tive doubt and exploration, in making that choice.
A teen in the identity diffused status has not made
any commitments and has not developed a relevant
set of values or principles with which to guide his
goal setting and decision making in a given realm
(e.g., career, education, political philosophy, reli-
gious affiliation). He has not experienced a period
of crisis or doubt but, rather, either is in the early
phase of identity development or is simply drifting
along, with no set plan for the future.
An adolescent in the foreclosure status, in con-
trast, is very committed to a plan and/or to a set
of values and principles. Similar to her identity
diffused colleagues, however, she has never expe-
rienced a crisis or period of doubt. Typically, this
indicates that she has adopted someone else’s goals
and plans, most often those of a parent or another
significant adult figure. Thus, adolescents in this
status tend to have a very narrow vision for their
future—and not much autonomy or power in mak-
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Figure 17.2: Marcias Identity Statuses. Source: Galotti (2017, p. 399).
ing decisions. Students at my college who enter my
office on their very first day of college, announcing
they are “premed” or “prelaw” because both of their
parents are doctors or lawyers and they’ve known
since they were 5 what they’d be, tend to present
rather textbook examples of foreclosure.
The moratorium identity status is often typified by
college students who “want to keep all their options
open.” They are actively exploring different options,
experimenting and trying on for size the possibility
of different majors, different careers, and different
religious or political affiliations. The moratorium
student is usually struggling and not in what others
would call a “stable” state—that is, this individual
is likely to remain in this period for only a brief
period—a year or two (Moshman, 2011). Morato-
rium is a period of delay, in which the individual
knows that a commitment must soon be made but is
not yet ready to make it. Individuals in this status
usually either resolve this crisis in a positive way,
moving into the identity achieved status, or, in less
successful cases, retreat into identity diffusion.
Marcia (1966) held that only individuals who ex-
perienced moratorium could move into the identity
achieved status. The individual here has made one
or more personal commitments, after having strug-
gled to find her or his own path toward that decision.
This student has considered alternative options and
weighed both the pros and the cons. This status is
seen as marking a successful end to adolescent devel-
opment, as a bridge has been built from one’s child-
hood to one’s future adulthood. Accompanying iden-
tity achievement are increases in self-acceptance.
Many theorists find Marcia’s (1966) proposal a
useful analogy for understanding one major realm of
adolescent development (Moshman, 2011). Identity
encompasses an adolescent’s value system as well
as her view of knowledge and herself as a learner
and an agent in the world.
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17.6 Conclusion
Our look at the development of thought has been
brief and selective. I’ve tried to give you some fla-
vor of the changes occurring during the first two
decades of life when it comes to higher-order cogni-
tive processes. We have seen a gradual increase in
knowledge of the world—the inputs used in think-
ing and reasoning and decision making. Although
infants are not without relevant knowledge of the
world, certainly they have much less when compared
with a child in third grade or an adolescent. We’ve
also seen that thinking becomes more abstract, more
flexible, and sometimes even more hypothetical with
increasing levels of cognitive development.
Many questions remain to be resolved. How many
of the changes we’ve described are due to factors
such as biological maturation, say, versus education,
experience, and expertise? Are there periods of rapid
change in thinking, or is the entire process an orderly
and continuous one? How different are the trajec-
tories of thinking for children who grow up in very
different cultures? Are the developmental paths for
thinking general-purpose and broad, or does think-
ing develop differently in different domains? Stay
tuned to the field of cognitive development to find
the answers to these important questions!
Summary
1. The term, thinking, covers a number of cognitive processes that processes information.
Examples include problem solving, reasoning, decision making, goal setting, and planning.
2. Thinking often makes use of two other cognitive realms: language, and the knowledge base.
3. Although Piagetian theory holds that before the age of about two, infants lack capacity for
mental representation and therefore, thought, recent work poses a strong challenge to this
tenet. Psychologist Renee Baillageron and her colleagues have shown that even three- to
six-month-old infants have expectations about the way objects behave, indicating they already
have some knowledge and some rudimentary reasoning abilities.
4. Preschoolers show an ability to draw deductive inferences under certain conditions. These
abilities are fragile, but present.
5. Preschoolers develop an elaborate theory of mind during the ages from two to five, learning to
understand and predict what beliefs, expectations, emotions, and preferences another person
might hold.
6. Children’s inferential reasoning begins to look very similar to that of adults when the infer-
ences involve concrete examples.
7. Adolescents are much more capable than younger children of thinking hypothetically, about
the future, and abstractly. This enriched ability is critical to another task of adolescence,
developing an identity, a mature sense of who you are and what your goals, values, and
principles are.
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Review Questions
1. Explain what the “core knowledge” approach to infant cognition is, and describe how it
challenges Piagetian theory.
2. What does it mean to say that reasoning abilities are pretty fragile in preschoolers, and become
more robust with development?
3. Describe a typical theory of mind task, and what the results indicate about preschoolers’ ability
to think about other people.
4. Why is the question of how knowledge is stored and structured so important for understanding
the development of the ability to draw inferences?
5. Cognitively speaking, what happens in adolescence? How do these changes impact different




My research program is centered around the question, how do ordinary people
facing important decisions go about the process of choosing an option? I’ve
studied adults choosing a first-grade program for their children; pregnant
women choosing birthing options; college students choosing majors, courses,
housing, and summer plans, to name just a few. Here, I’ll focus on the
studies of college students choosing a major (Galotti, 1999; Galotti, Ciner,
Altenbaumer, Geerts, Rupp, & Woulfe, 2006; Galotti, Wiener & Tandler
2014).
Many of these studies were longitudinal in design—meaning that we asked
the same people about their decision-making process at two or more different
points in time, in order to study changes over time. At each point, we
asked students to describe the options they were actively considering (e.g.,
Psychology, Computer Science, English) as well as the criteria they were
using to decide among options (e.g., How many requirements are there? Do
I like the profs who teach the classes? Are there labs? Will it help get me into med school?). We
also asked students to assess their emotional reactions to the decision-making process (e.g., How
stressful was it? How comfortable with the process were they?).
Across studies, college students considered about 4-5 options and about 5-7 criteria. As the final
decision drew near, students were likely to reduce the number of options under consideration (from
about 4-5 to about 3-4), but not the number of criteria they were using. When we looked at whether
or not the same options or criteria were being used at different points in time, the answer was that
about half of the options and half of the criteria were different. Students generally reported that this
decision was moderately stressful and difficult, and that it was guided by their overall values, with
an emphasis on the future. Some work suggests, however, that the way students approach a specific
decision is largely a function of what that decision is about. The implication here is that people
approach different decisions has at least as much to do with the specifics of a particular decision as
it does with the characteristics of the decision maker.
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Glossary
decision making The cognitive process(es) by
which an individual selects one course of ac-
tion from among alternatives. 327
goal setting The cognitive process(es) by which
an individual identifies achievements wanted
sometime in the future. 328
identity development The formation of a reflec-
tive concept of the self, used to define who
one is and what one’s goals, values, and prin-
ciples are. 334
knowledge base Stored information including all
general knowledge possessed by an individual.
327, 328
language A system of communication that is gov-
erned by a system of rules (a grammar) that
allows an infinite number of ideas to be ex-
pressed. 328
mental representation An internal depiction of
information. 328
planning Devising and coordinating actions aimed
at achieving a goal and at monitoring the ef-
fectiveness of the actions for reaching the goal.
328
problem solving The cognitive process(es) used
in transforming starting information into goal
state, using specified means of solution. 327
reasoning The cognitive processes used in drawing
inferences from given information to generate
conclusions. 327
theory of mind An understanding of what another
person might be thinking, feeling, believing,
or expecting or what her reaction might be to
a specific set of circumstances. 331
thinking The cognitive process(es) used in trans-
forming or manipulating information. 327
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Affect and Thought: The Relationship Between
Feeling and Thinking
JOSEPH FORGAS
University of New South Wales
Since time immemorial, philosophers, writers, and
artists have wondered about the intricate relationship
between feeling and thinking, affect and cognition.
Humans are certainly an emotional species. Our feel-
ings seem to influence and color everything we think
and do (Zajonc, 2000), in ways that we do not yet
fully understand. Philosophers such as Blaise Pascal
put it very succinctly: ‘The heart has its reasons
that reason does not understand’. Yet apart from
some early exceptions (e.g., Rapaport, 1942/1961;
Razran, 1940), focused empirical research on the
links between affect and cognition has been slow
to emerge. One possible reason is the widespread
assumption in Western philosophy that affect is an
inferior and more primitive faculty of human beings
compared to rational thinking, an idea that can be
traced all the way to Plato (Adolphs & Damasio,
2001; Hilgard, 1980; see also Chapter 2, “History
of the Field of the Psychology of Human Thought”).
Affective states indeed have some unique proper-
ties. They often have broad non-specific effects on
thinking and behavior, can occur spontaneously and
often subliminally, they are difficult to control, and
they are linked to powerful and sometimes visible
bodily reactions. Most importantly, affective states
have an invasive quality, influencing our thoughts
and behaviors (Dolan, 2002; James, 1890).
Yet, of the two major paradigms that domi-
nated the brief history of our discipline (behavior-
ism and cognitivism), neither assigned great im-
portance to the study of the functions of affec-
tive states, such as moods and emotions. Radi-
cal behaviorists considered all unobservable men-
tal events (including affect) as irrelevant to scien-
tific psychology. The emerging cognitive paradigm
in the 1960s largely focused on the study of
cold and rational mental processes, and initially
also had little interest in the study of affect.
Thus, understanding the delicate interplay be-
tween feeling and thinking still remains one of
the greatest puzzles about human nature (Koestler,
1967/1990). It was only in the last few decades
that researchers started to focus on how moods
and emotions influence how people think and be-
have.
This chapter reviews what we now know about
the multiple roles that affective states play in influ-
encing both the content (what we think) and the
process (how we think) of cognition. After a brief
introduction looking at some early work and theories
linking affect and cognition, the chapter is divided
into two main sections. First, research on affective
influences on the content of thinking is reviewed,
focusing especially on how positive and negative
affective states preferentially produce positive and
negative thoughts, a pattern of thinking called af-
fect congruence. The second section of the chapter
surveys evidence for the processing effects of affect,
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documenting how affect influences the quality of
our information processing strategies.
For the purposes of our discussion, affect is used
as a generic term to encompass two distinct kinds of
feeling states. Moods may be defined as “relatively
low-intensity, diffuse, subconscious, and enduring
affective states that have no salient antecedent cause
and therefore little cognitive content” (Forgas, 2006,
pp. 6–7). Distinct emotions in contrast are more
intense, conscious, and short-lived affective experi-
ences (e.g., fear, anger, or disgust). Moods tend to
have relatively uniform and reliable cognitive con-
sequences, and much of the research we deal with
looks at the cognitive consequences of moods. Emo-
tions such as anger, fear, or disgust tend to have
more context and situation-dependent effects that
are less uniform (e.g., Unkelbach, Forgas, & Denson,
2008).
Early Evidence Linking Affect and
Cognition
Although radical behaviorists showed little inter-
est in affect, Watson’s classic conditioning research
with Little Albert is an early demonstration of af-
fect congruence in judgments—when negative af-
fect produces negative reactions (Watson & Rayner,
1920). These studies showed that reactions to an
initially neutral stimulus, such as a furry rabbit, be-
came more negative after participants experienced
unexpected negative affect, elicited by a sudden loud
noise. Watson—incorrectly, as it turns out—thought
that most complex affective reactions are acquired in
a similar way throughout life as a result of ever-more
complex and subtle layers of stimulus associations.
In a later study linking affect and thought, Razran
(1940) found that people responded to sociopoliti-
cal messages more favorably when they were in a
positive affective state (just received a free lunch!)
rather than in a bad affective state (being exposed
to aversive smells). Politicians seem to instinctively
know this, using positive affect manipulations (up-
beat music, free food and drinks, etc.) to improve
the likely acceptance of their messages.
In a subsequent psychoanalytically oriented study,
Feshbach and Singer (1957) induced negative affect
using electric shocks and then instructed subjects
to suppress their fear. Fear produced more nega-
tive evaluations of another person just encountered,
and ironically, this effect became even greater when
judges were actively trying to suppress their fear.
This paradox pattern was interpreted as consistent
with the psychodynamic mechanism of suppression
and projection, suggesting that “suppression of fear
facilitates the tendency to project fear onto another
social object” (Feshbach & Singer, 1957, p.286).
Subsequently, Byrne and Clore (1970) returned
to a classical-conditioning approach to explore how
affective states can color thinking and judgments.
They placed participants into pleasant or unpleasant
environments (the unconditioned stimuli) to elicit
good or bad moods (the unconditioned response),
and then assessed their evaluations of a person they
just met (the conditioned stimulus; Gouaux, 1971;
Griffitt, 1970). As expected, manipulated positive
affect reliably produced more favorable judgments
than did negative affect. These early studies, al-
though based on very different theoretical models
(psychoanalysis, behaviorism, etc.), produced con-
vergent evidence demonstrating an affect congruent
bias in thinking.
18.1 Affect Congruence: Affective
Influences on the Content of
Thinking
In the studies described above, positive affect pro-
duced more positive thoughts and negative affect
produced more negative thoughts. Interest in this
pattern of affect congruence re-emerged in the last
few decades. Investigators now wanted to under-
stand the information-processing mechanisms that
can explain how affect can come to infuse the con-
tent and valence (positivity or negativity) of cog-
nition. Three convergent theories accounting for
affect congruence have been proposed: (1) asso-
ciative network theories emphasizing underlying
memory processes (Bower, 1981; 1991), (2) affect-
as-information theory relying on inferential pro-
cesses (Clore & Storbeck, 2006; Schwarz & Clore,
1983), and (3) an integrative Affect Infusion Model
(AIM; Forgas, 1995, 2006), a theory that seeks to ex-
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plain how different thinking strategies can increase
or decrease the extent of affect infusion.
18.1.1 A Memory Effect? The
Associative Network
Explanation
The first cognitive model to explain affect congru-
ence suggested that affective states influence cog-
nition because affect is linked to memory within
a shared associative network of memory represen-
tations (Bower, 1981). When an affective state is
experienced, for whatever reason, that affect may
automatically prime or activate units of knowledge
or memories previously associated with the same
affective state. Such affectively primed constructs
are then more likely to be primed or activated, and
used in subsequent constructive cognitive tasks. For
example, Bower (1981) found that happy or sad peo-
ple were more likely to remember details from their
childhood and also remembered more events that
occurred in the past few weeks that happened to
match their current affective state. Similar affect
congruence was also demonstrated in how people
interpreted their own and others’ observed social
behaviors. When happy or sad participants viewed
the same videotape of an encounter, judges in a pos-
itive affective state saw significantly more skilled,
positive behaviors both in themselves and in other
people, while those in a negative mood interpreted
the same observed behaviors more negatively (For-
gas, Bower, & Krantz, 1984).
Further research showed that affect congruence
is subject to some limiting conditions (see Blaney,
1986; Bower & Mayer, 1989). Affect-congruence
seems most robust (a) when the affective state is
clear, strong, and meaningful, (b) the cognitive task
is self-referential, and (c) when more open, elabo-
rate, and constructive thinking is used (Blaney, 1986;
Bower, 1991; Bower & Mayer, 1989). In general,
quick, easy, familiar and regularly performed tasks
are less likely to show affect congruence. In contrast,
cognitive tasks that call for more constructive, open-
ended thinking (such as judgments, associations,
inferences, impression formation, and planning be-
haviors) are most likely to show an affect-congruent
pattern (e.g., Bower, 1991; Fiedler, 2002; Forgas,
1995; Mayer, Gaschke, Braverman, & Evans, 1992).
This occurs because more open, elaborate process-
ing increases the opportunities for affectively primed
memories and associations to be retrieved and incor-
porated into a newly constructed response (Forgas,
1995; 2006).
18.1.2 Affect as a Heuristic? The
Affect-As-Information Theory
Following Bower’s (1981) work, an alternative the-
ory sought to explain affect congruence by propos-
ing that instead of computing a judgment on the
basis of recalled features of a target, individuals may
“ask themselves: ’how do I feel about it?’ [and] in
doing so, they may mistake feelings due to a pre-
existing state as a reaction to the target” (Schwarz,
1990, p. 529; see also Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Clore
& Storbeck, 2006). In other words, rather than prop-
erly constructing a response, the pre-existing affec-
tive state is used as a heuristic shortcut indicating
their reaction to a target. For example, affect inci-
dentally induced by good or bad weather was found
to influence evaluative judgments on a variety of
unexpected and unfamiliar questions in a telephone
interview (Schwarz & Clore, 1983). In a similar
situation, we also found affect congruence in survey
responses of almost 1000 subjects who completed a
questionnaire after they had just seen funny or sad
films at the cinema (Forgas, 1995).
The affect-as-information model is closely based
on related research showing that people often rely
on various shortcuts in their judgments. The model
is also related to earlier conditioning models that
predicted a blind, unconscious connection between
affect and coincidental responses (Byrne & Clore,
1970). This kind of affective influence is far less
likely to explain affective influences on more com-
plex cognitive tasks, involving memory and associa-
tions where more elaborate computation is required.
Affect as a simple, direct source of evaluation seems
most likely when “the task is of little personal rel-
evance, when little other information is available,
when problems are too complex to be solved system-
atically, and when time or attentional resources are
limited” (Fiedler, 2001, p. 175), as in the casual sur-
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vey situations studied by Schwarz and Clore (1983),
and also in the study showing affective influences
on responses to a street interview after seeing happy
or sad movies by Forgas (1995). In most realistic
situations when people need to think constructively
about new, unfamiliar and complex problems, mood-
congruent associations in memory offer a more plau-
sible explanation for affect congruence than simply
using affect as a heuristic cue.
18.1.3 Putting it all Together: The
Affect Infusion Model (AIM)
The research reviewed so far suggests that the occur-
rence of affect congruence in thinking (more positive
thoughts in positive mood, more negative thoughts
in negative mood) very much depends on how a
particular cognitive task is processed. The Affect
Infusion Model (AIM; Forgas, 1995; 2006) relies on
this principle to explain the presence or absence of
affect congruence in different situations. The AIM
identifies four alternative processing strategies that
vary in terms of (a) their openness (how much new
information needs to be accessed), and (b) the de-
gree of effort used in processing a cognitive task.
The first, direct-access strategy involves the simple
and direct retrieval of a pre-existing response, likely
to be used when a task is familiar and of low rel-
evance, producing no affect infusion (for example,
if somebody asked your opinion about a familiar
target, like President Trump, and you already have a
well-defined and stored judgment, simply reproduc-
ing this judgment requires no constructive thinking
and will not be influenced by how you are feeling
at the time). (2) Motivated processing occurs when
thinking is dominated by a specific motivational ob-
jective requiring highly targeted and selective infor-
mation search and processing strategies that inhibit
open, constructive thinking (e.g., when trying hard
to make a good impression at a job interview, this
objective will dominate your responses, and your
affective state will not have much of an affect con-
gruent influence) (Clark & Isen, 1982; Sedikides,
1994).
(3) The third, heuristic processing strategy (us-
ing whatever easy shortcuts are available) involves
low-effort processing used when time, involvement
and processing resources are limited (e.g., in the
telephone and street survey situations studied by
Schwarz & Clore, 1983, and in Forgas, 1995).
Heuristic processing only results in affect congru-
ence when affect can be used as a convenient short-
cut to infer a reaction (Schwarz & Clore, 1983; see
also Clore & Storbeck, 2006). (4) Only the fourth
processing style, substantive processing, involves
constructive and effortful thinking. This kind of
thinking should be used when the task is new and
relevant and there are adequate processing resources
available (for example, trying to form a judgment
about a new person you are likely to see a lot of
in the future). Substantive processing should pro-
duce affect congruence because it increases the like-
lihood of incorporating affectively primed thoughts
and memories in constructing a response (Forgas,
1994; 1999). In summary, the AIM explains how
four different processing strategies may promote
or inhibit affect congruence in thinking and judg-
ments (Fiedler, 2001; Forgas, 1995). One interest-
ing and counter-intuitive prediction of this model
is that sometimes, more extensive and elaborate
thinking may actually increase affective distortions
in judgments by increasing the likelihood that af-
fectively primed information will be used (Forgas,
1992; Sedikides, 1995). Such a paradoxical pattern
has now been found in a range of studies, as we will
see below.
18.1.4 Affect Congruence in Memory
Affect plays a key role in memory. The events
we remember are almost always marked out for
special attention by their affective quality (Dolan,
2002). And by definition, only the things we actu-
ally remember—the available contents of memory—
can be used for thinking. Considerable research
now shows that affect indeed does have a signifi-
cant influence on what we remember. People are
consistently better at remembering memories that
are either consistent with their current affective state
(affect congruence), or have been experienced in
a similar, matching rather than dissimilar affective
state (affect-state dependent memory).
Several studies found that people are better at re-
trieving both early and recent autobiographical mem-
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ories that match their current mood (Bower, 1981;
Miranda & Kihlstrom, 2005). Depressed people
also selectively remember negative experiences and
negative information (Direnfeld & Roberts, 2006).
This pattern is also confirmed with implicit tests
of memory when happy or sad subjects are asked
to complete a few letters to make a word that first
comes to mind (e.g., can- may be completed into
words like cancer or candy; Ruiz-Caballero & Gon-
zalez, 1994). It turns out that happy people reliably
come up with more positive, and sad people with
more negative words in such a task. We found that
happy or sad participants also selectively remem-
bered more positive and negative details respectively
about the good or bad characteristics of people they
had read about (Forgas & Bower, 1987). This pattern
was also confirmed in a study by Eich, Macaulay,
and Ryan (1994), who asked happy or sad students
to remember 16 specific episodes from their past.
There was a clear affect congruent pattern in what
they recalled.
These affect-congruent memory effects occur
because an affective state can selectively activate
affect-congruent information (Bower, 1981). Peo-
ple will actually spend longer reading and encoding
affect-congruent material into a richer pre-activated
network of affect-congruent memory associations.
Not surprisingly, they are also better in remember-
ing such information later on (see Bower, 1991).
Affect may also direct selective attention to affect-
congruent information when it is first encountered.
For example, affect influences participants’ atten-
tional filter, focusing attention on faces that showed
affect-congruent rather than incongruent expressions
(Becker & Leinenger, 2011). Positive affect can
also produce a marked attentional bias toward pos-
itive, rewarding words (Tamir & Robinson, 2007),
and greater attention to positive images (Wadlinger
& Isaacowitz, 2006). In contrast, depressed peo-
ple pay selectively greater attention to negative in-
formation (Koster, De Raedt, Goeleven, Franck,
& Crombez, 2005), negative facial expressions
(Gilboa-Schechtman, Erhard-Weiss, & Jecemien,
2002), and negative behaviors (Forgas et al., 1984).
Such an affect-congruent bias has its dangers, be-
cause through selective attention to negative events,
negative affect may easily spiral into a state of endur-
ing depression. Fortunately, with non-clinical sub-
jects, this spiral is rare as sad people automatically
escape the vicious circle of negativity by automati-
cally switching to an affect-incongruent processing
strategy after a while. For example, after initially
retrieving negative memories, non-depressed partici-
pants in a negative mood spontaneously shifted to
retrieving positive memories as if to lift their mood
(Josephson, Singer, & Salovey, 1996).
18.1.5 Affect-state Dependence in
Memory
Affective states also impact on memory by selec-
tively facilitating the retrieval of information that has
been learnt in a matching rather than a non-matching
affective state. Such affect-state dependent mem-
ory is a special case of state dependence. We all
remember information better when the same state
is reinstated in which the event was first encoun-
tered. For example, a list of words learnt when you
were feeling happy is more likely to be remembered
when you feel happy again rather than sad at the
time of retrieval (Bower, 1981). In extreme cases of
state dependency, serious memory deficits can also
occur in patients with alcoholic blackout, chronic de-
pression, dissociative identity and other psychiatric
disorders (Goodwin, 1974; Reus, Weingartner, &
Post, 1979). Bipolar patients with intense affective
fluctuations also show a marked pattern of affect-
state dependence in remembering (Eich, Macaulay,
& Lam, 1997).
Affect-state dependence is a rather subtle effect
(Bower & Mayer, 1989; Kihlstrom, 1989), and is
most likely to be found when the task requires open
and constructive processing. Accordingly, affect-
state dependence is more likely in constructive free
recall tasks rather than in recognition tasks (Eich,
1995; Bower & Mayer, 1989), and more robust when
the recalled events are self-relevant and the encod-
ing and retrieval affect are distinctive, well matched
and salient (Eich, 1995; Eich & Macauley, 2000;
Ucros, 1989). There are also important individual
differences between people in their susceptibility
to affect congruence and state-dependent memory
(Bower, 1991; Smith & Petty, 1995).
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18.1.6 Affect Infusion in Associations
and Judgments
The increased availability of affect-related informa-
tion in memory should also have a marked influence
on the kinds of associations and inferences people
make, and subsequently, of how complex or am-
biguous social information is interpreted. Bower
(1981) found that after receiving a mood induction,
people generated more mood-congruent ideas when
daydreaming or free associating to ambiguous TAT
pictures. Happy people also generated more posi-
tive than negative associations to words such as life
(e.g., love and freedom vs. struggle and death) than
did sad subjects. The selective priming and greater
availability of affect-congruent ideas in memory can
ultimately also influence complex social judgments,
as judges also tend to rely on their most available,
affect-consistent thoughts when making an interpre-
tation of complex and ambiguous stimuli. For ex-
ample, after an affect induction, judges made signif-
icantly more affect-congruent judgments when eval-
uating faces (Forgas, 2013; Gilboa-Schechtman et
al., 2002), and they also form more affect-consistent
impressions about others as well as themselves (For-
gas et al., 1984; Forgas & Bower, 1987; Sedikides,
1995).
Paradoxically, affective influences on judgments
tend to be greater when the targets require more
constructive and elaborate processing because they
are more complex and atypical (e.g., Forgas, 1992;
1995). Several studies found that the more people
needed to think in order to compute a difficult and
complex judgment, the greater the likelihood that
their affectively primed ideas influenced the out-
come. In one experiment, participants were asked to
form impressions about characters who had either
typical and predictable features (eg. typical medical
students), or were atypical and complex (eg. a medi-
cal student who is also a hippy; Forgas, 1992). Af-
fect had a significantly greater impact when judges
had to form impressions of such complex, atypical
characters (Figure 18.1).
These judgmental effects can be quite robust, even
influencing judgments about very well-known peo-
ple, such as a person’s real-life partners. Forgas
(1994) in one experiment showed that temporary
affective state significantly influenced judgments
about one’s partner as well as real, recurring rela-
tionship conflicts. Ironically, affective influences
were stronger when judgments about more complex,
difficult relationship situations required longer and
more constructive processing. In other words, the
more one needs to think about a judgmental task,
Figure 18.1: Affect-congruence in judgments is magnified when the target is complex and unusual and so requires more constructive
and extensive processing (after Forgas, 1992).
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the more likely that one’s prevailing affective state
will come to bias the outcome. Some personality
characteristics, such as high trait anxiety, may inter-
fere with these effects, as highly anxious people are
often less likely to process information in an open,
constructive manner.
18.1.7 Affect and Self-Perception
Can fluctuating affective state also bias how we
think about ourselves? It turns out that the answer
is ‘yes’ (Sedikides, 1995). For example, students
in a positive affective state are more likely to claim
credit for their success in a recent exam, but are less
likely to blame themselves for failure (in Forgas,
1995). These findings were replicated in a study by
Detweiler-Bedell and Detweiler-Bedell (2006), who
concluded that consistent with the AIM, “construc-
tive processing accompanying most self-judgments
is critical in producing mood-congruent perceptions
of personal success” (p. 196). Sedikides (1995) fur-
ther found that central, well-established ideas about
ourselves tend to be processed more automatically
and less constructively and thus are less likely to
be influenced by how we happen to feel at the time.
In contrast, judgments about more “peripheral” and
vague self-conceptions require more substantive pro-
cessing and are more influenced by a person’s af-
fective state. Long-term, enduring individual differ-
ences in self-esteem also play a role, as high self-
esteem people are less influenced by their temporary
affective state when judging themselves (Smith &
Petty, 1995). Low self-esteem judges in turn have a
less clearly defined and less stable self-concept and
are more influenced by their fluctuating affective
states (Brown & Mankowski, 1993).
These results are consistent with the Affect In-
fusion Model described previously (Forgas, 1995),
and show that affectively primed thoughts and asso-
ciations are more likely to influence associations and
judgments when more extensive, open and construc-
tive processing is required. Other work suggests that
affect congruence in self-judgments may eventually
be spontaneously corrected as people shift to a more
targeted, motivated thinking style, reversing the ini-
tial affect-congruent pattern (Sedikides, 1994).
18.1.8 Affect Congruence in Social
Behaviors
As we have seen, affective states often influence
what people think. Because planning strategic social
behaviors necessarily requires some degree of con-
structive, open information processing in calculating
what to do (Heider, 1958), affect should ultimately
also influence how people actually behave in social
situations. Positive affective states, by activating
more positive evaluations and inferences, should
elicit more optimistic, positive, confident, and coop-
erative behaviors. In contrast, negative mood may
produce more avoidant, defensive, and unfriendly
behaviors. In one experiment, positive and negative
affective states were induced in people (by showing
them happy and sad films) before they engaged in a
complex, strategic negotiation task (Forgas, 1998a).
Those in a positive affective state employed more
trusting, optimistic, and cooperative and less com-
petitive negotiating strategies, and actually achieved
better outcomes. Those in a negative mood were
more pessimistic, competitive and ultimately, less
successful in their negotiating moves (Figure 18.2).
Other kinds of social behaviors, for example, the
way people chose their words when formulating a
request, are also significantly influenced by how the
person feels at the time (Forgas, 1999). Individu-
als in a negative affective state tend to make more
pessimistic implicit inferences about the likely suc-
cess of their requests, and so they use more polite,
elaborate and cautious request forms. Positive affect
has the opposite effect: it increases optimism and re-
sults in more confident and less elaborate and polite
request formulations
Affect also has an impact on how people respond
to an unexpected real-life request. In a realistic field
study, students in a library were induced in a pos-
itive or negative affective state by finding folders
on their desks containing affect inducing pictures
and text (Forgas, 1998b). Soon afterwards they re-
ceived an unexpected polite or impolite request from
a passing student (actually, a confederate) asking for
some stationery needed to complete an essay. There
was a marked affect-congruent pattern. Negative
mood resulted in more critical, negative evaluations
of the request and requester, and reduced compli-
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ance, but positive mood yielded a more positive
evaluation and greater willingness to help. These
effects were even stronger when the request was
more unexpected and impolite and so required more
substantive processing.
Affect infusion can be particularly important
when performing complex strategic social behav-
iors such as self-disclosure that plays a critical role
in the development and maintenance of intimate rela-
tionships. By facilitating access to affect-congruent
memories and associations, people in a positive af-
fective state disclose more positive, intimate, var-
ied, and abstract information about themselves (For-
gas, 2011). Negative affect has exactly the oppo-
site effect, resulting in less open and positive self-
disclosure. Studies such as these provide conver-
gent evidence that temporary fluctuations in affec-
tive state can result in marked changes not only in
thinking (memory, associations and judgments), but
also in actual social behaviors. In other words, our
affective states play an important informational func-
tion in thinking and responding to the social world.
These effects are most marked when an open, con-
structive processing style is adopted (Forgas, 1995;
2006) that increases the scope for affectively primed
information to become activated and used (Bower,
1981).
18.2 Affective Influences on Thinking
Strategies
The evidence surveyed so far clearly shows that af-
fect has a marked informational influence on the
valence and content of our thinking, resulting in
affect-congruent effects on memory, attention, asso-
ciations, judgments and social behaviors. Affect also
has a second effect on cognition, influencing how
people think, that is, the process of cognition. This
section will look at evidence for the information-
processing consequences of affect. Early studies
suggested that people in a positive affective state
tend to think in a more superficial and less effortful
way. Those feeling good made up their minds more
quickly, used less information, tended to avoid more
effortful and systematic thinking, yet, ironically, also
appeared more confident about their decisions. Neg-
ative affect, in contrast, seemed to produce a more
effortful, systematic, analytic and vigilant process-
ing style (Clark & Isen, 1982; Isen, 1984; Schwarz,
1990). Positive affect can also produce distinct pro-
cessing advantages as happy people tend to adopt
a more creative, open, and inclusive thinking style,
use broader cognitive categories, show greater men-
tal flexibility, and perform better on secondary tasks
(Bless & Fiedler, 2006; Fiedler, 2001; Frederickson,
2009).
Figure 18.2: Affect-congruent influences on negotiating strategies: positive affect promotes cooperation and making deals, negative
affect promotes competition (After Forgas, 1998a).
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18.2.1 Linking Affect to Processing
Style
How can we explain such affectively induced pro-
cessing differences? Early theories emphasized mo-
tivational factors. According to the mood mainte-
nance/mood repair hypothesis, positive affect may
motivate people to maintain this pleasant state by
avoiding effortful activity such as elaborate think-
ing. In contrast, negative affect is aversive, and
should motivate people to shift to a more vigilant,
effortful information processing style as a useful
strategy to improve their affect (Clark & Isen, 1982;
Isen, 1984). A somewhat similar cognitive tuning
account (Schwarz, 1990) proposed that affective
states have a fundamental signaling/tuning function,
automatically informing us about the level of vigi-
lance and processing effort required in a given situa-
tion. Thus affective states have important adaptive
and motivational functions, consistent with a func-
tionalist/evolutionary view of affect (Dolan, 2002).
However, this view has been challenged by some
experiments demonstrating that positive mood does
not always reduce processing effort, as performance
on simultaneously presented secondary tasks is not
necessarily impaired (e.g., Fiedler, 2001).
An integrative theory by Bless and Fiedler’s
(2006) suggests that the fundamental, evolutionary
significance of affect is not simply to regulate pro-
cessing effort, but rather to trigger equally effortful
but qualitatively different processing styles. The
model identifies two complementary adaptive func-
tions, assimilation and accommodation, triggered
by positive and negative affect, respectively (cf. Pi-
aget, 1954). Assimilation means using existing in-
ternal knowledge to understand the world, whereas
accommodation requires greater attention to new,
external information to modify internal representa-
tions (Bless & Fiedler, 2006; p. 66; Piaget, 1954; see
also Chapter 10, “Decision Making”, on dual pro-
cess theories in psychology). Positive affect signals
safety and familiarity, so that existing knowledge
can be relied upon. In contrast, negative affect func-
tions as a mild alert signal, triggering more careful
and accommodative processing. This processing di-
chotomy bears more than a passing resemblance to
Kahneman’s (2011) distinction between System 1
and System 2 thinking. In important ways, it ap-
pears that positive affect promotes faster, simpler,
and more heuristic and creative thinking, while neg-
ative affect produces a slower, more systematic and
more analytic thinking style.
Several experiments show that positive affect in-
deed promotes more assimilative and abstract lan-
guage representations, the use of fewer and broader
cognitive categories, and greater focus on the global
rather than the local features of a target (Forgas,
2006; Frederickson, 2009; Gasper & Clore, 2002;
Isen, 1984; Koch, Forgas, & Matovic, 2013). Fur-
ther, positive affect increases, and negative affect
decreases people’s tendency to rely on their pre-
existing internal knowledge in cognitive tasks, and
improves memory for self-generated information
(Fiedler, Nickel, Asbeck, & Pagel, 2003). Thus, both
positive and negative affect can confer processing
advantages, albeit in response to different situations.
In contrast to the dominant hedonic emphasis on the
benefits of positive affect in our culture, an impor-
tant implication of this model is that positive affect
is not always advantageous, and negative affect can
often produce distinct processing advantages, as the
experiments to be reviewed next will show.
18.2.2 Can Negative Affect Improve
Cognitive Performance?
As negative affect promotes more accommodative,
externally focused processing, this should improve
memory as well. In one field experiment, happy or
sad shoppers (on sunny or rainy days, respectively)
saw a variety of unusual small objects displayed
in a local shop (Forgas, Goldenberg, & Unkelbach,
2009). Their affective state (induced by good or
bad weather on that day) had a significant effect on
memory. Those in a negative mood (on rainy days)
had significantly better memory for the details of
what they saw in the shop than did happy people (on
sunny days; Figure 18.3). Laboratory experiments
confirmed this pattern, as memory for the details of
essays read was also significantly better in a nega-
tive compared to a positive affective state (Forgas,
2013).
Negative affect can also improve recall and re-
duce errors in eyewitness memory (Forgas, Vargas,
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& Laham, 2005). In one experiment using a real-life
incident, students witnessed a staged aggressive en-
counter during a lecture (Forgas et al., 2005, Exp. 2).
A week later, while induced into a positive or neg-
ative affective state, witnesses received questions
about the incident that included false, misleading
information. Happy affect increased the tendency
to assimilate these false details into memory, but
negative affect eliminated this source of error in
eye-witness reports. Conceptually similar results
were reported by Clore and Storbeck (2006), who
also found that individuals in a negative mood were
significantly less likely to show false memory ef-
fects than those in positive moods, consistent with
negative affect promoting more attentive and ac-
commodative thinking. Paradoxically, even though
happy affect reduced eye-witness accuracy, it in-
creased eye-witness confidence, suggesting that wit-
nesses had no real internal awareness of the process-
ing consequences of their affective states.
18.2.3 Affective Influences on
Judgmental Accuracy
Many common judgmental errors occur in everyday
life because people are imperfect and often inatten-
tive information processors (Kahneman, 2011). For
example, the fundamental attribution error (FAE) or
correspondence bias refers to the pervasive tendency
by people to attribute intentionality and internal cau-
sation to an actor and underestimate external, situ-
ational constraints (Gilbert & Malone, 1995). This
happens because people focus on the most salient
information, the actor, and ignore peripheral cues.
As negative mood promotes more attentive, detail-
oriented processing, it should reduce the incidence
of this common judgmental bias. This was con-
firmed in one experiment (in Forgas, 2013) where
happy or sad subjects were asked to judge the atti-
tudes of the writer of an essay that was either freely
chosen, or was assigned to them. Happy persons
were more likely and sad people were less likely
to commit the fundamental attribution error by in-
correctly attributing internal causation based on a
coerced essay. Memory data confirmed that those
in a negative affective state also remembered more
details, consistent with accommodative processing.
Many judgmental inaccuracies are due to humans’
excessive reliance on using judgmental shortcuts or
heuristics (Kahneman, 2011). It seems that positive
affect may increase, and negative affect reduce such
judgmental biases when forming impressions. One
relevant example is primacy effects, when early in-
formation about a person dominates our subsequent
Figure 18.3: Mean number of target items seen in a shop correctly remembered as a function of affective state (happy vs. sad) induced
by good or bad weather (after Forgas, Goldenberg & Unkelbach, 2009).
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impressions. In one experiment, participants formed
impressions about a character (Jim) described in
two paragraphs in either an introvert–extrovert or an
extrovert–introvert sequence (Forgas, 2011). Subse-
quent impression-formation judgments showed that
positive affect significantly increased reliance on
heuristic primacy cues (relying on whatever infor-
mation came first; Figure 18.4). In contrast, neg-
ative mood, by recruiting a more accommodative,
System 2 processing style, almost eliminated the
usual primacy effect. We should note, however,
that negative affect can only improve judgmental
accuracy when relevant stimulus information is actu-
ally available. Ambady and Gray (2002) found that
in the absence of diagnostic details, “sadness im-
pairs [judgmental] accuracy precisely by promoting
a more deliberative information processing style”
(p. 947).
18.2.4 Affective Influences on
Stereotyping
Positive affect, by promoting assimilative thinking
and the use of pre-existing knowledge in judgments,
may also promote stereotyping. For example, Bo-
denhausen, Kramer, and Süsser (1994) found that
happy participants relied more on ethnic stereotypes
when evaluating a student accused of misconduct,
whereas negative mood reduced this tendency. Gen-
erally speaking, negative affect tends to promote
greater attention to specific, individuating informa-
tion when forming impressions of other people (For-
gas, 2013). Similar effects were demonstrated in
an experiment where happy or sad subjects had to
form impressions about the quality of a brief philo-
sophical essay allegedly written by a middle-aged
male academic (stereotypical author) or by a young,
alternative-looking female writer (atypical author).
Once again, results showed that positive affect in-
creased the judges’ tendency to be influenced by
irrelevant stereotypical information about the age
and gender of the author. In contrast, negative affect
eliminated this judgmental bias (in Forgas, 2013).
Relying on stereotyped expectations can ulti-
mately also impact on behaviors. We tested this
prediction using the ‘shooters bias’ paradigm assess-
ing subliminal aggressive tendencies, where happy
or sad people had to make rapid on-line decisions
about whether to shoot at rapidly presented video-
taped targets who did or did not appear to be holding
a weapon (Correll et al., 2007). US subjects often
display a strong implicit bias on this task and shoot
more at Black rather than White targets (Correll et
al., 2007). In our study we manipulated the im-
Figure 18.4: Primacy effects on impressions formation are increased by positive affect, and eliminated by negative affect: Judges
perceive the target person as more extroverted when the extroverted description comes first, and this primacy effect is
strongest in a positive rather than negative mood (vertical axis = extraversion judgments; differences between the columns
indicate the size of the primacy effect; after Forgas, 2011).
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ages so that some targets appeared to be Muslims,
wearing a turban, while in the control condition the
same person was shown without a turban.. In this
case, we found a strong “turban effect”, that is, Mus-
lim targets elicited more aggression. Yet the most
intriguing finding was that positive affect further
increased this selective response tendency to shoot
at muslim targets, while negative affect reduced it
(Unkelbach, Forgas, & Denson, 2008). Thus, affec-
tive influences on stereotyped thinking may extend
to influencing actual aggressive behaviors as well.
18.2.5 Affective Influences on
Gullibility
Much of our knowledge about the world is based
on second-hand information we receive from oth-
ers that is often ambiguous and not easily verified
(eg. hearsay, gossip, urban myths, fake news, con-
spiracy theories, trivia claims, etc.). Gullibility (ac-
cepting invalid information as true) can be just as
problematic as rejecting valid information (exces-
sive skepticism). Affective states also seem to play a
role in how such decisions are made (Forgas, 2008;
2013, in press). For example, one study asked happy
or sad participants to judge the probable truth of
a number of urban legends and rumours (Forgas,
2018). Positive mood promoted greater gullibility
for novel and unfamiliar claims, whereas negative
mood promoted skepticism, consistent with a more
externally focused, attentive, and accommodative
thinking style. In another experiment, participants’
recognition memory was tested two weeks after they
were informed about the truth or falsity of various
claims taken from a trivia game. Sad participants
were better able to correctly distinguish between
the true and false claims they had seen previously.
In contrast, happy participants tended simply to
rate previously seen and thus familiar statements
as likely to be true (in essence, a familiarity/fluency
effect). This pattern suggests that happy affect pro-
moted reliance on the simple “what is familiar is
true” heuristic, whereas negative mood conferred
a clear cognitive advantage improving judges’ abil-
ity to accurately remember the truth value of the
statements.
18.2.6 Mood Effects on Bullshit
Receptivity: Perceiving Meaning
Where There is None
Perhaps the most striking form of gullibility oc-
curs when people see meaning in meaningless, ran-
domly generated information. Such absurd gullibil-
ity has been repeatedly demonstrated even in ideo-
logically biased academic journals dealing with post-
modernist theory, radical feminism and ‘grievance
studies’. Several such academic journals accepted
for publication a number of articles composed of
intentionally meaningless jargon and politically cor-
rect verbiage (Sokal & Bricmont, 1998). Pennycook
et al. (2015) confirmed a similar effect, showing that
people often perceive vacuous, pseudo-profound
“bullshit” text as meaningful.
Can affect influence bullshit receptivity? One
experiment asked participants in a positive or neg-
ative mood (after viewing cheerful or sad video-
tapes) to rate the meaningfulness of two kinds of
verbal ‘bullshit’ text, including vacuous New Age
pronouncements (e.g. “Good health imparts reality
to subtle creativity”), and meaningless scientific-
sounding psychological jargon phrases (e.g. “sub-
jective instrumental sublimations”; Forgas, Matovic,
& Slater, 2018). People in a positive mood were
more gullible and saw more ‘meaning’ in these non-
sense statements than did those in the neutral and
negative mood groups (see Figure 18.5). Positive
mood judges were not only more gullible, but also
were faster to produce a judgment, and also had
worse recall and recognition memory than did those
in the neutral and negative mood conditions, consis-
tent with the prediction that positive mood produced
a less attentive information processing style.
In a related study, we also looked at mood effects
on bullshit receptivity using abstract visual rather
than verbal stimuli. Participants in public places
received a mood induction (reminiscing about pos-
itive or negative life episodes) and then judged the
meaningfulness of four modern abstract expression-
ist paintings. Positive mood again increased the
perceived meaningfulness of these abstract images
compared to negative mood.
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Figure 18.5: Mood effects on bullshit receptivity (seeing meaning in nonsense sentences): positive mood increased gullibility compared
to neutral and negative mood (after Forgas, Matovic, & Slater, 2018).
18.2.7 Mood Effects on Decoding
Interpersonal Messages
Interpersonal communications are often also am-
biguous and have no objective truth value (Hei-
der, 1958, see also Chapter 12, “Language and
Thought”). Accepting or rejecting such messages is
critically important for effective social interaction.
For example, people in a negative affective state
were significantly less likely than those in a posi-
tive state to believe that various facial expressions
were authentic (in Forgas, 2013).Taking this line of
reasoning one step further, can affective states also
influence people’s ability to detect deception? In one
study, happy or sad participants watched videotaped
interrogations of suspects accused of theft who were
either guilty or not guilty (Forgas & East, 2008).
As predicted, those in a positive mood were more
gullible, as they accepted more denials as true. In
contrast, negative affect resulted in more guilty judg-
ments, and also improved the participants’ ability to
correctly identify targets who were deceptive. So
negative affect not only increased overall skepticism,
but improved people’s ability to accurately detect
deception.
Detecting ambiguity in verbal messages is an
equally important task. In one study (Matovic,
Koch, & Forgas, 2014) participants received a mood
induction (watched happy or sad films), and were
next asked to detect confusing, ambiguous sentences
whose meaning was unclear. Results showed that
negative mood promoted the more accurate detec-
tion of verbal ambiguity, consistent with the adop-
tion of a more accommodative processing style. This
was also confirmed by more extensive processing,
and the more accurate recall when in a negative
mood (Figure 18.6).
18.2.8 Affective Influences on Behavior
Our behavioral strategies may also benefit when
negative affect triggers a more thorough processing
style. To take one example, negative affect may opti-
mize the way people process, produce, and respond
to persuasive messages. In a number of studies,
participants in a negative affective state were more
sensitive to message quality, and were more per-
suaded by strong rather than weak arguments. In
contrast, those in a positive affective state were not
influenced by message quality, and were equally per-
suaded by strong and weak arguments (e.g., Sinclair,
Mark, & Clore, 1994). Affective states may also
influence the production and quality of persuasive
messages. Those experiencing induced negative af-
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Figure 18.6: The effects of positive and negative mood on (a) the ability to correctly identify ambiguous sentences (left panel), (b)
the time taken to process the task (middle panel), and (c) the ability to remember the target sentences (right panel; after
Matovic et al., 2014).
fect produced significantly higher quality and more
effective persuasive arguments on topical issues than
people in a positive state (Forgas, 2013). Negative
affect also resulted in identifiable benefits when per-
forming demanding interpersonal tasks, such as in-
gratiation (Forgas, Matovic, & Slater, 2018), consis-
tent with the adoption of a more externally oriented,
concrete processing style (Bless & Fiedler, 2006;
Fiedler, 2001). Overall, participants in a negative
mood perform significantly better in complex com-
munication tasks, and are less likely to violate the
rules of effective communication compared to those
in a positive affective state (Koch, Forgas, & Ma-
tovic, 2013).
Decisions about the way we actually treat oth-
ers may also be influenced by affective states. For
example, affect was found to influence the degree
of selfishness versus fairness when people allocate
resources amongst themselves and others in strate-
gic games, such as the dictator game (Tan & For-
gas, 2010). Positive affect, by increasing internally
focused, assimilative processing resulted in more
selfish allocations. Negative affect, in contrast, fo-
cusing greater attention on external information such
as the norm of fairness, produced significantly more
generous and fair allocations in a series of decisions.
18.3 Conclusions
Understanding how affect influences thinking re-
mains one of the most fascinating questions in psy-
chology, an issue that has also occupied philoso-
phers since time immemorial. Recent neuropsycho-
logical research suggests that these two fundamental
human faculties, feeling and thinking, operate in
close interdependence, with affect playing an evo-
lutionary signalling role alerting the organism to
significant events in the environment (Dolan, 2002).
This chapter reviewed experimental evidence that
broadly confirms this view, and suggested that the
role of affect on thinking can be classified into two
major kinds of influence. Informational effects im-
pact on the content and valence (positivity vs. neg-
ativity) of thinking usually resulting in affect con-
gruence. Processing effects occur because affective
states trigger qualitatively different, more or less as-
similative vs. accommodative processing strategies.
The evidence reviewed here highlights the po-
tentially adaptive and beneficial processing conse-
354 • Psychology of Human Thought • Chapter 18
Conclusions Forgas
quences of both positive and negative affective states.
Contrary to the popular preoccupation with the uni-
versal desirability of positive affect in Western cul-
ture, the research shows that negative affect can
often produce important adaptive advantages, im-
proving memory, judgments and behavioral strate-
gies (Forgas, 2013; in press). The implication is that
our persistent and unilateral emphasis on positiv-
ity and happiness may be misplaced; instead, both
negative and positive affect should be accepted as
a normal part of human functioning (see also Chap-
ter 19, “Culture and Thought”). Of course, intense
and enduring negative affective states such as depres-
sion can be hugely debilitating, and require clinical
intervention.
In summary, there is now clear evidence that affec-
tive states have a powerful, yet often subconscious
influence on what people think (content effects) as
well as how people think (processing effects). These
effects are often subtle and subject to a variety of
boundary conditions and contextual influences. A
better understanding of the complex interplay be-
tween affect and cognition remains one of the most
important tasks for psychology as a science. A great
deal has been achieved in the last few decades, but in
a sense, the enterprise has barely begun. Hopefully
this chapter will contribute to a better understanding
of the fascinating relationship between affect and
cognition.
Summary
1. Affective states represent evolutionary adaptation and their main function is to inform / alert
the organism and to promote appropriate responses in a given situation.
2. Affect can influence thinking through multiple mechanisms, influencing both the content and
valence of what we think, as well as how we think (information processing effects).
3. Affect congruence in memory, attention, associations and judgments is typically produced by
the selective priming of affect-congruent associations.
4. More open and productive thinking tends to magnify affect infusion.
5. Positive affect tends to promote a faster, more heuristic and also more creative thinking style.
Negative affect promotes a slower, more attentive and more externally oriented thinking style.
6. In some situations, mild negative affect can improve memory and judgments and also produce
more effective social behaviors.
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Review Questions
1. Why does affect have an invasive quality on our thinking?
2. What is the difference between affect congruence, and affect state dependence in memory
processes?
3. How can negative affect reduce heuristic biases in judgments?
4. What is the influence of affective states on the way people think and communicate in social
situations?




The last few years produced genuine insights into the influence of affective
states on thinking. The current research project seeks to extend this work into
two new directions. First, several experiments investigate affective influences
on the way people communicate, including the sending and decoding of both
verbal, and nonverbal messages. Recently completed experiments showed
that paradoxically, mild negative affective states seem to promote a more
attentive and externally oriented information processing style that results
in more competent and successful communication strategies. For example,
participants in a negative affective state were better at both producing, and
dealing with ingratiating messages, and they were also better at constructing
more effective verbal messages in compliance with normative conversational
requirements (Matovic & Forgas, 2018). In another ongoing experiment, we
are also looking at the influence of affective states on verbal creativity. For example, we are asking
happy or sad participants to produce suitable captions to various cartoon drawings, or formulate
verbal responses in conflict situations, and the quality of their responses will be evaluated.
The second line of research explores how affective states influence judgments involving gullibility
vs. scepticism. In particular, we are interested in the possibility that negative affect may reduce
gullibility and increase skepticism. In a post-truth age of ‘fake news’ and the widespread use
of manipulative misinformation both in commerce and in public life, understanding what factors
promote critical thinking is of great practical importance. Several of our earlier experiments
suggested that negative affect can reduce people’s susceptibility to misleading information in their
eyewitness memories (Forgas, Vargas, & Laham, 2005). Further, negative affect also reduced the
‘truth bias’, the tendency to believe as true ambiguous information simply because it happens to be
salient and can be processed more easily (Koch & Forgas, 2012). Following on from this work, our
recent studies looked at the phenomenon of ‘bullshit receptivity’—the tendency for people to believe
that meaningless, randomly generate gibberish text is actually meaningful. We used randomly
generated New Age pronouncements from the work of Deepak Chopra, a New Age guru as the
stimuli, as well as randomly generated psychological jargon terms. We found that participants who
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were induced into a positive affective state (after watching cheerful, happy videos) were significantly
more gullible and showed higher ‘bullshit receptivity’ than those in a negative affective state.
In a companion experiment, we asked happy and sad participants to judge the meaningfulness of
various abstract expressionist paintings. Again, positive affect increased and negative affect reduced
their willingness to perceive meaning in these images. Further studies will look at the reasons
why these effects occur. For example, the universal human tendency to seek and find patterns in
otherwise random information may also be influenced by affect. The evolutionary significance of
these mild, but reliable affective influences on how we see and evaluate complex information will
also be explored. The role of affective states in promoting or inhibiting mental flexibility—the
ability to see multiple meanings in ambiguous information—will also be studied, as a step towards
better understanding the role of affect in why people often accept dubious information.
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Glossary Forgas
Glossary
affect congruence Selective attention to, access
to, and use of information from memory that
has previously been associated with the cur-
rent affective state, resulting in an affect-
congruent bias in thinking. 341, 342, 344
Affect Infusion Model A model predicting that
the infusion of affect into thinking and judg-
ments depends on the kind of information pro-
cessing strategy used, with more open, genera-
tive strategies increasing affect infusion. 342,
344, 347
affect state dependence Improved memory and
use for information that has been acquired in
a similar, matching affective state. 344, 345
affect-as-information A theory that predicts that
in some evaluative judgments, people may use
their current affective state as a heuristic cue
to infer their reaction rather than computing
a response based on the actual features of the
stimulus. 342
associative network model A theory that pre-
dicts that affective states are linked to
thoughts and memories in a cognitive network
of associations, such that the experience of an
affective states facilitates the recall and use of
cognitive contents previously associated with
it in the past. 342
emotion Intense, conscious and directed affective
state with clear cognitive content. 342
mood Mild, nonspecific and often enduring and
subliminal positive or negative affective state
with little cognitive content. 342
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Throughout the day, people solve many different
types of problems. The nature of these problems
and the way that people understand and think about
them can have enormous consequences for individ-
uals and their well-being. Psychologists have great
interest in this process and one thing is increasingly
clear—in order to understand human thinking it is
necessary to take culture into account (Greenfield,
Keller, Fuligni, & Maynard, 2003). This insight is
based on research that shows that culture, the natu-
ral environment or habitat of the human species, is
an essential and inextricable part of human psycho-
logical experience, including thought.
This chapter describes the relation between cul-
ture and thought. It begins with a brief historical
account of how culture has been studied in psycho-
logical research on human cognition. We then de-
scribe how culture becomes part of individual mental
functioning. Throughout the chapter, the focus is on
both the content and process of human cognition.
Content includes behaviors and other psychological
properties, such as knowledge. Process is about how
thinking works and includes mental functions such
as attention, perception, reasoning, classification,
memory, problem solving, and planning. Culture
plays a significant role in determining both the con-
tent and the process of human thinking.
To illustrate these ideas, findings from research in
the area of spatial cognition, the understanding and
use of space, are described. Navigating in and using
large-scale space effectively are critical to the every-
day functioning and the survival of all human beings.
The importance of spatial knowledge, along with
variations across cultural settings in the environment
and the resources available for understanding and us-
ing space, make this a rich area to study culture and
thought (Dasen & Mishra, 2010). What is clear from
this research is that, across cultures, there exists a
vast array of solutions for solving spatial problems
and they affect how people explore, learn about, and
remember the world around them. To help people
solve spatial problems, cultures, over the course
of human history, have devised various social con-
ventions (e.g., ways of describing space, teaching
people about how to understand and use space) and
symbolic and material ways of encoding and repre-
senting spatial information (e.g., maps, models, com-
passes, frames of reference). These cultural tools
are used to solve spatial problems including how
people communicate spatial information (e.g., direc-
tions), identify locations, orient themselves in space,
and find their way around. These cognitive skills
and the practices associated with them are highly
valued in cultures and, as such, they are shared by
community members and passed across generations
in the process of cognitive socialization (Gauvain
& Perez, 2015b).
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19.1 A Brief Historical Look at
Psychological Research on
Culture and Cognition
Psychologists have been interested in the relation
between culture and human cognition for well over
a century. At the very beginning of the discipline in
the late 1800s, Wilhelm Wundt, a founder of mod-
ern psychology, was concerned with how cultural-
historical forms, such as language and methods of
reasoning, affect cognitive functions (Cole, 1996).
At the same time, Wundt and other psychologists
were also committed to studying human psychology
experimentally, an approach to research that makes
it very difficult to study culture. This is because
two principal features of the experimental method,
random assignment and manipulation, cannot be
used—a person cannot be randomly assigned to a
culture nor can culture be experimentally manipu-
lated (Whiting, 1976). In short order, the attention
of these early researchers landed on topics better
suited to experimentation, such as physiological and
perceptual psychology. As a result, in the early 20th
century, the study of culture and human cognition,
at least among psychologists in the U.S. and Europe,
declined significantly. Interestingly, at this same
time, there was strong interest in Russia where Lev S.
Vygotsky and other Activity Theorists were putting
forward exciting ideas about culture and cognition,
many of which are taken up later in the chapter when
the sociocultural approach is described (Wertsch,
1985).
By the mid-20th century in American and Eu-
ropean psychology, there was renewed interest in
culture and cognition. It was fueled, in part, by the
“cognitive revolution” occurring in psychology at
the time (Bruner, 1957; Neisser, 1967) along with
a number of practical concerns that had great soci-
etal significance. Of particular importance was the
need to understand cognitive variation in human per-
formance on studies that included individuals from
different social or cultural backgrounds (Munroe &
Gauvain, 2010). Some researchers observed that
cognitive performance varied systematically with
participants’ social class and their experience with
Western forms of schooling (e.g., see Cole, Gay,
Glick, & Sharp, 1971). Interestingly, at the same
time, the research participants, both children and
adults, who had performed poorly on conventional
laboratory assessments of cognition were observed
using impressive cognitive capabilities in their daily
lives, including spatial knowledge, reasoning, classi-
fication, and linguistic and number systems (e.g., see
Gladwin, 1970; Hutchins, 1983; Lancy, 1983; Ser-
pell, 1979). Moreover, these skilled performances
resonated closely with the practices and values of
the participants’ cultural group.
These observations provided understanding that
may seem obvious in hindsight, but were at the time
quite profound. First, they suggested that human
cognitive performance is better when it is assessed
on the activities and skills that people practice and
are valued in their culture. Second, the more a cog-
nitive assessment deviates from the familiar con-
text in which an individual lives, the poorer the per-
son’s cognitive performance will be. Third, because
the patterns were similar for children and adults,
the connection between culture and cognition ex-
ists throughout the lifespan. And, finally, results
that demonstrate better cognitive performance in
people who live in Western, more industrialized
cultures are often based on assessments that favor
their experiences. In many cases, they reflect the
cultural background and values of the researchers
themselves. When taken together, these observa-
tions set the stage for a new generation of research
on culture and human cognition, one based on the
idea that experience in culture is fundamental to the
development and expression of human thinking.
Since that time, two different approaches to study-
ing culture and cognition have been used (Göncü &
Gauvain, 2012; Table 19.1). One, the cross-cultural
approach, focuses on comparisons across cultures,
while the other approach, based on the area of re-
search known as cultural psychology, concentrates
on processes and systems of meaning within cul-
tures. Each of these approaches has strengths and
limitations.
For Margaret Mead (1931), a founder of the cross-
cultural tradition, this approach is essentially a type
of experimental research design, one that investi-
gates how natural variations in culture affect the
human experience. Despite this hopeful point of
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Table 19.1: Contemporary approaches for studying culture and cognition.
Approach Method Purpose
Cross-cultural psychology Compares individuals across cultural set-
tings
Investigates how natural variation across
cultural settings relates to patterns of hu-
man cognition and its development
Cultural psychology Focuses on processes and systems of
meaning within a culture
Investigates how values and practices of
a culture relate to the expression and de-
velopment of human cognition in that
culture
view, the approach has, in practice, fallen short of
this goal. Most significantly, it is prone to biases
that favor one cultural group, typically the one simi-
lar to the researchers’ own background, over other
groups. Also, over time, research based on this
approach resulted in a number of unsubstantiated
assumptions about universality, most often by iden-
tifying the performances of Western middle-class
participants living in industrialized communities as
normative or optimal and applying deficit interpre-
tations to participants whose performances do not
match up (e.g., Cole et al., 1971; Rogoff, 2003;
Serpell, 2017; Shweder, 1990). Studies of within-
nation cultural differences that use this method, such
as research conducted in the U.S. when children
from low-income communities are compared with
their middle-class counterparts, have often been sim-
ilarly flawed when commonalities between groups
are overlooked and differences are interpreted as the
deficits of low-income children (Cole, 1996; Rogoff,
2003).
The cultural psychology approach was, in part,
developed to address these limitations (Göncü, Tuer-
mer, Jain, & Johnson, 1999; Shweder et al., 1998).
It avoids cross-cultural comparisons and takes issue
with the use of one culture as the standard or norm in
such comparisons. Rather, it views culture as an in-
herently integrated system of meaning that provides
organization and direction for human cognition and
learning. In this view, culture is psychologically ex-
perienced and takes form in individual thinking and
behavior. Research based on this approach has con-
centrated on how cultural meanings are expressed
and communicated in the day-to-day functioning of
community members through the customary prac-
tices, values, and beliefs of the group (Goodnow,
Miller, & Kessel, 1995; Shweder at al., 1998). Chil-
dren, over the course of development, are socialized
into these traditions, values, and practices through
their participation in regular events and activities
(Rogoff, 2003). Cultural knowledge and ways of
thinking are conveyed to young and new commu-
nity members socially, both through direct social
contact (i.e., social interaction) and less socially di-
rect, but nonetheless, social forms of information
exchange such as rituals, customs, and shared tools
and resources, including technology (Gauvain &
Nicolaides, 2015).
Some contemporary researchers working from
this approach are called sociocultural or sociohis-
torical psychologists and they base many of their
ideas on the aforementioned insights of Vygotsky
and Activity Theorists (Cole, 1996; Vygotsky, 1978).
Sociocultural approaches hold the view that human
thinking is culturally mediated, that is, it takes place
in historically-situated activities that are informed
and guided by culture. Culture becomes part of indi-
vidual psychological experience as people engage in
the practices, institutions and tools in settings where
the accumulated knowledge of the culture is used
and made available to new members. Over the last
decades, this view has helped shift attention away
from a view of human cognition as a solitary, indi-
vidual, and internally driven process towards one
that sees cognition as emerging from the coordina-
tion of inherent human abilities and cultural systems
of meaning.
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This chapter draws on empirical evidence from
both the cross-cultural and within-culture research
traditions. As stated, each approach has strengths
and they can be used in a complementary way to
guide theory and research (Van de Vijver, Hofer, &
Chasiotis, 2010). That said, each approach also has
limitations. The ultimate goal is to take culture into
account by benefitting from the unique insights each
approach can offer while avoiding problems asso-
ciated with their earlier use and interpretation. For
instance, cross-cultural research can be useful when
researchers do not assign greater value or worth
to any cultural pattern or behavior. Focusing on a
common point of reference across cultures, such
as behaviors related to universal developmental and
cognitive tasks (e.g., early dependency on caregivers,
spatial navigation; Van de Vijver, et al., 2010), is
particularly useful. Careful sampling and data anal-
ysis are critical in order to avoid ethnocentrism that
reifies any particular way of life.
Research rooted in cultural psychology can pro-
vide depth of understanding about a culture. How-
ever, it is important not to adopt a monolithic view
of a culture that suggests that all its members adhere
to cultural values and practices in the exact same
way and to the same extent. There is variation in
cognition and behavior both within and across cul-
tures. Individual differences within cultures stem
from many sources including age, interests, capabil-
ities, and other aspects of psychological functioning,
such as emotionality. These variations provide one
of the sources of complexity inherent to culture,
which contributes in important ways to the diversity
of thinking that can help a culture address new and
unexpected challenges (D’Andrade, 1984; Good-
now, 1990).
To summarize, for over a century there has been
interest among psychologists in the relation between
culture and human cognition. After many years of
research, several interesting ideas have taken shape
about how to conceptualize and approach this topic.
Research has made it clear that cognition has com-
plex and deep connections to the cultural context
in which an individual lives. This is because the
cultural context provides the social processes, tools,
practices, and institutions that support and guide
cognition and its development (Gauvain & Perez,
2015a). In considering research on culture and
thought, it is also important to understand that cul-
tures are not static. They change over time as people
and their environments change. And, lastly, it is
worth remembering that human beings may belong
to and move between many different cultures, or sys-
tems of meanings, at the same time—a phenomenon
that is increasingly evident today in the context of
widespread globalization.
19.2 Defining the Relation of Culture
and Cognition
Human beings learn to think about and solve prob-
lems in their everyday lives with the support and
guidance of practices and resources that have been
developed by their culture over time, continue to be
used, and are passed across generations. This type
of social learning is called cumulative cultural evo-
lution (Boyd & Richardson, 1996). It is the process
that enables human beings to create resources and
tools that support and extend human activity, in-
cluding thought processes, and for these resources
and tools to be used by subsequent generations in
the same or a modified form. These modifications,
referred to as the ratchet effect, are maintained by
culture and they enable the accumulation of modifi-
cations over time. As Tomasello (1999) explains
“some individual or group of individuals first
invented a primitive version of [an] artifact or
practice, and then some later user or users made a
modification, an ‘improvement,’ that others then
adopted perhaps without change for many gener-
ations, at which point some other individual or
group of individuals made another modification,
which was then learned and used by others, and
so on over historical time in what has sometimes
been dubbed ‘the ratchet effect’ [3, p. 5].
As this quotation makes clear, human beings are
active agents in this process as they adopt and adapt
cultural practices and ways of thinking to meet their
current needs (Tomasello, 1999).
Few would dispute the fact that the content of
thought varies across cultures. Less clear is what it
means to state that processes of cognition, such as
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attention and memory, differ across cultures. It is im-
portant to understand that this is not the same thing
as saying that different groups of human beings pos-
sess fundamentally different intellectual functions.
Basic intellectual functions are shared across cul-
tures and attest to our integrity as a species. All
human beings perceive stimuli, remember things,
solve problems, engage in social interaction, de-
velop and use tools to support human activity, are
self-aware and so forth. However, social and cultural
experiences contribute to the form these processes
take in any particular instance or setting. As a re-
sult, for any given psychological function there are
both commonalities and differences across cultural
communities.
Consider an example from color perception. Be-
cause all intact human brains have the same visual
system and photoreceptors, color perception is, as
far as we know, invariant across members of the
species and emerges on a similar developmental
course in early infancy (Franklin, Piling, & Davies,
2005). However, cultural and linguistic experience
determine a number of factors related to color per-
ception and categorization. The number of colors
identified by a single color term, how hue is classi-
fied, and the valence or preference for certain col-
ors varies across cultures in relation to the words
used in the language to denote and categorize colors
(Johnson & Hannon, 2015). And, although some
languages possess more color terms than others, the
sequence in which new terms are added to the lan-
guage appears to be uniform (Rosch, 1977). Thus,
both universal and culturally specific patterns in
the perception and classification of color have been
found. Such patterns suggest that even in basic cog-
nitive processes such as color perception, we see
cultural variations on a common theme.
19.3 Thinking in Niches
One way to trace out the cultural contributions to
human thinking is to identify the means by which
culture becomes part of an individual’s knowledge
and thought processes. To describe this process,
Gauvain (1995) built on ideas put forth by Super and
Harkness (1986) in their conception of the develop-
mental niche. In their approach, Super and Harkness
adapted a concept from biological ecology, the eco-
logical niche, to describe in a single framework how
social-psychological experience connects directly
to culture over the course of human development.
Super and Harkness identified three subsystems of
the developmental niche: the physical and social
settings of development, customs of child care, and
the psychology of caregivers.
In extending this idea to describe human cognition
and its development, Gauvain (1995) identified three
subsystems of culture: (1) conventions for organiz-
ing and communicating knowledge, (2) material and
symbolic tools that facilitate thinking and problem
solving, and (3) cultural practices and social institu-
tions (Table 19.2). Each of these subsystems relies
Table 19.2: Subsystems of culture that contribute to human knowledge and thought processes.
Cultural Subsystems Description Examples
Ways of conveying knowledge Conventions of language that peo-
ple use to organize and communicate
knowledge
Scripts, schemas, mental represen-
tations (e.g., a mental tour), spatial
relational terminology
Tools that aid thinking Material and symbolic methods that
are used to support and extend think-
ing and problem solving
Maps, compass, directions, frames
of reference in orienteering, Global
Positioning System (GPS)
Cultural practices and social institu-
tions
Formal and informal settings in
which people carry out everyday ac-
tivities and learn about and apply
cognitive skills
School, apprenticeships, wayfinding
techniques, navigational systems, rit-
uals, daily routines
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in important ways on social interaction as a primary
means by which culture and cognition become con-
nected to one another. However, each also includes
less interpersonally direct, but still fundamentally
social processes, that contribute to the acquisition,
organization, and use of cognitive functions through
the use of historically, or culturally, formulated tools
and resources for understanding the world and solv-
ing problems. In this section, these three subsystems
are described and illustrated with research on spatial
cognition.
19.3.1 Conventions for Organizing and
Communicating Knowledge
An important aspect of human cognition is organiz-
ing and communicating knowledge in understand-
able ways to others. These skills not only help peo-
ple structure their knowledge for effective use, they
also connect members of a community to one an-
other. Examples are schema and scripts, which are
abstract representations that connect pieces of infor-
mation into an overarching organization (Bobrow &
Norman, 1975; Nelson, 1993; Schank & Abelson,
1977). Scripts, for example, include the order or se-
quence in which actions are expected to happen and
how one should behave in a situation (e.g., going
to a restaurant). Even infants and toddlers organize
their knowledge of routine events, such as bathing,
along script-like lines. By the end of the first year,
infants use temporal information in recalling events
such as Teddy Bear’s bath: first put Teddy in the tub,
then wash him with a sponge, then dry him with a
towel (Bauer et al., 2000). By 20-months of age, if
toddlers are told about a familiar event in which the
order of actions is violated, they will correct it (e.g.,
“No, wash Teddy before drying him”) or say, “That’s
so silly.” These ways of organizing complex infor-
mation are valuable to cognitive functioning. They
support memory by aiding recall of events and they
can be used to plan or guide behaviors to reach a
goal, for example, what to do to get ready for school
or work in the morning. And, similar to routinized
actions or habits, schema and scripts aid learning
and problem solving by freeing up mental space for
new or challenging activities.
There are a number of examples of organizing
and communicating spatial information that reveal
culture contributions to this process. Research con-
ducted in Western cultural settings has found that
when adults describe spatial information, they tend
to use structured narratives that resemble route-like
directions that include the temporal and spatial con-
tiguity, or relatedness, of areas in the space, almost
as if someone is taking an imagined walk through it
or what is called a “mental tour” (Linde & Labov,
1975). From early to middle childhood, children’s
descriptions of large-scale space come to resemble
this type of mental tour (Gauvain & Rogoff, 1989).
However, cultural values determine which informa-
tion is important to include and this information is
found in descriptions produced even by young chil-
dren. For example, the route directions of Iranian
preschoolers living in Britain include more vivid and
fuller accounts of sites along a route and less direc-
tional information than the directions of same age
British children living in the same region (Spencer
& Darvizeh, 1983). This difference suggests that as
early as three years of age, children are beginning
to display some of the values of their culture when
communicating spatial information to others.
There is also evidence that cultural ways of com-
municating spatial information affect the process
of thinking about space and wayfinding (Peterson,
Nadel, Bloom, & Garrett, 1996). In some languages
absolute directions are used to describe spatial rela-
tions. The Guugu Yimithirr are a case in point. They
are an Aboriginal community in eastern Australia
and the language these people use to describe spatial
relations does not rely on relativistic terms, such as
left, right, up, and down (Levinson, 1996). Rather,
they describe spatial information in absolute terms
in accord with cardinal directions, such as north,
south, east, and west. In a series of studies that in-
volved asking speakers of this language to point to
out-of-sight locations (called dead reckoning) in the
desert and to reproduce the arrangements of objects
on table tops in adjacent rooms, Guugu Yimithirr
speakers identified and reconstructed spatial infor-
mation according to the absolute rather than the rel-
ative positioning of objects. Thus, even when they
were not speaking, they behaved in ways consistent
with the communicative conventions in their cul-
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ture for describing space. The rapidity and precision
with which the participants provided absolute spatial
information on these tasks led Levinson to conclude
that their spatial encoding reflected an orientation
consistent with the linguistic form. Although ex-
amples of this sort are rare, similar communicative
and cognitive systems have been found in other cul-
tures, such as the Tzeltal Maya (Levinson, 2003)
and Tongans in Polynesia (Bennardo, 2014).
19.3.2 Material and Symbolic Tools
That Aid Thinking
Material and symbolic tools and resources are de-
veloped and used by cultures to guide and support
mental activity and, as such, they play a central role
in the development and organization of cognitive
skill. This view, developed by Vygotsky (1987) and
other Activity Theorists (Wertsch, 1981), suggests
that tools and symbols mediate the origin and con-
duct of human activity and, thereby, connect the
human mind not only with the world of places and
objects but also with other people and their cultural
history. Thus, by acquiring and using culturally
developed tools for thinking, a person’s mental func-
tioning assumes a link to sociohistorical means and
understanding transmitted through these tools and
symbols. Cole and Griffin (1980) refer to these
tools and symbols as cultural amplifiers, that is,
techniques or technological features provided by a
culture that alter the approaches individual cultural
members use in solving problems posed by their
environment.
Material and symbolic tools play an important
role in spatial thinking because they extend cogni-
tive capabilities by allowing people to describe and
use large-scale space in ways that would not be pos-
sible without the tools. That is, these tools not only
aid thinking, e.g. by easing navigation and travel,
they also transform thinking and behavior. For ex-
ample, an individual may attend to and remember
directions to a location differently depending on
whether pencil and paper or GPS technology is at
hand. In this way, the availability of tools determines
how individuals attend to and store information, in
other words, the very cognitive processes that are
used in carrying out an activity and in learning about
the world.
The mostly widely studied cultural tool of spatial
thinking is the map, which functions as both a mem-
ory store and a tool for action. Children’s skill at
devising, understanding, and using maps increases
from early to middle childhood (Liben & Downs,
2015). Research shows that preschool children have
a basic understanding of what maps represent (e.g.,
they understand that maps depict locations) and how
they can be used (e.g., to find a place in space), but
they misunderstand many of the symbolic aspects of
maps (e.g., expect that a road shown as red on a map
is actually red; Liben, 2009). It is not until middle
childhood, when children are formally introduced
to maps in school, that they begin to develop a more
sophisticated understanding of maps (Uttal, 2005).
Full competence at reading and using maps may
not be achieved until adolescence or later depend-
ing on the opportunities available for developing
these skills (Presson, 1987). Some very important
or highly specialized maps, such as those represent-
ing the location of secret and valuable places (e.g.,
water sources) that are carved on weapons, rocks
and the human body by the Ngatajara people of the
Australian desert (Gould, 1969) or maps represent-
ing state or national electric grid systems, may be
inaccessible to most people in a culture.
How does experience with maps relate to cog-
nition? Research shows that this experience helps
people obtain insights about large-scale space that
would not otherwise be possible (Liben, 2001). It
also suggests that people’s ability to use maps not
only reflects their particular spatial representational
skills, but also the individual’s experience and prac-
tice with a system of representation or tools available
in their culture. Or as Uttal (2005) put it, skill at
using maps to navigate in space results from living
in a map-immersed culture. Because learning how
to understand and use maps is a social and com-
municative process, people need to be taught what
representations in maps stand for and how they can
be used. Such skills are highly valued in cultures
with these tools. In fact, recent innovations in STEM
(Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathemat-
ics) learning include introducing young people in
such cultures to map use across a diverse range of
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spatial contexts and technologies (Committee on
Support for Thinking Spatially, 2006).
Cultural symbol systems, such as numeracy and
language, also contribute to spatial thinking. Much
of the research that examines language in relation
to spatial cognition is centered on testing the idea
proposed by Whorf (1956) that language affects the
ways in which speakers conceptualize the world and
even their nonlinguistic cognitive abilities. Results
suggest that variation across languages in the cate-
gorization of spatial concepts contributes to cultural
variation in spatial understanding. For instance, re-
search conducted by Bowerman and colleagues (e.g.,
Bowerman & Choi, 2003; Majid, Bowerman, Kita,
Haun, & Levinson, 2004) found that culturally spe-
cific reading patterns can influence performance on
seemingly unrelated tasks. In one study, participants
spoke and read either English or Mandarin; English
text is written in a left-right pattern, whereas Man-
darin text is written vertically. When participants
were asked to described how they thought about the
future, English readers described the future as occur-
ring in a forward direction and the past in a backward
direction while Mandarin readers described the fu-
ture as occurring in an upward manner and the past
in a downward manner.
Research has also found that language is related
to cultural differences in preferences for particular
frames of reference in describing space. Majid and
colleagues (2004) identified three frames of refer-
ence: (1) relative, which involves use of the viewers’
own perspective (e.g., the spoon is to the right of the
fork); (2) absolute, which uses an external frame-
work (e.g., the spoon is to the north of the fork);
and (3) intrinsic, which uses the relationship of the
items themselves without reference to personal or
external coordinates (e.g., the fork is at the nose of
the spoon). The frequency of using these frames of
reference differs across languages. English speakers
are more likely to use relative and intrinsic frames
while the aforementioned Guugu Yimithirr speak-
ers from Australia exclusively use absolute frames
of reference. Similarly, Haun, Rapold, Janzen, and
Levinson (2011) found that Dutch and Namibian el-
ementary school children (6=Akhoe Hai‖om speak-
ers) also differed in their spatial frames of reference.
Dutch children were more likely to use relative de-
scriptions, whereas Namibian children were more
likely to use absolute descriptions. In addition, when
the children were instructed to use their nondomi-
nant frame of reference, they had great difficulty in
doing so and performed poorly. Thus, spatial cogni-
tion and language variability across cultures covary
in systematic ways.
The symbols and tools that cultures devise and use
to represent and support thinking are not static. They
change over time and may do so in a rather sweep-
ing fashion. Recently, there have been a number of
major changes in the tools people use to imagine,
communicate about, and experience large-scale or
geo-space, including geographic information sys-
tems (GIS), global positioning systems (GPS), and
geo-visualization tools (GeoVis). Downs (2014) de-
scribes these changes as revolutionary because of
their potential to affect the development and use of
spatial cognition along with people’s understanding
of and relation to the world as a whole. The ex-
tent of the impact is, as of yet, unknown. What is
known is that people are adopting these technologies
at a rapid pace and their use is both widespread and
regular. People use handheld spatial navigation de-
vices on a daily basis for moving around the world
in vehicles and on foot. Even people living in ge-
ographically isolated communities in the Majority
World use these tools, accessed mainly on mobile
or cell phones (Mpogole, Usanga, & Tedre, 2008).
Although most people in remote regions report pur-
chasing these phones for social and emergency con-
tact, the phones are also used to help people carry
out activities that are spatial in nature. For instance,
they help rural villagers living in very spread-out re-
gions make decisions important for their livelihood,
such as where to find clean water for livestock and
household use.
Downs (2014) identifies some potential down-
sides to adopting these technologies that warrant
more attention from researchers. For instance, he
asks, how do people evaluate the quality and utility
of the spatial information provided by these tech-
nologies? Do people monitor their activities as they
rely on this information to be certain it is helpful or
correct? Downs is also concerned about dependency.
These tools, without question, can afford greater
ease and flexibility for people when traveling, es-
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pecially in distant or unfamiliar places. Yet users
may become dependent on them, which may, in turn,
lead to an abandonment of more traditional methods
of thinking about and using space. These changes
would, inevitably, reduce the likelihood that tradi-
tional methods of spatial thinking and representation
are transmitted across generations.
Taken together, this research supports the view
that symbolic and material tools devised and used
by a culture are integrated with the development and
use of spatial thinking skills. These cultural tools
alter how individuals solve spatial problems, and as
a result, they transform spatial cognition. However,
their contribution to spatial thinking is complex and
provides both opportunities and constraints. Tools,
such as maps, and symbolic systems, including lan-
guage, can provide ways of solving spatial problems
that would not be possible without these resources.
However, at the same time, these tools constrain spa-
tial problem solving and what people know about
space. For instance, people’s understanding of the
geography of London is more reflective of the spatial
layout depicted in the map of the city’s underground
subway system than it is of the city itself (Roberts,
2005). Here we are reminded of our earlier discus-
sion about how to interpret an individual’s success
or failure when asked to solve a problem or do a
cognitive task. The body of research just described
demonstrates that when a person is asked to solve a
spatial problem that is integrated with a cultural tool,
symbolic or material, the person’s performance will
reflect not only the individual’s inherent cognitive
skills, but also their experience with the symbols
and tools of their culture.
19.3.3 Cultural Practices and
Institutions
Culture provides institutions and other formal and
informal social settings and arrangements, including
rituals and routines, that facilitate and guide human
thinking (Goodnow et al., 1995). Formal institu-
tions are designed to train people in the valued skills
and practices of their culture. School, for instance,
promotes and supports the development of particu-
lar approaches and methods that are valued in the
culture, such as literacy and numeracy (Serpell &
Hatano, 1997). The relation between schooling and
cognitive development is well known. What is im-
portant for present purposes is how experience in
school includes practice and skill development in
culturally-valued areas and that these experiences
carry over into everyday thinking. For instance,
schooling contributes to the development of spatial
thinking through the skills that are emphasized and
practiced there. The types of measurement and pre-
cision promoted in schools is evident in the degree
of accuracy seen or expected in people’s everyday
distance estimation, model replication, and map use
in cultures that value these skills. This degree of pre-
cision is less common in spatial representations and
memory among people living in some other cultural
communities, even though these individuals exhibit
high levels of spatial skill (Gauvain, 1998). Other
highly skilled ways of characterizing space may em-
phasize configurational information (where places
are relative to one another) or information about
changing landscape conditions (due to seasonal or
other types of climatic factors) that can alter the tex-
ture and dimension of a terrain and affect travel time
or safety.
Culture may also influence spatial memory and
use through more formalized traditional practices
for exploring and traversing large-scale space. Tra-
ditional Puluwat seafarers in Micronesia have de-
veloped a navigational system that does not rely on
modern instruments. Rather, these navigators learn a
complex set of principles to guide their travels (Glad-
win, 1971; Hutchins, 1983). Some of this informa-
tion is directly observed, such as wave patterns, and
other parts are inferred, such as the sidereal (star)
compass. The sidereal compass is an abstract men-
tal reference system of 32 star paths that defines the
courses or routes of travel among islands. This huge
memorization task is eased by the use of cultural
myths as mnemonics or memory aids (Hage, 1978).
The remarkable skill of traditional Puluwat naviga-
tors relies on knowing many star paths that define
courses of travel among islands. Similar to most
knowledge of familiar local space, star paths are not
fixed map routes or action sequences, rather they are
a reservoir of possible action plans for solving spa-
tial navigational problems. Locomotion, either real
or imagined, provides information about landmarks
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and actual or potential routes, as well as immedi-
ate cues (e.g., direction, winds, tides, currents, bird
patterns) that are used to update and adjust spatial
orientation and route finding in real time.
Other institutions of culture, such as rituals and
routines, also play important roles in cultural learn-
ing. By definition, rituals and routines entail un-
changing and prescribed patterns or sequences of
actions that are deemed important in the culture
(Goodnow et al., 1995). These action sequences
are displayed on a regular and predictable basis,
and as such, children have ample opportunity to
learn about them via observational and participatory
means. Children also learn about their cultural sig-
nificance, often in the context of family life, which
enhances motivation to learn about them and carry
them out (Fiese, 2006). Even early in life, chil-
dren have a role in cultural rituals and routines and
their role changes with development, typically in the
direction of increased expectations of independent
performance and responsibility (Rogoff, 2003).
Do cultural practices affect the development of
spatial thinking skills? In a study comparing the spa-
tial skills of Australian Aboriginal children reared in
the desert and European Australian children reared
in the city, Kearins (1981) found that the Aborig-
inal children performed far better on all the spa-
tial location tasks presented to them. This result
echoes the consistent finding that increased experi-
ence in an environment enhances memory for space
and aids spatial orientation (Liben & Christensen,
2010). Cultures differ in the opportunity children
have to explore space during everyday routine activ-
ities, which has consequences for spatial thinking
and its development. For example, research con-
ducted in the Logoli community in Kenya found a
relation between the distance children played from
their village and their skill on spatial tasks (Munroe
& Munroe, 1971). Children’s directed distance from
home, that is travel undertaken while engaging in
an activity away from the home area (e.g., herding,
running errands to neighboring villages, weeding
crops in the field) and not free-time distance from
home (e.g., playing in non-adult defined or directed
activities) was the important contributor to spatial
skill on several tasks (Munroe, Munroe, & Brasher,
1985).
Less formal social institutions and social settings
also influence spatial thinking. In cultures where
verbal explanation is highly valued, cultural prac-
tices reflect this value in the form of oral narratives
and storytelling. These practices assume much im-
portance and are part of everyday experience and
cognitive exchange that children have with older
children and adults (Heath, 1983). For example,
research shows that children are introduced to and
learn about cultural ways of conceptualizing and
representing space and how to use these represen-
tational forms by interacting with their caregivers.
Szechter and Liben (2004) found that mothers’ use
of spatial language during picture book reading with
3- to 5-year-old children predicted children’s suc-
cess on a spatial task that involved spatial-graphic
representations (i.e., understanding of graphically
depicted distance). Adults also guide children in
exploring new environments and they help children
learn spatial routes of travel (Spencer & Blades,
2006).
Researchers have also studied how variation in
cultural practice, such as access to aerial views of
the earth, relate to how individuals come to un-
derstand and solve spatial problems (Blaut, Mc-
Cleary, & Blaut, 1970, Spencer & Blades, 2006).
Hund, Schmettow and Noordzij (2012) discuss two
wayfinding strategies or perspectives: (1) route per-
spectives, or first-person mental tours, that provide
information such as left and right turns and land-
mark descriptions; and (2) survey perspectives, or
third-person perspectives that involve considering
the entire travel space at once (e.g., aerial views) and
use cardinal directions (e.g., north, south), precise
distances, and specific locations. The researchers
found that participants from the Midwestern United
States tended to use a survey perspective whereas
participants from the Netherlands tended to use a
route perspective. In explanation, the researchers
considered the ecological factors of the two regions.
Whereas the Midwestern United States is character-
ized by grid-like property boundaries, the Nether-
lands uses more natural features to define bound-
aries. Thus, spatial frame of reference is shaped by
the confluence of experience in the environment and
cultural conventions that have been developed over
time for describing a space. These conventions take
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time to learn and this learning relies on guidance
and support from others in the community.
Finally, although directional information in lan-
guage may seem clear, research indicates that it is
not possible to know which directional framework a
person is using from the literal meaning of a direc-
tional term. Frake (1980) describes how one needs
to understand cultural practices to interpret absolute
directions (e.g., north, south, east west) and contin-
gent directions (e.g., left-right, forward-behind). For
instance, in traditional navigation in Southeast Asia,
‘south’ is often used to refer to ‘seaward’ rather than
‘landward’, not to true south. If this seems puzzling,
consider a more familiar example. California has a
jagged coastline and the Pacific Ocean is in many
places actually to the north or south. Nonetheless,
the ocean is conventionally described as being to
the west. In both examples, the terms ‘south’ and
‘west’ are not veridical, or true, descriptions of the
world, but rather concepts or ideas for referring the
world within a particular cultural frame of reference
or practice. In order to know what directional frame-
work a person is using, even when using terms that
seem unequivocal in spatial information, it is nec-
essary to know the cultural context for using and
interpreting this information. Stated more generally,
to understand human spatial thinking it is necessary
to attend to the cultural practices people use to guide
their exploration, memory and communication about
large-scale space.
Summary
1. Culture is an organized social unit in which members of the group share values, beliefs, and
understandings about the world, participate in common practices, and transmit information
and ways of living across generations.
2. Culture influences both the content and processes of human thought.
3. Cultural contributions to human thinking exist in many forms including communication,
material and symbolic tools, and formal and informal practices and institutions.
4. As people participate in social interaction and other forms of social experience, the shared
understandings and behaviors of the culture become part of the person’s own thoughts and
actions.
5. Human spatial understanding is vital to everyday functioning and culture informs both our
knowledge of space and how we use space to carry out activities.
6. Culture influences spatial thinking by providing methods that support exploration and memory
of space, including communicative conventions such as route descriptions, material and
symbolic tools such as maps and frames of reference, and traditional practices for conducting
activities in space such as navigational routines.
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Review Questions
1. How is culture a psychological process?
2. How does the study of cognitive psychology benefit from taking culture into account?
3. What are the benefits of passing on cultural ways of thinking and acting across generations in
cumulative cultural evolution? What, if any, downsides might there be?
4. Why is understanding large-scale space important to everyday functioning?
5. Do you think some large-scale spaces are more difficult to understand than others? If so, what
makes them more difficult to understand?
6. In his 2014 essay on the relation of new geo-spatial technologies and human cognition, Downs
claims that this cultural change will re-define the self and our relationship to the world. What
do you think he means by this?
Hot Topic: What will spatial cognition be like in the future?
Mary Gauvain
Globalization is a pervasive force that is increasing connections across so-
cieties and cultures and rapidly transforming people and places around the
world. A principal feature of globalization is integration of technology and
other resources typically encountered in industrialized settings. These societal-
level changes are significant for human cognition because they affect, on a
daily basis, the work people do, the way children are cared for and educated,
and the nature and strength of links between the community and the world
beyond it. Thus, both inside and outside the home these changing conditions
of life expose people to new and recurrent modes of acting, interacting, and
learning that have direct relevance to psychological functioning.
Research shows that cultural tools contribute in meaningful ways to spatial
thinking. Thus, a reasonable question to ask is what might spatial cognition be like in the future?
One of the major changes taking place today are technologies that help people imagine, learn about,
and explore large-scale space. Many of these changes are due to changing map technologies (e.g.,
geographic information system, or GIS; Global Positioning System, or GPS) and their impact on
society is widespread and occurring at a rapid pace (Downs, 2014). These types of changes are
not only affecting adults in communities, children also learn to use them. In fact, they may be the
primary or only way many children today are learning to navigate in space. If this is true, these tools
will introduce a new mode of thinking about and using space in the community going forward. The
fact that these tools did not originate in many of the cultures adopting them is also an important
part of this story. Furthermore, the rapid pace at which these technologies are being adopted may
be destabilizing. Research has found that rapid, widespread change in a community can produce a
breakdown of traditional cultural systems, difficulties for individuals in adjusting to the changes, and
in some instances an increase in individual pathologies (Bodley, 1982; Munroe & Munroe, 1980).
Geospatial technologies connect people to the world beyond the community in many new and
exciting and, also, unknown ways. Unlike earlier tools for navigation that often emerged from
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within the community itself, and therefore were shaped to local needs and values, community
members are not involved in the creation of the geo-technology information that is used to guide
their spatial activities. As Downs explains, “While users have options, the shape of the world is
set by hardware and software designers. To the extent that we accept default settings of devices as
given, our experience of the world is dictated by others (p. 9).” Thus, in using the default settings on
these devices, there are benefits, but there are also tradeoffs for human spatial thinking. Research is
needed on societal-level changes that result from the adoption and use of technologies to support
spatial activity and how these changes may affect spatial thinking in the future.
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Glossary
cognitive socialization The process by which
parents and others ensure that a child’s way
of understanding and operating on the world
conforms to those appropriate in and valued
by the culture. 363
cross-cultural approach A research method that
focuses on comparisons across cultures. 364
cultural amplifiers Techniques or technological
features provided by a culture that alter the ap-
proaches individual cultural members use in
solving problems posed by their environment.
369
cultural psychology An approach to studying psy-
chology that concentrates on processes and
systems of meaning within cultures. 364
cultural tools Symbols or objects provided by cul-
ture, such as literacy and technology, that
support thinking and regulate interactions be-
tween the individual and the world. 363
culture Organized social unit in which members
of the group share values, beliefs, and un-
derstandings about the world, participate in
common practices, and transmit information
and ways of living across generations. 363
cumulative cultural evolution Process whereby
human beings create resources and tools that
support and extend human activity, including
thought processes, and for these resources and
tools to be used by subsequent generations in
the same or a modified form. 366
human cognition The mental activity through
which human beings acquire and process
knowledge. 363
sociocultural approach An approach that sees
development as emerging from children’s in-
teractions with more skilled people and the
institutions and tools provided by their culture.
364
spatial cognition Thinking that involves process-
ing, remembering, and using visual informa-
tion about the world in terms of spatial fea-
tures such as orientation, relationships, and
location. 363
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declarative knowledge, 222
deduction paradigm, 125
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